update to openssl 1.0.2r

Changes between 1.0.2q and 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019]

  *) 0-byte record padding oracle

     If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
     SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one)
     then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte
     record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is
     received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently
     based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this
     amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.

     In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in
     use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain
     commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown()
     twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do
     this but some do anyway).

     This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod
     Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew
     Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.
     (CVE-2019-1559)
     [Matt Caswell]

  *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
     [Richard Levitte]

build_3rdparty.py

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
 DEPENDENT_LIBS = {
     'openssl': {
         'order' : 1,
-        'url'   : 'https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.0.2q.tar.gz',
-        'sha1'  : '692f5f2f1b114f8adaadaa3e7be8cce1907f38c5',
+        'url'   : 'https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.0.2r.tar.gz',
+        'sha1'  : 'b9aec1fa5cedcfa433aed37c8fe06b0ab0ce748d',
         'target': {
             'mingw-w64': {
                 'result':   ['include/openssl/ssl.h', 'lib/libssl.a', 'lib/libcrypto.a'],