Ghost Block runs entirely on-device: it has no server, no account, no update-check callback, and no analytics. There is nothing it could leak your data to — but it does hold broad <all_urls> host permissions and runs code on every page you visit, so a bug here still matters.

Please open a GitHub issue for anything that isn't security-sensitive (a filter list gap, a broken site, a false positive from the ad-detection heuristics).

For anything genuinely security-sensitive — a way for a page to detect or fingerprint the extension despite the anti-detection design, a way for a page to read or influence data across the ISOLATED/MAIN world boundary, or any other way a malicious site could exploit having this extension installed — please open a GitHub issue marked clearly as a security report, or reach out to the maintainer directly before filing publicly if you'd prefer the fix land first. There's no bug bounty here; this is a personal open-source project maintained on a best-effort basis.

• No eval, no Function constructor, no inline scripts or event handler attributes anywhere — the popup already satisfies Manifest V3's default script-src 'self' CSP.
• No web_accessible_resources — nothing in the extension is reachable by a URL a page can probe.
• The fingerprint guard is injected via chrome.scripting.registerContentScripts rather than a <script src="chrome-extension://..."> tag, so its presence and the extension's ID never appear in the page DOM.
• Zero npm dependencies. build/convert.mjs and build/make-icons.py only use Node/Python standard library — nothing to audit in a dependency tree, nothing that can be supply-chain-compromised via a transitive package.
• All content-script DOM writes use textContent/createElement, never innerHTML, on data drawn from filter lists or page content.