Fix some typos

MIP41/mip41.md

@@ -202,6 +202,6 @@ To enable the smooth transition to Endgame, Core Unit related MIPs ([MIP38](http
 
 New Core Units can no longer be proposed or be approved, new budgets cannot be proposed or approved, and recurring budgets do not automatically renew. The only exception to the rule against recurring budget is the Strategic Finance Budget which can recur a single time.
 
-All Core Unit roles defined in the Core Unit related MIPs no longer apply, and are superseded by the rules and responsibilities defined in the Maker Constituion or Scope Frameworks. If no direction is given to a Core Unit in the Maker Constitution or the Scope Frameworks, they can fall back on their existing Core Unit mandate, but must also make efforts to support and enable the transition to Endgame, and provide input for how their work can be incorporated in the Scopes.
+All Core Unit roles defined in the Core Unit related MIPs no longer apply, and are superseded by the rules and responsibilities defined in the Maker Constitution or Scope Frameworks. If no direction is given to a Core Unit in the Maker Constitution or the Scope Frameworks, they can fall back on their existing Core Unit mandate, but must also make efforts to support and enable the transition to Endgame, and provide input for how their work can be incorporated in the Scopes.
 
 Over time, all budgets provided from the Core Unit related MIPs will run out, and the Core Units will be transitioned to new budgets and have their work regulated through the Maker Constitution and Scopes. Once the transition is complete and all budgets have run out or been offboarded, and no more payments occur to any Core Unit defined in the Core Unit MIPs, all of the Core Unit MIPs become obsolete and stop having any effect.

MIP55/MIP55.md

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ This is a component that can have on-chain effects that alter the Maker Protocol
 
 **The proposal parameters**
 
-Requests of less than or equal to 50k Dai may go into the Weekly Governance Cycle, provided the Feedback and Frozen Periods have been fullfilled. Anything above 50k Dai must go through the Monthly Governance Cycle.
+Requests of less than or equal to 50k Dai may go into the Weekly Governance Cycle, provided the Feedback and Frozen Periods have been fulfilled. Anything above 50k Dai must go through the Monthly Governance Cycle.
 
 _Parameters for requests of less or equal to 50K Dai:_
 

MIP61/MIP61.md

@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ Suppose the parameters are set to their initial values. The effect of the Perfor
 
 With 100 MKR delegated, 95% Participation, and 95% Communication, the compensation is calculated as `C*min(1,100^q/10000^q)`. The Performance Modifier is 100% because `min(95%,95%) >= 90%`. This is `100% C*10/100` = 14 400 DAI per year.
 
-With 6772 MKR delegated, 85% Participation, and 95% Communication, The Performance Modifier is `40%+(1-40%)(clamp(min(85%,95%),75%,90%)-75%)/(90%-75%)` simplifing to `40%+60%(85%-75%)/15%`. The compensation is calculated as `C*min(1,6772^q/10000^q)`. This is `80% C*82.29/100` = 94 797.6 DAI per year.
+With 6772 MKR delegated, 85% Participation, and 95% Communication, The Performance Modifier is `40%+(1-40%)(clamp(min(85%,95%),75%,90%)-75%)/(90%-75%)` simplifying to `40%+60%(85%-75%)/15%`. The compensation is calculated as `C*min(1,6772^q/10000^q)`. This is `80% C*82.29/100` = 94 797.6 DAI per year.
 
 Compensation can be visualized by plotting the amount of MKR delegated against the compensation formula,
 

MIP68/MIP68.md

@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ To eliminate ramp-up risks, we will employ the following capital deployment patt
 |Capital Deployment | Requirement|
 |---|---|
 | - 50M| Only refinance existing, performing portfolios with 50% or less left of duration and meeting the requirements of the Strategic Credit Guidelines. |
-|50M -100M| Further refinancing of existing, performing portfolios and add Super Senior facilites with relevant. performing UK Credit funds and Banks with portfolio's meeting the requirements of the Strategic Credit Guidelines.|
+|50M -100M| Further refinancing of existing, performing portfolios and add Super Senior facilities with relevant. performing UK Credit funds and Banks with portfolio's meeting the requirements of the Strategic Credit Guidelines.|
 
 
 **3. EXTERNAL REVIEWS & COMMENTARIES ON CREDIT, MARKET & MONETALIS OPERATIONS**

MIP91/MIP91.md

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ Defines the governance process to approve the first instance of `dss-defender`.
 `dss-defender` has three parameters that can be modified by Governance. These are:
 1. `threshold amount`: This is the amount of MKR that must be deposited into an instance of `dss-defender` to activate it.
 2. `cancel-spells duration`: This is the duration for which an instance of `dss-defender` can cancel executive spells using the mechanism detailed in MIP91c2.
-3. `lockup duration`: This is the duration for which MKR deposited to an instance of `dss-defender` is locked by default. This parameter should be significantly larger than the `cancel-spells` duration to prevent a minority of MKR holders from stalling governance. The lockup period can be overriden by two mechanisms detailed in MIP91c3.
+3. `lockup duration`: This is the duration for which MKR deposited to an instance of `dss-defender` is locked by default. This parameter should be significantly larger than the `cancel-spells` duration to prevent a minority of MKR holders from stalling governance. The lockup period can be overridden by two mechanisms detailed in MIP91c3.
 
 RISK-001 should recommend initial choices and changes to these parameters. They may be changed via weekly governance polls or emergency/weekly executive votes.