FIPS-8 Legacy: CVE-2024-27397 #7

gvrose8192 · 2024-11-06T19:09:53Z

jira VULN-7047
cve CVE-2024-27397

/home/g.v.rose/prj/kernel-build-tmp
no .config file found, moving on
[TIMER]{MRPROPER}: 0s
x86_64 architecture detected, copying config
'configs/kernel-4.18.0-x86_64.config' -> '.config'
Setting Local Version for build
CONFIG_LOCALVERSION="-debug-branch"
Making olddefconfig
  HOSTCC  scripts/basic/fixdep
  HOSTCC  scripts/kconfig/conf.o
  YACC    scripts/kconfig/zconf.tab.c
  LEX     scripts/kconfig/zconf.lex.c
  HOSTCC  scripts/kconfig/zconf.tab.o
  HOSTLD  scripts/kconfig/conf
scripts/kconfig/conf  --olddefconfig Kconfig
#
# configuration written to .config
#
Starting Build
scripts/kconfig/conf  --syncconfig Kconfig
  SYSHDR  arch/x86/include/generated/asm/unistd_32_ia32.h
  SYSTBL  arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_32.h
  SYSHDR  arch/x86/include/generated/asm/unistd_64_x32.h
  SYSTBL  arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h

[SNIP]
  INSTALL virt/lib/irqbypass.ko
  DEPMOD  4.18.0-debug-branch+
[TIMER]{MODULES}: 75s
Making Install
sh ./arch/x86/boot/install.sh 4.18.0-debug-branch+ arch/x86/boot/bzImage \
        System.map "/boot"
[TIMER]{INSTALL}: 21s
Checking kABI
Checking kABI
kABI check passed
Setting Default Kernel to /boot/vmlinuz-4.18.0-debug-branch+ and Index to 3
Hopefully Grub2.0 took everything ... rebooting after time metrices
[TIMER]{MRPROPER}: 0s
[TIMER]{BUILD}: 1022s
[TIMER]{MODULES}: 75s
[TIMER]{INSTALL}: 21s
[TIMER]{TOTAL} 1126s

Boots:

[g.v.rose@lts86-base shell]$ uname -a
Linux lts86-base 4.18.0-debug-branch+ #1 SMP Wed Nov 6 12:22:10 EST 2024 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux

No significant change to before and after kernel selftest log - the one small diff is not related to our patch and is not consistent across runs - it is skipped sometimes.
kernel-selftest-before.log

kernel-selftest-after.log

Ran the nftables tests with stress and lockdep and no change to the test log:
nftables-test.log

jira VULN-7047 cve CVE-2024-27397 commit-author Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> commit 7395dfa upstream-diff Significant code drift, fuzz, conflicts and every other dumb thing cherry-pick can do while pulling something new into something ancient. Tried to stay true to the resf_kernel-4.18.0-553.8.1.el8_10 tagged code. Add a timestamp field at the beginning of the transaction, store it in the nftables per-netns area. Update set backend .insert, .deactivate and sync gc path to use the timestamp, this avoids that an element expires while control plane transaction is still unfinished. .lookup and .update, which are used from packet path, still use the current time to check if the element has expired. And .get path and dump also since this runs lockless under rcu read size lock. Then, there is async gc which also needs to check the current time since it runs asynchronously from a workqueue. Fixes: c3e1b00 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add set element timeout support") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 7395dfa) Signed-off-by: Greg Rose <[email protected]> Conflicts: include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c

PlaidCat

Looks good and we had to sort out a bunch of refactors that are not present.

gvrose8192 · 2024-11-06T22:09:46Z

Thanks!

jira LE-2157 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-503.14.1.el9_5 commit-author Dawid Osuchowski <[email protected]> commit d11a676 Ethtool callbacks can be executed while reset is in progress and try to access deleted resources, e.g. getting coalesce settings can result in a NULL pointer dereference seen below. Reproduction steps: Once the driver is fully initialized, trigger reset: # echo 1 > /sys/class/net/<interface>/device/reset when reset is in progress try to get coalesce settings using ethtool: # ethtool -c <interface> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 11 PID: 19713 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G S 6.10.0-rc7+ #7 RIP: 0010:ice_get_q_coalesce+0x2e/0xa0 [ice] RSP: 0018:ffffbab1e9bcf6a8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: ffff94512305b028 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RDI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff9451c3f2e580 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff945121fa9000 R13: ffffbab1e9bcf760 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: ffffffff9e65dd40 FS: 00007faee5fbe740(0000) GS:ffff94546fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000106c2e005 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ice_get_coalesce+0x17/0x30 [ice] coalesce_prepare_data+0x61/0x80 ethnl_default_doit+0xde/0x340 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xf2/0x150 genl_rcv_msg+0x1b3/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5b/0x110 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x290 netlink_sendmsg+0x222/0x490 __sys_sendto+0x1df/0x1f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7faee60d8e27 Calling netif_device_detach() before reset makes the net core not call the driver when ethtool command is issued, the attempt to execute an ethtool command during reset will result in the following message: netlink error: No such device instead of NULL pointer dereference. Once reset is done and ice_rebuild() is executing, the netif_device_attach() is called to allow for ethtool operations to occur again in a safe manner. Fixes: fcea6f3 ("ice: Add stats and ethtool support") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Igor Bagnucki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dawid Osuchowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit d11a676) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-2169 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.27.1.el8_10 commit-author Dawid Osuchowski <[email protected]> commit d11a676 Ethtool callbacks can be executed while reset is in progress and try to access deleted resources, e.g. getting coalesce settings can result in a NULL pointer dereference seen below. Reproduction steps: Once the driver is fully initialized, trigger reset: # echo 1 > /sys/class/net/<interface>/device/reset when reset is in progress try to get coalesce settings using ethtool: # ethtool -c <interface> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 11 PID: 19713 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G S 6.10.0-rc7+ #7 RIP: 0010:ice_get_q_coalesce+0x2e/0xa0 [ice] RSP: 0018:ffffbab1e9bcf6a8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: ffff94512305b028 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RDI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff9451c3f2e580 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff945121fa9000 R13: ffffbab1e9bcf760 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: ffffffff9e65dd40 FS: 00007faee5fbe740(0000) GS:ffff94546fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000106c2e005 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ice_get_coalesce+0x17/0x30 [ice] coalesce_prepare_data+0x61/0x80 ethnl_default_doit+0xde/0x340 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xf2/0x150 genl_rcv_msg+0x1b3/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5b/0x110 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x290 netlink_sendmsg+0x222/0x490 __sys_sendto+0x1df/0x1f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7faee60d8e27 Calling netif_device_detach() before reset makes the net core not call the driver when ethtool command is issued, the attempt to execute an ethtool command during reset will result in the following message: netlink error: No such device instead of NULL pointer dereference. Once reset is done and ice_rebuild() is executing, the netif_device_attach() is called to allow for ethtool operations to occur again in a safe manner. Fixes: fcea6f3 ("ice: Add stats and ethtool support") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Igor Bagnucki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dawid Osuchowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit d11a676) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one. The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host() that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in machine__new_host(). Before the patch: (gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1 <SNIP> Summary of events: gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ pselect6 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ poll 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% <SNIP> Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478 478 if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL) (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478 #1 0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673 #2 0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708 #3 0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747 #4 0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456 #5 0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487 #6 0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351 #7 0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404 #8 0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448 #9 0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560 (gdb) After: root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1 <SNIP> pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ epoll_wait 188 0 983.428 0.000 5.231 15.595 8.68% ioctl 94 0 0.811 0.004 0.009 0.016 2.82% read 188 0 0.322 0.001 0.002 0.006 5.15% write 141 0 0.280 0.001 0.002 0.018 8.39% timerfd_settime 94 0 0.138 0.001 0.001 0.007 6.47% gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ poll 222 0 959.577 0.000 4.322 21.414 11.40% recvmsg 150 0 0.539 0.001 0.004 0.013 5.12% write 300 0 0.442 0.001 0.001 0.007 3.29% read 150 0 0.183 0.001 0.001 0.009 5.53% getpid 102 0 0.101 0.000 0.001 0.008 7.82% root@number:~# Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()") Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]> Tested-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1 Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

The 5760X (P7) chip's HW GRO/LRO interface is very similar to that of the previous generation (5750X or P5). However, the aggregation ID fields in the completion structures on P7 have been redefined from 16 bits to 12 bits. The freed up 4 bits are redefined for part of the metadata such as the VLAN ID. The aggregation ID mask was not modified when adding support for P7 chips. Including the extra 4 bits for the aggregation ID can potentially cause the driver to store or fetch the packet header of GRO/LRO packets in the wrong TPA buffer. It may hit the BUG() condition in __skb_pull() because the SKB contains no valid packet header: kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2766! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc2+ #7 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R760/0VRV9X, BIOS 1.0.1 12/27/2022 RIP: 0010:eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 Code: 80 00 00 00 eb c1 8b 47 70 2b 47 74 48 8b 97 d0 00 00 00 83 f8 01 7e 1b 48 85 d2 74 06 66 83 3a ff 74 09 b8 00 04 00 00 eb a5 <0f> 0b b8 00 01 00 00 eb 9c 48 85 ff 74 eb 31 f6 b9 02 00 00 00 48 RSP: 0018:ff615003803fcc28 EFLAGS: 00010283 RAX: 00000000000022d2 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ff2e8c25da334040 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: ff2e8c25c1ce8000 RDI: ff2e8c25869f9000 RBP: ff2e8c258c31c000 R08: ff2e8c25da334000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ff2e8c25da3342c0 R11: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R12: ff2e8c258e0990b0 R13: ff2e8c25bb120000 R14: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R15: ff2e8c25869f9000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2e8c34be300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055f05317e4c8 CR3: 000000108bac6006 CR4: 0000000000773ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die+0x33/0x90 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 bnxt_tpa_end+0x10b/0x6b0 [bnxt_en] ? bnxt_tpa_start+0x195/0x320 [bnxt_en] bnxt_rx_pkt+0x902/0xd90 [bnxt_en] ? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x89/0x300 [bnxt_en] ? kmem_cache_free+0x343/0x440 ? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x24f/0x300 [bnxt_en] __bnxt_poll_work+0x193/0x370 [bnxt_en] bnxt_poll_p5+0x9a/0x300 [bnxt_en] ? try_to_wake_up+0x209/0x670 __napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0 Fix it by redefining the aggregation ID mask for P5_PLUS chips to be 12 bits. This will work because the maximum aggregation ID is less than 4096 on all P5_PLUS chips. Fixes: 13d2d3d ("bnxt_en: Add new P7 hardware interface definitions") Reviewed-by: Damodharam Ammepalli <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-5.14.0-284.30.1.rt14.315.el9_2 commit-author minoura makoto <[email protected]> commit b18cba0 Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined. When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet. We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7. PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f ctrliq#1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9 ctrliq#2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] ctrliq#3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc [sunrpc] ctrliq#4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] ctrliq#5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] ctrliq#6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] ctrliq#7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] ctrliq#8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] ctrliq#9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc] The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe. When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up. Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that. This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall. Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <[email protected]> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <[email protected]> Cc: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit b18cba0) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-5.14.0-284.30.1.rt14.315.el9_2 commit-author Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> commit 4e264be When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb ctrliq#1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d ctrliq#2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc ctrliq#3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 ctrliq#4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] ctrliq#5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 ctrliq#6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa ctrliq#7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc ctrliq#8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e ctrliq#9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 ctrliq#10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 ctrliq#11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] ctrliq#12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] ctrliq#13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] ctrliq#14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 ctrliq#15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 ctrliq#16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 ctrliq#17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 ctrliq#18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 ctrliq#19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc ctrliq#20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d ctrliq#21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 ctrliq#22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4e264be) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-5.14.0-284.30.1.rt14.315.el9_2 commit-author Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]> commit de9df6c Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 ctrliq#1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc ctrliq#2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 ctrliq#3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 ctrliq#4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 ctrliq#5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c ctrliq#6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 ctrliq#7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 ctrliq#1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 ctrliq#2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 ctrliq#3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c ctrliq#4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 ctrliq#5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 ctrliq#6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 ctrliq#7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 ctrliq#8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 ctrliq#9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac ctrliq#10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 ctrliq#11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc ctrliq#12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] ctrliq#13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] ctrliq#14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] ctrliq#15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] ctrliq#16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] ctrliq#17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit de9df6c) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8671 cve CVE-2024-56642 A patch for a CVE Fix. commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8671 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8672 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8671 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8673 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8674 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8672 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-8674 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-12931 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-12932 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

jira VULN-12930 cve CVE-2024-56642 commit-author Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> commit 6a2fa13 syzkaller reported a use-after-free of UDP kernel socket in cleanup_bearer() without repro. [0][1] When bearer_disable() calls tipc_udp_disable(), cleanup of the UDP kernel socket is deferred by work calling cleanup_bearer(). tipc_net_stop() waits for such works to finish by checking tipc_net(net)->wq_count. However, the work decrements the count too early before releasing the kernel socket, unblocking cleanup_net() and resulting in use-after-free. Let's move the decrement after releasing the socket in cleanup_bearer(). [0]: ref_tracker: net notrefcnt@000000009b3d1faf has 1/1 users at sk_alloc+0x438/0x608 inet_create+0x4c8/0xcb0 __sock_create+0x350/0x6b8 sock_create_kern+0x58/0x78 udp_sock_create4+0x68/0x398 udp_sock_create+0x88/0xc8 tipc_udp_enable+0x5e8/0x848 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x84c/0xed8 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x38/0x60 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x170/0x248 genl_rcv_msg+0x400/0x5b0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 genl_rcv+0x44/0x68 netlink_unicast+0x678/0x8b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x898 ____sys_sendmsg+0x500/0x830 [1]: BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 udp_hashslot include/net/udp.h:85 [inline] udp_lib_unhash+0x3b8/0x930 net/ipv4/udp.c:1979 sk_common_release+0xaf/0x3f0 net/core/sock.c:3820 inet_release+0x1e0/0x260 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 inet6_release+0x6f/0xd0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:489 __sock_release net/socket.c:658 [inline] sock_release+0xa0/0x210 net/socket.c:686 cleanup_bearer+0x42d/0x4c0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:819 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was created at: slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2269 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x207/0xc40 mm/slub.c:4682 net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:454 [inline] cleanup_net+0x16f2/0x19d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:647 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xcaf/0x1c90 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xf6c/0x1510 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x531/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x60/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00131-gf66ebf37d69c #7 91723d6f74857f70725e1583cba3cf4adc716cfa Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer Fixes: 26abe14 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6a2fa13) Signed-off-by: David Gomez <[email protected]>

Calling perf top with branch filters enabled on Intel CPU's with branch counters logging (A.K.A LBR event logging [1]) support results in a segfault. $ perf top -e '{cpu_core/cpu-cycles/,cpu_core/event=0xc6,umask=0x3,frontend=0x11,name=frontend_retired_dsb_miss/}' -j any,counter ... Thread 27 "perf" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 0x7fffafff76c0 (LWP 949003)] perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653 653 *width = env->cpu_pmu_caps ? env->br_cntr_width : (gdb) bt #0 perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653 #1 0x00000000005b1599 in symbol__account_br_cntr (branch=0x7fffcc3db580, evsel=0xfea2d0, offset=12, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:345 #2 0x00000000005b17fb in symbol__account_cycles (addr=5658172, start=5658160, sym=0x7fffcc0ee420, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:389 #3 0x00000000005b1976 in addr_map_symbol__account_cycles (ams=0x7fffcd7b01d0, start=0x7fffcd7b02b0, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:422 #4 0x000000000068d57f in hist__account_cycles (bs=0x110d288, al=0x7fffafff6540, sample=0x7fffafff6760, nonany_branch_mode=false, total_cycles=0x0, evsel=0xfea2d0) at util/hist.c:2850 #5 0x0000000000446216 in hist_iter__top_callback (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, single=true, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:737 #6 0x0000000000689787 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at util/hist.c:1359 #7 0x0000000000446710 in perf_event__process_sample (tool=0x7fffffff9e00, event=0x110d250, evsel=0xfea2d0, sample=0x7fffafff6760, machine=0x108c968) at builtin-top.c:845 #8 0x0000000000447735 in deliver_event (qe=0x7fffffffa120, qevent=0x10fc200) at builtin-top.c:1211 #9 0x000000000064ccae in do_flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245 #10 0x000000000064d005 in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324 #11 0x000000000064d0ef in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:342 #12 0x00000000004472a9 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:1120 #13 0x00007ffff6e7dba8 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:448 #14 0x00007ffff6f01b8c in __GI___clone3 () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78 The cause is that perf_env__find_br_cntr_info tries to access a null pointer pmu_caps in the perf_env struct. A similar issue exists for homogeneous core systems which use the cpu_pmu_caps structure. Fix this by populating cpu_pmu_caps and pmu_caps structures with values from sysfs when calling perf top with branch stack sampling enabled. [1], LBR event logging introduced here: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Falcon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

As syzbot [1] reported as below: R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe17473450 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812d962278 by task syz-executor/564 CPU: 1 PID: 564 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack+0x21/0x24 lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x158 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x71/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:316 print_report+0x4a/0x60 mm/kasan/report.c:427 kasan_report+0x122/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:531 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351 __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline] f2fs_inode_synced+0xf7/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1531 f2fs_update_inode+0x74/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:585 f2fs_update_inode_page+0x137/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:703 f2fs_write_inode+0x4ec/0x770 fs/f2fs/inode.c:731 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x4a0/0xab0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677 writeback_single_inode+0x221/0x8b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1733 sync_inode_metadata+0xb6/0x110 fs/fs-writeback.c:2789 f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x16d/0x2a0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1159 block_operations fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1269 [inline] f2fs_write_checkpoint+0xca3/0x2100 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1658 kill_f2fs_super+0x231/0x390 fs/f2fs/super.c:4668 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x100 fs/super.c:332 deactivate_super+0xaf/0xe0 fs/super.c:363 cleanup_mnt+0x45f/0x4e0 fs/namespace.c:1186 __cleanup_mnt+0x19/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1193 task_work_run+0x1c6/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:203 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:39 [inline] do_exit+0x9fb/0x2410 kernel/exit.c:871 do_group_exit+0x210/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1021 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1030 x64_sys_call+0x7b4/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 RIP: 0033:0x7f28b1b8e169 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f28b1b8e13f. RSP: 002b:00007ffe174710a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f28b1c10879 RCX: 00007f28b1b8e169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007ffe1746ee47 R09: 00007ffe17472360 R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe17472360 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> Allocated by task 569: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x72/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x4f/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:737 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x104/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_lookup+0x366/0xab0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:487 __lookup_slow+0x2a3/0x3d0 fs/namei.c:1690 lookup_slow+0x57/0x70 fs/namei.c:1707 walk_component+0x2e6/0x410 fs/namei.c:1998 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2455 [inline] path_lookupat+0x180/0x490 fs/namei.c:2479 filename_lookup+0x1f0/0x500 fs/namei.c:2508 vfs_statx+0x10b/0x660 fs/stat.c:229 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3424 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline] __se_sys_newlstat+0xd5/0x350 fs/stat.c:417 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417 x64_sys_call+0x393/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 Freed by task 13: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x31/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:516 ____kasan_slab_free+0x132/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:236 __kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1724 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xc2/0x190 mm/slub.c:1750 slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x12d/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:3683 f2fs_free_inode+0x24/0x30 fs/f2fs/super.c:1562 i_callback+0x4c/0x70 fs/inode.c:250 rcu_do_batch+0x503/0xb80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2297 rcu_core+0x5a2/0xe70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2557 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2574 handle_softirqs+0x178/0x500 kernel/softirq.c:578 run_ksoftirqd+0x28/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:945 smpboot_thread_fn+0x45a/0x8c0 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x270/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:45 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:486 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 mm/kasan/generic.c:496 call_rcu+0xd4/0xf70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2845 destroy_inode fs/inode.c:316 [inline] evict+0x7da/0x870 fs/inode.c:720 iput_final fs/inode.c:1834 [inline] iput+0x62b/0x830 fs/inode.c:1860 do_unlinkat+0x356/0x540 fs/namei.c:4397 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4438 [inline] __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4436 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4436 x64_sys_call+0x958/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:88 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812d961f20 which belongs to the cache f2fs_inode_cache of size 1200 The buggy address is located 856 bytes inside of 1200-byte region [ffff88812d961f20, ffff88812d9623d0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004b65800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12d960 head:ffffea0004b65800 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1) raw: 4000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88810a94c500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0x1d2050(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 569, tgid 568 (syz.2.16), ts 55943246141, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1d0/0x1f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2532 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2539 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e63/0x2ef0 mm/page_alloc.c:4328 __alloc_pages+0x235/0x4b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5605 alloc_slab_page include/linux/gfp.h:-1 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1939 [inline] new_slab+0xec/0x4b0 mm/slub.c:1992 ___slab_alloc+0x6f6/0xb50 mm/slub.c:3180 __slab_alloc+0x5e/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3279 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3364 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x13f/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_fill_super+0x3ad7/0x6bb0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4293 mount_bdev+0x2ae/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1443 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:4642 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:632 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x260 fs/super.c:1573 do_new_mount+0x25a/0xa20 fs/namespace.c:3056 page_owner free stack trace missing Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88812d962100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88812d962200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88812d962280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 This bug can be reproduced w/ the reproducer [2], once we enable CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS config, the reproducer will trigger panic as below, so the direct reason of this bug is the same as the one below patch [3] fixed. kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:857! RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 Call Trace: <TASK> evict+0x32a/0x7a0 do_unlinkat+0x37b/0x5b0 __x64_sys_unlink+0xad/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17495ccc580000 [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected] Tracepoints before panic: f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file1 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 10, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 0, i_advise = 0x0 f2fs_truncate_node: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, nid = 8, block_address = 0x3c05 f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file3 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 9000, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 0, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate_blocks_enter: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, i_size = 0, i_blocks = 24, start file offset = 0 f2fs_truncate_blocks_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = -2 The root cause is: in the fuzzed image, dnode #8 belongs to inode #7, after inode #7 eviction, dnode #8 was dropped. However there is dirent that has ino #8, so, once we unlink file3, in f2fs_evict_inode(), both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_update_inode_page() will fail due to we can not load node #8, result in we missed to call f2fs_inode_synced() to clear inode dirty status. Let's fix this by calling f2fs_inode_synced() in error path of f2fs_evict_inode(). PS: As I verified, the reproducer [2] can trigger this bug in v6.1.129, but it failed in v6.16-rc4, this is because the testcase will stop due to other corruption has been detected by f2fs: F2FS-fs (loop0): inconsistent node block, node_type:2, nid:8, node_footer[nid:8,ino:8,ofs:0,cpver:5013063228981249506,blkaddr:15366] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_lookup: inode (ino=9) has zero i_nlink Fixes: 0f18b46 ("f2fs: flush inode metadata when checkpoint is doing") Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

jira VULN-49904 cve CVE-2022-49111 commit-author Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> commit f63d24b This fixes the following trace caused by receiving HCI_EV_DISCONN_PHY_LINK_COMPLETE which does call hci_conn_del without first checking if conn->type is in fact AMP_LINK and in case it is do properly cleanup upper layers with hci_disconn_cfm: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e404818 by task bluetoothd/142 CPU: 0 PID: 142 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-00006-gda4022eeac1a #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 l2cap_do_send+0x23f/0x3d0 l2cap_chan_send+0xc06/0x2cc0 l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x201/0x2b0 sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0x110 sock_write_iter+0x20f/0x370 do_iter_readv_writev+0x343/0x690 do_iter_write+0x132/0x640 vfs_writev+0x198/0x570 do_writev+0x202/0x280 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RSP: 002b:00007ffce8a099b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffce8a099e0 RDI: 0000000000000015 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce8a099e0 RCX: 00007f788fc3cf77 R10: 00007ffce8af7080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e4ccf75580 RBP: 0000000000000015 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001 </TASK> R13: 000055e4ccf754a0 R14: 000055e4ccf75cd0 R15: 000055e4ccf4a6b0 Allocated by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x2f0 l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdc0 l2cap_connect_cfm+0x236/0x1000 le_conn_complete_evt+0x15a7/0x1db0 hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x226/0x2c0 hci_le_meta_evt+0x247/0x450 hci_event_packet+0x61b/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Freed by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130 kfree+0xac/0x350 hci_conn_cleanup+0x101/0x6a0 hci_conn_del+0x27e/0x6c0 hci_disconn_phylink_complete_evt+0xe0/0x120 hci_event_packet+0x812/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f0500 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address belongs to the page: 128-byte region [ffff88800c0f0500, ffff88800c0f0580) flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) page:00000000fe45cd86 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xc0f0 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00003a2c80 dead000000000004 ffff8880078418c0 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected ffff88800c0f0400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc Memory state around the buggy address: >ffff88800c0f0500: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88800c0f0480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88800c0f0580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ================================================================== ffff88800c0f0600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Reported-by: Sönke Huster <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sönke Huster <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f63d24b) Signed-off-by: Pratham Patel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a509a55 ] As syzbot [1] reported as below: R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe17473450 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812d962278 by task syz-executor/564 CPU: 1 PID: 564 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack+0x21/0x24 lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x158 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x71/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:316 print_report+0x4a/0x60 mm/kasan/report.c:427 kasan_report+0x122/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:531 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351 __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline] f2fs_inode_synced+0xf7/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1531 f2fs_update_inode+0x74/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:585 f2fs_update_inode_page+0x137/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:703 f2fs_write_inode+0x4ec/0x770 fs/f2fs/inode.c:731 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x4a0/0xab0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677 writeback_single_inode+0x221/0x8b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1733 sync_inode_metadata+0xb6/0x110 fs/fs-writeback.c:2789 f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x16d/0x2a0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1159 block_operations fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1269 [inline] f2fs_write_checkpoint+0xca3/0x2100 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1658 kill_f2fs_super+0x231/0x390 fs/f2fs/super.c:4668 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x100 fs/super.c:332 deactivate_super+0xaf/0xe0 fs/super.c:363 cleanup_mnt+0x45f/0x4e0 fs/namespace.c:1186 __cleanup_mnt+0x19/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1193 task_work_run+0x1c6/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:203 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:39 [inline] do_exit+0x9fb/0x2410 kernel/exit.c:871 do_group_exit+0x210/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1021 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1030 x64_sys_call+0x7b4/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 RIP: 0033:0x7f28b1b8e169 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f28b1b8e13f. RSP: 002b:00007ffe174710a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f28b1c10879 RCX: 00007f28b1b8e169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007ffe1746ee47 R09: 00007ffe17472360 R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe17472360 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> Allocated by task 569: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x72/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x4f/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:737 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x104/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_lookup+0x366/0xab0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:487 __lookup_slow+0x2a3/0x3d0 fs/namei.c:1690 lookup_slow+0x57/0x70 fs/namei.c:1707 walk_component+0x2e6/0x410 fs/namei.c:1998 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2455 [inline] path_lookupat+0x180/0x490 fs/namei.c:2479 filename_lookup+0x1f0/0x500 fs/namei.c:2508 vfs_statx+0x10b/0x660 fs/stat.c:229 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3424 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline] __se_sys_newlstat+0xd5/0x350 fs/stat.c:417 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417 x64_sys_call+0x393/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 Freed by task 13: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x31/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:516 ____kasan_slab_free+0x132/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:236 __kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1724 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xc2/0x190 mm/slub.c:1750 slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x12d/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:3683 f2fs_free_inode+0x24/0x30 fs/f2fs/super.c:1562 i_callback+0x4c/0x70 fs/inode.c:250 rcu_do_batch+0x503/0xb80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2297 rcu_core+0x5a2/0xe70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2557 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2574 handle_softirqs+0x178/0x500 kernel/softirq.c:578 run_ksoftirqd+0x28/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:945 smpboot_thread_fn+0x45a/0x8c0 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x270/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:45 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:486 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 mm/kasan/generic.c:496 call_rcu+0xd4/0xf70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2845 destroy_inode fs/inode.c:316 [inline] evict+0x7da/0x870 fs/inode.c:720 iput_final fs/inode.c:1834 [inline] iput+0x62b/0x830 fs/inode.c:1860 do_unlinkat+0x356/0x540 fs/namei.c:4397 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4438 [inline] __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4436 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4436 x64_sys_call+0x958/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:88 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812d961f20 which belongs to the cache f2fs_inode_cache of size 1200 The buggy address is located 856 bytes inside of 1200-byte region [ffff88812d961f20, ffff88812d9623d0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004b65800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12d960 head:ffffea0004b65800 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1) raw: 4000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88810a94c500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0x1d2050(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 569, tgid 568 (syz.2.16), ts 55943246141, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1d0/0x1f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2532 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2539 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e63/0x2ef0 mm/page_alloc.c:4328 __alloc_pages+0x235/0x4b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5605 alloc_slab_page include/linux/gfp.h:-1 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1939 [inline] new_slab+0xec/0x4b0 mm/slub.c:1992 ___slab_alloc+0x6f6/0xb50 mm/slub.c:3180 __slab_alloc+0x5e/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3279 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3364 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x13f/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_fill_super+0x3ad7/0x6bb0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4293 mount_bdev+0x2ae/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1443 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:4642 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:632 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x260 fs/super.c:1573 do_new_mount+0x25a/0xa20 fs/namespace.c:3056 page_owner free stack trace missing Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88812d962100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88812d962200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88812d962280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 This bug can be reproduced w/ the reproducer [2], once we enable CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS config, the reproducer will trigger panic as below, so the direct reason of this bug is the same as the one below patch [3] fixed. kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:857! RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 Call Trace: <TASK> evict+0x32a/0x7a0 do_unlinkat+0x37b/0x5b0 __x64_sys_unlink+0xad/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17495ccc580000 [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected] Tracepoints before panic: f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file1 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 10, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 0, i_advise = 0x0 f2fs_truncate_node: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, nid = 8, block_address = 0x3c05 f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file3 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 9000, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 0, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate_blocks_enter: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, i_size = 0, i_blocks = 24, start file offset = 0 f2fs_truncate_blocks_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = -2 The root cause is: in the fuzzed image, dnode #8 belongs to inode #7, after inode #7 eviction, dnode #8 was dropped. However there is dirent that has ino #8, so, once we unlink file3, in f2fs_evict_inode(), both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_update_inode_page() will fail due to we can not load node #8, result in we missed to call f2fs_inode_synced() to clear inode dirty status. Let's fix this by calling f2fs_inode_synced() in error path of f2fs_evict_inode(). PS: As I verified, the reproducer [2] can trigger this bug in v6.1.129, but it failed in v6.16-rc4, this is because the testcase will stop due to other corruption has been detected by f2fs: F2FS-fs (loop0): inconsistent node block, node_type:2, nid:8, node_footer[nid:8,ino:8,ofs:0,cpver:5013063228981249506,blkaddr:15366] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_lookup: inode (ino=9) has zero i_nlink Fixes: 0f18b46 ("f2fs: flush inode metadata when checkpoint is doing") Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-75590 commit 4991b88 Author: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]> Date: Fri Feb 14 18:46:50 2025 +0100 net: phy: marvell-88q2xxx: Init PHY private structure for mv88q211x When adding LED support for mv88q222x devices the PHY private data structure was added to the mv88q211x code path, the data structure is however only allocated during mv88q222x probe. This results in a nullptr deference for mv88q2110 devices. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000001 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [0000000000000001] user address but active_mm is swapper Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1-arm64-renesas-00342-ga3783dbf2574 #7 Hardware name: Renesas White Hawk Single board based on r8a779g2 (DT) pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mv88q2xxx_config_init+0x28/0x84 lr : mv88q2110_config_init+0x98/0xb0 sp : ffff8000823eb9d0 x29: ffff8000823eb9d0 x28: ffff000440942000 x27: ffff80008144e400 x26: 0000000000001002 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000000009 x22: ffff8000810534f0 x21: ffff800081053550 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0004437d6800 x18: 0000000000000018 x17: 00000000000961c8 x16: ffff0006bef75ec0 x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: ffff000440218080 x12: 071c71c71c71c71c x11: ffff000440218080 x10: 0000000000001420 x9 : ffff8000823eb770 x8 : ffff8000823eb650 x7 : ffff8000823eb750 x6 : ffff8000823eb710 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000800 x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 00000000ffffffff x0 : ffff0004437d6800 Call trace: mv88q2xxx_config_init+0x28/0x84 (P) mv88q2110_config_init+0x98/0xb0 phy_init_hw+0x64/0x9c phy_attach_direct+0x118/0x320 phy_connect_direct+0x24/0x80 of_phy_connect+0x5c/0xa0 rtsn_open+0x5bc/0x78c __dev_open+0xf8/0x1fc __dev_change_flags+0x198/0x220 dev_change_flags+0x20/0x64 ip_auto_config+0x270/0xefc do_one_initcall+0xe4/0x22c kernel_init_freeable+0x2a8/0x308 kernel_init+0x20/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: b907e404 f9432814 3100083f 540000e3 (39400680) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x000,00000070,00801250,8200700b Memory Limit: none ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]--- Fix this by using a generic probe function for both mv88q211x and mv88q222x devices that allocates the PHY private data structure, while only the mv88q222x probes for LED support. Fixes: a3783db ("net: phy: marvell-88q2xxx: Add support for PHY LEDs on 88q2xxx") Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Izabela Bakollari <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-71129 upstream ======== commit ea04fe1 Author: Aditya Bodkhe <[email protected]> Date: Tue Apr 29 12:21:32 2025 +0530 description =========== pert script tests fails with segmentation fault as below: 92: perf script tests: --- start --- test child forked, pid 103769 DB test [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.012 MB /tmp/perf-test-script.7rbftEpOzX/perf.data (9 samples) ] /usr/libexec/perf-core/tests/shell/script.sh: line 35: 103780 Segmentation fault (core dumped) perf script -i "${perfdatafile}" -s "${db_test}" --- Cleaning up --- ---- end(-1) ---- 92: perf script tests : FAILED! Backtrace pointed to : #0 0x0000000010247dd0 in maps.machine () #1 0x00000000101d178c in db_export.sample () #2 0x00000000103412c8 in python_process_event () #3 0x000000001004eb28 in process_sample_event () #4 0x000000001024fcd0 in machines.deliver_event () #5 0x000000001025005c in perf_session.deliver_event () #6 0x00000000102568b0 in __ordered_events__flush.part.0 () #7 0x0000000010251618 in perf_session.process_events () #8 0x0000000010053620 in cmd_script () #9 0x00000000100b5a28 in run_builtin () #10 0x00000000100b5f94 in handle_internal_command () #11 0x0000000010011114 in main () Further investigation reveals that this occurs in the `perf script tests`, because it uses `db_test.py` script. This script sets `perf_db_export_mode = True`. With `perf_db_export_mode` enabled, if a sample originates from a hypervisor, perf doesn't set maps for "[H]" sample in the code. Consequently, `al->maps` remains NULL when `maps__machine(al->maps)` is called from `db_export__sample`. As al->maps can be NULL in case of Hypervisor samples , use thread->maps because even for Hypervisor sample, machine should exist. If we don't have machine for some reason, return -1 to avoid segmentation fault. Reported-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Aditya Bodkhe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Tested-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Suggested-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Brnak <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-89362 commit e4d4648 Author: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Date: Tue Jan 28 00:02:01 2025 +0300 devm_platform_profile_register() expects a pointer to the private driver data but instead an address of the pointer variable is passed due to a typo. This leads to the crashes later: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000fe0d0044 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1284 Comm: tuned Tainted: G W 6.13.0+ #7 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: LENOVO 21D0/LNVNB161216, BIOS J6CN45WW 03/17/2023 RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x6bf/0x7f0 Call Trace: <TASK> dytc_profile_set+0x4a/0x140 [ideapad_laptop] _store_and_notify+0x13/0x40 [platform_profile] class_for_each_device+0x145/0x180 platform_profile_store+0xc0/0x130 [platform_profile] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13e/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x290/0x450 ksys_write+0x6c/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 249c576 ("ACPI: platform_profile: Let drivers set drvdata to the class device") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kurt Borja <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mark Langsdorf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c80aa2a ] The hfsplus_bnode_read() method can trigger the issue: [ 174.852007][ T9784] ================================================================== [ 174.852709][ T9784] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360 [ 174.853412][ T9784] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810b5fc6c0 by task repro/9784 [ 174.854059][ T9784] [ 174.854272][ T9784] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9784 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #7 PREEMPT(full) [ 174.854281][ T9784] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 174.854286][ T9784] Call Trace: [ 174.854289][ T9784] <TASK> [ 174.854292][ T9784] dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 [ 174.854305][ T9784] print_report+0xd0/0x660 [ 174.854315][ T9784] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x81/0x610 [ 174.854323][ T9784] ? __phys_addr+0xe8/0x180 [ 174.854330][ T9784] ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360 [ 174.854337][ T9784] kasan_report+0xc6/0x100 [ 174.854346][ T9784] ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360 [ 174.854354][ T9784] hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360 [ 174.854362][ T9784] hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x2ec/0x380 [ 174.854370][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854377][ T9784] ? hfsplus_bnode_write_u16+0x83/0xb0 [ 174.854385][ T9784] ? srcu_gp_start+0xd0/0x310 [ 174.854393][ T9784] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40 [ 174.854402][ T9784] hfsplus_brec_remove+0x3d2/0x4e0 [ 174.854411][ T9784] __hfsplus_delete_attr+0x290/0x3a0 [ 174.854419][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfs_find_1st_rec_by_cnid+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854427][ T9784] ? __pfx___hfsplus_delete_attr+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854436][ T9784] ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50 [ 174.854450][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x262/0x320 [ 174.854459][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854469][ T9784] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 174.854476][ T9784] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40 [ 174.854483][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_cat+0x845/0xde0 [ 174.854493][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_cat+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854507][ T9784] hfsplus_unlink+0x1ca/0x7c0 [ 174.854516][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_unlink+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854525][ T9784] ? down_write+0x148/0x200 [ 174.854532][ T9784] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854540][ T9784] vfs_unlink+0x2fe/0x9b0 [ 174.854549][ T9784] do_unlinkat+0x490/0x670 [ 174.854557][ T9784] ? __pfx_do_unlinkat+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854565][ T9784] ? __might_fault+0xbc/0x130 [ 174.854576][ T9784] ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550 [ 174.854584][ T9784] __x64_sys_unlink+0xc5/0x110 [ 174.854592][ T9784] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480 [ 174.854600][ T9784] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 174.854608][ T9784] RIP: 0033:0x7f6fdf4c3167 [ 174.854614][ T9784] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 26 0d 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 08 [ 174.854622][ T9784] RSP: 002b:00007ffcb948bca8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057 [ 174.854630][ T9784] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f6fdf4c3167 [ 174.854636][ T9784] RDX: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RSI: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RDI: 00007ffcb948bd50 [ 174.854641][ T9784] RBP: 00007ffcb948cd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffcb948bb40 [ 174.854645][ T9784] R10: 00007f6fdf564fc0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561e1bc9c2d0 [ 174.854650][ T9784] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 174.854658][ T9784] </TASK> [ 174.854661][ T9784] [ 174.879281][ T9784] Allocated by task 9784: [ 174.879664][ T9784] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 174.880082][ T9784] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 174.880500][ T9784] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 [ 174.880908][ T9784] __kmalloc_noprof+0x205/0x550 [ 174.881337][ T9784] __hfs_bnode_create+0x107/0x890 [ 174.881779][ T9784] hfsplus_bnode_find+0x2d0/0xd10 [ 174.882222][ T9784] hfsplus_brec_find+0x2b0/0x520 [ 174.882659][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x23b/0x320 [ 174.883144][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_cat+0x845/0xde0 [ 174.883595][ T9784] hfsplus_rmdir+0x106/0x1b0 [ 174.884004][ T9784] vfs_rmdir+0x206/0x690 [ 174.884379][ T9784] do_rmdir+0x2b7/0x390 [ 174.884751][ T9784] __x64_sys_rmdir+0xc5/0x110 [ 174.885167][ T9784] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480 [ 174.885568][ T9784] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 174.886083][ T9784] [ 174.886293][ T9784] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810b5fc600 [ 174.886293][ T9784] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192 [ 174.887507][ T9784] The buggy address is located 40 bytes to the right of [ 174.887507][ T9784] allocated 152-byte region [ffff88810b5fc600, ffff88810b5fc698) [ 174.888766][ T9784] [ 174.888976][ T9784] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 174.889533][ T9784] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10b5fc [ 174.890295][ T9784] flags: 0x57ff00000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff) [ 174.890927][ T9784] page_type: f5(slab) [ 174.891284][ T9784] raw: 057ff00000000000 ffff88801b4423c0 ffffea000426dc80 dead000000000002 [ 174.892032][ T9784] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 [ 174.892774][ T9784] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 174.893327][ T9784] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [ 174.893825][ T9784] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52c00(GFP_NOIO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NO1 [ 174.895373][ T9784] post_alloc_hook+0x1c0/0x230 [ 174.895801][ T9784] get_page_from_freelist+0xdeb/0x3b30 [ 174.896284][ T9784] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x25c/0x2460 [ 174.896810][ T9784] alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fb/0x550 [ 174.897242][ T9784] new_slab+0x23b/0x340 [ 174.897614][ T9784] ___slab_alloc+0xd81/0x1960 [ 174.898028][ T9784] __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x56/0xb0 [ 174.898468][ T9784] __kmalloc_noprof+0x2b0/0x550 [ 174.898896][ T9784] usb_alloc_urb+0x73/0xa0 [ 174.899289][ T9784] usb_control_msg+0x1cb/0x4a0 [ 174.899718][ T9784] usb_get_string+0xab/0x1a0 [ 174.900133][ T9784] usb_string_sub+0x107/0x3c0 [ 174.900549][ T9784] usb_string+0x307/0x670 [ 174.900933][ T9784] usb_cache_string+0x80/0x150 [ 174.901355][ T9784] usb_new_device+0x1d0/0x19d0 [ 174.901786][ T9784] register_root_hub+0x299/0x730 [ 174.902231][ T9784] page last free pid 10 tgid 10 stack trace: [ 174.902757][ T9784] __free_frozen_pages+0x80c/0x1250 [ 174.903217][ T9784] vfree.part.0+0x12b/0xab0 [ 174.903645][ T9784] delayed_vfree_work+0x93/0xd0 [ 174.904073][ T9784] process_one_work+0x9b5/0x1b80 [ 174.904519][ T9784] worker_thread+0x630/0xe60 [ 174.904927][ T9784] kthread+0x3a8/0x770 [ 174.905291][ T9784] ret_from_fork+0x517/0x6e0 [ 174.905709][ T9784] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 174.906128][ T9784] [ 174.906338][ T9784] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 174.906828][ T9784] ffff88810b5fc580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 174.907528][ T9784] ffff88810b5fc600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 174.908222][ T9784] >ffff88810b5fc680: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 174.908917][ T9784] ^ [ 174.909481][ T9784] ffff88810b5fc700: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 174.910432][ T9784] ffff88810b5fc780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 174.911401][ T9784] ================================================================== The reason of the issue that code doesn't check the correctness of the requested offset and length. As a result, incorrect value of offset or/and length could result in access out of allocated memory. This patch introduces is_bnode_offset_valid() method that checks the requested offset value. Also, it introduces check_and_correct_requested_length() method that checks and correct the requested length (if it is necessary). These methods are used in hfsplus_bnode_read(), hfsplus_bnode_write(), hfsplus_bnode_clear(), hfsplus_bnode_copy(), and hfsplus_bnode_move() with the goal to prevent the access out of allocated memory and triggering the crash. Reported-by: Kun Hu <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jiaji Qin <[email protected]> Reported-by: Shuoran Bai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-427.37.1.el9_4 commit-author Dawid Osuchowski <[email protected]> commit d11a676 Ethtool callbacks can be executed while reset is in progress and try to access deleted resources, e.g. getting coalesce settings can result in a NULL pointer dereference seen below. Reproduction steps: Once the driver is fully initialized, trigger reset: # echo 1 > /sys/class/net/<interface>/device/reset when reset is in progress try to get coalesce settings using ethtool: # ethtool -c <interface> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 11 PID: 19713 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G S 6.10.0-rc7+ #7 RIP: 0010:ice_get_q_coalesce+0x2e/0xa0 [ice] RSP: 0018:ffffbab1e9bcf6a8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: ffff94512305b028 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RDI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff9451c3f2e580 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff945121fa9000 R13: ffffbab1e9bcf760 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: ffffffff9e65dd40 FS: 00007faee5fbe740(0000) GS:ffff94546fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000106c2e005 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ice_get_coalesce+0x17/0x30 [ice] coalesce_prepare_data+0x61/0x80 ethnl_default_doit+0xde/0x340 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xf2/0x150 genl_rcv_msg+0x1b3/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5b/0x110 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x290 netlink_sendmsg+0x222/0x490 __sys_sendto+0x1df/0x1f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7faee60d8e27 Calling netif_device_detach() before reset makes the net core not call the driver when ethtool command is issued, the attempt to execute an ethtool command during reset will result in the following message: netlink error: No such device instead of NULL pointer dereference. Once reset is done and ice_rebuild() is executing, the netif_device_attach() is called to allow for ethtool operations to occur again in a safe manner. Fixes: fcea6f3 ("ice: Add stats and ethtool support") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Igor Bagnucki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dawid Osuchowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit d11a676) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-4076 cve CVE-2025-38472 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-6.12.0-55.30.1.el10_0 commit-author Florian Westphal <[email protected]> commit 2d72afb A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry. Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence: 1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects. This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes. Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 2d72afb) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira VULN-49907 jira VULN-49906 cve CVE-2022-49111 commit-author Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> commit f63d24b This fixes the following trace caused by receiving HCI_EV_DISCONN_PHY_LINK_COMPLETE which does call hci_conn_del without first checking if conn->type is in fact AMP_LINK and in case it is do properly cleanup upper layers with hci_disconn_cfm: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e404818 by task bluetoothd/142 CPU: 0 PID: 142 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-00006-gda4022eeac1a #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 l2cap_do_send+0x23f/0x3d0 l2cap_chan_send+0xc06/0x2cc0 l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x201/0x2b0 sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0x110 sock_write_iter+0x20f/0x370 do_iter_readv_writev+0x343/0x690 do_iter_write+0x132/0x640 vfs_writev+0x198/0x570 do_writev+0x202/0x280 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RSP: 002b:00007ffce8a099b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffce8a099e0 RDI: 0000000000000015 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce8a099e0 RCX: 00007f788fc3cf77 R10: 00007ffce8af7080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e4ccf75580 RBP: 0000000000000015 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001 </TASK> R13: 000055e4ccf754a0 R14: 000055e4ccf75cd0 R15: 000055e4ccf4a6b0 Allocated by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x2f0 l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdc0 l2cap_connect_cfm+0x236/0x1000 le_conn_complete_evt+0x15a7/0x1db0 hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x226/0x2c0 hci_le_meta_evt+0x247/0x450 hci_event_packet+0x61b/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Freed by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130 kfree+0xac/0x350 hci_conn_cleanup+0x101/0x6a0 hci_conn_del+0x27e/0x6c0 hci_disconn_phylink_complete_evt+0xe0/0x120 hci_event_packet+0x812/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f0500 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address belongs to the page: 128-byte region [ffff88800c0f0500, ffff88800c0f0580) flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) page:00000000fe45cd86 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xc0f0 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00003a2c80 dead000000000004 ffff8880078418c0 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected ffff88800c0f0400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc Memory state around the buggy address: >ffff88800c0f0500: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88800c0f0480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88800c0f0580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ================================================================== ffff88800c0f0600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Reported-by: Sönke Huster <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sönke Huster <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f63d24b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106441 CVE: CVE-2025-38472 Upstream Status: commit 2d72afb commit 2d72afb Author: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Date: Wed Jul 16 20:39:14 2025 +0200 netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix crash due to removal of uninitialised entry A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry. Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence: 1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects. This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes. Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106430 CVE: CVE-2025-38472 commit 2d72afb Author: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Date: Wed Jul 16 20:39:14 2025 +0200 netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix crash due to removal of uninitialised entry A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry. Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence: 1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects. This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes. Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-108616 commit d093c90 Author: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]> Date: Fri Jan 17 11:32:58 2025 -0500 nfsd: fix management of listener transports Currently, when no active threads are running, a root user using nfsdctl command can try to remove a particular listener from the list of previously added ones, then start the server by increasing the number of threads, it leads to the following problem: [ 158.835354] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. [ 158.835603] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 9145 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0 [ 158.836017] Modules linked in: rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace overlay isofs uinput snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 rfkill ip_set nf_tables qrtr sunrpc vfat fat uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 videodev videobuf2_common snd_hda_codec_generic mc e1000e snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore sg loop dm_multipath dm_mod nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce vmwgfx sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sr_mod sha1_ce cdrom nvme drm_client_lib drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_core drm_kms_helper nvme_auth drm fuse [ 158.840093] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 9145 Comm: nfsd Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B W 6.13.0-rc6+ #7 [ 158.840624] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN [ 158.840802] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/VBSA, BIOS VMW201.00V.24006586.BA64.2406042154 06/04/2024 [ 158.841220] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 158.841563] pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0 [ 158.841780] lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0 [ 158.842000] sp : ffff800089be7d80 [ 158.842147] x29: ffff800089be7d80 x28: ffff00008e68c148 x27: ffff00008e68c148 [ 158.842492] x26: ffff0002e3b5c000 x25: ffff600011cd1829 x24: ffff00008653c010 [ 158.842832] x23: ffff00008653c000 x22: 1fffe00011cd1829 x21: ffff00008653c028 [ 158.843175] x20: 0000000000000002 x19: ffff00008653c010 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 158.843505] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 158.843836] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: ffff600050a26493 [ 158.844143] x11: 1fffe00050a26492 x10: ffff600050a26492 x9 : dfff800000000000 [ 158.844475] x8 : 00009fffaf5d9b6e x7 : ffff000285132493 x6 : 0000000000000001 [ 158.844823] x5 : ffff000285132490 x4 : ffff600050a26493 x3 : ffff8000805e72bc [ 158.845174] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000098588000 [ 158.845528] Call trace: [ 158.845658] refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0 (P) [ 158.845894] svc_recv+0x58c/0x680 [sunrpc] [ 158.846183] nfsd+0x1fc/0x348 [nfsd] [ 158.846390] kthread+0x274/0x2f8 [ 158.846546] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 158.846714] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() would manipulate the list of transports of server's sv_permsocks and close the specified listener but the other list of transports (server's sp_xprts list) would not be changed leading to the problem above. Instead, determined if the nfsdctl is trying to remove a listener, in which case, delete all the existing listener transports and re-create all-but-the-removed ones. Fixes: 16a4711 ("NFSD: add listener-{set,get} netlink command") Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <[email protected]>

…ised entry MR: https://gitlab.com/redhat/rhel/src/kernel/rhel-9/-/merge_requests/4443 JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106430 CVE: CVE-2025-38472 commit 2d72afb Author: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Date: Wed Jul 16 20:39:14 2025 +0200 netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix crash due to removal of uninitialised entry A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry. Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence: 1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects. This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes. Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Closes RHEL-106430 Approved-by: Murphy Zhou <[email protected]> Approved-by: Phil Sutter <[email protected]> Approved-by: CKI KWF Bot <[email protected]> Merged-by: Augusto Caringi <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-105420 commit e4d4648 Author: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Date: Tue Jan 28 00:02:01 2025 +0300 platform/x86: ideapad-laptop: pass a correct pointer to the driver data devm_platform_profile_register() expects a pointer to the private driver data but instead an address of the pointer variable is passed due to a typo. This leads to the crashes later: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000fe0d0044 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1284 Comm: tuned Tainted: G W 6.13.0+ #7 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: LENOVO 21D0/LNVNB161216, BIOS J6CN45WW 03/17/2023 RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x6bf/0x7f0 Call Trace: <TASK> dytc_profile_set+0x4a/0x140 [ideapad_laptop] _store_and_notify+0x13/0x40 [platform_profile] class_for_each_device+0x145/0x180 platform_profile_store+0xc0/0x130 [platform_profile] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13e/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x290/0x450 ksys_write+0x6c/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 249c576 ("ACPI: platform_profile: Let drivers set drvdata to the class device") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kurt Borja <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Arcari <[email protected]>

jira LE-4311 cve CVE-2025-38472 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-570.49.1.el9_6 commit-author Florian Westphal <[email protected]> commit 2d72afb A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry. Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence: 1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects. This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes. Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 2d72afb) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

When s_start() fails to allocate memory for set_event_iter, it returns NULL before acquiring event_mutex. However, the corresponding s_stop() function always tries to unlock the mutex, causing a lock imbalance warning: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! 6.17.0-rc7-00175-g2b2e0c04f78c #7 Not tainted ------------------------------------- syz.0.85611/376514 is trying to release lock (event_mutex) at: [<ffffffff8dafc7a4>] traverse.part.0.constprop.0+0x2c4/0x650 fs/seq_file.c:131 but there are no more locks to release! The issue was introduced by commit b355247 ("tracing: Cache ':mod:' events for modules not loaded yet") which added the kzalloc() allocation before the mutex lock, creating a path where s_start() could return without locking the mutex while s_stop() would still try to unlock it. Fix this by unconditionally acquiring the mutex immediately after allocation, regardless of whether the allocation succeeded. Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: b355247 ("tracing: Cache ":mod:" events for modules not loaded yet") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 #8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 #9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 #10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]

The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events fails. Before: ``` $ perf test -vv 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: --- start --- test child forked, pid 1189568 Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/ ..after resolving event: software/config=0/ cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/ ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE) size 136 config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY) sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU read_format ID|LOST disabled 1 inherit 1 mmap 1 comm 1 enable_on_exec 1 task 1 sample_id_all 1 mmap2 1 comm_exec 1 ksymbol 1 bpf_event 1 { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 perf_evlist__open: Permission denied ---- end(-2) ---- Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]' ---- unexpected signal (6) ---- iFailed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311 #1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44 #3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27 #4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81 #5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226 #6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344 #7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128 #8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545 #9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647 #10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849 #11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349 #12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 #13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448 #14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555 #15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 #16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 #17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1] 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED! ``` After: ``` $ perf test 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <[email protected]> Cc: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

jira VULN-89209 cve CVE-2025-38472 commit-author Florian Westphal <[email protected]> commit 2d72afb A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry. Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence: 1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects. This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes. Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 2d72afb) Signed-off-by: Brett Mastbergen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 48918ca ] The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events fails. Before: ``` $ perf test -vv 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: --- start --- test child forked, pid 1189568 Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/ ..after resolving event: software/config=0/ cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/ ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE) size 136 config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY) sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU read_format ID|LOST disabled 1 inherit 1 mmap 1 comm 1 enable_on_exec 1 task 1 sample_id_all 1 mmap2 1 comm_exec 1 ksymbol 1 bpf_event 1 { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 perf_evlist__open: Permission denied ---- end(-2) ---- Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]' ---- unexpected signal (6) ---- iFailed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311 #1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44 #3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27 #4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81 #5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226 #6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344 #7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128 #8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545 #9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647 #10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849 #11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349 #12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 #13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448 #14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555 #15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 #16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 #17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1] 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED! ``` After: ``` $ perf test 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <[email protected]> Cc: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 0570327 upstream. Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 #8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 #9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 #10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

jira VULN-49908 cve CVE-2022-49111 commit-author Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> commit f63d24b This fixes the following trace caused by receiving HCI_EV_DISCONN_PHY_LINK_COMPLETE which does call hci_conn_del without first checking if conn->type is in fact AMP_LINK and in case it is do properly cleanup upper layers with hci_disconn_cfm: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e404818 by task bluetoothd/142 CPU: 0 PID: 142 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-00006-gda4022eeac1a #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b hci_send_acl+0xaba/0xc50 l2cap_do_send+0x23f/0x3d0 l2cap_chan_send+0xc06/0x2cc0 l2cap_sock_sendmsg+0x201/0x2b0 sock_sendmsg+0xdc/0x110 sock_write_iter+0x20f/0x370 do_iter_readv_writev+0x343/0x690 do_iter_write+0x132/0x640 vfs_writev+0x198/0x570 do_writev+0x202/0x280 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RSP: 002b:00007ffce8a099b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffce8a099e0 RDI: 0000000000000015 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce8a099e0 RCX: 00007f788fc3cf77 R10: 00007ffce8af7080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e4ccf75580 RBP: 0000000000000015 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001 </TASK> R13: 000055e4ccf754a0 R14: 000055e4ccf75cd0 R15: 000055e4ccf4a6b0 Allocated by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 hci_chan_create+0x9a/0x2f0 l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1a/0xdc0 l2cap_connect_cfm+0x236/0x1000 le_conn_complete_evt+0x15a7/0x1db0 hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x226/0x2c0 hci_le_meta_evt+0x247/0x450 hci_event_packet+0x61b/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Freed by task 45: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130 kfree+0xac/0x350 hci_conn_cleanup+0x101/0x6a0 hci_conn_del+0x27e/0x6c0 hci_disconn_phylink_complete_evt+0xe0/0x120 hci_event_packet+0x812/0xe90 hci_rx_work+0x4d5/0xc50 process_one_work+0x8fb/0x15a0 worker_thread+0x576/0x1240 kthread+0x29d/0x340 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f0500 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address belongs to the page: 128-byte region [ffff88800c0f0500, ffff88800c0f0580) flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) page:00000000fe45cd86 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xc0f0 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 raw: 0100000000000200 ffffea00003a2c80 dead000000000004 ffff8880078418c0 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected ffff88800c0f0400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc Memory state around the buggy address: >ffff88800c0f0500: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88800c0f0480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88800c0f0580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ================================================================== ffff88800c0f0600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Reported-by: Sönke Huster <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sönke Huster <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f63d24b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira VULN-89210 cve CVE-2025-38472 commit-author Florian Westphal <[email protected]> commit 2d72afb A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry. Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence: 1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects. This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes. Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 2d72afb) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-78203 commit ee684de Author: Viktor Malik <[email protected]> Date: Tue Apr 15 17:50:14 2025 +0200 libbpf: Fix buffer overflow in bpf_object__init_prog As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-112997 commit ffa1e7a Author: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Date: Tue Mar 18 10:55:48 2025 +0100 block: Make request_queue lockdep splats show up earlier In recent kernels, there are lockdep splats around the struct request_queue::io_lockdep_map, similar to [1], but they typically don't show up until reclaim with writeback happens. Having multiple kernel versions released with a known risc of kernel deadlock during reclaim writeback should IMHO be addressed and backported to -stable with the highest priority. In order to have these lockdep splats show up earlier, preferrably during system initialization, prime the struct request_queue::io_lockdep_map as GFP_KERNEL reclaim- tainted. This will instead lead to lockdep splats looking similar to [2], but without the need for reclaim + writeback happening. [1]: [ 189.762244] ====================================================== [ 189.762432] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 189.762441] 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #6 Tainted: G U [ 189.762450] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 189.762459] kswapd0/119 is trying to acquire lock: [ 189.762467] ffff888110ceb710 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#26){++++}-{0:0}, at: __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.762485] but task is already holding lock: [ 189.762494] ffffffff834c97c0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0xbe/0xb00 [ 189.762507] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 189.762519] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 189.762529] -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 189.762540] fs_reclaim_acquire+0xc5/0x100 [ 189.762548] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x4a/0x480 [ 189.762558] alloc_inode+0xaa/0xe0 [ 189.762566] iget_locked+0x157/0x330 [ 189.762573] kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x110 [ 189.762582] kernfs_get_tree+0x1b0/0x2e0 [ 189.762590] sysfs_get_tree+0x1f/0x60 [ 189.762597] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xf0 [ 189.762605] path_mount+0x4cd/0xc00 [ 189.762613] __x64_sys_mount+0x119/0x150 [ 189.762621] x64_sys_call+0x14f2/0x2310 [ 189.762630] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 189.762637] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 189.762647] -> #1 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 189.762659] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [ 189.762667] kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 189.762676] sysfs_remove_dir+0x4f/0x60 [ 189.762685] __kobject_del+0x33/0xa0 [ 189.762709] kobject_del+0x13/0x30 [ 189.762716] elv_unregister_queue+0x52/0x80 [ 189.762725] elevator_switch+0x68/0x360 [ 189.762733] elv_iosched_store+0x14b/0x1b0 [ 189.762756] queue_attr_store+0x181/0x1e0 [ 189.762765] sysfs_kf_write+0x49/0x80 [ 189.762773] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17d/0x250 [ 189.762781] vfs_write+0x281/0x540 [ 189.762790] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 189.762798] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 [ 189.762807] x64_sys_call+0x2a3/0x2310 [ 189.762815] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 189.762823] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 189.762833] -> #0 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#26){++++}-{0:0}: [ 189.762845] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 189.762854] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 189.762861] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x8a2/0xba0 [ 189.762870] __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.762878] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x323/0x430 [ 189.762888] submit_bio_noacct+0x2cc/0x620 [ 189.762896] submit_bio+0x38/0x110 [ 189.762904] __swap_writepage+0xf5/0x380 [ 189.762912] swap_writepage+0x3c7/0x600 [ 189.762920] shmem_writepage+0x3da/0x4f0 [ 189.762929] pageout+0x13f/0x310 [ 189.762937] shrink_folio_list+0x61c/0xf60 [ 189.763261] evict_folios+0x378/0xcd0 [ 189.763584] try_to_shrink_lruvec+0x1b0/0x360 [ 189.763946] shrink_one+0x10e/0x200 [ 189.764266] shrink_node+0xc02/0x1490 [ 189.764586] balance_pgdat+0x563/0xb00 [ 189.764934] kswapd+0x1e8/0x430 [ 189.765249] kthread+0x10b/0x260 [ 189.765559] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 189.765889] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 189.766198] other info that might help us debug this: [ 189.767089] Chain exists of: &q->q_usage_counter(io)#26 --> &root->kernfs_rwsem --> fs_reclaim [ 189.767971] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 189.768555] CPU0 CPU1 [ 189.768849] ---- ---- [ 189.769136] lock(fs_reclaim); [ 189.769421] lock(&root->kernfs_rwsem); [ 189.769714] lock(fs_reclaim); [ 189.770016] rlock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)#26); [ 189.770305] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 189.771167] 1 lock held by kswapd0/119: [ 189.771453] #0: ffffffff834c97c0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0xbe/0xb00 [ 189.771770] stack backtrace: [ 189.772351] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G U 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #6 [ 189.772353] Tainted: [U]=USER [ 189.772354] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023 [ 189.772354] Call Trace: [ 189.772355] <TASK> [ 189.772356] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 [ 189.772359] dump_stack+0x10/0x18 [ 189.772360] print_circular_bug.cold+0x17a/0x1b7 [ 189.772363] check_noncircular+0x13a/0x150 [ 189.772365] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772368] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 189.772368] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 189.772371] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 189.772372] ? __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.772375] ? lock_release+0xd5/0x2c0 [ 189.772376] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x8a2/0xba0 [ 189.772378] ? __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.772380] __submit_bio+0x76/0x230 [ 189.772382] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xe0 [ 189.772384] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x323/0x430 [ 189.772386] ? submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x323/0x430 [ 189.772387] ? __might_sleep+0x58/0xa0 [ 189.772390] submit_bio_noacct+0x2cc/0x620 [ 189.772391] ? count_memcg_events+0x68/0x90 [ 189.772393] submit_bio+0x38/0x110 [ 189.772395] __swap_writepage+0xf5/0x380 [ 189.772396] swap_writepage+0x3c7/0x600 [ 189.772397] shmem_writepage+0x3da/0x4f0 [ 189.772401] pageout+0x13f/0x310 [ 189.772406] shrink_folio_list+0x61c/0xf60 [ 189.772409] ? isolate_folios+0xe80/0x16b0 [ 189.772410] ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 [ 189.772412] evict_folios+0x378/0xcd0 [ 189.772414] ? evict_folios+0x34a/0xcd0 [ 189.772415] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa3/0x130 [ 189.772417] try_to_shrink_lruvec+0x1b0/0x360 [ 189.772420] shrink_one+0x10e/0x200 [ 189.772421] shrink_node+0xc02/0x1490 [ 189.772423] ? shrink_node+0xa08/0x1490 [ 189.772424] ? shrink_node+0xbd8/0x1490 [ 189.772425] ? mem_cgroup_iter+0x366/0x480 [ 189.772427] balance_pgdat+0x563/0xb00 [ 189.772428] ? balance_pgdat+0x563/0xb00 [ 189.772430] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xe0 [ 189.772431] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xcb/0x330 [ 189.772433] ? __switch_to_asm+0x33/0x70 [ 189.772437] kswapd+0x1e8/0x430 [ 189.772438] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772440] ? __pfx_kswapd+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772441] kthread+0x10b/0x260 [ 189.772443] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772444] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 189.772446] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 189.772447] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 189.772450] </TASK> [2]: [ 8.760253] ====================================================== [ 8.760254] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 8.760255] 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #7 Tainted: G U [ 8.760256] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 8.760257] (udev-worker)/674 is trying to acquire lock: [ 8.760259] ffff888100e39148 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760265] but task is already holding lock: [ 8.760266] ffff888110dc7680 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#27){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x12/0x30 [ 8.760272] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 8.760272] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 8.760273] -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#27){++++}-{0:0}: [ 8.760276] blk_alloc_queue+0x30a/0x350 [ 8.760279] blk_mq_alloc_queue+0x6b/0xe0 [ 8.760281] scsi_alloc_sdev+0x276/0x3c0 [ 8.760284] scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x22a/0x440 [ 8.760286] __scsi_scan_target+0x109/0x230 [ 8.760288] scsi_scan_channel+0x65/0xc0 [ 8.760290] scsi_scan_host_selected+0xff/0x140 [ 8.760292] do_scsi_scan_host+0xa7/0xc0 [ 8.760293] do_scan_async+0x1c/0x160 [ 8.760295] async_run_entry_fn+0x32/0x150 [ 8.760299] process_one_work+0x224/0x5f0 [ 8.760302] worker_thread+0x1d4/0x3e0 [ 8.760304] kthread+0x10b/0x260 [ 8.760306] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 8.760309] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 8.760312] -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 8.760315] fs_reclaim_acquire+0xc5/0x100 [ 8.760317] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x4a/0x480 [ 8.760319] alloc_inode+0xaa/0xe0 [ 8.760322] iget_locked+0x157/0x330 [ 8.760323] kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x110 [ 8.760325] kernfs_get_tree+0x1b0/0x2e0 [ 8.760327] sysfs_get_tree+0x1f/0x60 [ 8.760329] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xf0 [ 8.760332] path_mount+0x4cd/0xc00 [ 8.760334] __x64_sys_mount+0x119/0x150 [ 8.760336] x64_sys_call+0x14f2/0x2310 [ 8.760338] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 8.760340] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 8.760342] -> #0 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 8.760345] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 8.760347] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 8.760348] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [ 8.760350] kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760351] sysfs_remove_dir+0x4f/0x60 [ 8.760353] __kobject_del+0x33/0xa0 [ 8.760355] kobject_del+0x13/0x30 [ 8.760356] elv_unregister_queue+0x52/0x80 [ 8.760358] elevator_switch+0x68/0x360 [ 8.760360] elv_iosched_store+0x14b/0x1b0 [ 8.760362] queue_attr_store+0x181/0x1e0 [ 8.760364] sysfs_kf_write+0x49/0x80 [ 8.760366] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17d/0x250 [ 8.760367] vfs_write+0x281/0x540 [ 8.760370] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 8.760372] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 [ 8.760374] x64_sys_call+0x2a3/0x2310 [ 8.760376] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 8.760377] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 8.760380] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8.760380] Chain exists of: &root->kernfs_rwsem --> fs_reclaim --> &q->q_usage_counter(io)#27 [ 8.760384] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 8.760384] CPU0 CPU1 [ 8.760385] ---- ---- [ 8.760385] lock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)#27); [ 8.760387] lock(fs_reclaim); [ 8.760388] lock(&q->q_usage_counter(io)#27); [ 8.760390] lock(&root->kernfs_rwsem); [ 8.760391] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 8.760391] 6 locks held by (udev-worker)/674: [ 8.760392] #0: ffff8881209ac420 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 8.760398] #1: ffff88810c80f488 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x136/0x250 [ 8.760402] #2: ffff888125d1d330 (kn->active#101){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13f/0x250 [ 8.760406] #3: ffff888110dc7bb0 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: queue_attr_store+0x148/0x1e0 [ 8.760411] #4: ffff888110dc7680 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#27){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x12/0x30 [ 8.760416] #5: ffff888110dc76b8 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#27){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_freeze_queue_nomemsave+0x12/0x30 [ 8.760421] stack backtrace: [ 8.760422] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 674 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G U 6.14.0-rc6-xe+ #7 [ 8.760424] Tainted: [U]=USER [ 8.760425] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023 [ 8.760426] Call Trace: [ 8.760427] <TASK> [ 8.760428] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 [ 8.760431] dump_stack+0x10/0x18 [ 8.760433] print_circular_bug.cold+0x17a/0x1b7 [ 8.760437] check_noncircular+0x13a/0x150 [ 8.760441] ? save_trace+0x54/0x360 [ 8.760445] __lock_acquire+0x1525/0x2760 [ 8.760446] ? irqentry_exit+0x3a/0xb0 [ 8.760448] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [ 8.760452] lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 8.760453] ? kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760457] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [ 8.760459] ? kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760460] kernfs_remove+0x32/0x60 [ 8.760462] sysfs_remove_dir+0x4f/0x60 [ 8.760464] __kobject_del+0x33/0xa0 [ 8.760466] kobject_del+0x13/0x30 [ 8.760467] elv_unregister_queue+0x52/0x80 [ 8.760470] elevator_switch+0x68/0x360 [ 8.760472] elv_iosched_store+0x14b/0x1b0 [ 8.760475] queue_attr_store+0x181/0x1e0 [ 8.760479] ? lock_acquire+0xca/0x310 [ 8.760480] ? kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13f/0x250 [ 8.760482] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa3/0x130 [ 8.760485] sysfs_kf_write+0x49/0x80 [ 8.760487] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17d/0x250 [ 8.760489] vfs_write+0x281/0x540 [ 8.760494] ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 [ 8.760497] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 [ 8.760499] x64_sys_call+0x2a3/0x2310 [ 8.760502] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 [ 8.760504] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x5d/0xe0 [ 8.760506] ? handle_softirqs+0x479/0x4d0 [ 8.760508] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x13f/0x280 [ 8.760511] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x8b/0x260 [ 8.760513] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70 [ 8.760515] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70 [ 8.760516] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x15/0x70 [ 8.760518] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 8.760520] RIP: 0033:0x7aa3bf2f5504 [ 8.760522] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 8b 10 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 [ 8.760523] RSP: 002b:00007ffc1e3697d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 8.760526] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007aa3bf2f5504 [ 8.760527] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc1e369ae0 RDI: 000000000000001c [ 8.760528] RBP: 00007ffc1e369800 R08: 00007aa3bf3f51c8 R09: 00007ffc1e3698b0 [ 8.760528] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 8.760529] R13: 00007ffc1e369ae0 R14: 0000613ccf21f2f0 R15: 00007aa3bf3f4e80 [ 8.760533] </TASK> v2: - Update a code comment to increase readability (Ming Lei). Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>

jira VULN-89210 cve CVE-2025-38472 commit-author Florian Westphal <[email protected]> commit 2d72afb A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry. Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence: 1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects. This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes. Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 2d72afb) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <[email protected]>

gvrose8192 requested a review from PlaidCat November 6, 2024 19:09

PlaidCat approved these changes Nov 6, 2024

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PlaidCat changed the title ~~Fix CVE-2024-27397~~ FIPS-8 Legacy: CVE-2024-27397 Nov 6, 2024

gvrose8192 merged commit 4675fc2 into fips-legacy-8-compliant/4.18.0-425.13.1 Nov 6, 2024
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gvrose8192 deleted the gvrose_fips-legacy-8-compliant_4.18.0-425.13.1 branch November 6, 2024 22:09

PlaidCat mentioned this pull request Nov 22, 2024

Sync fips legacy 8 compliant 4.18.0 425.13.1.el8.ciqfipscompliant.36.1 ciq-rocky-fips/kernel#15

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gvrose8192 mentioned this pull request Dec 5, 2024

CVE-2023-2163 kernel lts-9.2 fix #19

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FIPS-8 Legacy: CVE-2024-27397 #7

FIPS-8 Legacy: CVE-2024-27397 #7

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gvrose8192 commented Nov 6, 2024 •

edited by PlaidCat

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FIPS-8 Legacy: CVE-2024-27397 #7

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gvrose8192 commented Nov 6, 2024 • edited by PlaidCat Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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gvrose8192 commented Nov 6, 2024

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gvrose8192 commented Nov 6, 2024 •

edited by PlaidCat

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