Lucent is testnet-only and unaudited — see the "Not production ready" note in the README. The UltraHonk verifier backend and circuits have not been audited, and the escrow custody model carries a documented trust caveat. Do not use it with real value.

That said, we still want to know about security issues, especially anything that would matter if this code were ever hardened for production:

• A way to move, mint, or withdraw confidential balances outside the rules described in How value moves.
• A way to bypass the compliance policy (allowlist/freeze) enforced by the token contract.
• A way to break confidentiality — recovering a plaintext amount, balance, or Grumpkin key without the corresponding decryption key.
• A soundness bug in a circuit or the on-chain verifier that lets an invalid proof pass.
• A way for the PayrollVault or PrivateEscrow contracts to move funds without the authorization the state machine is supposed to require.

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security-sensitive bugs.

Instead, email dahunsisamuel1st@gmail.com with:

• A description of the issue and its potential impact.
• Steps to reproduce (a failing test, script, or testnet transaction is ideal).
• Which contract(s), circuit(s), or SDK module(s) are affected.

You should get an acknowledgment within a few days. This is a small, unfunded open-source project — there's no bug bounty, but we'll credit reporters (unless you'd prefer to stay anonymous) once a fix ships.

In scope: everything in contracts/, packages/sdk, packages/disclosure, and the proving/verification logic they depend on.

Out of scope: third-party dependencies (report those upstream — OpenZeppelin stellar-contracts, Nethermind rs-soroban-ultrahonk), and anything requiring physical access to a user's device or browser extension.