feat(weight-custody-manifest): add WCM demo catalog

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -145,3 +145,28 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Run the delegation demo
         run: python delegation_agent.py
+
+  weight-custody-manifest:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: weight-custody-manifest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v7
+
+      - name: Set up Python 3.11
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v7
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.11"
+
+      - name: Install the WCM SDK from PyPI
+        run: python -m pip install -r requirements.txt
+
+      - name: Run the end-to-end custody demo
+        run: python open_model_e2e.py
+
+      - name: Run the sovereign threshold demo
+        run: python sovereign_self_custody.py
+
+      - name: Replay a SEV-SNP quote offline
+        run: python snp_replay.py

weight-custody-manifest/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# weight-custody-manifest: Custody for Model Weights
+
+The other examples in this repo govern what an agent may **do**. This one governs the model **weights** themselves: when a builder deploys a model into a customer's own or sovereign infrastructure, how do you prove the weights running in the enclave are exactly the ones the builder shipped, release the decryption key only against a valid hardware attestation, wipe it when custody lapses, and carry the lineage of every derivative?
+
+That is the [Weight Custody Manifest](https://pypi.org/project/weight-custody-manifest/) (WCM): an open protocol and reference SDK. These four demos run its real code.
+
+For a public open-weight model, base-weight confidentiality is theater (anyone can download the weights), so the same flow does the work that still matters: **integrity and provenance** (is this the model the builder shipped, or a tampered copy), **license as a release condition**, **derivative custody and lineage**, and a **kill switch**.
+
+> **Honest scope.** WCM does not claim silicon-enforced custody against an operator who physically owns the hardware. Cheap published memory-bus attacks (TEE.fail, BadRAM) extract keys from live confidential-computing memory, so against that adversary WCM is accountability-grade (cost, detection, containment, mandatory physical hardening), not cryptographic custody. It is custody-grade against software and remote adversaries. The demos below use a software (mock) attestation provider so they run with no hardware; the hardware-rooted step is validated separately on real SEV-SNP and TDX silicon.
+
+---
+
+## Setup
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/agentrust-io/examples.git
+cd examples/weight-custody-manifest
+pip install -r requirements.txt      # weight-custody-manifest>=0.19.0, Python 3.11+
+```
+
+The three offline demos need nothing else. `real_open_model.py` needs run-local extras (below).
+
+---
+
+## The demos
+
+### 1. `open_model_e2e.py` -- the whole flow, end to end
+
+The full six-step Weight Custody Manifest flow on an open-weight model with a mock attestation provider: sign the joint manifest (builder + custodian), run the attestation-gated key release, hold the key under a wipe-on-lapse custody lease, enforce the license as a release condition, then fine-tune into a derivative and verify its lineage back to the base. Narrated, and honest about which steps are real work versus theater for a public model. Runs anywhere.
+
+```bash
+python open_model_e2e.py
+```
+
+### 2. `sovereign_self_custody.py` -- threshold release, no single point of trust
+
+Sovereign self-custody with a 2-of-3 threshold split-key (SPEC 3.5): the release key is split with Shamir secret sharing so no single party can release the weights alone. Real WCM code, software attestation, runs anywhere.
+
+```bash
+python sovereign_self_custody.py
+```
+
+### 3. `snp_replay.py` -- replay a real attestation, offline
+
+The CPU half of Layer 2's composite verification (SPEC 3.2), run offline against a recorded AMD SEV-SNP quote. It exercises exactly what a key broker runs before releasing a key: parse the SNP report, verify the VCEK to ASK to ARK certificate chain to a trusted AMD root, verify the report's own signature, and confirm REPORT_DATA binds the challenge nonce (anti-replay). A synthetic bundle is committed in `fixtures/` so it runs anywhere; pass a captured bundle to replay genuine silicon.
+
+```bash
+python snp_replay.py                         # committed synthetic bundle
+python snp_replay.py path/to/snp_quote.json  # a bundle captured on a real Azure SEV-SNP CVM
+```
+
+### 4. `real_open_model.py` -- run-local, over real weights
+
+The same flow over a **real** open model's actual bytes: it downloads an open model (SmolLM2-135M by default, ~270MB), hashes its real safetensors into the manifest, includes a tamper demo (a one-byte-flipped fork no longer matches the manifest), and with `--infer` loads the model and generates so the certified serving stack is a real running model. Network and heavy, so it is run-local and excluded from CI.
+
+```bash
+pip install -r requirements-infer.txt
+python real_open_model.py                    # download, hash, full flow, tamper demo
+python real_open_model.py --infer            # also load the model and generate
+python real_open_model.py --local path/to/model.safetensors   # skip the download
+```
+
+---
+
+## What runs in CI
+
+The three offline demos (`open_model_e2e.py`, `sovereign_self_custody.py`, `snp_replay.py`) run in CI against the published PyPI package and must exit 0. `real_open_model.py` is not in CI (it downloads a model).
+
+## Reference
+
+- Package: [weight-custody-manifest on PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/weight-custody-manifest/)
+- `manifest.example.json` in this folder is a sample signed manifest for reference.
+
+## License
+
+Apache 2.0. See [LICENSE](../LICENSE) in the repo root.

weight-custody-manifest/fixtures/snp_quote_synthetic.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "kind": "wcm-snp-quote-bundle/v1",
+  "source": "synthetic",
+  "note": "Self-consistent synthetic ARK->VCEK chain and report. NOT real hardware. Replace with tools/capture_snp_quote.py output for a genuine Azure SEV-SNP quote.",
+  "report_b64": "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",
+  "vcek_pem": "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\n1gePcPp9kUJZ/nSu9RIl7NvwMueinw==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+  "intermediates_pem": [],
+  "root_pem": "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\ndF/mAzWU2hWC53hx5/T8oxw=\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+  "expected_nonce": "abababababababababababababababababababababababababababababababab",
+  "expected_measurement": "111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111"
+}

weight-custody-manifest/manifest.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+{
+  "manifest_version": "0.1",
+  "weights_hash": "sha256:4a1c9b024a1c9b024a1c9b024a1c9b024a1c9b024a1c9b024a1c9b024a1c9b02",
+  "builder": {
+    "identity": "example-builder",
+    "signing_key": "ed25519:builder-key-placeholder"
+  },
+  "release_terms": {
+    "license": "customer-deployment-agreement-ref:CDA-2026-0091",
+    "permitted_derivatives": "fine-tune-only, no re-export of base weights",
+    "permitted_environments": ["opaque-cmcp-attested-enclave"],
+    "jurisdiction_restriction": "US, EU"
+  },
+  "release_policy": {
+    "required_assurance_tier": "hardware-attested",
+    "physical_hardening": "not-required",
+    "trusted_time_source": "secure-tsc",
+    "memory_fingerprint_challenge": "not-required",
+    "required_hw_platform": ["amd-sev-snp", "nvidia-cc-gpu"],
+    "required_gpu_measurement": {
+      "rim_pin": "nvidia-rim:driver+vbios golden measurement id",
+      "note": "GPU attestation report is a separate evidence chain from the CVM report; verify both plus the serving-image measurement, bound by a nonce echo (SPEC 3.2)"
+    },
+    "tenancy": "shared",
+    "required_serving_image": {
+      "signer": "ed25519:builder-key-placeholder",
+      "release_rule": "prefer-current: refuse a retiring image when a current one is available; require signed/attested time for retire_after, never the host clock",
+      "accepted_measurements": [
+        {
+          "measurement": "sha256:5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d5e2d",
+          "status": "current"
+        },
+        {
+          "measurement": "sha256:6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e6f3e",
+          "status": "retiring",
+          "retire_after": "2026-07-16T00:00:00Z"
+        },
+        {
+          "measurement": "sha256:70af70af70af70af70af70af70af70af70af70af70af70af70af70af70af70af",
+          "status": "revoked"
+        }
+      ],
+      "note": "key decrypts only under a builder-signed serving stack whose measurement is current or retiring; status:revoked hard-fails immediately"
+    },
+    "key_release_mode": "attestation-gated",
+    "replay_protection": "kbs-nonce-required",
+    "attestation_revocation_check": "live-per-release, max-cache-age: short-window",
+    "revocation_authority": "builder-and-opaque-joint",
+    "sovereign_profile": {
+      "enabled": false,
+      "revocation_authority": "quorum",
+      "sovereign_signer": null,
+      "note": "when enabled, no single party (builder included) can revoke or dark the model unilaterally"
+    }
+  },
+  "custody": {
+    "custodian": "opaque-systems",
+    "custodian_type": "opaque-hosted",
+    "kbs_image": {
+      "measurement": "sha256:abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
+      "signer": "ed25519:opaque-key-placeholder",
+      "note": "the key release service runs in an attested enclave in every profile, Opaque-hosted included"
+    },
+    "enclave_id": "did:opaque:example-enclave-04",
+    "attestation_cadence": "24h",
+    "kbs_attestation_cadence": "24h"
+  },
+  "base_confidentiality": "confidential",
+  "deployment_model": "builder-to-customer",
+  "signatures": []
+}