fix(gateway): screen a code-mode script's final aggregate like a direct result (SBS-881) - #858
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe gateway now defends script-composed aggregate results before attaching metadata. It applies pseudonymization, brand-spoof neutralization, and injection blocking. Tests cover labeled, blocked, exempted, and failure-result paths. ChangesScript Aggregate Defense
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Screening a flagged script aggregate can lose completed-call checkpoint and progress data. Retrying a failed script may then repeat non-idempotent operations, so this should be fixed before merge. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant ScriptPath
participant defend_script_aggregate
participant ContentDefense
participant StructuredResult
ScriptPath->>defend_script_aggregate: submit final aggregate and owner
defend_script_aggregate->>ContentDefense: pseudonymize PII
ContentDefense->>ContentDefense: neutralize brand spoofing
ContentDefense->>ContentDefense: scan and block injection
ContentDefense-->>defend_script_aggregate: defended or blocked result
defend_script_aggregate->>StructuredResult: attach defended result or error payload
Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 0 files. (1 skipped: 1 too large.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1🛠️ Fix failing CI checks 💡
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Inline comments:
In `@src-tauri/src/bin/toolport-gateway.rs`:
- Around line 6582-6590: Update defend_script_aggregate and its caller so
aggregate defense preserves structuredContent.toolportScript.checkpoint,
progress, and the text failure ledger when block mode replaces the result. In
label mode, recompute protected_failure_prefix_bytes from the defended text
before shape_result_preserving_prefix runs, preventing checkpoint truncation.
Add a regression test for a flagged script failure with completed non-idempotent
calls.
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Review of #858: defending the composed failure envelope let a block wipe the Toolport-authored ledger and checkpoint an agent needs to resume without repeating committed side effects, and measured the protected prefix before the wrap was added. The thrown text and the checkpoint are now defended separately, before composition, so a block replaces only the untrusted part. The aggregate is attributed to a NUL-prefixed identity for the exemption lookup and the PII origin, which no registry id can carry, so a server named "Script" can neither lend it an exemption nor receive its pseudonyms.
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…to 404 (SBS-937) The OpenAPI POST handler translated every tools/call envelope into HTTP 200 and only checked the JSON-RPC error slot, which MCP reserves for protocol errors. A timeout, a denied destructive call, a downstream failure or a misspelt tool name all arrived as 200 with the error text as a JSON string, so Open WebUI, n8n and generated clients ran their success path. The spec already promised 400 and 404 for those cases; the handler now honours it by reading the result's isError flag, with the router's no-route wording as the unknown-tool signal.
… result text Review of #857: matching the router's "no route" wording in the result text turned a real tool's error that happened to echo it into a 404. The handler now asks whether the requested name resolves at all (a meta-tool, a grouped browse tool, a live route, or a catalog entry) and uses only that and the isError flag to pick 400 or 404.
Review of #858: defending the composed failure envelope let a block wipe the Toolport-authored ledger and checkpoint an agent needs to resume without repeating committed side effects, and measured the protected prefix before the wrap was added. The thrown text and the checkpoint are now defended separately, before composition, so a block replaces only the untrusted part. The aggregate is attributed to a NUL-prefixed identity for the exemption lookup and the PII origin, which no registry id can carry, so a server named "Script" can neither lend it an exemption nor receive its pseudonyms.
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…ct result (SBS-881) Every intermediate toolport.call result went through defend_and_shape inside execute_call, but the value the script composed from them reached the model with only the size pass: no PII pseudonymization, no brand-spoof neutralization, no injection scan, and block mode never saw it. A payload split across two results that each passed on their own, or a script that trimmed an intermediate's provenance wrapper, arrived unscanned, and the structured copy of the aggregate carried the same text. The aggregate and the failure text now get the same pass, attributed to the script (or routine) rather than to a server so a per-server block exemption cannot cover a multi-server result. Routines share the path and are covered by the same change.
Review of #858: defending the composed failure envelope let a block wipe the Toolport-authored ledger and checkpoint an agent needs to resume without repeating committed side effects, and measured the protected prefix before the wrap was added. The thrown text and the checkpoint are now defended separately, before composition, so a block replaces only the untrusted part. The aggregate is attributed to a NUL-prefixed identity for the exemption lookup and the PII origin, which no registry id can carry, so a server named "Script" can neither lend it an exemption nor receive its pseudonyms.
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What and why
Every intermediate
toolport.callresult inside a code-mode script is defended inexecute_call, but the value the script returns was only shaped for size before reaching the model. No PII pass, no brand-spoof neutralization, no injection scan, so block mode never saw it. That made the script a decapsulation primitive: a payload split across two results that each pass on their own, or a script that trims an intermediate's provenance wrapper, arrived unscanned, andstructuredContent.resultcarried the same text.defend_script_aggregateruns the same PII, neutralization and injection passes asdefend_and_shape, before the Toolport-authored candidate metadata is inserted and before shaping.script(orroutine:<id>) rather than to a server, so a per-server block exemption cannot cover a multi-server result and a PII placeholder minted here only rehydrates through the cross-server gate.Behaviour change to note: in label mode, an aggregate that carries a flagged intermediate now has its text wrapped and its
structuredContentreplaced by the redaction stub, the same as a direct result with a flaggedstructuredContent. The existing routine test was updated to assert that.Testing
cargo test --no-default-features --bin toolport-gateway(341 passed; new test covers label mode, block mode with a per-server exemption, and the failure path)cargo fmt --checkNote
High Risk
Changes content-defense and injection blocking on script output and alters HTTP status semantics for Open WebUI/n8n/OpenAPI integrators; mis-scoping could break clients that assumed 200 meant success.
Overview
Closes two gateway gaps called out in the unreleased changelog: code-mode / routine output and the OpenAPI
POST /{tool}surface.Script and routine results now run the same PII, brand-spoof neutralization, and injection passes as a direct
tools/callresult before shaping. Successful aggregates go throughdefend_script_aggregate; failures defend the thrown error and checkpoint separately so a block can strip untrusted text without wiping Toolport’s recovery ledger. Output is attributed toscriptorroutine:<id>viaScriptOwner(NUL-prefixed identity), so per-server injection exemptions cannot cover multi-server compositions.OpenAPI HTTP clients no longer get 200 when the MCP result has
isError: true.openapi_statusmaps known-tool failures to 400, unknown or out-of-scope names to 404, with{"error": ...}bodies; scoped clients treat invisible tools as 404 so inventory cannot leak across tenants.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit bab8aef. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.
Note
Apply content-defense to script final aggregates and fix OpenAPI tool-call HTTP statuses
ScriptOwneridentity rather than a server's exemptionMacroscope summarized 7aedb63.