Orchestrator beacon-owner migration to the chain Safe - #317
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds build-specific beacon codehash validation, allows beacon ownership migration from the deploy EOA to the active token-owner Safe, updates deployment checks, and adds migration and invariant tests. ChangesBeacon owner migration
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The PR gives the token-owner Safe direct authority to upgrade the production orchestrator beacon, bypassing the required governance delay. Ownership and validation should be routed through the governance timelock before this change is merged. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant MigrateOrchestratorBeaconOwner
participant LibProdDeployV4
participant LibBeaconInvariants
participant UpgradeableBeacon
participant IGnosisSafe
MigrateOrchestratorBeaconOwner->>LibProdDeployV4: resolve beacon, implementation, and active Safe
MigrateOrchestratorBeaconOwner->>LibBeaconInvariants: assert EOA-owned beacon invariants
MigrateOrchestratorBeaconOwner->>UpgradeableBeacon: transferOwnership(safe)
MigrateOrchestratorBeaconOwner->>LibBeaconInvariants: assert Safe-owned beacon invariants
MigrateOrchestratorBeaconOwner->>IGnosisSafe: simulate upgradeTo(currentImpl) through execTransaction
Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 0 files. (7 skipped: 7 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1🛠️ Fix failing CI checks 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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## Why Main's test CI (and cron) has been red since **2026-08-22**, and #314's inherits it: the `20260810-revoke-fireblocks-service-signer` Safe bundles **executed on all three chains** (verified live — the retired signer `0x1C66…D1A9` holds no `DEPOSIT`/`WITHDRAW`/`CERTIFY` on Base, Ethereum, or HyperEVM), which flipped its forcing-function tests red by design: they demand this pin PR. ## What (per the script's own retire instructions) - **Canonical grant map**: the retired signer's three rows leave `expectedGrants` (16 → 13 entries). The `GRANTEE_SERVICE_1C66` constant stays as the audit-trail record. - **The revocation is pinned as an absence**: `assertExpectedGrants` gains `assertRetiredSignerAbsent` — any action role landing back on the retired signer red-lines cron with the new `UnexpectedRetiredSignerGrant`. Strictly stronger than the old presence rows. - **Spent fixtures retire**: the script, its `run-script.yaml` registry entry, the `.prod.t.sol` forcing tests, the unit tests, and both harnesses are deleted — the standing absence assertion supersedes their pre-flight per the registry's deletion rule. ## Consumers of the retired rows (second round — surfaced by CI, masked locally by RPC rate limits) - `20260619-deploy-v4-authoriser-clone`: `MIRROR_COUNT` 9 → 6 (the operational slice is now Safe + service signer) plus its replica test. - `20260729-migrate-governance-to-timelock`: the governance-loop proof's sample no-op op re-granted `DEPOSIT` to the retired signer — post-revocation that's a real grant and trips the absence check. Now re-grants to the live signer (`GRANTEE_SERVICE_3D0C`, a genuine no-op again). - `20260723-provision-additional-service-signer` drift test: drift is now created by revoking the Safe's `DEPOSIT` row instead of the departed retired-signer row. ## Verification Against live forks on all three chains: the full previously-red set passes — provisioning prod tests (`AlreadyProvisioned` refusals restored), timelock-migration surface, cross-chain parity, Base prod-state, Ethereum clone pin. `slither .` 0, fmt/reuse clean. ## Merge order This merges **first**; the orchestrator stack (#314 → #316 → #317) restacks on it and its inherited test failures disappear. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_01KbsbYN4C4YDa8pu9DdudoX <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Updates** * Retired service signer access has been removed from the expected authorization configuration. * Authorization grants now reflect six operational grants, with Safe grants listed before service grants. * Governance validation now uses the active service signer for `DEPOSIT`. * Added checks to prevent accidental regranting of roles to the retired signer. * **Maintenance** * Removed the retired signer revocation workflow and its associated validation tests. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
20260818-migrate-orchestrator-beacon-owner: EOA broadcast (the beacon is Ownable and its owner is the deploy EOA, so this is deliberately NOT in the manual-broadcast registry - that dispatcher signs as the CI deploy key). Per chain: pre-flight the EOA-owned state via assertBeaconInvariants (OZ codehash pin, 0.1.8 impl), one transferOwnership(safe), post-assert Safe-owned, then LibSafeOps.simulateBeaconNPlus1 proves the Safe can drive the beacon through its threshold-gated exec. Re-running after execution reverts on the owner pre-flight. LibOrchestratorInvariants.assertBeaconSet's owner pin becomes the dual-state migration invariant (pre = deploy EOA, post = chain Safe, deadline 2026-10-01) via LibMigrationInvariant, so the existing prod fork tests cover the migration on all three chains and cron red-lines any chain it misses. Callers pass the chain Safe; unit tests cover the post-migration acceptance and drifted-owner refusal. Verified by full fork simulation on Base as the EOA sender: pre-flight, transfer, post-assert and the n+1 Safe exec all pass against live state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KbsbYN4C4YDa8pu9DdudoX
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`assertBeaconInvariants` hardcoded `UPGRADEABLE_BEACON_CODEHASH`, a pin taken on Base on 2026-05-22 against the three live V1 beacons. Its NatSpec called that "a property of the OZ bytecode rather than of any one deployment generation", which is false: it is one build's runtime, and `optimizer_runs` has since moved 5000 -> 2000. The orchestrator beacon is a fresh OZ 5.6.1 build, so it could never match. Measured: the live V1 fleet beacons are 858 bytes, the orchestrator beacon deployed to all three chains on 2026-08-28 is 728. `MigrateOrchestratorBeaconOwner.run()` therefore reverted `BeaconCodehashMismatch` in pre-flight, before broadcasting, on Base, Ethereum and HyperEVM alike - while the suite stayed green, because the only test touching the constant compared it to another copy of the same V1 constant. Adds `UPGRADEABLE_BEACON_CODEHASH_0_1_30` and a codehash-parameterised `assertBeaconInvariants` overload. The V1 pin is untouched and the existing three-argument form still passes it, so every V1 caller is unchanged: the live fleet is still asserted against the value that describes it. `testOrchestratorBeaconCodehashPin` re-derives the new pin by compiling a beacon, so an OZ bump or an optimizer change fails at build time rather than at a broadcast. `testBeaconCodehashPinsAreDistinct` blocks the shortcut of repointing the V1 constant to clear a mismatch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Inline comments:
In `@script/20260818-migrate-orchestrator-beacon-owner.s.sol`:
- Line 71: Update script/20260818-migrate-orchestrator-beacon-owner.s.sol:71 to
resolve the target with LibTimelockInvariants.timelockForChainId(block.chainid),
then update lines 85-98 to transfer ownership through the timelock’s schedule,
delay, and execute flow instead of direct Safe simulation. Update
src/lib/LibOrchestratorInvariants.sol:109-114 to accept the deploy EOA before
migration and the chain timelock afterward.
Apply the same fix in `@script/20260818-deploy-orchestrator.s.sol` at line 155:
The deployment invariant also validates the token-owner Safe as beacon owner and
must use the governance timelock instead.
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📒 Files selected for processing (7)
script/20260818-deploy-orchestrator.s.solscript/20260818-migrate-orchestrator-beacon-owner.s.solsrc/lib/LibBeaconInvariants.solsrc/lib/LibOrchestratorInvariants.soltest/script/20260818-deploy-orchestrator.prod.t.soltest/script/20260818-deploy-orchestrator.t.soltest/src/lib/LibBeaconInvariants.t.sol
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Top of the orchestrator stack: #314 (audited 0.1.30 set workflow) ← #316 (instance deploy + pins) ← this.
Why
The orchestrator beacon starts EOA-owned on every chain — the beacon-set deployer's constructor bakes
BEACON_INITIAL_OWNER(rainlang.eth) — and never joined the migration that moved the token beacons to the per-chain Safes. This is the orchestrator-beacon analogue ofMigrateBeaconOwners/20260716/20260722.What
script/20260818-migrate-orchestrator-beacon-owner.s.sol(PENDING): per chain — pre-flight the EOA-owned state viaLibBeaconInvariants.assertBeaconInvariants(OZUpgradeableBeaconcodehash pin —UPGRADEABLE_BEACON_CODEHASH_0_1_30, NOT the token beacons' V1 pin: the fleet beacons are 858 bytes and this one is 728, sinceoptimizer_runsmoved 5000 -> 2000 — plus the 0.1.30 impl), onetransferOwnership(safe), post-assert Safe-owned, thenLibSafeOps.simulateBeaconNPlus1proves the Safe can drive the beacon through its threshold-gated exec. Re-running after execution reverts on the owner pre-flight.manual-broadcastregistry — that dispatcher signs as the CI deploy key, and the beacon's owner is the EOA. Run as rainlang.eth, once per chain:--legacyon HyperEVM.)LibOrchestratorInvariants.assertBeaconSetowner pin becomes the dual-state migration invariant viaLibMigrationInvariant: deploy EOA (pre) or chain Safe (post) until 2026-10-01, only the Safe after — so the existing prod fork tests cover this migration on all three chains and cron red-lines any chain it misses. Unit tests cover post-migration acceptance and drifted-owner refusal (15 total now).Verification
run()revertedBeaconCodehashMismatchbefore broadcasting on all three chains. Fixed in 72f3c81 by pinningUPGRADEABLE_BEACON_CODEHASH_0_1_30, re-derived bytestOrchestratorBeaconCodehashPinand checked against the beacon live on Base, Ethereum and HyperEVM (728 bytes, codehash0x448cd063…).slither .0, fmt/reuse clean.Rollout order per chain
manual-sol-artifacts-0-1-30suites (Deploy workflow for the audited 0.1.30 orchestrator set #314) — DONE, all six live and byte-exact on Base, Ethereum and HyperEVMmanual-broadcast->20260818-deploy-orchestrator(Orchestrator instance deploy script + pinned invariants #316) — DONE on all three chains; instance live at0x3A7387a4…MINT_ROLE/BURN_ROLEto the issuance bot's signer → issuance runbook🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01KbsbYN4C4YDa8pu9DdudoX
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Tests