xinyunliu · xinyunliu · Jan 14, 2019 · Jan 14, 2019 · Jan 14, 2019 · Jan 14, 2019
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/configfs-stp-policy-p_sys-t b/Documentation/ABI/testing/configfs-stp-policy-p_sys-t
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+What:		/config/stp-policy/<device>:p_sys-t.<policy>/<node>/uuid
+Date:		June 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.19
+Description:
+		UUID source identifier string, RW.
+		Default value is randomly generated at the mkdir <node> time.
+		Data coming from trace sources that use this <node> will be
+		tagged with this UUID in the MIPI SyS-T packet stream, to
+		allow the decoder to discern between different sources
+		within the same master/channel range, and identify the
+		higher level decoders that may be needed for each source.
+
+What:		/config/stp-policy/<device>:p_sys-t.<policy>/<node>/do_len
+Date:		June 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.19
+Description:
+		Include payload length in the MIPI SyS-T header, boolean.
+		If enabled, the SyS-T protocol encoder will include payload
+		length in each packet's metadata. This is normally redundant
+		if the underlying transport protocol supports marking message
+		boundaries (which STP does), so this is off by default.
+
+What:		/config/stp-policy/<device>:p_sys-t.<policy>/<node>/ts_interval
+Date:		June 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.19
+Description:
+		Time interval in milliseconds. Include a timestamp in the
+		MIPI SyS-T packet metadata, if this many milliseconds have
+		passed since the previous packet from this source. Zero is
+		the default and stands for "never send the timestamp".
+
+What:		/config/stp-policy/<device>:p_sys-t.<policy>/<node>/clocksync_interval
+Date:		June 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.19
+Description:
+		Time interval in milliseconds. Send a CLOCKSYNC packet if
+		this many milliseconds have passed since the previous
+		CLOCKSYNC packet from this source. Zero is the default and
+		stands for "never send the CLOCKSYNC". It makes sense to
+		use this option with sources that generate constant and/or
+		periodic data, like stm_heartbeat.
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei
@@ -26,3 +26,31 @@ KernelVersion:	4.3
 Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
 Description:	Stores mei client protocol version
 		Format: %d
+
+What:		/sys/bus/mei/devices/.../max_conn
+Date:		Sep 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.19
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:	Stores mei client maximum number of connections
+		Format: %d
+
+What:		/sys/bus/mei/devices/.../fixed
+Date:		Sep 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.19
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:	Stores mei client fixed address, if any
+		Format: %d
+
+What:		/sys/bus/mei/devices/.../vtag
+Date:		Sep 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.19
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:	Stores mei client vm tag support status
+		Format: %d
+
+What:		/sys/bus/mei/devices/.../max_len
+Date:		Sep 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.19
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:	Stores mei client maximum message length
+		Format: %d
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-mei b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-mei
@@ -65,3 +65,18 @@ Description:	Display the ME firmware version.
 		<platform>:<major>.<minor>.<milestone>.<build_no>.
 		There can be up to three such blocks for different
 		FW components.
+
+What:		/sys/class/mei/meiN/dev_state
+Date:		Sep 2019
+KernelVersion:	4.19
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:	Display the ME device state.
+
+		The device state can have following values:
+		INITIALIZING
+		INIT_CLIENTS
+		ENABLED
+		RESETTING
+		DISABLED
+		POWER_DOWN
+		POWER_UP
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-rpmb b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-rpmb
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+What:		/sys/class/rpmb/
+Date:		Jul 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.18
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:
+		The rpmb/ class sub-directory belongs to RPMB device class.
+
+		Few storage technologies such is EMMC, UFS, and NVMe support
+		Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) hardware partition with
+		common protocol and similar frame layout.
+		Such a partition provides authenticated and replay protected access,
+		hence suitable as a secure storage.
+
+What:		/sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN/
+Date:		Jul 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.18
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:
+		The /sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN directory is created for
+		each RPMB registered device.
+
+What:		/sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN/type
+Date:		Jul 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.18
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:
+		The /sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN/type file contains device
+		underlying storage type technology: EMMC, UFS, NVMe.
+		In case of simulated device it will have :SIM suffix
+		i.e EMMC:SIM.
+
+What:		/sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN/id
+Date:		Jul 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.18
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:
+		The /sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN/id file contains unique device id
+		in a binary form as defined by underlying storage device.
+		In case of multiple RPMB devices a user can determine correct
+		device.
+		The content can be parsed according the storage device type.
+
+What:		/sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN/wr_cnt_max
+Date:		Jul 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.18
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:
+		The /sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN/wr_cnt_max file contains
+		number of blocks that can be reliable written in a single request.
+
+What:		/sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN/rd_cnt_max
+Date:		Jul 2018
+KernelVersion:	4.18
+Contact:	Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
+Description:
+		The /sys/class/rpmb/rpmbN/rd_cnt_max file contains
+		number of blocks that can be read in a single request.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst
@@ -17,11 +17,16 @@ MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide
 specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available
 in the core functionality of Linux itself.
 
-Without a specific LSM built into the kernel, the default LSM will be the
-Linux capabilities system. Most LSMs choose to extend the capabilities
-system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks.
-For more details on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux
-man-pages project.
+The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. For more details
+on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux man-pages project.
+
+Security modules that do not use the security data blobs maintained
+by the LSM infrastructure are considered "minor" modules. These may be
+included at compile time and stacked explicitly. Security modules that
+use the LSM maintained security blobs are considered "major" modules.
+These may only be stacked if the CONFIG_LSM_STACKED configuration
+option is used. If this is chosen all of the security modules selected
+will be used.
 
 A list of the active security modules can be found by reading
 ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm``. This is a comma separated list, and
@@ -30,6 +35,14 @@ order in which checks are made. The capability module will always
 be first, followed by any "minor" modules (e.g. Yama) and then
 the one "major" module (e.g. SELinux) if there is one configured.
 
+Process attributes associated with "major" security modules should
+be accessed and maintained using the special files in ``/proc/.../attr``.
+A security module may maintain a module specific subdirectory there,
+named after the module. ``/proc/.../attr/smack`` is provided by the Smack
+security module and contains all its special files. The files directly
+in ``/proc/.../attr`` remain as legacy interfaces for modules that provide
+subdirectories.
+
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -741,6 +741,10 @@
 			Format: <port#>,<type>
 			See also Documentation/input/devices/joystick-parport.rst
 
+	dev_sec_info.param_addr=
+			[BOOT] address of automotive bootloader (abl)
+			security parameters.
+
 	ddebug_query=	[KNL,DYNAMIC_DEBUG] Enable debug messages at early boot
 			time. See
 			Documentation/admin-guide/dynamic-debug-howto.rst for
@@ -1063,7 +1067,7 @@
 			earlyprintk=serial[,0x...[,baudrate]]
 			earlyprintk=ttySn[,baudrate]
 			earlyprintk=dbgp[debugController#]
-			earlyprintk=pciserial,bus:device.function[,baudrate]
+			earlyprintk=pciserial[,force],bus:device.function[,baudrate]
 			earlyprintk=xdbc[xhciController#]
 
 			earlyprintk is useful when the kernel crashes before
@@ -1095,6 +1099,10 @@
 
 			The sclp output can only be used on s390.
 
+			The optional "force" to "pciserial" enables use of a
+			PCI device even when its classcode is not of the
+			UART class.
+
 	edac_report=	[HW,EDAC] Control how to report EDAC event
 			Format: {"on" | "off" | "force"}
 			on: enable EDAC to report H/W event. May be overridden
@@ -2069,6 +2077,9 @@
 			off
 				Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
 				emit any warnings.
+				It also drops the swap size and available
+				RAM limit restriction on both hypervisor and
+				bare metal.
 
 			Default is 'flush'.
 
@@ -3053,6 +3064,14 @@
 			timeout < 0: reboot immediately
 			Format: <timeout>
 
+	panic_print=	Bitmask for printing system info when panic happens.
+			User can chose combination of the following bits:
+			bit 0: print all tasks info
+			bit 1: print system memory info
+			bit 2: print timer info
+			bit 3: print locks info if CONFIG_LOCKDEP is on
+			bit 4: print ftrace buffer
+
 	panic_on_warn	panic() instead of WARN().  Useful to cause kdump
 			on a WARN().
 
@@ -3899,6 +3918,9 @@
 			      reboot_cpu is s[mp]#### with #### being the processor
 					to be used for rebooting.
 
+	reboot_panic=	[KNL]
+			Same as reboot parameter above but only in case of panic.
+
 	relax_domain_level=
 			[KNL, SMP] Set scheduler's default relax_domain_level.
 			See Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt.
@@ -4165,9 +4187,13 @@
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+			The default operation protects the kernel from
+			user space attacks.
 
-			on   - unconditionally enable
-			off  - unconditionally disable
+			on   - unconditionally enable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=on
+			off  - unconditionally disable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=off
 			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
 			       vulnerable
 
@@ -4177,6 +4203,12 @@
 			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
 			compiler with which the kernel was built.
 
+			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+			against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+			the user space protections.
+
 			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
 			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
@@ -4186,6 +4218,48 @@
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
 
+	spectre_v2_user=
+			[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		        (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		        user space tasks
+
+			on	- Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+			off     - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+			prctl   - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+				  but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+				  per thread.  The mitigation control state
+				  is inherited on fork.
+
+			prctl,ibpb
+				- Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different user
+				  space processes.
+
+			seccomp
+				- Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+				  threads will enable the mitigation unless
+				  they explicitly opt out.
+
+			seccomp,ibpb
+				- Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different
+				  user space processes.
+
+			auto    - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+				  the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+			Default mitigation:
+			If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
 	spec_store_bypass_disable=
 			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
 			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
@@ -4683,6 +4757,8 @@
 					prevent spurious wakeup);
 				n = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_CTRL_MSG (Device needs a
 					pause after every control message);
+				o = USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET (Hub needs extra
+					delay after resetting its port);
 			Example: quirks=0781:5580:bk,0a5c:5834:gij
 
 	usbhid.mousepoll=

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
@@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
 
   off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
 		warnings.
+		It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
+		on both hypervisor and bare metal.
+
   ============  =============================================================
 
 The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
@@ -576,7 +579,8 @@ Default mitigations
   The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
 
   - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
-    unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
+    unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
+    to ~16TB.
 
   - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
     a guest.