Feature/825 visual regression branch

.audit-evidence/AUDIT_REPORT.md

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+# Security Audit Report
+
+**Generated:** 2026-07-05T12:56:04.694Z
+**Status:** FAIL
+
+## Summary
+
+| Metric       | Value |
+| ------------ | ----- |
+| Total Checks | 11    |
+| Passed       | 7     |
+| Failed       | 4     |
+| Pass Rate    | 63.6% |
+
+## Checks
+
+### ✓ File exists: docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md
+
+**Description:** Threat model documentation
+**Status:** PASS
+
+### ✓ File exists: docs/security/AUDIT_CHECKLIST.md
+
+**Description:** Audit checklist
+**Status:** PASS
+
+### ✓ File exists: docs/security/CRYPTOGRAPHY.md
+
+**Description:** Cryptography details
+**Status:** PASS
+
+### ✓ File exists: SECURITY.md
+
+**Description:** Security policy
+**Status:** PASS
+
+### ✗ dependency audit
+
+**Description:** NPM dependency vulnerability scan
+**Status:** FAIL
+**Error:** Command failed: pnpm audit --audit-level=high
+
+### ✗ cargo audit
+
+**Description:** Rust dependency vulnerability scan
+**Status:** FAIL
+**Error:** Command failed: cargo audit
+'cargo' is not recognized as an internal or external command,
+operable program or batch file.
+
+### ✗ unit tests
+
+**Description:** Run unit tests with coverage
+**Status:** FAIL
+**Error:** Command failed: pnpm test -- --coverage
+ERROR unexpected argument '--coverage' found
+
+tip: to pass '--coverage' as a value, use '-- --coverage'
+
+Usage: turbo.exe run [OPTIONS] [TASKS]... [-- <PASS_THROUGH_ARGS>...]
+
+Options:
+--cache-dir <CACHE_DIR>
+--concurrency <CONCURRENCY>
+--continue[=<CONTINUE>]
+--single-package
+--framework-inference [<BOOL>]
+--global-deps <GLOBAL_DEPS>
+--env-mode [<ENV_MODE>]
+--filter <FILTER>
+--affected
+--output-logs <OUTPUT_LOGS>
+--log-order <LOG_ORDER>
+--json
+--log-file [<LOG_FILE>]
+--only
+--pkg-inference-root <PKG_INFERENCE_ROOT>
+--log-prefix <LOG_PREFIX>
+TASKS
+PASS_THROUGH_ARGS
+--cache <CACHE>
+--force [<FORCE>]
+--remote-only [<REMOTE_ONLY>]
+--remote-cache-read-only [<REMOTE_CACHE_READ_ONLY>]
+--no-cache <NO_CACHE>
+--cache-workers <CACHE_WORKERS>
+--dry-run [<DRY_RUN>]
+--graph [<GRAPH>]
+--daemon <DAEMON>
+--no-daemon <NO_DAEMON>
+--profile [<PROFILE>]
+--anon-profile [<ANON_PROFILE>]
+--summarize [<SUMMARIZE>]
+--parallel <PARALLEL>
+
+For more information, try '--help'.
+
+### ✗ lint
+
+**Description:** Linting check
+**Status:** FAIL
+**Error:** Command failed: pnpm lint
+• turbo 2.9.15
+ERROR @ancore/wallet-api#lint: command (C:\Users\Wittig_Lyon\Desktop\wae\ancore\packages\wallet-api) C:\Users\Wittig_Lyon\AppData\Roaming\npm\pnpm.cmd run lint exited (1)
+ERROR run failed: command exited (1)
+
+### ✓ format check
+
+**Description:** Code formatting check
+**Status:** PASS
+
+### ✓ ts compilation
+
+**Description:** TypeScript compilation check
+**Status:** PASS
+
+### ✓ build
+
+**Description:** Full build verification
+**Status:** PASS
+
+## Artifacts
+
+| Artifact        | Description                | Location        |
+| --------------- | -------------------------- | --------------- |
+| package-lock    | Locked dependency versions | package-lock    |
+| cargo-lock      | Rust dependency lock file  | cargo-lock      |
+| security-docs   | Security documentation     | security-docs   |
+| audit-checklist | Audit checklist            | audit-checklist |

.audit-evidence/audit-checklist

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+# Security Audit Checklist (Pre-Mainnet)
+
+_Last updated: 2026-04-26_
+
+This checklist is the working artifact for internal pre-audit review of the extension wallet and shared SDK/contract stack.
+
+## Scope
+
+- Browser extension wallet (`apps/extension-wallet`)
+- Core SDK/storage (`packages/core-sdk`)
+- Crypto primitives (`packages/crypto`)
+- Account contract (`contracts/account`)
+- Relayer API auth middleware (`services/relayer`)
+
+## How to use this checklist
+
+- `✅ Done`: evidence exists and has been verified in code/tests/docs.
+- `⚠️ Partial`: partly implemented or implemented with gaps.
+- `❌ Open`: not implemented or not yet validated.
+
+---
+
+## 1) Cryptography
+
+### Required controls
+
+- [x] ✅ All encryption uses AES-256-GCM.
+- [x] ✅ Key derivation uses PBKDF2 with 100k iterations.
+- [x] ✅ Random generation uses `crypto.getRandomValues`.
+- [x] ✅ No private keys in logs/errors.
+- [x] ✅ Decryption failure messages are generic.
+- [x] ✅ Encrypted payloads are versioned and validated.
+- [x] ✅ Secret byte comparisons use constant-time helper (`timingSafeEqual`).
+
+### Evidence
+
+- AES-GCM + 256-bit key usage in `encryptSecretKey` and `decryptSecretKey`. (`packages/crypto/src/encryption.ts`)
+- PBKDF2 iteration floor/ceiling (`100000`/`600000`) enforced in payload validation. (`packages/crypto/src/encryption.ts`)
+- `getRandomValues` used for salt/IV generation in crypto and secure storage manager. (`packages/crypto/src/encryption.ts`, `packages/core-sdk/src/storage/secure-storage-manager.ts`)
+- `timingSafeEqual` for constant-time `Uint8Array` comparison. (`packages/crypto/src/timing-safe.ts`, `packages/crypto/src/__tests__/timing-safe.test.ts`)
+
+---
+
+## 2) Sensitive data storage
+
+### Required controls
+
+- [x] ✅ Private keys always encrypted at rest (SDK secure storage path).
+- [x] ✅ Sensitive account/session data encrypted before persistence in secure storage manager.
+- [x] ✅ Storage quota errors are typed and handled.
+- [ ] ❌ Data cleared on uninstall.
+- [ ] ❌ No security-sensitive state in plaintext localStorage (currently partial).
+
+### Sensitive storage inventory
+
+| Location | Data | Protection | Status |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `chrome.storage.local` / `browser.storage.local`: `account`, `sessionKeys` | account/session key payloads | AES-256-GCM encrypted payload | ✅ |
+| `chrome.storage.local` / `browser.storage.local`: `master_salt`, `verification_payload` | KDF salt + encrypted verifier | verifier encrypted; salt plaintext by design | ✅ |
+| `localStorage`: `ancore_extension_auth` | auth/session flags + wallet metadata | plaintext JSON | ⚠️ |
+| `localStorage`: telemetry/error buffers | operational logs/events | plaintext JSON | ⚠️ |
+
+### Notes
+
+- Plaintext storage currently appears limited to metadata/session flags, not private keys.
+- Uninstall data cleanup strategy is not implemented in extension lifecycle handlers.
+
+---
+
+## 3) Authentication & session management
+
+### Required controls
+
+- [x] ✅ Password complexity rules exist in crypto package.
+- [x] ✅ Auto-lock timer exists (`LockManager` + `InactivityDetector`).
+- [x] ✅ Session timeout is configurable (settings-driven auto-lock).
+- [ ] ❌ Failed unlock attempt limiting/backoff.
+- [ ] ❌ Production-grade password verification in extension service worker flow.
+
+### Authentication flow review
+
+1. User unlock request reaches background `UNLOCK_WALLET` message handler.
+2. Handler checks onboarding state and password shape.
+3. Session unlock flag persisted and mirrored in memory.
+4. Router guards enforce lock/unlock navigation state.
+
+**Known gap:** service worker currently contains TODO to replace placeholder password check with `SecureStorageManager.unlock(password)` verification.
+
+---
+
+## 4) Network and API security
+
+### Required controls
+
+- [ ] ⚠️ HTTPS-only endpoint enforcement in code/config.
+- [ ] ⚠️ Explicit certificate pinning/validation strategy.
+- [x] ✅ No sensitive data in URLs in reviewed auth middleware (Bearer header used).
+- [ ] ❌ Rate limiting policy documented and enforced for relayer endpoints.
+
+### Evidence
+
+- Relayer authentication expects bearer token in `Authorization` header and returns 401 on missing/invalid token. (`services/relayer/src/middleware/auth.ts`)
+
+---
+
+## 5) Permissions usage (extension)
+
+### Declared permissions
+
+- [x] ✅ `storage`
+- [x] ✅ `activeTab`
+
+### Review
+
+- [x] ✅ `storage` is required for wallet persistence and session/auth metadata.
+- [ ] ⚠️ `activeTab` usage should be explicitly justified in security design docs and least-privilege review (code usage should be audited before external review).
+
+---
+
+## 6) External dependencies (security-relevant)
+
+### Crypto and signing
+
+- `@noble/ed25519`
+- `@noble/hashes`
+- `@stellar/stellar-sdk`
+- `bip39`
+- `ed25519-hd-key`
+
+### Extension/runtime
+
+- `webextension-polyfill`
+- `react`, `react-router-dom`, `zustand`
+
+### Relayer/backend
+
+- `express`
+- `zod`
+
+### Contract
+
+- `soroban-sdk`
+- `ed25519-dalek` (dev-dependency)
+- `rand` (dev-dependency)
+
+---
+
+## 7) Security testing scenarios
+
+- [x] ✅ Crypto round-trip (encrypt/decrypt) tests.
+- [x] ✅ Signature verification tests.
+- [x] ✅ Session key lifecycle tests (add/revoke/expiry/permissions).
+- [x] ✅ Storage unlock/auto-lock behavior tests.
+- [ ] ❌ Dedicated abuse-case tests for failed password retry lockout.
+- [ ] ❌ Dedicated tests proving no sensitive fields leak into logs.
+- [ ] ❌ Network abuse/rate-limit tests for relayer.
+
+---
+
+## 8) Common vulnerability review (internal)
+
+| Vulnerability class | Result | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| Hardcoded secrets/private keys | ✅ No direct evidence in reviewed files | Continue full-repo scan before audit |
+| Sensitive logging | ⚠️ Partial | Need explicit test assertions/no-log policy checks |
+| Broken authentication | ⚠️ Partial | Extension unlock placeholder logic must be fixed |
+| Insecure storage | ⚠️ Partial | Secret material encrypted, but auth metadata is plaintext |
+| Missing access control | ✅ Partial coverage | Contract and relayer paths include explicit checks |
+| Injection (API) | ⚠️ Unknown | Relayer validation coverage should be expanded |
+| Replay/session abuse | ✅ Session/nonces present in contract test snapshots | Confirm full end-to-end paths |
+
+---
+
+## 9) Known issues and mitigation plan
+
+1. **Background unlock placeholder logic**
+   - Risk: weak authentication bypass in extension flow.
+   - Mitigation: integrate `SecureStorageManager.unlock(password)` and add failed-attempt throttling/lockout.
+
+2. **Plaintext localStorage auth metadata**
+   - Risk: local compromise exposes usage/session metadata.
+   - Mitigation: migrate sensitive auth/session state to hardened encrypted store or minimize persisted fields.
+
+3. **No uninstall cleanup hook**
+   - Risk: data remnants remain after extension removal in some environments.
+   - Mitigation: document platform limitations + add explicit reset path and uninstall guidance.
+
+4. **Rate limiting not documented/enforced (relayer)**
+   - Risk: brute force and DoS risk.
+   - Mitigation: implement IP/token-based rate limiting and add tests.
+
+---
+
+## 10) Pre-audit exit criteria
+
+- [ ] All ❌ checklist items resolved or accepted with compensating controls.
+- [ ] Threat model signed off by Engineering + Security.
+- [ ] Crypto documentation validated against implementation.
+- [ ] Incident response plan approved and exercised (tabletop).
+- [ ] Dependency audit and test evidence package generated.
+
+## Internal review sign-off
+
+- Security owner: _TBD_
+- Engineering owner: _TBD_
+- Internal review date: _Pending_
+- External audit ready: **No (open critical items above)**