Don't allow secrets to be extracted without approval#135
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nickdavies wants to merge 1 commit intoldayton:mainfrom
Open
Don't allow secrets to be extracted without approval#135nickdavies wants to merge 1 commit intoldayton:mainfrom
nickdavies wants to merge 1 commit intoldayton:mainfrom
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Secrets -o yaml and config --raw are leaking secrets that should be generally sealed in the cluster so don't allow those by default. Also rethinks how sometimes-safe commands are treated: commands with opaque tokens (command substitutions, parameter expansions, indirect expansions) that could alter security-sensitive arguments are conservatively blocked. Handlers receive opaque_positions so they can detect when runtime-determined values bypass static checks.
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Secrets -o yaml and config --raw could be leaking secrets that should be generally sealed in the cluster so don't allow those by default.
This also rethinks how sometimes-safe commands are treated: commands with opaque tokens (command substitutions, parameter expansions, indirect expansions) that could alter security-sensitive arguments are conservatively blocked. Handlers receive opaque_positions so they can detect when runtime-determined values bypass static checks.
I believe this is a sane pattern for handling this case. I did the same choice in the modules and -c PRs where if there are expansions we just default to unsafe. I think this is scoped down correctly though so that most
getcommands for kubectl (except forsecretare going to be approved automatically still the false-negative should be low