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…ection and SSRF git_export_utils.export_to_git() passes a course-author-controlled giturl to ``git clone`` and ``git remote set-url``. Subprocess list-form already prevents shell metacharacter injection, but git itself treats arguments beginning with ``-`` as options (CVE-2017-1000117 class), so a course author with Studio staff permissions and ``ENABLE_EXPORT_GIT`` on could set ``giturl`` to ``--upload-pack=<cmd>`` or similar and gain RCE on the CMS host. The legacy validator only checked URL prefix and suffix and did not reject option-style URLs or internal network targets. This change: * Adds ``_validate_git_url(repo)`` which rejects URLs that begin with ``-`` and, for http/https URLs, resolves the hostname and rejects any address that is loopback, link-local, private, reserved, multicast, or unspecified (SSRF defense). * Calls the new validator from ``export_to_git`` immediately after the legacy endswith/startswith check. * Passes ``--`` to ``git clone`` so the repo is unambiguously positional, as defense in depth against future validator regressions. (``git remote set-url`` does not accept ``--``, so the validator remains load-bearing for the pull/reset branch.) Adds unit tests covering option-injection URLs, loopback / RFC1918 / link-local IPv4 and IPv6 targets (with ``socket.getaddrinfo`` patched to avoid network dependencies), the public-host allowlist path, and the ``git clone --`` invocation shape. The feature is gated behind ``FEATURES['ENABLE_EXPORT_GIT']`` (off by default) and requires Studio course-author access, so real-world exposure is limited — but course authors are not OS-trusted, and this closes a privilege escalation path from Studio staff to RCE on the CMS host when the feature is enabled.
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Closed.