perf: P0 performance optimizations

src/browser/stealth.ts

@@ -13,9 +13,15 @@
  * Return a self-contained JS string that, when evaluated in a page context,
  * applies all stealth patches. Safe to call multiple times — the guard flag
  * ensures patches are applied only once.
+ *
+ * The generated string is pure static (no dynamic parameters), so we cache
+ * it after the first call to avoid re-building ~350 lines on every goto().
  */
+let _cachedStealthJs: string | undefined;
+
 export function generateStealthJs(): string {
-  return `
+  if (_cachedStealthJs !== undefined) return _cachedStealthJs;
+  return (_cachedStealthJs = `
     (() => {
       // Guard: prevent double-injection across separate CDP evaluations.
       // We cannot use a closure variable (each eval is a fresh scope), and
@@ -350,5 +356,5 @@ export function generateStealthJs(): string {
 
       return 'applied';
     })()
-  `;
+  `);
 }

src/main.ts

@@ -86,10 +86,20 @@ const { registerUpdateNoticeOnExit, checkForUpdateBackground } = await import('.
 
 installNodeNetwork();
 
-// Sequential: plugins must run after built-in discovery so they can override built-in commands.
-await ensureUserCliCompatShims();
-await ensureUserAdapters();
-await discoverClis(BUILTIN_CLIS, USER_CLIS);
+// Parallelise independent startup I/O:
+//  - Built-in adapter discovery has no dependency on user-dir setup.
+//  - ensureUserCliCompatShims and ensureUserAdapters operate on different paths
+//    (~/.opencli/node_modules/ vs ~/.opencli/clis/ + adapter-manifest.json).
+//  - registerCommand() overwrites on name collision (see registry.ts), so
+//    user-CLI discovery MUST run after built-in discovery to preserve the
+//    intended override order (user adapters override built-in ones).
+//  - discoverPlugins runs last: plugins may override both built-in and user CLIs.
+const [, ,] = await Promise.all([
+  ensureUserCliCompatShims(),
+  ensureUserAdapters(),
+  discoverClis(BUILTIN_CLIS),
+]);
+await discoverClis(USER_CLIS);
 await discoverPlugins();
 
 // Register exit hook: notice appears after command output (same as npm/gh/yarn)

src/pipeline/template.ts

@@ -182,12 +182,32 @@ const FORBIDDEN_EXPR_PATTERNS = /\b(constructor|__proto__|prototype|globalThis|p
 /**
  * Deep-copy plain data to sever prototype chains, preventing sandbox escape
  * via `args.constructor.constructor('return process')()` etc.
+ *
+ * Uses a WeakMap cache keyed by object reference: when the same object
+ * (e.g. `args` or `data`) is passed repeatedly across loop iterations,
+ * the expensive JSON round-trip is performed only once. The WeakMap
+ * lets entries be GC'd when the source object is no longer referenced.
+ */
+/**
+ * Cache serialized JSON strings (not parsed objects) by source reference.
+ * Caching the parsed object would be unsafe: the VM sandbox could mutate it,
+ * and the polluted version would leak to subsequent calls. By caching the
+ * string and returning a fresh JSON.parse() each time, every evaluation gets
+ * its own clean deep-copy while still avoiding redundant JSON.stringify()
+ * for the same unchanged source object across loop iterations.
  */
+const _sanitizeCache = new WeakMap<object, string>();
+
 function sanitizeContext(obj: unknown): unknown {
   if (obj === null || obj === undefined) return obj;
   if (typeof obj !== 'object' && typeof obj !== 'function') return obj;
+  const objRef = obj as object;
+  const cached = _sanitizeCache.get(objRef);
+  if (cached !== undefined) return JSON.parse(cached);
   try {
-    return JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(obj));
+    const jsonStr = JSON.stringify(obj);
+    _sanitizeCache.set(objRef, jsonStr);
+    return JSON.parse(jsonStr);
   } catch {
     return {};
   }
@@ -212,44 +232,79 @@ function getOrCompileScript(expr: string): vm.Script {
   return script;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Reusable VM sandbox context.
+ *
+ * vm.createContext() is expensive (~0.3ms per call) because it creates a new
+ * V8 context with its own global object. In pipeline loops (map/filter over
+ * hundreds of items), this adds up to significant overhead.
+ *
+ * Instead, we create the context once and mutate the sandbox properties
+ * before each evaluation. This is safe because:
+ *   1. Sandbox properties are sanitized (deep-copied) before assignment
+ *   2. Scripts run with a 50ms timeout
+ *   3. codeGeneration is disabled (no eval/Function inside the sandbox)
+ */
+let _reusableSandbox: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
+let _reusableContext: vm.Context | null = null;
+
+function getReusableContext(): { sandbox: Record<string, unknown>; context: vm.Context } {
+  if (_reusableSandbox && _reusableContext) {
+    return { sandbox: _reusableSandbox, context: _reusableContext };
+  }
+  _reusableSandbox = {
+    args: {},
+    item: {},
+    data: null,
+    index: 0,
+    encodeURIComponent,
+    decodeURIComponent,
+    JSON,
+    Math,
+    Number,
+    String,
+    Boolean,
+    Array,
+    Date,
+  };
+  _reusableContext = vm.createContext(_reusableSandbox, {
+    codeGeneration: { strings: false, wasm: false },
+  });
+  return { sandbox: _reusableSandbox, context: _reusableContext };
+}
+
+/** Properties that are part of the sandbox's initial shape and safe to keep. */
+const SANDBOX_WHITELIST = new Set([
+  'args', 'item', 'data', 'index',
+  'encodeURIComponent', 'decodeURIComponent',
+  'JSON', 'Math', 'Number', 'String', 'Boolean', 'Array', 'Date',
+]);
+
 function evalJsExpr(expr: string, ctx: RenderContext): unknown {
   // Guard against absurdly long expressions that could indicate injection.
   if (expr.length > 2000) return undefined;
 
   // Block obvious sandbox escape attempts.
   if (FORBIDDEN_EXPR_PATTERNS.test(expr)) return undefined;
 
-  const args = sanitizeContext(ctx.args ?? {});
-  const item = sanitizeContext(ctx.item ?? {});
-  const data = sanitizeContext(ctx.data);
-  const index = ctx.index ?? 0;
-
   try {
     const script = getOrCompileScript(expr);
-    const sandbox = vm.createContext(
-      {
-        args,
-        item,
-        data,
-        index,
-        encodeURIComponent,
-        decodeURIComponent,
-        JSON,
-        Math,
-        Number,
-        String,
-        Boolean,
-        Array,
-        Date,
-      },
-      {
-        codeGeneration: {
-          strings: false,
-          wasm: false,
-        },
-      },
-    );
-    return script.runInContext(sandbox, { timeout: 50 });
+    const { sandbox, context } = getReusableContext();
+
+    // Clean non-whitelisted properties that a previous script may have added.
+    // Without this, `${{ x = 42 }}` would leak `x` into subsequent evaluations.
+    for (const key of Object.keys(sandbox)) {
+      if (!SANDBOX_WHITELIST.has(key)) {
+        delete sandbox[key];
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Update mutable sandbox properties — sanitizeContext severs prototype chains.
+    sandbox.args = sanitizeContext(ctx.args ?? {});
+    sandbox.item = sanitizeContext(ctx.item ?? {});
+    sandbox.data = sanitizeContext(ctx.data);
+    sandbox.index = ctx.index ?? 0;
+    return script.runInContext(context, { timeout: 50 });
   } catch {
     return undefined;
   }