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safe_extractall at openedx/core/lib/extract_archive.py enforces symlink, path-traversal, and dev-file guards but never checks the decompressed size, member count, or compression ratio of the archive before calling archive.extractall. A small, highly-compressible zip or tar.gz can declare gigabytes of members -- the canonical "zip bomb" pattern -- and exhaust disk / memory on the CMS worker during course import. Course authors can trigger this via the Studio course import UI, so the trust boundary is relevant (CWE-409). Add _check_archive_bomb helper that iterates the ZipInfo / TarInfo list once and enforces three operator-overridable thresholds before extraction begins: * COURSE_IMPORT_MAX_EXTRACTED_SIZE default 2 GB * COURSE_IMPORT_MAX_EXTRACTED_FILES default 50 000 * COURSE_IMPORT_MAX_COMPRESSION_RATIO default 200x The helper short-circuits on the first violation and raises SuspiciousOperation, matching the existing failure mode of _checkmembers. Because the guard runs *before* extractall writes anything, a pathological archive never materializes a byte on disk. The thresholds are chosen to accept every realistic edX course export (real exports observed ~100 MB / ~5 000 members / ratio <~10x for mixed XML+media) with a ~10x headroom while blocking 42.zip-class bombs whose ratio is upwards of 10^6. Add unit tests for the helper covering size, count, ratio, and the happy path, plus an integration test that builds a real on-disk zip and confirms safe_extractall rejects the bomb without writing any output files.
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