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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions contracts/predictify-hybrid/src/lib.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ mod validation;
// mod validation_tests; // disabled - API drift
mod versioning;
mod voting;
#[cfg(test)]
mod voting_invariants;

#[cfg(test)]
mod override_audit_tests;
Expand Down
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ fn test_set_event_bet_limits_forged_admin_rejected() {
#[test]
fn test_set_oracle_val_cfg_global_authorized_admin_succeeds() {
let (env, cid, admin) = setup();
let result = client(&env, &cid).try_set_oracle_val_cfg_global(&admin, &300u64, &9500u32);
let result = client(&env, &cid).try_set_oracle_val_cfg_global(&admin, &300u64, &9500u32, &None::<u32>);
assert_auth_ok_contract!(result, "set_oracle_val_cfg_global rejected authorized admin");
}

Expand All @@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ fn test_set_oracle_val_cfg_global_authorized_admin_succeeds() {
fn test_set_oracle_val_cfg_global_forged_admin_rejected() {
let (env, cid, _admin) = setup();
let attacker = Address::generate(&env);
let result = client(&env, &cid).try_set_oracle_val_cfg_global(&attacker, &300u64, &9500u32);
let result = client(&env, &cid).try_set_oracle_val_cfg_global(&attacker, &300u64, &9500u32, &None::<u32>);
assert_unauthorized_contract!(result);
}

Expand All @@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ fn test_set_oracle_val_cfg_event_authorized_admin_succeeds() {
let (env, cid, admin) = setup();
let market_id = make_market(&env, &cid, &admin);
let result = client(&env, &cid).try_set_oracle_val_cfg_event(
&admin, &market_id, &300u64, &9500u32,
&admin, &market_id, &300u64, &9500u32, &None::<u32>,
);
assert_auth_ok_contract!(result, "set_oracle_val_cfg_event rejected authorized admin");
}
Expand All @@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ fn test_set_oracle_val_cfg_event_forged_admin_rejected() {
let market_id = make_market(&env, &cid, &admin);
let attacker = Address::generate(&env);
let result = client(&env, &cid).try_set_oracle_val_cfg_event(
&attacker, &market_id, &300u64, &9500u32,
&attacker, &market_id, &300u64, &9500u32, &None::<u32>,
);
assert_unauthorized_contract!(result);
}
Expand Down
258 changes: 258 additions & 0 deletions contracts/predictify-hybrid/src/voting_invariants.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
//! # Proptest invariant tests for VotingManager total-stake conservation
//!
//! Issue #607: These property tests assert that for any sequence of valid votes
//! the following invariant always holds:
//!
//! sum(outcome_distribution.values()) == market.total_staked == VotingStats.total_staked
//!
//! Tests cover:
//! - Sequential single-outcome votes
//! - Multi-outcome distribution across outcomes
//! - Duplicate-user votes (second vote is silently ignored by the contract)
//! - Zero-stake votes (rejected, total_staked stays unchanged)
//!
//! Strategy: We operate directly on `Market` and `VotingUtils` (unit level) to
//! avoid the oracle/token infrastructure required by the full contract client.
//! `MarketStateManager::add_vote` is the same code path called by
//! `VotingManager::process_vote`, so this covers the bookkeeping invariant.

#![cfg(test)]

use crate::markets::MarketStateManager;
use crate::types::{Market, MarketState, OracleConfig, OracleProvider};
use crate::voting::VotingUtils;
use proptest::prelude::*;
use soroban_sdk::{testutils::Address as _, vec as svec, Address, Env, String};

// ── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Minimum valid stake (mirrors MIN_VOTE_STAKE in voting.rs / config.rs).
const MIN_STAKE: i128 = 1_000_000;

/// A handful of outcome labels that generated votes may reference.
const OUTCOME_LABELS: &[&str] = &["yes", "no", "maybe", "abstain"];

// ── Strategy helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Generates a valid stake in [MIN_STAKE, 1_000_000_000] (up to 100 XLM).
fn arb_stake() -> impl Strategy<Value = i128> {
MIN_STAKE..=1_000_000_000i128
}

/// Generates an outcome index into OUTCOME_LABELS.
fn arb_outcome_idx() -> impl Strategy<Value = usize> {
0..OUTCOME_LABELS.len()
}

/// A single vote instruction: (outcome_index, stake).
/// The test harness assigns a fresh unique Address per vote so duplicates are
/// only introduced when we deliberately want to test that case.
fn arb_vote_op() -> impl Strategy<Value = (usize, i128)> {
(arb_outcome_idx(), arb_stake())
}

// ── Market builder ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Build a minimal Active market with two outcomes in a fresh Env.
/// Returns `(env, market)`.
fn make_market() -> (Env, Market) {
let env = Env::default();
env.mock_all_auths();
let admin = Address::generate(&env);
let oracle = OracleConfig::none_sentinel(&env);
let market = Market::new(
&env,
admin,
String::from_str(&env, "Will BTC hit 100k?"),
svec![
&env,
String::from_str(&env, "yes"),
String::from_str(&env, "no"),
String::from_str(&env, "maybe"),
String::from_str(&env, "abstain"),
],
env.ledger().timestamp() + 86_400, // ends in 24 h
oracle,
None,
86_400,
MarketState::Active,
);
(env, market)
}

// ── Core invariant check ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Assert: sum(outcome_distribution) == market.total_staked == VotingStats.total_staked
fn assert_stake_conservation(env: &Env, market: &Market) {
let stats = VotingUtils::get_voting_stats(env, market);

// sum of per-outcome buckets
let dist_sum: i128 = stats.outcome_distribution.values().iter().sum();

assert_eq!(
dist_sum,
market.total_staked,
"outcome_distribution sum ({}) != market.total_staked ({})",
dist_sum,
market.total_staked,
);

assert_eq!(
stats.total_staked,
market.total_staked,
"VotingStats.total_staked ({}) != market.total_staked ({})",
stats.total_staked,
market.total_staked,
);
}

// ── Proptest suites ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

proptest! {
// Use a deterministic seed so CI is reproducible (1000 cases each).
#![proptest_config(ProptestConfig {
cases: 1000,
// Deterministic seed for CI reproducibility.
source_file: Some("src/voting_invariants.rs"),
..ProptestConfig::default()
})]

/// After a sequence of distinct-user votes the invariant must hold after
/// every step, not just at the end.
#[test]
fn prop_sequential_votes_conserve_stake(
votes in prop::collection::vec(arb_vote_op(), 1..=20),
) {
let (env, mut market) = make_market();

for (outcome_idx, stake) in votes {
let user = Address::generate(&env);
let outcome = String::from_str(&env, OUTCOME_LABELS[outcome_idx]);
MarketStateManager::add_vote(&mut market, user, outcome, stake, None);
assert_stake_conservation(&env, &market);
}
}

/// Invariant holds with votes spread across all four outcome labels.
#[test]
fn prop_multi_outcome_distribution_conserves_stake(
v0 in arb_vote_op(),
v1 in arb_vote_op(),
v2 in arb_vote_op(),
v3 in arb_vote_op(),
) {
let (env, mut market) = make_market();
let votes = [v0, v1, v2, v3];
for (i, (outcome_idx, stake)) in votes.iter().enumerate() {
// Pin each vote to a specific outcome to guarantee full coverage.
let forced_outcome = String::from_str(&env, OUTCOME_LABELS[i % OUTCOME_LABELS.len()]);
let _ = outcome_idx; // outcome_idx from proptest keeps strategy active; pinning for coverage
let user = Address::generate(&env);
MarketStateManager::add_vote(&mut market, user, forced_outcome, *stake, None);
}
assert_stake_conservation(&env, &market);
}

/// Duplicate vote from the same user: the contract layer (`process_vote`)
/// rejects it with `AlreadyVoted`, so `total_staked` must not double-count.
///
/// This test verifies two things:
/// 1. After the first (valid) vote, the invariant holds.
/// 2. Documented raw `add_vote` behavior when the guard is bypassed:
/// `stakes[user]` is overwritten (upsert → stake2), but `total_staked`
/// accumulates both stakes, creating an invariant violation.
/// This confirms the `AlreadyVoted` guard in `process_vote` is load-bearing.
#[test]
fn prop_duplicate_user_stake_not_silently_doubled(
stake1 in arb_stake(),
stake2 in arb_stake(),
outcome_idx in arb_outcome_idx(),
) {
let (env, mut market) = make_market();
let user = Address::generate(&env);
let outcome = String::from_str(&env, OUTCOME_LABELS[outcome_idx]);

// First vote — always valid; invariant must hold after it
MarketStateManager::add_vote(&mut market, user.clone(), outcome.clone(), stake1, None);
prop_assert_eq!(market.total_staked, stake1, "First vote sets total_staked to stake1");
assert_stake_conservation(&env, &market);

// Raw second call with same Address (bypassing process_vote's AlreadyVoted guard):
// stakes[user] is overwritten to stake2; total_staked accumulates both.
MarketStateManager::add_vote(&mut market, user.clone(), outcome.clone(), stake2, None);

let recorded_stake = market.stakes.get(user).unwrap_or(0);
prop_assert_eq!(
recorded_stake, stake2,
"stakes map holds the latest value (upsert)"
);
// total_staked double-counts — this is the vulnerability the guard prevents
prop_assert_eq!(
market.total_staked, stake1 + stake2,
"total_staked double-counts when AlreadyVoted guard is bypassed"
);

// The invariant is intentionally violated here; document it via explicit assertion.
let stats = VotingUtils::get_voting_stats(&env, &market);
let dist_sum: i128 = stats.outcome_distribution.values().iter().sum();
prop_assert_eq!(
dist_sum, stake2,
"outcome_distribution uses the upserted (latest) stake"
);
// dist_sum != total_staked here — expected; the guard prevents this in production
prop_assert!(
dist_sum < market.total_staked,
"invariant violation when guard is bypassed: dist_sum={} < total_staked={}",
dist_sum, market.total_staked
);
}

/// Zero-stake votes must not change total_staked.
/// Note: `process_vote` rejects stake < MIN_VOTE_STAKE before reaching add_vote.
/// This test confirms that if stake=0 somehow passes through, the invariant holds.
#[test]
fn prop_zero_stake_does_not_corrupt_total(
good_stake in arb_stake(),
outcome_idx in arb_outcome_idx(),
) {
let (env, mut market) = make_market();
let outcome = String::from_str(&env, OUTCOME_LABELS[outcome_idx]);

// Apply a valid vote first
let user1 = Address::generate(&env);
MarketStateManager::add_vote(&mut market, user1, outcome.clone(), good_stake, None);
let baseline = market.total_staked;

// Apply a zero-stake vote (bypasses the MIN_VOTE_STAKE guard at unit level)
let user2 = Address::generate(&env);
MarketStateManager::add_vote(&mut market, user2, outcome, 0, None);

// total_staked grows by 0; distribution sum must still match
prop_assert_eq!(market.total_staked, baseline, "zero-stake should not increase total_staked");
assert_stake_conservation(&env, &market);
}

/// Large number of voters: invariant must hold at the end of 200 votes.
#[test]
fn prop_large_voter_set_conserves_stake(
votes in prop::collection::vec(arb_vote_op(), 50..=200),
) {
let (env, mut market) = make_market();
let expected_total: i128 = votes.iter().map(|(_, s)| s).sum();

for (outcome_idx, stake) in &votes {
let user = Address::generate(&env);
let outcome = String::from_str(&env, OUTCOME_LABELS[*outcome_idx]);
MarketStateManager::add_vote(&mut market, user, outcome, *stake, None);
}

prop_assert_eq!(
market.total_staked,
expected_total,
"total_staked ({}) must equal sum of all stakes ({})",
market.total_staked,
expected_total
);
assert_stake_conservation(&env, &market);
}
}
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