[New Rule] Privilege Escalation via SUID/SGID Proxy Execution

[Aegrah]

Summary

Detects potential privilege escalation via SUID/SGID proxy execution on Linux systems. Attackers may exploit binaries with the SUID/SGID bit set to execute commands with elevated privileges. This rule identifies instances where a process is executed with root privileges (user ID 0 or group ID 0) while the real user or group ID is non-root, indicating potential misuse of SUID/SGID binaries.

References

In a recent blog (https://dfir.ch/posts/today_i_learned_binfmt_misc/) SUID exploitation was researched through the use of binfmt. One of the artifacts left from this attack is that the SUID execution happens via a proxy. Therefore, my current rule did not catch this. This rule added the SUID binaries to the process args in conjunction with a whitelist of commonly available SUID binaries on Linux systems.

Telemetry

[github-actions]

Rule: New - Guidelines

These guidelines serve as a reminder set of considerations when proposing a new rule.

Documentation and Context

• Detailed description of the rule.
• List any new fields required in ECS/data sources.
• Link related issues or PRs.
• Include references.

Rule Metadata Checks

• creation_date matches the date of creation PR initially merged.
• min_stack_version should support the widest stack versions.
• name and description should be descriptive and not include typos.
• query should be inclusive, not overly exclusive, considering performance for diverse environments. Non ecs fields should be added to non-ecs-schema.json if not available in an integration.
• min_stack_comments and min_stack_version should be included if the rule is only compatible starting from a specific stack version.
• index pattern should be neither too specific nor too vague, ensuring it accurately matches the relevant data stream (e.g., use logs-endpoint.process-* for process data).
• integration should align with the index. If the integration is newly introduced, ensure the manifest, schemas, and new_rule.yaml template are updated.
• setup should include the necessary steps to configure the integration.
• note should include any additional information (e.g. Triage and analysis investigation guides, timeline templates).
• tags should be relevant to the threat and align/added to the EXPECTED_RULE_TAGS in the definitions.py file.
• threat, techniques, and subtechniques should map to ATT&CK always if possible.

New BBR Rules

• building_block_type should be included if the rule is a building block and the rule should be located in the rules_building_block folder.
• bypass_bbr_timing should be included if adding custom lookback timing to the rule.

Testing and Validation

• Provide evidence of testing and detecting the expected threat.
• Check for existence of coverage to prevent duplication.

[tradebot-elastic]

⛔️ Test failed

Results

• ❌ Privilege Escalation via SUID/SGID Proxy Execution (eql)
  • coverage_issue: no_rta
  • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

[tradebot-elastic]

⛔️ Test failed

Results

• ❌ Privilege Escalation via SUID/SGID Proxy Execution (eql)
  • coverage_issue: no_rta
  • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

[tradebot-elastic]

⛔️ Test failed

Results

• ❌ Potential Privilege Escalation via SUID/SGID Proxy Execution (eql)
  • coverage_issue: no_rta
  • stack_validation_failed: no_rta