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XEP-SASL-CB-TYPES (440): recommend tls-exporter over tls-server-end-p… #1317

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Apr 15, 2024
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XEP-SASL-CB-TYPES (440): recommend tls-exporter over tls-server-end-p… #1317

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16 changes: 13 additions & 3 deletions xep-0440.xml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -23,6 +23,14 @@
<supersededby/>
<shortname>sasl-cb-types</shortname>
&flow;
<revision>
<version>0.4.1</version>
<date>2024-30-30</date>
<initials>fs</initials>
<remark>
Recommend the usage of tls-exporter over tls-server-end-point
</remark>
</revision>
<revision>
<version>0.4.0</version>
<date>2022-09-21</date>
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -162,7 +170,9 @@

<p>As further mitigation, servers MUST and clients are RECOMMENDED to
at least implement the channel-binding type tls-server-end-point (&rfc5929;)
to increase the probability of a mutual supported channel-binding type.</p>
to increase the probability of a mutual supported channel-binding type. However,
due its improved security properties, the tls-exporter (&rfc9266;) channel-binding
type should be prefered over tls-server-end-point.</p>

</section1>

Expand All @@ -189,8 +199,8 @@
<p>Thanks to Sam Whited for the discussion about the underlying
issue and incentivizing me to come up with this extension. Further
thanks goes to Ruslan N. Marchenko for pointing out the possible
MITM attack vector. Last but not least, Dave Cridland and Thilo Molitor
provided valuable feedback.</p>
MITM attack vector. Last but not least, Dave Cridland, Thilo Molitor,
and Simon Josefsson provided valuable feedback.</p>

</section1>

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