@automagik-dev/aegis is maintained by Automagik. We take the security of this package seriously and appreciate responsible disclosure from the community.

Please do not open public issues for security reports.

Send private reports to one of the following channels:

PGP available on request.

• Acknowledgement: within 2 business hours (UTC-3).
• Initial triage and severity assessment: within 24 hours.
• Fix or mitigation plan: within 7 days for critical/high severity.
• Public disclosure: coordinated with reporter, typically within 30 days of fix.

We will credit reporters publicly (with their permission) in the released advisory.

Always install from the current stable line. Pin explicit versions in your package.json and avoid latest for supply-chain sensitive packages.

If you installed a compromised version or need to assess a workstation, developer VM, CI runner, or WSL environment, start with:

aegis scan --all-homes --root "$PWD"

Add one --root per repository or application directory you want scanned. Use --json for machine-readable output.

Interpretation:

• LIKELY COMPROMISED — execution, persistence, .pth, dropped payload, or live-process evidence exists.
• LIKELY AFFECTED — compromised versions were installed or fetched and the host should be treated as exposed.
• OBSERVED ONLY — logs, caches, or lockfiles reference the malicious versions, but stronger execution evidence was not found.
• NO FINDINGS — no incident-specific evidence was found in the scanned scope.

The scanner inventories:

• compromised versions in npm and bun caches plus installed package directories
• shell history, shell startup files, persistence locations, Python .pth injection paths, temp drops, and suspicious live processes
• at-risk local material present on host so operators can see which secret stores, browser profiles, wallets, and local app files were present and should be considered during rotation

If aegis is not available, use the manual procedure in the incident response guide below.

Between 2026-04-21 (~22:14 UTC) and 2026-04-22 (~14:00 UTC), versions 4.260421.33 through 4.260421.40 were published to npm by a threat actor after a developer GitHub OAuth token was exfiltrated. The malicious versions contained a credential harvester that executed via postinstall.

• Exposure window: ~16 hours
• Detection-to-containment: under 20 hours
• Estimated base affected: ≤ 2% of weekly download volume
• Current status: malicious versions npm unpublish-ed and no longer installable

If you installed any version in that range between April 21–22, 2026, run aegis scan --all-homes --root "$PWD" immediately. If the host shows LIKELY COMPROMISED or LIKELY AFFECTED, follow the remediation guide linked below.

Resources:

• 📖 Incident response manual
• 🌐 Public advisory (English)
• 🌐 Aviso público (Português)
• 🛡️ GitHub Security Advisories for this repository

A full public post-mortem will be published within 30 days of containment.

We thank the researchers and organizations that identified and tracked this incident:

• Socket Research Team — primary discovery and continued tracking at socket.dev/supply-chain-attacks/canistersprawl.
• Endor Labs, Kodem Security, BleepingComputer, The Register, CSO Online, GBHackers, Cybersecurity News — for coverage, analysis, and technical breakdowns that helped defenders respond quickly.

We also thank the Automagik team that ran the end-to-end response during the incident window, and the broader open-source community whose scrutiny, tools, and unfiltered feedback keep this ecosystem healthy. We will keep earning it.

Effective 2026-04-23, all @automagik-dev/aegis releases are governed by:

• Provenance attestation — every publication is signed with npm --provenance and verifiable via Sigstore.
• OIDC trusted publishing — migrating to GitHub Actions OIDC publish, eliminating long-lived npm tokens. (in progress)
• Mandatory 2FA on every maintainer account with publish rights.
• Environment protection — production publishes require manual approval from a second maintainer.
• Quarterly token audit — scope and permission review.
• External pentest — scheduled ahead of the original roadmap.

The security-tooling surface shipped with @automagik-dev/aegis is governed by four architectural invariants. Any change that weakens an invariant requires a security-reviewed PR and a SECURITY.md entry documenting the regression.

• The scanner is read-only by design. aegis scan, aegis print-cleanup-commands, and aegis quarantine list inspect the host and emit findings — they never mutate state on the scanned target. GENIE_SEC_SCAN_DISABLED=1 is honored as a global opt-out; the scanner never bypasses it.
• aegis remediate is the only mutating verb. Any future mutating subcommand MUST obey the same six-part contract: (1) dry-run default — --apply is opt-in; (2) frozen plan manifest — actions are materialized once and consented to once; (3) typed per-action consent — the operator acknowledges each mutation class verbatim, not a blanket yes/no; (4) quarantine-by-move — nothing is deleted without a recoverable copy under $GENIE_SEC_QUARANTINE_DIR; (5) signed-channel verification — aegis verify-install must pass before --apply proceeds, or the invocation must use the --unsafe-unverified <INCIDENT_ID> escape hatch with a typed ack; (6) audit-log append-only — every action lands in $GENIE_SEC_AUDIT_LOG with a monotonic sequence number and cannot be rewritten in place.
• Distribution-channel risk is declared, not hidden. @automagik-dev/aegis appears on the scanner's own IOC list for the CanisterWorm compromise window (see Supported Versions). Operators are advised to (a) pin to a post-incident release from the current stable line, (b) run aegis verify-install after install to confirm the binary matches the signed release identity, and (c) treat any --unsafe-unverified invocation as an incident — it must be recorded in the audit log with a typed I_ACKNOWLEDGE_UNSIGNED_AEGIS_<INCIDENT_ID> ack and a matching post-mortem. "The prompt is annoying" is explicitly not a legitimate context for --unsafe-unverified — see docs/incident-response/canisterworm.md for the allow-list.
• IOC-list freshness is tied to release cadence. The scanner's IOC catalogue is baked into the shipped binary; there is no mutable online IOC feed to race against. Operators responding to a fresh advisory must upgrade to a release whose CHANGELOG references the new IOC set, then re-run aegis scan --all-homes --root /. The incident runbook tells operators when to pin to a specific post-incident release.

These invariants apply to every release from 4.260422.x forward. Legacy lines (4.260421.x) predate the invariants and are listed under Supported Versions with appropriate status.

@automagik-dev/aegis releases are signed with cosign keyless via GitHub Actions OIDC. There is no long-lived public key to pin — no private key in repo secrets, no hardware-backed offline key, no two-officer key-custody ceremony. What operators pin instead is the certificate identity + OIDC issuer + provenance source-uri tuple that cosign verify-blob and slsa-verifier must accept. If all three values match across all three pinning channels, the release was signed by the repo's own Actions workflow and by nothing else.

certificate-identity-regexp: ^https://github.com/automagik-dev/aegis/.github/workflows/release.yml@
certificate-oidc-issuer:     https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
provenance source-uri:       github.com/automagik-dev/aegis

These three lines are byte-identical across three independent channels. If any channel drifts, treat all three as compromised and escalate per the runbook.

A fourth in-repo witness — .github/cosign.pub — carries the same values inside a NO-PINNED-KEY sentinel so tooling that naively reads a PEM file fails closed rather than trusting a fabricated key. The CI gate (scripts/check-fingerprint-pinning.sh) asserts all four witnesses agree on every PR that touches any of them.

The canonical verification entry point is scripts/verify-release.sh, which wraps cosign verify-blob + slsa-verifier using the pinned identity above. Exit codes mirror aegis verify-install .

# End-to-end: downloads release assets from GitHub, verifies cosign signature
# + SLSA provenance against the pinned identity.
scripts/verify-release.sh v4.260422.4

# If you already downloaded the tarball + .sig + .cert + provenance.intoto.jsonl:
scripts/verify-release.sh --local /path/to/automagik-dev-aegis-0.1.0.tgz

If you cannot run the wrapper — for example, a locked-down incident-response host — the underlying cosign invocation is the ground truth:

# Cosign keyless signature verification (sole verification path).
# Paste the three pinned lines above into your check; never accept a
# value from any other source.
cosign verify-blob \
  --certificate-identity-regexp "^https://github.com/automagik-dev/aegis/.github/workflows/release.yml@" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer     "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  --signature  automagik-dev-aegis-0.1.0.tgz.sig \
  --certificate automagik-dev-aegis-0.1.0.tgz.cert \
  automagik-dev-aegis-0.1.0.tgz

# SLSA provenance verification.
slsa-verifier verify-artifact automagik-dev-aegis-0.1.0.tgz \
  --provenance-path provenance.intoto.jsonl \
  --source-uri github.com/automagik-dev/aegis

On a host that already has @automagik-dev/aegis installed from a release channel, the shortest check is:

aegis verify-install

Exit codes:

• 0 — verified: signature + provenance both pass against the pinned identity
• 2 — cosign signature verification failed
• 3 — signer identity does not match the pinned regex
• 4 — SLSA provenance verification failed
• 5 — signature material missing (no .sig / .cert / provenance found)

Before trusting a release during incident response, confirm the pin has not drifted:

# Run from a clone of automagik-dev/aegis on a trusted host.
scripts/check-fingerprint-pinning.sh

The script greps each of the four in-repo witnesses (SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt, .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/signing-key-fingerprint.md, .github/cosign.pub) for the three canonical lines above and exits non-zero if any witness is missing a line or carries a divergent value. The same script runs as a GitHub Actions gate (.github/workflows/signing-identity-pin.yml) on every PR that touches any of the pinning channels.

One-liner for operators without the repo cloned (checks the in-repo canonical + the project-site copy):

diff <(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automagik-dev/aegis/main/SECURITY.md \
        | awk '/BEGIN SIGNING_IDENTITY_PIN/,/END SIGNING_IDENTITY_PIN/' \
        | grep -E 'certificate-identity-regexp|certificate-oidc-issuer|provenance source-uri') \
     <(curl -fsSL https://automagik.dev/.well-known/security.txt \
        | awk '/BEGIN SIGNING_IDENTITY_PIN/,/END SIGNING_IDENTITY_PIN/' \
        | grep -E 'certificate-identity-regexp|certificate-oidc-issuer|provenance source-uri')
# Empty output = channels agree. Any output = escalate.

1. Do not run aegis remediate --apply on any host — you cannot distinguish a legitimate rotation from a compromise until the out-of-band channel is reconciled.
2. Check the pinned GitHub issue: a legitimate rotation lands a new SIGNING_CERT_IDENTITY_<YYYYMMDD> issue co-authored by two Namastex security officers (verified GPG signatures). The rotation procedure lives in docs/security/key-rotation.md.
3. Email privacidade@namastex.ai with the diverging channel, the observed value, and the expected value. Response SLA is two business hours (see Reporting a Vulnerability).
4. While triage is in flight, operators who must mutate a compromised host use the --unsafe-unverified <INCIDENT_ID> escape hatch documented in docs/incident-response/canisterworm.md. Every invocation lands in the audit log.

• Pin explicit versions, not latest: "@automagik-dev/aegis": "4.260422.4".
• Use npm ci in CI. It enforces lockfile-based installs by default.
• Evaluate --ignore-scripts per-package for untrusted dependencies. Note: @automagik-dev/aegis relies on a postinstall step to download the bundled tmux binary; if you disable scripts, run node scripts/postinstall-tmux.js manually after install.
• Verify package provenance: npm view @automagik-dev/aegis --json | jq '.dist.attestations'.
• Monitor advisories: subscribe to GitHub security alerts for this repository.

• Security & incidents: privacidade@namastex.ai
• Data Protection Officer (DPO): Cezar Vasconcelos — dpo@namastex.ai
• Security disclosure page: automagik.dev/security

Namastex Labs Serviços em Tecnologia Ltda · CNPJ 46.156.854/0001-62

Last updated: 2026-04-23 · v1.0