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Persist the 'state' parameter until a successful callback.
We discovered the following issue while using [omniauth-facebook][1]. We
are seeing an unexpectedly high number of CSRF violations (roughly 6%
of sign-ins) when users return from facebook.com.
Every time the user visits `/auth/facebook` and invokes the
`request_phase` method, a new `state` value is generated and put in the
session. If a user opens the site in two tabs and navigates to
`/auth/facebook` in each, then they have two copies of
https://www.facebook.com/dialog/oauth open, each with a different
`state` param. But, only one of these state params is in the session
under the `omniauth.state` key.
One of these pages will thus have a `state` param that does not match
the session. It is also possible to trigger this with concurrent or
duplicate requests, or by using the back/forward buttons, causing a race
condition in updating the session.
The page with the `state` value that "lost" the race will authorize
Facebook's permissions, but then fail when redirected to
`/auth/facebook/callback` due to the token mismatch.
I wondered why this gem always assigns a new `state` value on visiting
`/auth/:provider`, compared to how [rack-protection][2] and [Rails][3]
implement CSRF protection using a guarded assignment. My assumption in
this patch is that this is to avoid sending a value to one provider that
could be redeemed by another. If I send a state value to alice.com, then
someone working for alice.com could take that value and the account of
the user that authenticated there, then email the user a phishing
callback link for bob.com, including a `state` value that will work.
To avoid this, I have introduced a namespace into the session: each
`state` value is keyed by the class name of the particular provider, so
you can have a different state value per provider, but have them be
reusable. The value is still removed from the session on completion to
avoid replay attacks.
Keeping the `state` constant until the auth process completes means it's
safe to open multiple tabs and perform concurrent requests, or anything
else that might leave the session in an inconsistent or unpredictable
state.
[1]: https://github.com/mkdynamic/omniauth-facebook
[2]: https://github.com/sinatra/rack-protection/blob/v1.5.3/lib/rack/protection/authenticity_token.rb#L24
[3]: https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/v4.2.3/actionpack/lib/action_controller/metal/request_forgery_protection.rb#L316
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