fix: remove activation_key from account REST API response#827
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Kelketek merged 1 commit intoopencraft/teakfrom Apr 2, 2026
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fix: remove activation_key from account REST API response#827Kelketek merged 1 commit intoopencraft/teakfrom
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cherry-pick from upstream: openedx#38241 The activation_key field was exposed in /api/user/v1/accounts/{username}, allowing an attacker to bypass email verification by combining two behaviors: 1. OAuth2 password grant issues tokens to inactive users (intentional) 2. activation_key returned in API response (the vulnerability) An attacker could register, get an OAuth2 token, read the activation_key from the API, then GET /activate/{key} to activate without email access. Fix: remove activation_key from UserReadOnlySerializer.to_representation() and from ACCOUNT_VISIBILITY_CONFIGURATION["admin_fields"] (which controls the field whitelist in _filter_fields — listed fields default to None even if absent from the serializer data dict). Reported by Daniel Baillo via the Open edX security working group. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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samuelallan72
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@Kelketek 👍 Thanks!
- I tested this: checked this matches the upstream patch, checked it appears to apply cleanly, checked the tests pass
- I read through the code
- I checked for accessibility issues
- Includes documentation
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cherry-pick from upstream: openedx#38241
The activation_key field was exposed in /api/user/v1/accounts/{username}, allowing an attacker to bypass email verification by combining two behaviors:
An attacker could register, get an OAuth2 token, read the activation_key from the API, then GET /activate/{key} to activate without email access.
Fix: remove activation_key from UserReadOnlySerializer.to_representation() and from ACCOUNT_VISIBILITY_CONFIGURATION["admin_fields"] (which controls the field whitelist in _filter_fields — listed fields default to None even if absent from the serializer data dict).
Reported by Daniel Baillo via the Open edX security working group.