Phase 0 + Phase 1 integration: dev → main

.cargo/audit.toml

@@ -19,4 +19,22 @@ ignore = [
     # for nonce/key generation, none of it from inside a logger.
     # TODO: remove once `agentmesh` ships a release with `rand >= 0.8.6`.
     "RUSTSEC-2026-0097",
+    # RUSTSEC-2023-0071 — Marvin Attack: potential key recovery in `rsa` via timing sidechannels
+    # https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071
+    #
+    # Severity: medium (CVSS 5.9). NO upstream fix is available.
+    # Source: transitive dependency — `jsonwebtoken 10.3.0` → `rsa 0.9.10`.
+    # The Marvin attack requires *RSA private key operations* whose timing leaks
+    # to a co-located attacker. AzureClaw's only RSA usage is **JWT signature
+    # verification on JWKS-published public keys** (OAuth 2.1 access-token
+    # validation in `inference-router/src/mcp/oauth.rs`). Public-key verification
+    # does not exercise the vulnerable scalar-multiplication path; we never hold
+    # an RSA private key in router or controller code. Defence-in-depth: the
+    # OAuth verifier additionally enforces alg allow-listing (`RS256`/`PS256`/
+    # `EdDSA` only — no `none`, no algorithm confusion), kid pinning, and
+    # JWKS-cache bounds, so even a compromised RSA public key cannot widen the
+    # surface.
+    # TODO: drop this ignore when `jsonwebtoken` switches to a non-vulnerable
+    # RSA backend (tracked upstream: https://github.com/Keats/jsonwebtoken).
+    "RUSTSEC-2023-0071",
 ]

.github/workflows/ci-gates.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+name: ci-gates
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ci-gates-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  gates:
+    # Per internal Phase 1 plan §4.4 — all gates fail-hard, no continue-on-error.
+    name: ${{ matrix.gate }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        gate:
+          - loc
+          - no-stubs
+          - no-custom-crypto
+          - no-null-provider-prod
+          - security-audit-required
+          - vendored-patch-audit
+          - a2a-module-isolation
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0  # full history so BASE_REF diffs work
+
+      - name: Set BASE_REF
+        id: base
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "pull_request" ]; then
+            echo "BASE_REF=origin/${{ github.base_ref }}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+          else
+            echo "BASE_REF=HEAD~1" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+          fi
+
+      - name: Make scripts executable
+        run: chmod +x ci/*.sh
+
+      - name: Run gate ${{ matrix.gate }}
+        shell: bash
+        env:
+          VERBOSE: "1"
+        run: |
+          case "${{ matrix.gate }}" in
+            loc)                       ./ci/check-loc.sh ;;
+            no-stubs)                  ./ci/no-stubs.sh ;;
+            no-custom-crypto)          ./ci/no-custom-crypto.sh ;;
+            no-null-provider-prod)     ./ci/no-null-provider-prod.sh ;;
+            security-audit-required)   ./ci/security-audit-required.sh ;;
+            vendored-patch-audit)      ./ci/vendored-patch-audit.sh ;;
+            a2a-module-isolation)      ./ci/a2a-module-isolation.sh ;;
+          esac

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ name: CI
 
 on:
   push:
-    branches: [main]
+    branches: [main, dev]
   pull_request:
-    branches: [main]
+    branches: [main, dev]
   workflow_call:      # allow reuse from release.yml
   workflow_dispatch:  # manual trigger
 

.github/workflows/codeql.yml

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ name: CodeQL
 
 on:
   push:
-    branches: [main]
+    branches: [main, dev]
   pull_request:
-    branches: [main]
+    branches: [main, dev]
   schedule:
     - cron: "30 5 * * 1"  # Monday 05:30 UTC
 

.gitignore

@@ -474,3 +474,6 @@ SECURITY-HARDENING-PLAN.md
 docs/demo-script.md
 docs/competitive.md
 nohup.out
+docs/implementation-plan.md
+*.code-workspace
+docs/internal/