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Introduces a command analysis layer that categorizes shell commands, assesses risk, detects patterns, and emits metadata (category, risk level, duration hint, UX flags) before execution. Risky commands are blocked pending confirmation. Downstream UI can use the analysis to collapse verbose output and render silent successes cleanly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WalkthroughThis PR introduces pre-execution shell command analysis by adding a new Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~50 minutes Possibly related PRs
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| } | ||
| } | ||
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| let analysis = self.analyzer.analyze(&args.command, &working_dir); |
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Heads-up: analysis.requires_confirmation currently hard-blocks execution, but ShellArgs doesn't include any confirm/ack flag. If the intention is “ask user then re-run”, we probably need an explicit arg (default false) or a structured “needs_confirmation” error that carries analysis so the caller can display details and retry.
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
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| if character == '\r' && !in_double_quote { |
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This flags carriage returns inside single quotes as risky (the condition only checks !in_double_quote). Probably want to treat \r like \n and ignore it in both quote modes.
| if character == '\r' && !in_double_quote { | |
| if character == '\r' && !in_single_quote && !in_double_quote { | |
| patterns.push(pattern( | |
| PatternType::CarriageReturn, | |
| "Command contains a carriage return outside quotes.", | |
| )); | |
| continue; | |
| } |
| } | ||
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| fn base_command(words: &[String]) -> Option<String> { | ||
| let command_word = command_words(words).first()?; |
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Potential bypass: base_command is derived from the first command word, so wrappers like sudo rm -rf … / env rm -rf … get categorized as sudo/env (likely Other) and won't trigger destructive confirmation. Might be worth skipping common wrapper commands (+ their flags) to recover the underlying command for analysis.
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Actionable comments posted: 4
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@src/tools/shell_analysis/categorizer.rs`:
- Around line 31-46: DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS currently misses "rmdir" so rmdir is
classified as SILENT and skips confirmation; update the DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS
LazyLock initialization to include "rmdir" in the HashSet and also remove
"rmdir" from the SILENT_COMMANDS HashSet to avoid conflicting classification;
modify the static DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS and SILENT_COMMANDS definitions (refer to
symbols DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS and SILENT_COMMANDS in categorizer.rs) accordingly
so rmdir is treated as CommandCategory::Destructive.
- Around line 166-223: segment_semantics incorrectly assumes the subcommand is
words.get(1) and misses cases where wrappers (e.g., "env") or command-global
options (e.g., "-C", "--context") appear; add a helper (e.g.,
normalize_command_words) that takes the output of command_words(&segment.words)
and strips leading wrapper executables ("env", etc.), environment assignments,
and any leading global-style options (short/long flags and known global flags
like -C/--context) until the real subcommand token is reached; then replace the
current subcommand derivation (words.get(1).map(String::as_str)) with one based
on the normalized list and use that normalized list for checks in the "git",
"docker", "chmod" branches (and any flag helpers like
recursive_flag_present/force_flag_present/long_flag_present as needed).
In `@src/tools/shell.rs`:
- Around line 241-253: The analyzer is blocking "risky" commands with no way to
proceed; add a confirmation pathway by adding a confirm: bool field to ShellArgs
(or equivalent caller payload) and update the check in the function that calls
self.analyzer.analyze(&args.command, &working_dir) to only return the ShellError
when requires_confirmation is true AND args.confirm is false; if args.confirm is
true, allow execution to continue (or set a clear pending state), and ensure any
user-facing messages reflect that confirmation was used (use ShellError only for
unconfirmed attempts).
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
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📒 Files selected for processing (12)
docs/design-docs/production-worker-failures.mdprompts/en/tools/shell_description.md.j2src/agent/channel.rssrc/config/load.rssrc/tools.rssrc/tools/shell.rssrc/tools/shell_analysis.rssrc/tools/shell_analysis/analyzer.rssrc/tools/shell_analysis/categorizer.rssrc/tools/shell_analysis/parser.rssrc/tools/shell_analysis/security.rssrc/tools/shell_analysis/types.rs
| fn detect_outside_workspace_paths( | ||
| &self, | ||
| parsed: &ParsedCommand, | ||
| working_dir: &Path, | ||
| ) -> Vec<DetectedPattern> { | ||
| for segment in parsed.executable_segments() { | ||
| let words = command_words(&segment.words); | ||
| for word in words.iter().skip(1) { | ||
| if let Some(path) = resolve_candidate_path(working_dir, word) | ||
| && !path.starts_with(&self.workspace) | ||
| { | ||
| return vec![DetectedPattern { | ||
| pattern_type: PatternType::OutsideWorkspacePath, | ||
| description: format!( | ||
| "Command references a path outside the workspace: {word}" | ||
| ), | ||
| position: None, | ||
| }]; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| for segment in parsed.redirect_targets() { | ||
| for word in &segment.words { | ||
| if let Some(path) = resolve_candidate_path(working_dir, word) | ||
| && !path.starts_with(&self.workspace) | ||
| { | ||
| return vec![DetectedPattern { | ||
| pattern_type: PatternType::OutsideWorkspacePath, | ||
| description: format!( | ||
| "Command redirects to a path outside the workspace: {word}" | ||
| ), | ||
| position: None, | ||
| }]; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| Vec::new() |
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Special-case device sinks in the outside-workspace guard; treat unresolved home/env expansions in write positions as confirmation-worthy.
resolve_candidate_path() rejects ~ and $-prefixed paths, but accepts absolute paths like /dev/null. This causes benign redirects such as 2>/dev/null to be flagged as dangerous off-workspace writes and require confirmation. Meanwhile, real off-workspace writes using ~/backup.txt or $HOME/backup.txt are silently ignored because they don't resolve. The guard should whitelist safe device sinks (/dev/null, /dev/stdout, /dev/stderr) and instead treat unresolved expansions in write/redirect positions as confirmation-worthy rather than ignoring them.
| static DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = | ||
| LazyLock::new(|| HashSet::from(["dd", "mkfs", "rm", "shred"])); | ||
|
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| static NETWORK_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| { | ||
| HashSet::from([ | ||
| "apt", "apt-get", "brew", "bun", "curl", "ftp", "npm", "pip", "pip3", "pnpm", "rsync", | ||
| "scp", "sftp", "ssh", "telnet", "wget", "yarn", | ||
| ]) | ||
| }); | ||
|
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| static SILENT_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| { | ||
| HashSet::from([ | ||
| "cd", "chmod", "chgrp", "chown", "cp", "export", "ln", "mkdir", "mv", "rm", "rmdir", | ||
| "touch", "unset", "wait", | ||
| ]) | ||
| }); |
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Add rmdir to DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS.
rmdir currently classifies as CommandCategory::Silent because it only appears in SILENT_COMMANDS, not DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS. This causes it to bypass the confirmation gate for destructive operations despite permanently removing filesystem state. The fix is straightforward:
Fix
static DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> =
- LazyLock::new(|| HashSet::from(["dd", "mkfs", "rm", "shred"]));
+ LazyLock::new(|| HashSet::from(["dd", "mkfs", "rm", "rmdir", "shred"]));📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| static DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = | |
| LazyLock::new(|| HashSet::from(["dd", "mkfs", "rm", "shred"])); | |
| static NETWORK_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| { | |
| HashSet::from([ | |
| "apt", "apt-get", "brew", "bun", "curl", "ftp", "npm", "pip", "pip3", "pnpm", "rsync", | |
| "scp", "sftp", "ssh", "telnet", "wget", "yarn", | |
| ]) | |
| }); | |
| static SILENT_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| { | |
| HashSet::from([ | |
| "cd", "chmod", "chgrp", "chown", "cp", "export", "ln", "mkdir", "mv", "rm", "rmdir", | |
| "touch", "unset", "wait", | |
| ]) | |
| }); | |
| static DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = | |
| LazyLock::new(|| HashSet::from(["dd", "mkfs", "rm", "rmdir", "shred"])); | |
| static NETWORK_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| { | |
| HashSet::from([ | |
| "apt", "apt-get", "brew", "bun", "curl", "ftp", "npm", "pip", "pip3", "pnpm", "rsync", | |
| "scp", "sftp", "ssh", "telnet", "wget", "yarn", | |
| ]) | |
| }); | |
| static SILENT_COMMANDS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| { | |
| HashSet::from([ | |
| "cd", "chmod", "chgrp", "chown", "cp", "export", "ln", "mkdir", "mv", "rm", "rmdir", | |
| "touch", "unset", "wait", | |
| ]) | |
| }); |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@src/tools/shell_analysis/categorizer.rs` around lines 31 - 46,
DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS currently misses "rmdir" so rmdir is classified as SILENT
and skips confirmation; update the DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS LazyLock initialization
to include "rmdir" in the HashSet and also remove "rmdir" from the
SILENT_COMMANDS HashSet to avoid conflicting classification; modify the static
DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS and SILENT_COMMANDS definitions (refer to symbols
DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS and SILENT_COMMANDS in categorizer.rs) accordingly so rmdir
is treated as CommandCategory::Destructive.
| fn segment_semantics( | ||
| segment: &crate::tools::shell_analysis::parser::ParsedSegment, | ||
| ) -> CommandSemantics { | ||
| let mut semantics = CommandSemantics::default(); | ||
| let Some(base_command) = segment.base_command.as_deref() else { | ||
| return semantics; | ||
| }; | ||
|
|
||
| if SEMANTIC_NEUTRAL_COMMANDS.contains(base_command) { | ||
| semantics.is_neutral = true; | ||
| return semantics; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| semantics.is_search = SEARCH_COMMANDS.contains(base_command); | ||
| semantics.is_read = READ_COMMANDS.contains(base_command); | ||
| semantics.is_list = LIST_COMMANDS.contains(base_command); | ||
| semantics.is_write = WRITE_COMMANDS.contains(base_command); | ||
| semantics.is_destructive = DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS.contains(base_command); | ||
| semantics.is_network = NETWORK_COMMANDS.contains(base_command); | ||
| semantics.is_silent = SILENT_COMMANDS.contains(base_command); | ||
|
|
||
| let words = command_words(&segment.words); | ||
| let subcommand = words.get(1).map(String::as_str); | ||
|
|
||
| match base_command { | ||
| "chmod" => { | ||
| semantics.is_write = true; | ||
| semantics.is_silent = true; | ||
| if recursive_flag_present(words) { | ||
| semantics.is_destructive = true; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| "chgrp" | "chown" => { | ||
| semantics.is_write = true; | ||
| semantics.is_silent = true; | ||
| } | ||
| "docker" => { | ||
| if matches!(subcommand, Some("build" | "compose" | "pull" | "push")) { | ||
| semantics.is_network = true; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| "git" => match subcommand { | ||
| Some("checkout" | "switch") => { | ||
| semantics.is_silent = true; | ||
| } | ||
| Some("clean") if force_flag_present(words) => { | ||
| semantics.is_destructive = true; | ||
| semantics.is_silent = true; | ||
| } | ||
| Some("clone" | "fetch" | "pull" | "push" | "submodule") => { | ||
| semantics.is_network = true; | ||
| } | ||
| Some("reset") if long_flag_present(words, "--hard") => { | ||
| semantics.is_destructive = true; | ||
| semantics.is_silent = true; | ||
| } | ||
| _ => {} | ||
| }, |
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# First, let's see what command_words does with our examples
cat > /tmp/test_parsing.py << 'EOF'
# Simulate command_words behavior
def is_env_assignment(word):
if '=' not in word:
return False
name, _ = word.split('=', 1)
if not name or '/' in name:
return False
if not name[0].isalpha() and name[0] not in ('_',):
return False
return all(c.isalnum() or c == '_' for c in name)
def first_command_word_index(words):
for i, word in enumerate(words):
if not is_env_assignment(word):
return i
return None
def command_words(words):
idx = first_command_word_index(words)
return words[idx:] if idx is not None else []
# Test examples
examples = [
["env", "FOO=1", "rm", "-rf", "target"],
["git", "-C", "repo", "reset", "--hard", "HEAD~1"],
["docker", "--context", "prod", "compose", "pull"],
]
for ex in examples:
cw = command_words(ex)
base = cw[0] if cw else None
subcommand = cw[1] if len(cw) > 1 else None
print(f"Command: {' '.join(ex)}")
print(f" base_command: {base}")
print(f" subcommand (words[1]): {subcommand}")
print()
EOF
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# Simulate the categorizer logic for git -C repo reset --hard
def command_words(words):
# Only filters env assignments, not flags
result = []
for word in words:
if '=' not in word:
result.append(word)
else:
# Check if it's an assignment
name, _ = word.split('=', 1)
if not name or '/' in name:
result.append(word)
else:
continue
return result if result else []
words = ["git", "-C", "repo", "reset", "--hard", "HEAD~1"]
cw = command_words(words)
base_command = cw[0] if cw else None
subcommand = cw[1] if len(cw) > 1 else None
print(f"Input: {' '.join(words)}")
print(f"command_words result: {cw}")
print(f"base_command: {base_command}")
print(f"subcommand (words[1]): {subcommand}")
print()
print("Expected to match 'git' with subcommand 'reset':")
print(f" base_command == 'git': {base_command == 'git'}")
print(f" subcommand == 'reset': {subcommand == 'reset'}")
print()
print("What actually happens:")
print(f" Match fails because subcommand is '{subcommand}' not 'reset'")
EOF
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cat > /tmp/verify_bug.py << 'EOF'
# Test the three examples from the review to confirm they bypass detection
examples = {
"env FOO=1 rm -rf target": {
"expected": "Destructive",
"actual_base": "env",
"actual_subcommand": "FOO=1",
"will_match": False,
"reason": "env is not a destructive command and is in SEMANTIC_NEUTRAL_COMMANDS or not matched"
},
"git -C repo reset --hard HEAD~1": {
"expected": "Destructive (via git reset --hard)",
"actual_base": "git",
"actual_subcommand": "-C",
"will_match": False,
"reason": "subcommand is -C not reset, so pattern doesn't match"
},
"docker --context prod compose pull": {
"expected": "Network (via docker compose pull)",
"actual_base": "docker",
"actual_subcommand": "--context",
"will_match": False,
"reason": "subcommand is --context not compose, so pattern doesn't match"
}
}
for cmd, info in examples.items():
print(f"Command: {cmd}")
print(f" Expected: {info['expected']}")
print(f" Actual base_command: {info['actual_base']}")
print(f" Actual subcommand: {info['actual_subcommand']}")
print(f" Will trigger confirmation: {info['will_match']}")
print(f" Reason: {info['reason']}")
print()
EOF
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# Let's verify what category "env FOO=1 rm -rf target" actually gets categorized as
cat > /tmp/test_final.py << 'EOF'
# Simulate the full categorizer for "env FOO=1 rm -rf target"
# First segment would be just "env" with words ["env", "FOO=1", "rm", "-rf", "target"]
# OR it could be parsed differently
# Let's check: command_words skips env assignments
def is_env_assignment(word):
if '=' not in word:
return False
name, _ = word.split('=', 1)
if not name or '/' in name:
return False
return all(c.isalnum() or c == '_' for c in name)
def command_words(words):
for i, word in enumerate(words):
if not is_env_assignment(word):
return words[i:]
return []
# Test case 1: "env FOO=1 rm -rf target" as single segment
words1 = ["env", "FOO=1", "rm", "-rf", "target"]
cw1 = command_words(words1)
print("Case 1: env FOO=1 rm -rf target (single segment)")
print(f" Input words: {words1}")
print(f" command_words result: {cw1}")
print(f" base_command: {cw1[0] if cw1 else None}")
print()
# But wait - let's check the actual code again
# base_command gets the FIRST command_word via Path::file_name
# So for ["env", "FOO=1", "rm", ...], command_words gives ["env", "FOO=1", "rm", ...]
# And base_command takes the first element "env"
EOF
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# Let's verify the final categorization for each example
cat > /tmp/final_verification.py << 'EOF'
# Full trace through categorization logic
SEMANTIC_NEUTRAL = {":", "echo", "false", "printf", "true"}
DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS = {"dd", "mkfs", "rm", "shred"}
NETWORK_COMMANDS = {"apt", "apt-get", "brew", "bun", "curl", "ftp", "npm", "pip", "pip3", "pnpm", "rsync", "scp", "sftp", "ssh", "telnet", "wget", "yarn", "docker"}
def categorize(base_cmd, subcommand):
semantics = {
'is_destructive': False,
'is_network': False,
'is_neutral': False,
}
if base_cmd in SEMANTIC_NEUTRAL:
semantics['is_neutral'] = True
return semantics
semantics['is_destructive'] = base_cmd in DESTRUCTIVE_COMMANDS
semantics['is_network'] = base_cmd in NETWORK_COMMANDS
# Special handling for git
if base_cmd == 'git':
if subcommand == 'reset': # Simplified - in reality needs --hard check
semantics['is_destructive'] = True
# Special handling for docker
if base_cmd == 'docker':
if subcommand in ['build', 'compose', 'pull', 'push']:
semantics['is_network'] = True
return semantics
examples = [
("env", "FOO=1", "env FOO=1 rm -rf target"),
("git", "-C", "git -C repo reset --hard HEAD~1"),
("docker", "--context", "docker --context prod compose pull"),
]
for base, sub, cmd in examples:
sem = categorize(base, sub)
print(f"Command: {cmd}")
print(f" base_command: {base}")
print(f" subcommand (words[1]): {sub}")
print(f" is_destructive: {sem['is_destructive']}")
print(f" is_network: {sem['is_network']}")
if sem['is_destructive']:
print(f" → Requires confirmation (destructive)")
elif sem['is_network']:
print(f" → May require confirmation (network)")
else:
print(f" → NO confirmation (safe/other)")
print()
EOF
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cat > /tmp/comprehensive_test.py << 'EOF'
# Comprehensive verification of the review comment
# Based on code analysis:
# 1. confirmation_reason() only adds to reasons if has_destructive OR pattern-specific
# 2. has_network affects risk_level (Caution) but NOT confirmation requirement
# 3. Confirmation is ONLY required for destructive or certain patterns
print("=" * 70)
print("VERIFICATION OF REVIEW COMMENT")
print("=" * 70)
print()
examples = [
{
"cmd": "env FOO=1 rm -rf target",
"expected": "Should require confirmation (destructive)",
"base_command": "env",
"subcommand": "FOO=1",
"in_destructive_set": False,
"has_special_handling": False,
"result": "NO confirmation required",
"bug": True,
},
{
"cmd": "git -C repo reset --hard HEAD~1",
"expected": "Should require confirmation (destructive git reset)",
"base_command": "git",
"subcommand": "-C",
"subcommand_match": "reset",
"subcommand_matches": False,
"result": "NO confirmation required",
"bug": True,
},
{
"cmd": "docker --context prod compose pull",
"expected": "Should have network risk",
"base_command": "docker",
"subcommand": "--context",
"in_network_set": True,
"subcommand_match": "compose",
"subcommand_matches": False,
"result": "Risk=Caution, but NO confirmation required (network alone doesn't confirm)",
"bug": True,
"note": "Network risk detected but confirmation not triggered",
}
]
for i, ex in enumerate(examples, 1):
print(f"{i}. {ex['cmd']}")
print(f" Expected: {ex['expected']}")
print(f" Result: {ex['result']}")
print(f" Bug: {'YES' if ex['bug'] else 'NO'}")
if 'note' in ex:
print(f" Note: {ex['note']}")
print()
print("=" * 70)
print("CONCLUSION: Review comment is CORRECT")
print("=" * 70)
print()
print("Root cause: The categorizer assumes:")
print(" • base_command is always the effective executable")
print(" • subcommand is always words[1]")
print()
print("This fails when:")
print(" • Wrapper executables like 'env' are used")
print(" • Global options like '-C', '--context' precede the actual subcommand")
print()
print("Impact: Confirmation gate can be bypassed with common shell patterns")
EOF
python /tmp/comprehensive_test.pyRepository: spacedriveapp/spacebot
Length of output: 1289
Handle command-global options and wrapper executables in subcommand matching.
The matcher assumes words[1] always contains the subcommand, but common patterns bypass detection:
env FOO=1 rm -rf target→ base="env", subcommand="FOO=1" (no confirmation despite destructive operation)git -C repo reset --hard→ base="git", subcommand="-C" (fails to match "reset", no confirmation)docker --context prod compose pull→ base="docker", subcommand="--context" (fails to match "compose")
The command_words() function correctly skips environment variable assignments but does not skip command-global options (e.g., -C, --context), causing subcommand matching to fail and destructive commands to bypass the confirmation gate. A helper function to normalize arguments by skipping leading command-global options before extracting the actual subcommand would close this gap.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@src/tools/shell_analysis/categorizer.rs` around lines 166 - 223,
segment_semantics incorrectly assumes the subcommand is words.get(1) and misses
cases where wrappers (e.g., "env") or command-global options (e.g., "-C",
"--context") appear; add a helper (e.g., normalize_command_words) that takes the
output of command_words(&segment.words) and strips leading wrapper executables
("env", etc.), environment assignments, and any leading global-style options
(short/long flags and known global flags like -C/--context) until the real
subcommand token is reached; then replace the current subcommand derivation
(words.get(1).map(String::as_str)) with one based on the normalized list and use
that normalized list for checks in the "git", "docker", "chmod" branches (and
any flag helpers like
recursive_flag_present/force_flag_present/long_flag_present as needed).
| let analysis = self.analyzer.analyze(&args.command, &working_dir); | ||
| if analysis.requires_confirmation { | ||
| return Err(ShellError { | ||
| message: format!( | ||
| "Command requires confirmation: {}", | ||
| analysis | ||
| .confirmation_reason | ||
| .as_deref() | ||
| .unwrap_or("the command was flagged as risky before execution") | ||
| ), | ||
| exit_code: -1, | ||
| }); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
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Hard-blocked commands have no recovery pathway despite commit message promising "pending confirmation."
The PR description states "Risky commands are blocked pending confirmation," but ShellArgs contains no confirmation flag, and the tool returns ShellError immediately with no mechanism to re-execute after approval. The LLM cannot proceed even if the user intends to run the flagged command.
Either add a confirm: bool parameter to allow bypassing the check on confirmed calls, or clarify that this is an intentional hard block and update the commit message accordingly.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@src/tools/shell.rs` around lines 241 - 253, The analyzer is blocking "risky"
commands with no way to proceed; add a confirmation pathway by adding a confirm:
bool field to ShellArgs (or equivalent caller payload) and update the check in
the function that calls self.analyzer.analyze(&args.command, &working_dir) to
only return the ShellError when requires_confirmation is true AND args.confirm
is false; if args.confirm is true, allow execution to continue (or set a clear
pending state), and ensure any user-facing messages reflect that confirmation
was used (use ShellError only for unconfirmed attempts).
1 participant
Summary
shell_analysismodule that parses and categorizes shell commands before execution, assessing risk level, detecting dangerous patterns, and emitting UX metadata (duration hints,collapsed_by_default,expects_no_output)ShellOutputnow includes ananalysisfield for downstream UI/worker logicTest plan
ls,cargo build) execute normally with correct analysis metadatarm -rf /) are blocked with a confirmation errorexpects_no_outputcommands showDoneinstead of[No output]on successShellOutput.analysisfields are populated correctly for various command categories🤖 Generated with Claude Code