sec(jobs): pass pg_dump password via PGPASSWORD env, not argv - #62
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Closes SEC-WORKER FINDING-1 (CWE-214, P1) + FINDING-2 (CWE-214, P1).
Both pg_dump call-sites embedded the connection password in the URL on
argv:
- platform_db_backup.go:631 — daily 02:00 UTC platform DB backup
(leaks the doadmin password)
- customer_backup_runner.go:108 — hourly Pro/Team customer backup
(leaks the customer's DB password,
decrypted from AES-GCM ciphertext)
argv is world-readable via /proc/<pid>/cmdline for the entire backup
window (multi-minute on the platform DB). Any sidecar / debug shell /
log-shipper / kube-exec process — and any crash-dump archived by
`kubectl describe` — captures the secret.
Fix: tiny helper `splitPGPassword(url) → (urlWithoutPW, password, err)`
strips the password from the URL userinfo. Both call-sites set
`PGPASSWORD=<pw>` on cmd.Env (alongside the parent env) so libpq picks
it up out-of-band. URL on argv no longer contains the password.
Fail-open posture: if URL parse fails (malformed connection_url), fall
back to the original URL on argv — better than wedging every customer's
backup ladder over one operator typo. Today's URLs are constructed by
the provisioner from validated identifiers so this path is purely
defensive.
Production LOC delta: 62 (helper 58 + 4 imports/edits per site).
Tests:
- TestSplitPGPassword (6 subcases: userpass, user-only, no-userinfo,
empty, percent-encoded password, malformed-URL-fail-open)
- TestSplitPGPassword_NoLeak: literal password substring MUST NOT
appear in returned URL (THE regression guard for this fix)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Add direct tests for realPgDumpRunner.Run and defaultPgDumpExec.Dump that exercise the SEC-WORKER FINDING-1 + FINDING-2 fix paths added in this PR: - pw != "" → cmd.Env carries PGPASSWORD, argv carries the stripped DSN - splitErr != nil → fail-open passthrough (no env, original URL on argv) Spawns a shell-script fake pg_dump that records argv + PGPASSWORD env to files in a TempDir, then asserts no literal password leak in argv and the secret IS in PGPASSWORD env. Closes the diff-cover gap on lines 117-119, 126-127 (customer_backup_runner.go) and 644-647, 656-658 (platform_db_backup.go).
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Closes SEC-WORKER FINDING-1 (CWE-214, P1) + SEC-WORKER FINDING-2 (CWE-214, P1) from
/tmp/qa-session/shared/SEC-INBOX.md.Why
Both
pg_dumpcall-sites embedded the connection password in the URL on argv:platform_db_backup.go:631— daily 02:00 UTC platform DB backup (leaks the doadmin password)customer_backup_runner.go:108— hourly Pro/Team customer backup (leaks the customer's DB password, decrypted from AES-GCM ciphertext)argv is world-readable via
/proc/<pid>/cmdlinefor the entire backup window (multi-minute on the platform DB). Any sidecar / debug shell / log-shipper /kube-execprocess — and any crash-dump archived bykubectl describe— captures the secret.What
Tiny helper
splitPGPassword(url) → (urlWithoutPW, password, err)strips the password from URL userinfo. Both call-sites setPGPASSWORD=<pw>oncmd.Env(alongside the parent env) so libpq picks it up out-of-band. URL on argv no longer contains the password.Fail-open posture: if URL parse fails (malformed
connection_url), fall back to the original URL on argv — better than wedging every customer's backup ladder over one operator typo. Today's URLs are constructed by the provisioner from validated identifiers, so this fail-open path is purely defensive.Verification
make gategreen (build + vet +go test ./... -short -count=1).TestSplitPGPassword— 6 subcases pass.TestSplitPGPassword_NoLeak— the literal password substring MUST NOT appear in the returned URL (THE regression guard).Production LOC delta: 62 (helper 58 + 4 imports/edits per site).
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