fix(razorpay): productionization pass — terminal payout statuses, a bounded RazorpayX client, and an inbound webhook-secret rotation grace - #1451
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…ounded RazorpayX client, and an inbound webhook-secret rotation grace Audited every Razorpay surface against current dev (post #1385/#1390/#1391 groundwork) using the razorpay skill references and the razorpay-* agent checklists, then fixed the legit pre-MVP items that do not belong to an in-flight PR. - `mapPayoutStatus` treated the terminal RazorpayX status `failed` as an unknown string and returned PENDING, so a payout the bank refused never reached FAILED and its earnings stayed BATCHED. - Every RazorpayX HTTP call used a bare `fetch` with no timeout, which can wedge a payout batch that holds a cron lock, and flattened Razorpay's `{ error: { code, description } }` envelope into one opaque message. - Rotating `RAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET` was a hard cutover. Razorpay disables a webhook that has failed for 24 hours and lost events cannot be replayed, so `RAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET_PREVIOUS` now gives the rotation a grace window, mirroring ADR 09's outbound posture and reporting every delivery that actually lands on the old secret. Docs gain the missing Razorpay go-live checklist and the payout-status and idempotency-key corrections. Part of #1377 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
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📝 SummarySummary by CodeRabbit
WalkthroughRazorpay webhook processing now verifies raw request bodies with rotating secrets and payout-only fallback. RazorpayX requests add timeouts and structured errors. Failed payout statuses map correctly, idempotency keys are deterministic, and production readiness documentation and tests were added. ChangesRazorpay productionization
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Production payouts may be rejected or miss terminal failure updates, while webhook misconfiguration can leave a retired secret active and stalled responses can bypass retry handling. These issues should be fixed before merge. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Razorpay
participant WebhookRoute
participant SignatureHelpers
participant WebhookLogger
Razorpay->>WebhookRoute: Send webhook with raw body and signature
WebhookRoute->>SignatureHelpers: Match current or previous secret
SignatureHelpers-->>WebhookRoute: Return matching role or no match
WebhookRoute->>SignatureHelpers: Classify payout event for fallback
SignatureHelpers-->>WebhookRoute: Return payout-event result
WebhookRoute->>WebhookLogger: Record verified signature
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 66.67% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 6 functions across 4 files. (3 skipped: 3 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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… refund idempotency key stops pretending to be a race Round-2 review triage on this PR plus two findings from the Razorpay productionization audit (#1451). The consultant payout status map had no `failed` entry, so a `payout.failed` delivery fell through to the `|| "PENDING"` default: the payout stayed in flight and its earnings stayed BATCHED, because the un-batch back to READY only runs on the FAILED branch of handlePayoutWebhook. The Stripe twin ten lines below already mapped it. One compact pin covers the consultant path. postRefund retried every 409, but Razorpay answers 409 for two conditions and only one of them is worth waiting on. A key replayed with a different payload answers 409 for as long as the key lives, so the retry bought a wasted second and reported the wrong cause; it now throws immediately as REFUND_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED. The key material is untouched. reportTerminalCaptureRace re-reads the payment status instead of echoing the caller's pre-read, which is the doctrine confirmApprovalStatus has followed since #844 — the state named in that report is what an operator reconciles against. Callers pass their own client so no global-client read happens inside a transaction (#1435). The dev mock-webhook gate loses its `VERCEL_ENV === "preview"` disjunct: it was a runtime toggle contradicting the build-time posture the same comment claims, and it was dead anyway because this app deploys on Netlify. Part of #1353 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
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… payment id, deferred webhooks page, and the post-payment channel leg is re-driven off the appointment row (#1391) * fix(payments): refunds and disputes find their Payment by the gateway payment id, deferred webhooks page, and the post-payment channel leg is re-driven off the appointment row Closes #1352 Closes #1353 Closes #1356 Part of #1358 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(webhooks): the either-id lookup keeps the old reachability — soft-deleted payments still take their refund and dispute events The `findFirst` that replaced `findUnique({ where: { paymentIntent } })` in handleRefundCreated and handleDisputeCreated carried a `deletedAt: null` filter the original lookup never had. That is a semantic narrowing on a money path: a Payment soft-deleted after capture would stop matching, so its refund event would DEFER and be given up on after 168h, and its dispute would page as CRITICAL_DISPUTE_UNLINKED with earnings left payable. Nothing about adding a second key justifies excluding those rows. The OR-match now reaches exactly what the old lookup reached, plus the gateway payment id. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * test(security): the DM-precedence source pin follows the channel block to ensure-channels.ts Two suites assert against `lib/payments/webhooks/handlers.ts` as source TEXT, so extracting the Stream channel block into `ensure-channels.ts` left them reading a file that no longer contains what they pin. Both entries now name the new module; every assertion is kept, because each one is still true there — the code moved, the contract did not. The trial rung's expected substring changed with it: the extracted function early-returns on a missing appointment, so the chain reads `appointment.trialSession?.consultantProfile` rather than optional-chaining off the lookup variable. The negative assertion — that it is NOT the plan author's `trialSession?.subscriptionPlan?.consultantProfile` — is untouched, which is the part that was ever load-bearing. Two other suites also read handlers.ts as text and were verified unaffected: reschedule-respond pins the Novu booked-notification block and participant-shadow-write pins the participant edge, neither of which moved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(payments): a Razorpay error envelope with no body maps to a RefundError instead of a TypeError `handleRazorpayRefundError` and `handleRazorpayError` both guarded with `"error" in error`, which also passes for `{ error: undefined }` — the key is an own property even when its value is not there. Reading `.code` off it then threw `TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined`, which escaped the handler that exists precisely to classify the failure. Live E2E on 2026-09-04 lost 4 of 8 reconcile-refunds attempts to that TypeError instead of recording a classified RefundError. Both handlers now read the envelope through a shared helper that requires the body to be a non-null object and its `code`/`description` to be strings, so an empty or malformed envelope falls through to the generic error. The 409 to REFUND_IN_FLIGHT mapping in `postRefund` is unchanged. Part of #1353 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(payments): the client-confirmation audit row is written inside after(), and the chat-leg queue gets an index Review round 1 on #1391. The `recordSystemEvent` call that records a CLIENT-side confirmation was floated next to the response rather than scheduled with `after()`. On Netlify the invocation freezes once the response is sent, so a detached insert races that freeze — and the confirmations worth auditing are the slow ones, exactly the ones whose audit row could be dropped. It now runs inside the existing `after()` callback, awaited ahead of the pipeline, keeping its `.catch` so it stays best-effort and can never fail a confirmation. `Appointment` had no index able to serve the #1356 chat-leg work queue, which filters `chatChannelEnsuredAt IS NULL AND deletedAt IS NULL` and orders by `createdAt`; every existing index leads with a different column. Prisma cannot express the partial index this really wants, but leading with the two equality columns gets the same seek. The high-`deferCount` refund runbook entry claimed such an event almost always means the payment was never captured. A pre-`gatewayPaymentId` row whose `payments.fetch` translation fails on credentials or availability defers identically, so the entry now sends operators to the local capture state first and to the gateway lookup second. The `ensure-channels` header now states which buyers the sweep actually re-drives: the stamp is per appointment, so for a shared `WEBINAR` or `CLASS` a later buyer whose ensure fails after the row is stamped is caught by `syncUserEventChannels` on their next dashboard load rather than by the sweep. Part of #1353 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(payments): a refund idempotency key is rejected rather than rewritten, and the channel re-drive pass has a buyer-operation budget postRefund used to strip the characters Razorpay rejects out of the idempotency key before sending it. That is lossy: two distinct keys can collapse onto one header value, and Razorpay answers the second refund with the first one's result. The key is now validated whole against the documented rule and refused with REFUND_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID when it does not match. The only production caller passes Refund.id, so nothing changes in practice and the failure mode is closed. The chat-channel pass of the reconcile sweep took the operator's limit, which reaches 500 appointments, and spent one outbound Stream call per paid buyer of each — unbounded work against the ticker's function ceiling. It now caps at 100 appointments and 500 buyer operations and stops cleanly when the budget is spent; rows it did not reach keep a NULL chatChannelEnsuredAt and the next run resumes oldest-first. Both counts are reported in the run summary. Part of #1353 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(payments): the manual-recovery stamp is a compare-and-set, so a late capture cannot resurrect an expired payment Both REQUIRES_MANUAL_RECOVERY branches of handlePaymentSuccess — the capture-amount mismatch and the metadata-validation failure — stamped SUCCEEDED with a bare `tx.payment.update({ where: { id } })`. When the abandoned-payments sweep had already expired the row and released its tentative hold, a late `payment.captured` flipped the EXPIRED payment back to SUCCEEDED, leaving money recorded against an appointment that stayed tentative with nothing left to release it. Every status stamp in this pipeline now rides a compare-and-set: the `paymentStatus: PENDING` predicate sits in the WHERE of an `updateMany`, as ADR 21 requires. A count of zero means the row is already terminal, so the handler writes nothing, records a PAYMENT system error and a Sentry warning naming the order, the current status and the reason, and returns the same result it returned before — the webhook is still acknowledged and Razorpay does not retry it. Two further stamps of the same shape take the same guard: the confirmation write itself, which a replay now reaches, and the post-transaction stamp on the legacy capture that loses the GiST overlap race. The dev replay route built its metadata under the key `consulteeId` while the schema requires `userId`, so every replayed first capture failed validation and took the recovery branch instead of confirming the booking. Renaming the key sends it down the confirmation path, which is why that path needed the guard in the same change. Closes #1439 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(payments): post-commit notifications and the chat-channel step are bounded, so after() work cannot starve the single-connection pool Phase 2 of handlePaymentSuccess runs inside after(), on the same warm instance that is already serving the next inbound request, and PG_POOL_MAX=1 means the two share one Prisma connection. Two unawaited Novu triggers ran 39 s each while the chat-channel step waited for that connection and died at the 3 s connect timeout. The triggers are now collected and awaited together, each under a 5 s deadline, before the channel step begins; the channel step has the same deadline and, on timeout, leaves chatChannelEnsuredAt NULL so reconcile-orphaned-confirmations re-drives it. The Novu client gets an explicit request timeout and a bounded retry budget, so an abandoned call cannot keep burning the instance. The ensure-channels read is a narrow select of the ids, org ids and consultant userId the step uses instead of a six-relation include. Money is untouched: the Serializable transaction commits before any of this runs. Closes #1446 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * refactor(payments): one compare-and-set stamp helper for the capture handler, and a smaller channel pass Extracts the identical payment->appointment->consultantProfile resolution that the webhook success path and the checkout mock/zero/sponsored path both ran before creating earnings into resolvePaymentForEarnings, and pulls the channel-pass loop body in the orphaned-confirmation reconciler into ensureChannelForOrphan so the sweep function's cognitive complexity clears the gate. No behaviour change. Part of #1439 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * chore(sonar): exclude test suites from copy-paste detection in Automatic Analysis too .sonarcloud.properties is what SonarQube Cloud Automatic Analysis reads, not sonar-project.properties (that one is staged for the future CI-based scan). #1330 added the CPD exclusion for __tests__/**,tests/** only to the latter, so the new-code duplication gate kept counting per-file jest.mock scaffolding as duplication against every PR that added test coverage — this PR's own gate failure is that boilerplate, not application code. Part of #1439 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(payments): a failed RazorpayX payout reaches FAILED, and a reused refund idempotency key stops pretending to be a race Round-2 review triage on this PR plus two findings from the Razorpay productionization audit (#1451). The consultant payout status map had no `failed` entry, so a `payout.failed` delivery fell through to the `|| "PENDING"` default: the payout stayed in flight and its earnings stayed BATCHED, because the un-batch back to READY only runs on the FAILED branch of handlePayoutWebhook. The Stripe twin ten lines below already mapped it. One compact pin covers the consultant path. postRefund retried every 409, but Razorpay answers 409 for two conditions and only one of them is worth waiting on. A key replayed with a different payload answers 409 for as long as the key lives, so the retry bought a wasted second and reported the wrong cause; it now throws immediately as REFUND_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED. The key material is untouched. reportTerminalCaptureRace re-reads the payment status instead of echoing the caller's pre-read, which is the doctrine confirmApprovalStatus has followed since #844 — the state named in that report is what an operator reconciles against. Callers pass their own client so no global-client read happens inside a transaction (#1435). The dev mock-webhook gate loses its `VERCEL_ENV === "preview"` disjunct: it was a runtime toggle contradicting the build-time posture the same comment claims, and it was dead anyway because this app deploys on Netlify. Part of #1353 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…mits Part of #1396 Round-2 inline comments on #1414. Fixed: the FX estimate note promised a gateway charge on a zero total that never reaches a gateway (and the branch chain is now early returns, which also clears the nested-ternary gate); `loadScript` REJECTS on `script.onerror`, so the load-failure toast was unreachable and buyers saw the generic message; `res.json()` sat outside every stale-cache fallback in `getExchangeRates`, so a malformed 200 answered 500 with a young cache in hand, and a payload without `rates` published `undefined`; `handleCheckout` cognitive complexity 17 against a ceiling of 15; the navbar drawer animated through a reduced-motion request and its close button had no accessible name. From the Razorpay productionization audit (#1451): Razorpay caps an order's `notes` at 15 keys and 256 characters per value, and the buyer's booking note was forwarded verbatim with no bound anywhere — a long note made the order impossible to create, which a buyer experiences as being unable to pay at all. `checkoutSchema` now bounds it with a message they can act on and `buildPaymentMetadata` truncates as a second line of defence; the full note is still persisted on the Payment and Appointment rows. `discountCode` is dropped from the gateway payload because the org-sponsored event case emitted exactly 15 keys with no headroom, and nothing reads it back. `BAD_REQUEST_ERROR` is Razorpay's generic 4xx class and was reported as an authentication failure, sending operators to rotate keys that were fine; only auth-shaped payloads keep that wording now. `RAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET_PREVIOUS` is documented in both the required-secrets table and `.env.sample`. Left open as needs-decision: the webinar page showing a payable total under LICENSE funding, because the client cannot know whether an ACTIVE ProgramAssignment will actually absorb the booking. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
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…ys so when it shows an estimate, and the rate provider gets its attribution (#1414) * fix(payments): settlement is INR at the gateway boundary, checkout says so when it shows an estimate, and the rate provider gets its attribution A non-INR currency could reach Razorpay order creation through the org wallet top-up: `BillingAccount.currency` accepted USD/EUR/GBP and was forwarded verbatim alongside an amount in INR paise, so a 100000-paise (₹1,000) top-up went out as a $1,000.00 order. `assertInrSettlement` now runs as the first statement of `createRazorpayOrder` and `createStripeCheckoutSession`, and the three admin-facing currency schemas are narrowed to `z.literal("INR")`. On the display side, all four checkout pages rendered the Total through a live FX conversion while the gateway charged INR and the confirmation email said INR, with nothing on the page disclosing the gap. `useCurrency` now reports `isEstimate`, degrades `currency`/`symbol` to INR along with `rate`, and a shared `FxEstimateNote` under each Total names the INR amount the gateway will take. `displayCurrency` is allowlisted against a shared, React-free code list instead of any three-letter string. The rate provider is bounded and credited: the endpoint is configurable, a cache older than 24 h is refused so the client degrades to honest INR, `/api/currency` is CDN-cached and IP rate-limited, and the licence-required attribution appears beside the navbar switcher and in the estimate note. Also corrects the IBT claims in the gateway router (an INR order paid by an overseas card, not a bank-transfer product), scales `refundPct` to integer bps in event refunds, and deletes six dead FX helpers. Closes #1396 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(checkout): a wallet- or licence-funded booking that already succeeded never opens the gateway widget Closes #1437 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(payments): the FX estimate names the rail that will actually take the money Review round 1 on #1414. - /api/currency allowlists `to` against SUPPORTED_CURRENCY_CODES with zod instead of indexing the provider's ~160-code table, and stops echoing the raw query value into the 400 body. - getExchangeRates bounds its provider fetch with AbortSignal.timeout and treats a timeout like a 5xx: serve the young cached copy, else throw. - FxEstimateNote branches on the selected org's funding source. WALLET debits the credit pool, INVOICE defers to NET-X billing and LICENSE charges nothing, so none of them should have read "you will be charged ... by the payment gateway". The provider attribution stays on every branch. - The navbar's rate attribution is `lg:inline`; at `xl` it was on no surface at all between the desktop bar and the `lg:hidden` drawer. - The multi-currency doc's international settlement row is T+7, per Razorpay's own FAQ and our gateway evaluation, and the "zero-fee UPI" claim is corrected to zero MDR with the 2% platform fee plus GST still payable. Part of #1396 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(checkout): the gateway SDK loads only for a rail that needs it, and the INR guard hands back the canonical code Part of #1396 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(checkout): the Total row and its FX note are one shared component, closing the SonarCloud new-code duplication gate The Total-row + FxEstimateNote pair rendered identically on all four checkout pages; folding it into CheckoutTotalRow means each page adds one call instead of a repeated multi-line block, which is what the new-code duplication gate on PR #1414 was flagging. Part of #1396 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * Revert "fix(checkout): the Total row and its FX note are one shared component, closing the SonarCloud new-code duplication gate" This reverts commit c3ab9b6. * chore(sonar): exclude test suites from copy-paste detection in Automatic Analysis too .sonarcloud.properties is what SonarQube Cloud Automatic Analysis reads, not sonar-project.properties (that one is staged for the future CI-based scan). #1330 added the CPD exclusion for __tests__/**,tests/** only to the latter, so the new-code duplication gate kept counting per-file jest.mock scaffolding as duplication against every PR that added test coverage — this PR's own gate failure is that boilerplate, not application code. Part of #1439 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 * fix(checkout): round-2 review triage plus the Razorpay order-notes limits Part of #1396 Round-2 inline comments on #1414. Fixed: the FX estimate note promised a gateway charge on a zero total that never reaches a gateway (and the branch chain is now early returns, which also clears the nested-ternary gate); `loadScript` REJECTS on `script.onerror`, so the load-failure toast was unreachable and buyers saw the generic message; `res.json()` sat outside every stale-cache fallback in `getExchangeRates`, so a malformed 200 answered 500 with a young cache in hand, and a payload without `rates` published `undefined`; `handleCheckout` cognitive complexity 17 against a ceiling of 15; the navbar drawer animated through a reduced-motion request and its close button had no accessible name. From the Razorpay productionization audit (#1451): Razorpay caps an order's `notes` at 15 keys and 256 characters per value, and the buyer's booking note was forwarded verbatim with no bound anywhere — a long note made the order impossible to create, which a buyer experiences as being unable to pay at all. `checkoutSchema` now bounds it with a message they can act on and `buildPaymentMetadata` truncates as a second line of defence; the full note is still persisted on the Payment and Appointment rows. `discountCode` is dropped from the gateway payload because the org-sponsored event case emitted exactly 15 keys with no headroom, and nothing reads it back. `BAD_REQUEST_ERROR` is Razorpay's generic 4xx class and was reported as an authentication failure, sending operators to rotate keys that were fine; only auth-shaped payloads keep that wording now. `RAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET_PREVIOUS` is documented in both the required-secrets table and `.env.sample`. Left open as needs-decision: the webinar page showing a payable total under LICENSE funding, because the client cannot know whether an ACTIVE ProgramAssignment will actually absorb the booking. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Inline comments:
In `@__tests__/payments/razorpay-productionization.test.ts`:
- Around line 82-109: Add a route-level test for the POST handler that mocks
after(), submits the same valid signed payout concurrently twice, and verifies
processRazorpayWebhookEvent is called only once. Assert that one response
succeeds normally and the other reports a duplicate, covering logWebhookEvent
deduplication rather than only the secret-matching helpers.
In `@app/api/webhooks/razorpay/signature.ts`:
- Around line 76-78: The resolveRazorpayPaymentSecrets flow must return no
candidates when the current RAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET is unset, rather than
falling back to RAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET_PREVIOUS. Update the candidate
resolution around the current-secret check, preserving rotation behavior only
when a current secret exists, and add a regression test covering the
missing-current-secret configuration.
In `@docs/payments/gateways/razorpay/03-payout-flow.md`:
- Line 259: The payout idempotency key must be deterministic and no longer than
Razorpay’s 36-character limit. Update createPayoutBatch and
processRazorpayPayout to persist and reuse a bounded key for each
ConsultantPayout, ensuring generateIdempotencyKey does not add time, randomness,
or attempt-specific data and that retries for the same payout use the identical
key.
In `@docs/payments/gateways/razorpay/05-go-live-checklist.md`:
- Line 45: Update docs/payments/gateways/razorpay/01-setup.md lines 120-120 to
include payout.failed in the selected payout events. Update
docs/payments/gateways/razorpay/05-go-live-checklist.md lines 45-45 so its
required-event count and explicit list remain aligned with the setup
instructions.
In `@lib/payments/payouts/razorpay-payouts.ts`:
- Around line 216-218: Update the Razorpay payout request flow around the fetch
catch block so errors from await response.json(), including timeout aborts while
reading a stalled body, are converted to PaymentError with the existing
RAZORPAYX_REQUEST_FAILED metadata. Add a regression test covering a response
whose body stalls and times out, and verify the normalized PaymentError is
returned.
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__tests__/payments/razorpay-productionization.test.tsapp/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.tsapp/api/webhooks/razorpay/signature.tsdocs/payments/gateways/razorpay/01-setup.mddocs/payments/gateways/razorpay/03-payout-flow.mddocs/payments/gateways/razorpay/05-go-live-checklist.mdlib/payments/payouts/razorpay-payouts.ts
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Webhook handlers.
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
app/api/webhooks/razorpay/signature.tsapp/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts
Money-critical code.
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
lib/payments/payouts/razorpay-payouts.ts
Edge cases that must be covered for money tests: zero/negative amounts, currency mismatch, concurrent invocations, expired signatures/orders, partial refunds, idempotent replays.
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
__tests__/payments/razorpay-productionization.test.ts
Route handlers: authz checked per handler (session + role + org scoping), inputs validated with zod, correct status codes, no internal error leaks.
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
app/api/webhooks/razorpay/signature.tsapp/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts
🪛 LanguageTool
docs/payments/gateways/razorpay/03-payout-flow.md
[style] ~261-~261: ‘in preference to’ might be wordy. Consider a shorter alternative.
Context: ...an idempotencyKey, that value is used in preference to the generated one, so a row reissued ac...
(EN_WORDINESS_PREMIUM_IN_PREFERENCE_TO)
docs/payments/gateways/razorpay/05-go-live-checklist.md
[style] ~45-~45: Consider an alternative for the overused word “exactly”.
Context: ...th a 400. - [ ] The selected events are exactly the ones the dispatcher handles: `payme...
(EXACTLY_PRECISELY)
[grammar] ~77-~77: Use a hyphen to join words.
Context: ...] A real ₹1 payment has been taken end to end in live mode and has produced a Pa...
(QB_NEW_EN_HYPHEN)
🪛 OpenGrep (1.27.1)
__tests__/payments/razorpay-productionization.test.ts
[ERROR] 34-34: Possible credit card number (PAN) detected in source code. Credit card numbers should never be hardcoded or stored in source files. Use a secrets manager or tokenization service instead.
(coderabbit.pii.credit-card-number)
…s 36-character bound, and rotation grace needs a current secret Review triage on #1451. RazorpayX accepts an `X-Payout-Idempotency` value of 4-36 characters and answers anything else with a 400, so both money-out paths were sending a header the gateway could never accept: an organization payout derives `payout_<uuid>` at 43 characters, and a consultant payout prefers the `idempotencyKey` persisted on the row, `payout_<profileId>_<batchId>`, at 72. `boundPayoutIdempotencyKey` folds any key the gateway would refuse onto a 34-character digest of itself at the point the header is written. The fold is a pure function of the key, so the property that makes a retry safe survives untouched — the same row always derives the same slot, and a request that timed out after RazorpayX accepted it returns the original payout rather than paying twice. The persisted key is deliberately left alone: it is also the row's unique constraint and the Stripe transfer key, and neither is bounded this way. The RazorpayX success body was read outside the `fetch()` try, so a reply whose headers arrived but whose body stalls tripped the same AbortSignal there, and a non-JSON body threw a SyntaxError. Both escaped as bare exceptions and lost the retryable code the payout callers classify on; both are now normalised to RAZORPAYX_REQUEST_FAILED, which is the honest reading since neither says whether the payout was accepted. `resolveRazorpayPaymentSecrets` returned the previous secret on its own when the current one was unset. The grace window is an aid to a rotation, not a secret in its own right, so a deployment that has lost `RAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET` must fail loudly on the route's 500 instead of quietly accepting deliveries signed with a value the operator has retired. The webhook setup table omitted `payout.failed` — the terminal event that tells the platform a bank refused a transfer — along with two dispute events, so an operator following it would have configured six of the seven payout events the dispatcher handles. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
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Sep 5, 2026
Resolves conflict in app/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts: keep the 413 Content-Length guard (#1459) as the first statement of POST, and keep dev's shared signature verifier (#1451) and everything after it as-is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
This was referenced Sep 5, 2026
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What
A Razorpay productionization pass audited against current
dev(post #1385, #1390, #1391 groundwork, #1392, #1393, #1435) using the repo'srazorpayskill references and the ninerazorpay-*agent definitions as checklists, applied directly rather than delegated. Three code fixes, all in files no in-flight finance PR touches, plus the missing go-live documentation.lib/payments/payouts/razorpay-payouts.ts—mapPayoutStatusnow maps the terminal RazorpayX statusfailedto FAILED. It previously fell through to thedefaultarm and read as PENDING.lib/payments/payouts/razorpay-payouts.ts— every RazorpayX HTTP call is now bounded byAbortSignal.timeout(30s), and a non-2xx throws aPaymentErrorcarrying Razorpay's own errorcodeplus the HTTP status instead of a bareErrorholding onlydescription.app/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts+ newsignature.ts— inbound webhook secret rotation gains a grace window via the optionalRAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET_PREVIOUS, and the RazorpayX payout-only fallback is routed through the same constant-time verifier instead of a second, shadowing dynamiccryptoimport. The route also pinsruntime = "nodejs".docs/payments/gateways/razorpay/05-go-live-checklist.md; payout status table,payout.failedwebhook row and the idempotency-key description corrected in03-payout-flow.md; per-mode secret and rotation note added to01-setup.md.Why
The
failedpayout status is a money-flow bug. RazorpayX documents five terminal payout states —processed,rejected,cancelled,reversedandfailed— andfailedis the one that fires when the transfer fails at RazorpayX, at the contact's bank, or in transit (status details). Reading a terminal state as an intermediate one means the payout never leaves PROCESSING, its earnings are never returned from BATCHED to READY, and the consultant is neither paid nor re-queued. Thedefaultarm is kept for genuinely unknown strings, where PENDING is the right answer because it keeps the reconciler polling rather than settling on a guess.An unbounded
fetchis worse on the payout rail than on the payments one.lib/payments/core/razorpay.tsalready documents this hazard and fixes it withwithRazorpaySdkTimeoutandAbortSignal.timeout; the RazorpayX client had neither. The payout submission loop runs under a cron lock, so one stalled socket can wedge an entire disbursement run. Retrying is safe because every submission carriesX-Payout-Idempotency.A webhook secret rotation without a grace window can take payment confirmation offline. The operator saves the new secret in the Razorpay dashboard and the platform picks it up only on the next deploy; every event signed in that gap is rejected with a 400. Razorpay treats any non-2xx as a delivery failure, retries on exponential backoff for 24 hours, and then disables the webhook (webhook FAQs) — and a disabled webhook loses events permanently, because replay needs a support ticket, only covers events under 15 days old, and only works if the webhook was enabled when the event fired.
RAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET_PREVIOUScloses that gap the same way ADR 09 closes it for outbound deliveries. Honouring a second secret does not widen the trust boundary — each check is the same full HMAC over the same raw body — and every delivery that only the old secret can verify writes aWEBHOOK/WARNsystem event, so a variable left behind after the cutover is loud rather than silent. The payments-first,payout.*-only ordering of the RazorpayX fallback is preserved exactly, because that ordering is what stops the X secret from ever accepting a forgedpayment.captured.Findings table
Every checklist item that produced a claim, with a verdict against the code. Nothing in an in-flight PR's file list was edited.
Fixed here
mapPayoutStatushas nofailedcase; the terminal state reads as PENDINGlib/payments/payouts/razorpay-payouts.ts:478ondev; theRazorpayPayoutStatusunion already listed"failed"apiRequesthas no request timeoutapiRequest; contrastSDK_CALL_TIMEOUT_MS/REFUND_TIMEOUT_MSinlib/payments/core/razorpay.ts:109,259app/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts:17; ADR 09 covers outbound onlyawait import("crypto")route.ts:58-67; now one verifier shared by both paths03-payout-flow.mddocuments the idempotency key aspayout_{payoutId}_{timestamp}payout_${payoutId}; #771 P1-6 removed the clock precisely because it defeated the mechanism. A doc teaching the banned pattern03-payout-flow.mdstatus table and webhook table omitfailedpayout.failedsince #789docs/docs/enterprise/50-operations/06-live-payout-go-live-runbook.mdexisted, and it covers disbursement rather than acceptanceLegit-pending, belongs to an in-flight PR
payout.failedwebhook path has the same gap as finding 1:statusMapinhandleRazorpayPayoutWebhookhas nofailedkey, sostatusfalls back to"PENDING". A failed payout webhook records the payout as still in flightapp/api/webhooks/utils.ts:2085). One line: addfailed: "FAILED"to the mapmapGatewayStatusin the stuck-payout reconciler also omitsfailed, returnsnull, and logsUnknown gateway status: failed - skipping. The job that exists to unstick payouts skips exactly the payouts that are stuck because they failedscripts/payouts/handle-stuck-payouts.ts:165)getRazorpayPayoutStatusin the same reconciler authenticates withRAZORPAY_KEY_ID/RAZORPAY_SECRET, never theRAZORPAYX_*pair. When RazorpayX has its own credentials — which the factory explicitly supports — the reconciler 401s against/v1/payoutsand silently reports "could not query gateway"scripts/payouts/reconcile-payout-status.ts:125looks identical and should be checked with itnotesunbounded. Razorpay capsnotesat 15 key-value pairs of 256 characters each (Orders API);schemas/checkout.ts:42validatesnotes: z.string().optional()with no maximum, andbuildPaymentMetadataforwards it verbatim. A booking note over 256 characters fails order creation and the customer cannot paylib/payments/operations/checkout.ts,schemas/checkout.ts,lib/payments/core/razorpay.ts). Clamp the value and add a.max()to the schemabuildPaymentMetadataemits exactly 15 notes keys in the org-sponsored case — precisely the documented ceiling, with zero headroom. The sixteenth key anyone adds fails every org-funded orderlib/payments/operations/checkout.ts:163-186). At minimum a comment recording the budget; better, a runtime assertionhandleRazorpayErrormaps any code containingBAD_REQUEST_ERRORto"Authentication failed - Invalid Razorpay credentials".BAD_REQUEST_ERRORis Razorpay's generic validation error class, so an over-longnotesvalue or a sub-₹1 amount is reported to operators as a credentials problem — which is how findings 13 and 14 would present in productionlib/payments/core/razorpay.ts:574)RAZORPAY_WEBHOOK_SECRET_PREVIOUSneeds an entry in the secrets manifest and.env.sampledocs/enterprise/50-operations/07-required-secrets.md; #1386 also owns.env.sample). Documented in the new go-live checklist meanwhilepostRefundretries once on any 409. Razorpay returns 409 both for "a request with this key is in flight" (retryable) and for "a different request with the same idempotency key has already been processed" (idempotent refunds), which is a programming error and not retryable. The unparseable-body arm then labels itREFUND_IN_FLIGHT, so the reconciler polls a refund that will never existlib/payments/core/razorpay.tspostRefund). Only reachable when the error body fails to parse, since the parsed arm rethrows Razorpay's own codeAlready handled
app/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts:52readsreq.text()once and never re-serialisestimingSafeEqual, not==="app/api/webhooks/utils.ts:557and nowsignature.ts:41, both behind the 64-character pre-check that stopstimingSafeEqualfrom throwingWebhookEventdedup table with a synthesized${eventType}:${entityId}key, deliberately not the unsignedx-razorpay-event-idheader (route.ts:137-169)razorpay-dispatch.tsdefault arm logs, marks processed and returns 200after()X-Refund-Idempotencyset to theRefundrow id via raw HTTP because razorpay-node'sgetValidHeaders()whitelist drops it;X-Payout-Idempotencyset to the deterministicpayout_{id}items[0]"lib/payments/core/razorpay.ts:405, regression-testedlib/payments/operations/refund.tswithcascadedAtas the atomic claimrazorpay.ts:44-68and itsENABLE_LIVE_PAYOUTStwin inrazorpay-payouts.ts, both with a documentednext buildexemptionNEXT_PUBLIC_RAZORPAY_KEY_IDis public; payloads pass throughscrubWebhookPayloadbefore any logconsumerStateCodeonPayment, IGST/CGST/SGST heads on the invoice models, ADR 26sweep-stuck-webhook-events,reconcile-payment-status,reconcile-pending-refunds, driven by the Netlify ticker (#1390, ADR 27)BigIntpaise end to end after the paise migration; no conversion at the gateway boundaryBS or not applicable
payment_captureon the order to force auto-capture"payment_capture"is being deprecated and hence no longer required", and directs you to the dashboard capture settings. The current per-order mechanism is thepayment.capture/payment.capture_optionsobjects, which this platform deliberately does not send so that one account setting governs every order. Recorded as a dashboard verification step in the new checklist insteadexpire_byon the order"expire_byis a Payment Links and Invoices field, not a standard Orders API field. Order-level expiry here is the platform's ownPayment.expiresAthold plus the abandoned-payments sweep, which is the right mechanism because it also has to release the slotoptimumrefund speed"optimumcosts an extra fee and can still fall back tonormal, which is whatrefund.speed_changedreports. Always sendingnormalis a deliberate pricing decision, not an oversight; recorded as such in the checklistprocessed_webhook_eventstable" and "add subscription-state handlers"WebhookEvent, and Razorpay Subscriptions/Plans/Invoices APIs are not used at all here;Subscriptionis a booking-domain package paid for with an ordinary one-off ordercreateRazorpayOrderrejectsamount <= 0(BUG-C)RAZORPAYX_*variable falls back to itsRAZORPAY_*twinRAZORPAYX_WEBHOOK_SECREThas no fallback, and correctly so: falling back to the payments webhook secret would make the payout-only trust boundary meaningless. Noted rather than "fixed"Observations carried, not acted on
RazorpayPayoutsService.verifyWebhookSignatureandparseWebhookEventhave no callers anywhere — the route verifies inline. They are correct but dead, and a future reader may reasonably think the route uses them. Left alone as out of scope for this PRdeterminePayoutModedeclares RTGS in its type and comment but never returns it; everything above ₹5L goes NEFT. Correct behaviour, misleading signaturedocs/payments/gateways/razorpay/*nor the new checklist can verify the account's actual auto-capture setting,manual_expiry_periodor settlement cycle. Those need a dashboard screenshot recorded against #1377 before launchVerification
One compact pin,
__tests__/payments/razorpay-productionization.test.ts(7 cases): every terminal RazorpayX status maps to a terminal internal status while the three intermediate ones stay non-terminal; the rotation resolver offers the previous secret second and never duplicates the current one; a delivery signed with either secret verifies and reports which one matched, while an attacker's secret does not; a malformed signature returns false instead of throwing out oftimingSafeEqual; and onlypayout.*bodies are classified as eligible for the RazorpayX secret.No dev server, no
prisma generate, no schema change and no database script was run.Part of #1377
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7