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Unsafe environment parsing enables code injection
Reference: apps/api/config/config.py:120
Impact: Usingeval()onLEARNHOUSE_DEVELOPMENT_MODElets anyone controlling that environment variable execute arbitrary Python.
Recommendation: Replaceeval()with explicit string-to-bool parsing (e.g.distutils.util.strtobool) and provide a safe default. -
Default admin credentials ship in tooling
Reference: apps/api/cli.py:60, load_test2/user_test.py:21
Impact: Both the installer and load test scripts hard-code production-like admin passwords/email, creating an instant compromise if scripts leak or run in shared environments.
Recommendation: Require credentials to be supplied via environment variables or prompts, and strip secrets from version control. -
Automatic installer can recreate weak admin accounts
Reference: apps/api/src/core/events/autoinstall.py:21
Impact: On startup, empty databases triggerinstall(short=True), which reinstalls default data and the weak admin credentials above—opening a privilege-escalation path after resets.
Recommendation: Remove auto-install or gate it behind an explicit feature flag and prompt for secure credentials. -
JWT config downgrades secrets and disables expiry
Reference: apps/api/src/security/auth.py:21-26
Impact:authjwt_secret_keyfalls back to the literal string"secret"whenever “dev mode” is toggled, andauthjwt_access_token_expiresstores seconds as a float instead of atimedelta, so tokens may never expire.
Recommendation: Always load secrets from configuration, fail fast when missing, and pass atimedeltainstance to the FastAPI-JWT Auth settings. -
Password reset leaks credentials through URLs
Reference: apps/web/services/auth/auth.ts:88, apps/api/src/routers/users.py:231
Impact: The frontend sendsnew_passwordas a query string, so logs, proxies, and analytics capture plaintext passwords; the backend endpoint also treats it as a query parameter.
Recommendation: Move all reset parameters into a JSON body over HTTPS and ensure sensitive values never enter the URL. -
Embed sanitisation allows arbitrary attributes
Reference: apps/web/components/Objects/Editor/Extensions/EmbedObjects/EmbedObjectsComponent.tsx:41-44
Impact:DOMPurifyis configured withADD_ATTR: ['*'], reinstating dangerous event attributes (onload,onclick) and enabling stored XSS.
Recommendation: Whitelist only the attributes you actually need (e.g.src,allow,frameborder) and rely on DOMPurify defaults for everything else. -
Middleware sets cookies for .localhost only
Reference: apps/web/middleware.ts:75-83
Impact: Production domains will never receive thelearnhouse_current_orgslugcookie, breaking auth flows and forcing insecure fallbacks.
Recommendation: Derive the cookie domain dynamically from the request host, and default to no domain attribute in development.
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Type coercion in config breaks falsy values
Reference: apps/api/config/config.py:334-360
Impact: Wrapping strings like"false"withbool()always returnsTrue, andlist(allowed_origins)raises when the value isNone. Ports also default to empty strings, causingint('')crashes.
Recommendation: Parse booleans/ints explicitly (e.g.strtobool, guardedint()), defaultallowed_originsto an empty list, and validate config via Pydantic. -
Database schema mutates at import time
Reference: apps/api/src/core/events/database.py:32-48
Impact: Importing the module triggers a recursive model import andSQLModel.metadata.create_all, so any script import can modify the production schema unexpectedly.
Recommendation: Move model discovery and migrations into startup hooks or migrations tooling, and leave module import side-effect free. -
Async services block the event loop
Reference: apps/api/src/services/users/users.py:37-116
Impact: Manyasync defhandlers synchronously callSession.execandcommit, blocking the FastAPI event loop under load.
Recommendation: Either switch to SQLModel’s async engine/session or run these services synchronously behindrun_in_threadpool. -
Runtime configuration utilities rely on brittle hacks
Reference: apps/web/services/config/config.ts:12-92
Impact: Dynamically rebuilding env var names ('NEXT_PUBLIC_LEARNHOUSE_BASE_TOP_DOMAI' + N) and returning"error"strings makes it easy to ship broken builds and leaks implementation details viaconsole.log.
Recommendation: Standardise config loading (e.g. with Zod schemas), remove string-splicing hacks, and fail fast when required env vars are missing. -
Middleware contains placeholder error handling
Reference: apps/web/middleware.ts:149
Impact:throw("This is broken")will surface as a 500 with no context, making production diagnostics harder.
Recommendation: Replace placeholder exceptions with structured errors or redirects, and cover the path in tests.
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Checked-in dependencies inflate the repo
Reference: node_modules/.modules.yaml:1, apps/web/node_modules/.modules.yaml:1
Impact: Committednode_modulestrees slow down clones and make dependency provenance opaque.
Recommendation: Delete these directories from source control and rely on lockfiles + CI installs. -
Conflicting lockfiles
Reference: apps/web/package-lock.json:1, apps/web/pnpm-lock.yaml:1
Impact: Maintaining both npm and pnpm locks guarantees drift and wasted builds.
Recommendation: Pick a single package manager (pnpm per root config) and remove the other lockfile. -
Stale orchestration artefacts
Reference: docker-compose.yml.old:1
Impact: An unmaintained compose file confuses operators and risks drift from supported deployments.
Recommendation: Archive or delete the legacy file once its contents are documented elsewhere. -
Load-test scaffolding mixes prod credentials
Reference: load_test2/user_test.py:1-140
Impact: The entire directory is bespoke tooling with hard-coded hosts and secrets, better suited for a private ops repo.
Recommendation: Move these scripts out of the main repo or gate them behind explicit opt-in configuration.
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Configuration is recomputed on every call
Reference: apps/api/config/config.py:108, apps/api/src/services/dev/dev.py:5, apps/api/src/security/security.py:7
Impact: Each helper call reloads the YAML file and environment variables, so routine operations (JWT setup, feature gating) repeatedly hit the filesystem.
Recommendation: Cache the parsed configuration (e.g. module-level singleton orfunctools.lru_cache) and inject settings where needed. -
Auth scaffolding is inconsistent and mostly dead code
Reference: apps/api/src/security/auth.py:16, apps/api/src/security/auth.py:43-49
Impact:OAuth2PasswordBearerpoints at/api/auth/logineven though the router lives under/api/v1, and the resulting dependency is never used; theTokenmodels are also unused clutter.
Recommendation: Fix the token URL, wire the dependency into endpoints, or delete the unused scaffolding entirely. -
Password hashing utilities are contradictory
Reference: apps/api/src/security/security.py:5-17
Impact: A bcryptCryptContextis initialised but the hashing helpers callpbkdf2_sha256directly, signalling drift and confusing maintainers about the real hash algorithm.
Recommendation: Standardise on one hashing strategy and delete any unused context setup. -
User service is a 600+ line grab bag
Reference: apps/api/src/services/users/users.py:1-600
Impact: Business logic, persistence, RBAC checks, and email side effects all live in one file, storing timestamps asstr(datetime.now())(apps/api/src/services/users/users.py:52-54). The breadth makes it hard to reason about regressions or isolate unit tests.
Recommendation: Split the module into cohesive units (domain, persistence, API), adopt timezone-aware datetimes, and add targeted tests around each responsibility. -
Production code still emits ad-hoc prints
Reference: apps/api/src/core/events/database.py:28, apps/api/app.py:69
Impact:printstatements leak internal paths and overwhelm logs, while bypassing structured logging and observability tooling.
Recommendation: Replace prints with the shared logger (or Python’sloggingmodule) and gate noisy messages behind debug levels. -
Type safety on the frontend is effectively disabled
Reference: apps/web/services/auth/auth.ts:4-18
Impact: The response interface uses literal'string'types and the API functions acceptany, so TypeScript cannot catch regressions or guide refactors.
Recommendation: Define real interfaces for responses/requests, removeany, and share types with the backend where possible. -
Automated coverage is almost nonexistent
Reference: apps/api/src/tests/test_main.py:1-49
Impact: Only two backend tests exist and they exercise a single happy-path GET, leaving critical logic (auth, billing, RBAC) untested.
Recommendation: Establish a baseline test suite (unit + integration) and wire it into CI so refactors have safety rails.