fix(enterprise): wallet credits and debits are null-safe on the cached balance, the disputes sweep reports its failures, and the abandoned-payments sweep fits the ticker budget - #1461
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…d balance, the disputes sweep reports its failures, and the abandoned-payments sweep fits the ticker budget
`BillingAccount.walletBalance` is nullable and every INVOICE-funded account
carries NULL, so `walletCredit`'s `{ increment }` evaluated to NULL and no-opped
while the ledger CREDIT posted — permanent cache-vs-ledger drift that only the
reconciler noticed. Both helpers now write a zero over the NULL in the same
transaction before the arithmetic and read the balance back off the mutated row
instead of coercing it with `?? 0`.
The related items from the same wave-1C run ship with it: the disputes reconcile
route no longer hardcodes a 200 over a failed run, and the sweep counts
STRIPE-gateway disputes as `skippedFenced` when the gateway fence is shut rather
than failing on a gateway we deliberately turned off; the abandoned-payments
sweep runs its gateway cancels five at a time with a per-call timeout and the
ticker sends it a limit of ten, so it fits the six-second per-target budget;
`reconcile-orphaned-confirmations` uses the shared `parseLimitParam`; and the
Razorpay webhook refuses a body over 256 KB before it reads the signature.
Closes #1459
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
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📝 SummarySummary by CodeRabbit
WalkthroughThe pull request fixes nullable wallet cache updates, makes abandoned-payment cleanup resilient to gateway failures, reports cleanup failures through HTTP and job outputs, standardizes cleanup limits, fences Stripe dispute calls, and adds a Razorpay webhook body-size limit. ChangesFinancial and cleanup correctness
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The cleanup can expire a payment locally while its Stripe intent remains active, creating a serious financial-state mismatch. The webhook and cleanup safeguards also remain bypassable, so these issues should be resolved before merge. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Cleanup as cleanup-abandoned-payments
participant Stripe as shared Stripe client
participant Database as Payment database
participant Ledger as Credit reversal services
Cleanup->>Stripe: cancel payment intent or expire checkout session
Stripe-->>Cleanup: cancellation result or failure
Cleanup->>Database: mark pending payment EXPIRED
Cleanup->>Ledger: restore credits and release slots
Cleanup-->>Database: report cleanup success and error counts
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✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 70.83% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 24 functions across 13 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
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…cel fails, and the failure fails the run (#1464) The abandoned-payments sweep skipped the PENDING→EXPIRED CAS for any payment whose gateway cancel threw, while the same transaction still restored the referral credits and released the slot or seat. The Payment then sat PENDING for ever: its hold was gone, so nothing about it looked abandoned to a later sweep, the credits were handed back on a live payment, and the admin pending figure inflated with rows no job would ever heal. Because only thrown exceptions reached errorCount, the run reported success: true. The expiry no longer depends on the cancel. The Razorpay arm has always expired without a real cancel, since an order cannot be cancelled, and a capture landing after the row is EXPIRED is the terminal race #1439 owns. A failed cancel is now recorded in errors AND counted, so the run reports success: false, and the HTTP twin maps that to a 500 through the shared statusFor instead of forcing 200. The CAS-miss "skipped" semantics are untouched. The Stripe arm also stops building a raw client around STRIPE_SECRET_KEY outside the #1386 fence and its test-key guard. With STRIPE_ENABLED unset it makes no gateway call and logs once per run, which is "nothing to cancel" rather than a failure; with the fence open it goes through the fenced getStripeClient, expires a checkout session or cancels a payment intent by id shape, and treats resource_missing or an already-terminal intent as nothing to cancel. The #1459 concurrency ceiling and abort timeout are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
Resolves conflict in app/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts: keep the 413 Content-Length guard (#1459) as the first statement of POST, and keep dev's shared signature verifier (#1451) and everything after it as-is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
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In `@__tests__/enterprise/wallet-null-cached-balance.test.ts`:
- Around line 64-87: Add a focused walletDebit regression test alongside the
existing walletCredit test, using invoiceFundedAccount with a NULL cached
balance, asserting that a positive debit rejects with
WalletInsufficientFundsError and that row.walletBalance remains 0. Keep the test
limited to this debit-path behavior without adding unrelated money-edge
coverage.
In `@__tests__/payments/razorpay-webhook-body-cap.test.ts`:
- Around line 38-45: Update the webhook body-cap test to mock the symbols used
by the route’s actual Razorpay signature module, matchRazorpayWebhookSecret and
verifyRazorpaySignature, instead of the unrelated utility helper. Add an
x-razorpay-signature header and spy on the request’s text() method, then assert
the oversized-body request returns 413 without invoking text(), proving the size
check precedes signature verification.
In `@app/api/cleanup/reconcile-orphaned-confirmations/route.ts`:
- Line 31: Update parseLimitParam so only raw === null is treated as absent;
reject an empty limit value with the existing INVALID_LIMIT behavior. Add "" to
the invalid-limit tests, and apply the route’s required Zod validation for the
query parameters without introducing a separate shared schema.
In `@app/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts`:
- Around line 42-46: Update the raw-body handling in the Razorpay webhook route
so the actual request stream is capped at MAX_WEBHOOK_BODY_BYTES while reading,
rather than relying only on the optional Content-Length header. Reject bodies
that exceed the limit before completing HMAC verification, while preserving
normal processing for bodies within the cap.
In `@scripts/payments/cleanup-abandoned-payments.ts`:
- Around line 379-390: Update the cancellation flow around cancelPaymentIntent
so the gateway request receives abort support and is actually canceled on
timeout, or keep its concurrency slot occupied until the underlying request
settles. Ensure later chunks cannot start while timed-out requests remain
active, and add a hung-request test covering this concurrency behavior.
- Around line 56-123: Update cancelStripeIntent and the expirePendingPayments
flow to retrieve the PaymentIntent when Stripe returns
payment_intent_unexpected_state, suppressing the error only when the intent is
confirmed canceled or missing. Propagate/report the error for non-terminal
states such as processing so the local payment is not marked EXPIRED while the
gateway intent remains active; preserve existing handling for genuinely missing
intents.
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📒 Files selected for processing (15)
__tests__/enterprise/wallet-null-cached-balance.test.ts__tests__/maintenance/abandoned-payments-reversal.test.ts__tests__/maintenance/cleanup-route.test.ts__tests__/payments/razorpay-webhook-body-cap.test.tsapp/api/cleanup/abandoned-payments/route.tsapp/api/cleanup/reconcile-disputes/route.tsapp/api/cleanup/reconcile-orphaned-confirmations/route.tsapp/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.tsdocs/enterprise/10-money-and-ledger/04-wallet-and-topups.mddocs/maintenance/04-cron-jobs-reference.mdjobs/disputes/reconcile-disputes.tslib/api/organizations/wallet.tsnetlify/functions/cron-tick.mtsscripts/disputes/reconcile-disputes.tsscripts/payments/cleanup-abandoned-payments.ts
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Webhook handlers.
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
app/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts
Edge cases that must be covered for money tests: zero/negative amounts, currency mismatch, concurrent invocations, expired signatures/orders, partial refunds, idempotent replays.
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
__tests__/payments/razorpay-webhook-body-cap.test.ts__tests__/maintenance/cleanup-route.test.ts__tests__/enterprise/wallet-null-cached-balance.test.ts__tests__/maintenance/abandoned-payments-reversal.test.ts
Route handlers: authz checked per handler (session + role + org scoping), inputs validated with zod, correct status codes, no internal error leaks.
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
app/api/cleanup/abandoned-payments/route.tsapp/api/cleanup/reconcile-orphaned-confirmations/route.tsapp/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.tsapp/api/cleanup/reconcile-disputes/route.ts
🔇 Additional comments (1)
app/api/cleanup/abandoned-payments/route.ts (1)
56-68: LGTM!
…mit= is junk not absent Review triage on #1461. The 256 KB webhook cap was enforced only against Content-Length, which the caller chooses: omitting it, or sending chunked, left `req.text()` free to buffer whatever arrived before the HMAC could reject it. The raw body is now read through a counting reader that abandons the stream the moment the cap is passed, so the limit holds against the unauthenticated caller it was written for. The header check stays in front of it because an honest oversized delivery should still cost us zero bytes. `parseLimitParam` treated `?limit=` as an absent limit, because it tested the raw value for truthiness rather than for a missing key. That is a caller that meant to bound a ticker sweep and sent nothing, and it got the unbounded batch back — the silent fall-through the shared parser exists to make visible. Only `null` is absent now; an empty value is INVALID_LIMIT like any other junk. Two pins follow the code they cover. The wallet pin only exercised the credit path, so it now also asserts that seeding a NULL cache to zero does not become a licence to spend: the debit's gte guard still refuses. The webhook pin asserted against a signature helper the route does not import, which made it vacuous; it now mocks the route's real signature module, carries a signature header so every later step would otherwise run, and covers the undeclared-size stream directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
…e sweep Review triage on #1461, comment 5. `payment_intent_unexpected_state` was read as "already gone" and suppressed. It does not mean that. It means the intent's current state forbids a cancel, which covers a `canceled` or `succeeded` intent — genuinely nothing left to do — and equally a `processing` or `requires_capture` one, where Stripe is still holding the buyer's money. Suppressing both left the second case invisible: the run counted no failure and reported `success: true`, so the HTTP twin answered 2xx while a live gateway intent sat behind a payment this sweep had just marked EXPIRED. Stripe attaches the offending intent to the error, so the two are told apart off the payload rather than by spending a `retrieve` round trip out of the 4 s per-cancel budget. Only `canceled` and `succeeded` stay suppressed; any other status, and an absent one, is now recorded and counted, because unproven is not the same as safe. The status is read from both the top level and `raw`, since which one carries it depends on the SDK's error wrapping. #1464 is untouched: the PENDING to EXPIRED CAS still runs regardless of the cancel's outcome, and #1439 still owns a capture that lands after it. What changes is only whether an operator is told, and that state is one they should see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
…icker-budget Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MgadJydWEKkdhhzY58yiL7
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What
walletCredit/walletDebitare null-safe on the cached balance (lib/api/organizations/wallet.ts). Both helpers now write a zero over aNULLwalletBalancein the same transaction, through anupdateManywhoseWHEREmatches only the still-NULLrow, before they run the{ increment }/{ decrement }.balanceAfteris read off the mutated row and aNULLthere is now an explicit error rather than a?? 0. No schema change: a non-null default belongs to the pre-MVP reset, which is noted in the wallet doc.app/api/cleanup/reconcile-disputes/route.ts). The hardcodedstatus: () => 200is gone, sosuccess: falsemaps to the shared 500 exactly as chore(cron): a Netlify scheduled ticker drives the sub-hourly money sweeps #1390 did for the other sweeps. The sweep itself (scripts/disputes/reconcile-disputes.ts) now counts Stripe disputes asskippedFencedwhenSTRIPE_ENABLED !== "true"instead of failing the run on a gateway that is deliberately off.scripts/payments/cleanup-abandoned-payments.ts,netlify/functions/cron-tick.mts). Gateway cancels run five in flight over chunks withPromise.allSettledand a 4 s per-call timeout; every DB status write is unchanged, still one at a time and in cohort order inside the caller's transaction. The ticker gained per-targetlimitoverrides and sendsabandoned-paymentsa limit of 10.reconcile-orphaned-confirmationsuses the shared limit parser (app/api/cleanup/reconcile-orphaned-confirmations/route.ts), so junk answers400 INVALID_LIMITand a value above the cap is clamped instead of being logged and ignored.app/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.ts): over 256 KB answers 413 as the first statement of the handler, before the signature read and before any inbox row.Why
Found on the deploy preview of #1422 during wave-1C E2E.
sweep-orphaned-topup-capturesre-credited a top-up for an INVOICE-funded billing account: theLedgerTransaction/LedgerEntryCREDIT of 123400 posted correctly butBillingAccount.walletBalancestayedNULL, because Postgres evaluatesNULL + xtoNULLand the column's old comment assumed it was never null. Every INVOICE-funded account today carriesNULL, so every wallet-credit path against one — refund to wallet, top-up sweep, admin credit — produced permanent cache-versus-ledger drift.The rest are the P1/P2 findings from the same run. The 200 override made a failed disputes run indistinguishable from a healthy one to anything watching the status, which is the masking class #1390 removed elsewhere. The abandoned-payments sweep took roughly 6.2 s on five stuck payments because each gateway cancel waited for the previous one, so the ticker aborted it on every tick and the sweep effectively never ran under the ticker. The private
parseLimitswallowed a malformed bound and swept the defaults, hiding a broken caller. And the webhook let an unauthenticated caller choose how much memory the HMAC read allocates.The gateway cancel keeps its per-payment failure semantics: a cancel that fails or times out is reported against its own payment and that payment is left
PENDINGfor the next run, exactly as the sequential version did.Verification
npx tsc --noEmit(buildinfo removed first): clean, exit 0.npx eslinton all twelve changed TypeScript files: no errors and no warnings.npx prettier --checkon the changed files: clean.docs/enterprise/10-money-and-ledger/04-wallet-and-topups.mdstill reports as unformatted, but it was already unformatted ondevbefore this branch and the reformat it wants is a whole-document table-alignment and italics rewrite, so it is deliberately left out of this diff.npx jest __tests__/payments __tests__/enterprise __tests__/maintenance __tests__/webhooks: 161 suites, 1399 tests, all passing.Pins added:
__tests__/enterprise/wallet-null-cached-balance.test.ts— a fake transaction that reproduces PostgresNULLarithmetic rather than JavaScript's; a credit of 123400 against aNULLcached balance leaves the cache reading 123400 and posts the WALLETCREDIT.__tests__/maintenance/abandoned-payments-reversal.test.ts— twelve payments with the gateway client mocked and in-flight counted never exceed five concurrent cancels, and a single failed cancel is reported against its own payment while the rest go through.__tests__/maintenance/cleanup-route.test.ts—parseLimitParamdirectly: junk throws, above the cap clamps, absent stays undefined.__tests__/payments/razorpay-webhook-body-cap.test.ts— a 512 KB declared body answers 413 and never reachesverifyWebhookSignatureorlogWebhookEvent.Not covered here: the drifted throwaway billing account from the wave-1C run still needs its cached balance repaired to the ledger value, which is a data fix rather than a code change. PR #1451 also edits
app/api/webhooks/razorpay/route.tsto extractsignature.ts; this change is a self-contained block at the very top of the handler, so the later merge intodevshould be a keep-both.Closes #1459
#1464 — a gateway-cancel failure left the payment PENDING beside a released slot
Folded in here because this PR already owns
scripts/payments/cleanup-abandoned-payments.ts. The sweep skipped the PENDING→EXPIRED CAS for any payment whose gateway cancel threw, while the same transaction still restored the referral credits and released the slot or the group seat, and only thrown exceptions reachederrorCount— so the run answeredsuccess: truewhile the Payment sat PENDING for ever, invisible to every later sweep because nothing about it still looked abandoned. The expiry no longer depends on the cancel: the Razorpay arm has always expired without a real cancel, since an order cannot be cancelled, and a capture landing after the row is EXPIRED is the terminal race #1439 owns. A failed cancel is recorded inerrorsand counted, so the run reportssuccess: false, and the HTTP twin now maps that through the sharedstatusForinstead of forcing a 200. The CAS-missskippedsemantics are untouched.The script's Stripe arm also stops building a raw
new Stripe(process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY)outside the #1386 fence and its test-key guard. WithSTRIPE_ENABLEDunset it makes no gateway call and logs one line per run, which is "nothing to cancel" rather than a failure; with the fence open it goes through the fencedgetStripeClient, expires a checkout session or cancels a payment intent by id shape, and treatsresource_missingor an already-terminal intent as nothing to cancel. The #1459 concurrency ceiling and abort timeout are unchanged.Pinned in
__tests__/maintenance/abandoned-payments-reversal.test.ts: a cancel that throws still writes the EXPIRED CAS and restores the credits while the result carrieserrorCount1 andsuccess: false, and a fenced Stripe row never reachesgetStripeClient. Verified with a coldnpx tsc --noEmit,npx eslintandnpx prettier --checkon the changed files, andnpx jest __tests__/maintenance __tests__/payments(69 suites, 686 tests, all passing).Closes #1464
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