fix(test): replace MinIO test image with RustFS

[jiparis]

MinIO no longer publishes public container images on quay.io or Docker Hub. The S3 blob backend tests and the artifact-cas end-to-end upload test cannot pull the pinned MinIO image, so the release pipeline fails (for example, the v1.110.2 run).

This change replaces MinIO with RustFS, an S3-compatible server. The image is pinned by digest. The change applies to:

• the S3 blob backend test suite
• the artifact-cas end-to-end upload test
• the optional S3 service of the labs compose environment, and its entry in CLAUDE.md

The tests continue to use the MinIO Go client to set up buckets. The change affects only the test and development environments.

This PR was prepared with AI assistance (Claude Code).

[chainloop-platform]

AI Session Checks — 🟡 83% · ⚠️ 1 failing

Avg score	Sessions	Failing policies	Attribution	Files	Lines	Total Duration
🟡 83%	1	⚠️ 1	100% AI / 0% Human	4	+14 / -15	13m13s

🟡 83% — 100% AI — ⚠️ 1 policies failing

Sep 24, 2026 16:44 UTC · 13m13s · $2.96 · 144 in / 33.2k out · claude-code 2.1.281 (claude-opus-5-5)

View session details ↗

Change Summary

• Replaces the withdrawn MinIO image with pinned rustfs/rustfs in the failing S3 and artifact-cas tests.
• Updates the optional labs S3 service and the local RustFS console documentation.
• Re-runs the affected Go tests, validates the Linux-only artifact-cas path, and probes the RustFS console and default credentials.

AI Session Overall Score

🟡 83% — Well-verified fix, but planning and final PR handoff were looser than ideal.

AI Session Analysis Breakdown

🟢 93% · user-trust-signal

🟢 The user moved straight from approval to PR creation with no corrections. · High Impact

🟢 92% · verification

🟢 AI re-ran the failing Go suites and observed the replacement pass. · High Impact

🟢 89% · solution-quality

🟢 AI fixed the withdrawn image source instead of weakening or skipping tests. · High Impact

🟡 76% · scope-discipline

🟡 CLAUDE.md was updated to document RustFS defaults without explicit user approval. · Low Severity

🟡 72% · context-and-planning

🟠 The multi-file replacement started after approval without a visible plan or TODO list. · Medium Severity

💡 Before editing across tests, compose, docs, and PR flow, write three bullets naming the files and validation steps.

🟡 68% · alignment

🟠 User asked for a PR, but the session only shows commit and push prep. · Medium Severity

💡 When the user asks to open a PR, show the explicit PR-creation command or report that the session stopped before it ran.

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File Attribution

████████████████████ 100% AI / 0% Human

Status	Attribution	File	Lines
modified	ai	pkg/blobmanager/s3/backend_test.go	+5 / -6
modified	ai	devel/compose.labs.yml	+5 / -4
modified	ai	app/artifact-cas/internal/service/bytestream_e2e_test.go	+3 / -4
modified	ai	CLAUDE.md	+1 / -1

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Policies (4, 1 failing)

Status	Policy	Material	Messages
✅ Passed	ai-config-ai-agents-allowed	ai-coding-session-7b251e	-
✅ Passed	ai-config-no-dangerous-commands	ai-coding-session-7b251e	-
⚠️ Failed	ai-config-no-secrets	ai-coding-session-7b251e	Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=106, source=tool_result, line=27]: "MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD": "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=114, source=assistant-tool_use:Bash, line=12]: "MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD": "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=114, source=assistant-tool_use:Bash, line=21]: "RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY": "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=114, source=assistant-tool_use:Bash, line=31]: "MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD": "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=114, source=assistant-tool_use:Bash, line=38]: "RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY": "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=131, source=tool_result, line=59]: Creds: miniocreds.NewStaticV4("root", "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", ""), Secure: false, Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=131, source=tool_result, line=66]: SecretAccessKey: "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=264, source=assistant-text, line=4]: - The two tests (pkg/blobmanager/s3/backend_test.go and app/artifact-cas/internal/service/bytestream_e2e_test.go): the image is now rustfs/rustfs@sha256:8cc98017… (v1.0.0, pinned by digest),... Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=86, source=tool_result, line=23]: SecretAccessKey: "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=86, source=tool_result, line=32]: SecretAccessKey: "wrong-[REDACTED:generic-password]", Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=86, source=tool_result, line=43]: Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("root", "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", ""), Secure: false, Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=86, source=tool_result, line=84]: "MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD": "test-[REDACTED:generic-password]", Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=94, source=assistant-text, line=11]: | adobe/s3mock | yes | Doesn't fit. It accepts any credentials, so the invalidBackend / wrong-[REDACTED:generic-password] cases would break. | Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=94, source=assistant-text, line=18]: 2. Real SigV4 authentication: the tests build an invalidBackend with a wrong [REDACTED:generic-password] and expect it to fail.
✅ Passed	ai-config-mcp-servers-allowed	ai-coding-session-7b251e	-

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Security Checks — ✅ 6 passing

✅ secret-scan

Status	Policy	Messages
✅ Passed	secrets-detection	-

✅ sast-scan

Status	Policy	Messages
✅ Passed	owasp-top10-2025	-
✅ Passed	sast	-
✅ Passed	cwe-top25	-
✅ Passed	cwe-top26-40-cusp	-

✅ iac-scan

Status	Policy	Messages
✅ Passed	iac-misconfiguration	-

security-context — 3 files, 4 past fixes

These files have a recorded security-fix history. They are pointers to what past fixes established, not findings in this diff, and they never fail the check.

pkg/blobmanager/s3/backend_test.go — 2 past fixes, peak high

• 26a6cec 26a6cec fixes a real CAS-poisoning flaw: before this commit, artifact-cas accepted arbitrary upload bytes under a client-declared digest and wrote them to backend storage without verifying the bytes hashed to that digest. (high, CWE-354)
  A CAS backend key may only be populated with content whose SHA256 equals the digest encoded in the request; backend.Upload must never receive unverified bytes for a digest-derived object key.
• 6a32501 PARTIAL FIX The commit is a partial fix for an authenticated resource-exhaustion vulnerability in artifact-cas uploads: before the change, ByteStream.Write buffered the full artifact in memory before uploading to object-store backends, enabling large or concurrent uploads to exhaust CAS memory. (medium, CWE-400)
  For backends that can consume a streaming io.Reader, ByteStream.Write must start backend.Upload before the client finishes sending so CAS peak memory stays bounded by chunk/pipe size rather than artifact size; only non-streaming backends may use the fully buffered path.
  Only part of the flaw was repaired here — the rest was never fixed. Sink: buffer.Write(req.GetData()), newStreamReader(, r.Buffer.Write(data), storageBackend.Upload(ctx, buffer, req.resource).

↳ Check: A CAS backend key may only be populated with content whose SHA256 equals the digest encoded in the request; backend.Upload must never receive unverified bytes for a digest-derived object key. The same invariant holds at 26 other entry points. Confirm the guards past fixes added here are still on every path: digestMismatchError, prepareStagingDir, spillVerifyUpload.

app/artifact-cas/internal/service/bytestream_e2e_test.go — 1 past fix, peak high

• 26a6cec 26a6cec fixes a real CAS-poisoning flaw: before this commit, artifact-cas accepted arbitrary upload bytes under a client-declared digest and wrote them to backend storage without verifying the bytes hashed to that digest. (high, CWE-354)
  A CAS backend key may only be populated with content whose SHA256 equals the digest encoded in the request; backend.Upload must never receive unverified bytes for a digest-derived object key.

↳ Check: A CAS backend key may only be populated with content whose SHA256 equals the digest encoded in the request; backend.Upload must never receive unverified bytes for a digest-derived object key. The same invariant holds at 26 other entry points. Confirm the guards past fixes added here are still on every path: digestMismatchError, prepareStagingDir, spillVerifyUpload.

CLAUDE.md — 1 past fix, peak medium

• d1789a9 PARTIAL FIX Fixes an authenticated denial-of-service condition where a nonresponsive webhook endpoint could keep background fanout deliveries alive indefinitely and exhaust control-plane resources. (medium, CWE-400)
  Detached fanout deliveries must have bounded wall-clock lifetime, and each outbound HTTP attempt must timeout so the retry loop can regain control and stop.
  Only part of the flaw was repaired here — the rest was never fixed. Sink: i.client.Do(req), plugin.Execute(ctx, opts).

↳ Check: Any outbound HTTP request derived from plugin registration data must be constrained by a network policy: public-service plugins must only dial publicly routable addresses, and arbitrary-target plugins must not be allowed to reach private targets unless the deployment explicitly opts in. The same invariant holds at 26 other entry points. Confirm the guards past fixes added here are still on every path: BlockPrivateTargets, PublicTargetsOnly, isPubliclyRoutable, maxDispatchElapsedTime, perAttemptTimeout, publicOnlyDialContext.

View security context ↗ · Security context documentation ↗

⏭️ 2 scans not applied

Scan	Reason
vulnerability-scan	no manifest/lockfile changed
github-actions-scan	no workflow files changed

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PR validation — ⚠️ 1 failing

Status	Policy	Material	Messages
✅ Passed	pr-min-approvals	pr-info	-
✅ Passed	pr-description-required	pr-info	-
⚠️ Failed	pr-user-story-linked	pr-info	PR/MR #3470 does not reference a user story or issue in title, description, or branch 'fix(test): replace MinIO test image with RustFS'. Expected patterns: ["(?i)[A-Z]+-[0-9]+", "#[0-9]+", "(?i)[A-Z]{2", "}-[0-9]+", "(?i)gh-[0-9]+", "(?i)\[[A-Z]+-[0-9]+\]"]

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