security(ci): fix pull_request_target privilege escalation#44
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…flows Three workflows (pytest, ruff, radon) used pull_request_target and checked out GITHUB_HEAD_REF, running attacker-controlled code from fork PRs with access to repo secrets including CLONE_PRIVATE_REPOS_TOKEN. - Switch to pull_request trigger (fork PRs run in fork context) - Remove GITHUB_HEAD_REF checkout and dependency checkout with CLONE_PRIVATE_REPOS_TOKEN - Add explicit permissions: contents: read - Remove CODECOV_TOKEN (public repo uses tokenless upload) - Add explicit permissions to build-and-release workflow Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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