diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 9881fe19d0..239c3dd1de 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -3,6 +3,16 @@
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [v0.51.558] — 2026-06-21 — Release TQ (workspace tree shows symlinks that point outside the workspace)
+
+### Added
+
+- **The workspace file tree now shows symlinks whose target resolves outside the workspace, as display-only rows.** Previously these were silently dropped, so a link in your workspace simply didn't appear. They now show with an indicator that they point outside the workspace; they remain non-navigable (the read/list gate still blocks traversing through them), and the row deliberately does **not** disclose the resolved outside path or any target metadata. Thanks @claw-io.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **A prompt dialog (rename / new file) could open without its Cancel button** right after viewing an outside-symlink's info dialog. The shared dialog's Cancel button is now always restored.
+
 ## [v0.51.557] — 2026-06-21 — Release TP (jump-to-question stays discoverable on desktop)
 
 ### Changed
diff --git a/api/workspace.py b/api/workspace.py
index 5e83d26b99..f736d25ad5 100644
--- a/api/workspace.py
+++ b/api/workspace.py
@@ -1220,32 +1220,54 @@ def _process(name, is_symlink, raw_link, lstat_result, reachable):
                 return  # target is under link_target — ancestor → cycle
             except ValueError:
                 pass
-            # Hide symlinks that resolve outside the workspace (can never be opened).
+            # Tag symlinks whose resolved target escapes the workspace root.
+            # Previously silently dropped; now emitted with target_outside_workspace=True
+            # so the workspace tree can show the link exists (display-only — the
+            # read/list gate in safe_resolve_ws / open_anchored_fd still blocks
+            # navigation through it).
+            target_outside_workspace = False
             try:
                 link_target.relative_to(ws_resolved)
             except ValueError:
-                return
+                target_outside_workspace = True
             if _is_blocked_system_path(link_target):
                 return
-            is_dir = link_target.is_dir()
             display_path = name
             if rel and rel != '.':
                 display_path = rel + '/' + display_path
             mtime_ns = lstat_result.st_mtime_ns if lstat_result is not None else None
-            entry = {
-                'name': name,
-                'path': display_path,
-                'type': 'symlink',
-                'target': str(link_target),
-                'is_dir': is_dir,
-                'mtime_ns': mtime_ns,
-            }
-            if not is_dir:
-                try:
-                    entry['size'] = link_target.stat().st_size
-                except OSError:
-                    entry['size'] = None
-            entries.append(entry)
+            if target_outside_workspace:
+                # #4581 hardening: a display-only escape-target symlink must NOT
+                # disclose where it points. Emit ONLY display-safe fields — never
+                # the resolved outside path, target-derived is_dir, or target size
+                # (the row exists to show the link is present; navigation/read
+                # through it stays blocked by safe_resolve_ws/open_anchored_fd).
+                entry = {
+                    'name': name,
+                    'path': display_path,
+                    'type': 'symlink',
+                    'is_dir': False,
+                    'target_outside_workspace': True,
+                    'mtime_ns': mtime_ns,
+                }
+                entries.append(entry)
+            else:
+                is_dir = link_target.is_dir()
+                entry = {
+                    'name': name,
+                    'path': display_path,
+                    'type': 'symlink',
+                    'target': str(link_target),
+                    'is_dir': is_dir,
+                    'target_outside_workspace': False,
+                    'mtime_ns': mtime_ns,
+                }
+                if not is_dir:
+                    try:
+                        entry['size'] = link_target.stat().st_size
+                    except OSError:
+                        entry['size'] = None
+                entries.append(entry)
         else:
             entry_path = name
             if rel and rel != '.':
@@ -1381,6 +1403,7 @@ def dir_signature(workspace: Path, rel: str = '.', entries: list[dict] | None =
             'size': entry.get('size'),
             'mtime_ns': entry.get('mtime_ns'),
             'target': entry.get('target'),
+            'target_outside_workspace': entry.get('target_outside_workspace'),
         })
     raw = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False)
     return hashlib.sha256(raw.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
diff --git a/static/i18n.js b/static/i18n.js
index 65ec0863f1..ec0df00f3d 100644
--- a/static/i18n.js
+++ b/static/i18n.js
@@ -443,6 +443,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `Downloading ${name}\u2026`,
     double_click_rename: 'Double-click to rename',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: 'Renamed to ',
     rename_failed: 'Rename failed: ',
@@ -1988,6 +1989,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `Scaricamento ${name}\u2026`,
     double_click_rename: 'Doppio clic per rinominare',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: 'Rinominato in ',
     rename_failed: 'Rinomina fallita: ',
@@ -3524,6 +3526,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `${name} をダウンロード中…`,
     double_click_rename: 'ダブルクリックで名前変更',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: '名前変更を開始できませんでした — 行が見つかりません。',
     renamed_to: '名前を変更: ',
     rename_failed: '名前変更失敗: ',
@@ -4984,6 +4987,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `Скачиваю ${name}…`,
     double_click_rename: 'Дважды щёлкните, чтобы переименовать',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: 'Переименовано в ',
     rename_failed: 'Не удалось переименовать: ',
@@ -6437,6 +6441,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `Descargando ${name}…`,
     double_click_rename: 'Haz doble clic para renombrar',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: 'Renombrado a ',
     rename_failed: 'Error al renombrar: ',
@@ -7888,6 +7893,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `Lade ${name} herunter\u2026`,
     double_click_rename: 'Doppelklick zum Umbenennen',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: 'Umbenannt in ',
     rename_failed: 'Umbenennen fehlgeschlagen: ',
@@ -9404,6 +9410,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `正在下载 ${name}...`,
     double_click_rename: '双击重命名',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: '已重命名为 ',
     rename_failed: '重命名失败：',
@@ -10954,6 +10961,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `正在下載 ${name}…`,
     double_click_rename: '按兩下即可重新命名',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: '無法開始重新命名，找不到資料列。',
     renamed_to: '已重新命名為 ',
     rename_failed: '重新命名失敗：',
@@ -12393,6 +12401,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `Baixando ${name}…`,
     double_click_rename: 'Duplo clique para renomear',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: 'Renomeado para ',
     rename_failed: 'Falha ao renomear: ',
@@ -13823,6 +13832,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `Downloading ${name}\u2026`,
     double_click_rename: 'Double-click to rename',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: 'Renamed to ',
     rename_failed: 'Rename failed: ',
@@ -15298,6 +15308,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     file_open_failed: 'Impossible d\'ouvrir le fichier',
     double_click_rename: 'Double-cliquez pour renommer',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: 'Renommé en',
     rename_failed: 'Échec du changement de nom :',
@@ -16839,6 +16850,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `${name} indiriliyor\u2026`,
     double_click_rename: 'Yeniden adlandırmak için çift tıklayın',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Could not start rename — row not found.',
     renamed_to: 'Yeniden adlandırıldı',
     rename_failed: 'Yeniden adlandırma başarısız oldu:',
@@ -18389,6 +18401,7 @@ const LOCALES = {
     downloading: (name) => `Pobieranie ${name}…`,
     double_click_rename: 'Kliknij dwukrotnie, aby zmienić nazwę',
     symlink_link_to: 'Symlink → {target}',
+    external_link_open_confirm: 'This symlink points outside the workspace and cannot be opened from here.',
     session_rename_failed_no_row: 'Nie można rozpocząć zmiany nazwy — nie znaleziono wiersza.',
     renamed_to: 'Nazwa zmieniona na ',
     rename_failed: 'Zmiana nazwy nie powiodła się: ',
diff --git a/static/icons.js b/static/icons.js
index 5fe3a28193..68e4190e8a 100644
--- a/static/icons.js
+++ b/static/icons.js
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ const LI_PATHS = {
   'lightbulb':       '<path d="M12 2a7 7 0 0 1 7 7c0 2.5-1.3 4.7-3.2 6H8.2C6.3 13.7 5 11.5 5 9a7 7 0 0 1 7-7z"/><line x1="9" y1="17" x2="15" y2="17"/><line x1="10" y1="20" x2="14" y2="20"/>',
   'folder':          '<path d="M22 19a2 2 0 0 1-2 2H4a2 2 0 0 1-2-2V5a2 2 0 0 1 2-2h5l2 3h9a2 2 0 0 1 2 2z"/>',
   'link':            '<path d="M10 13a5 5 0 0 0 7.54.54l3-3a5 5 0 0 0-7.07-7.07l-1.72 1.71"/><path d="M14 11a5 5 0 0 0-7.54-.54l-3 3a5 5 0 0 0 7.07 7.07l1.71-1.71"/>',
+  'external-link':   '<path d="M18 13v6a2 2 0 0 1-2 2H5a2 2 0 0 1-2-2V8a2 2 0 0 1 2-2h6"/><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"/><line x1="10" y1="14" x2="21" y2="3"/>',
   'list-todo':       '<rect x="3" y="5" width="6" height="6" rx="1"/><path d="m3 17 2 2 4-4"/><path d="M13 6h8"/><path d="M13 12h8"/><path d="M13 18h8"/>',
   // Editing / actions
   'pencil':          '<path d="M17 3a2.85 2.83 0 1 1 4 4L7.5 20.5 2 22l1.5-5.5Z"/>',
diff --git a/static/ui.js b/static/ui.js
index 7346fed8e9..a16c4529b3 100644
--- a/static/ui.js
+++ b/static/ui.js
@@ -5885,7 +5885,10 @@ function showConfirmDialog(opts={}){
   if(title) title.textContent=opts.title||t('dialog_confirm_title');
   if(desc) desc.textContent=opts.message||'';
   if(input){input.style.display='none';input.value='';}
-  if(cancelBtn) cancelBtn.textContent=opts.cancelLabel||t('cancel');
+  if(cancelBtn){
+    if(opts.hideCancel){cancelBtn.style.display='none';}
+    else{cancelBtn.style.display='';cancelBtn.textContent=opts.cancelLabel||t('cancel');}
+  }
   if(confirmBtn){
     confirmBtn.textContent=opts.confirmLabel||t('dialog_confirm_btn');
     confirmBtn.classList.toggle('danger',!!opts.danger);
@@ -5915,7 +5918,13 @@ function showPromptDialog(opts={}){
     input.value=prefill;input.placeholder=opts.placeholder||'';
     input.autocomplete='off';input.spellcheck=false;
   }
-  if(cancelBtn) cancelBtn.textContent=opts.cancelLabel||t('cancel');
+  if(cancelBtn){
+    // A prior showConfirmDialog({hideCancel:true}) (e.g. the outside-symlink info
+    // dialog, #4581) may have hidden the shared Cancel button; always restore it
+    // so a subsequent prompt keeps its Cancel affordance.
+    cancelBtn.style.display='';
+    cancelBtn.textContent=opts.cancelLabel||t('cancel');
+  }
   if(confirmBtn){
     confirmBtn.textContent=opts.confirmLabel||t('create');
     confirmBtn.classList.toggle('danger',!!opts.danger);
@@ -14350,9 +14359,13 @@ function _renderTreeItems(container, entries, depth){
     el.ondragend=()=>{el.classList.remove('dragging');_clearWorkspaceMoveDragOver();};
 
     const isLk = item.type === 'symlink';
-    const isDirLike = item.type === 'dir' || (isLk && item.is_dir);
-    const isFileLike = !isDirLike;
+    const isExternalLink = isLk && item.target_outside_workspace;
+    // External symlinks are display-only: not expandable, not openable.
+    // The read gate (safe_resolve_ws) still blocks navigation through them.
+    const isDirLike = !isExternalLink && (item.type === 'dir' || (isLk && item.is_dir));
+    const isFileLike = !isExternalLink && !isDirLike;
     el.dataset.wsIsDir = String(isDirLike);
+    if(isExternalLink){el.removeAttribute('draggable');el.ondragstart=null;}
 
     if(isDirLike){
       // Toggle arrow for directories
@@ -14373,9 +14386,11 @@ function _renderTreeItems(container, entries, depth){
     // Icon
     const iconEl=document.createElement('span');
     iconEl.className='file-icon';
-    iconEl.innerHTML = isDirLike
-      ? (isLk ? li('link', 14) : li('folder', 14))
-      : (isLk ? li('link', 14) : fileIcon(item.name, item.type));
+    iconEl.innerHTML = isExternalLink
+      ? li('external-link', 14)
+      : isDirLike
+        ? (isLk ? li('link', 14) : li('folder', 14))
+        : (isLk ? li('link', 14) : fileIcon(item.name, item.type));
     el.appendChild(iconEl);
 
     // Name
@@ -14407,6 +14422,8 @@ function _renderTreeItems(container, entries, depth){
       if(_nameClickTimer){clearTimeout(_nameClickTimer);_nameClickTimer=null;}
       // For directories, double-click navigates (breadcrumb view)
       if(isDirLike){loadDir(item.path);return;}
+      // External symlinks: show informational dialog, not rename
+      if(isExternalLink){if(typeof el.onclick==='function')el.onclick(e);return;}
       const inp=document.createElement('input');
       inp.className='file-rename-input';inp.value=item.name;
       inp.onclick=(e2)=>e2.stopPropagation();
@@ -14495,6 +14512,21 @@ function _renderTreeItems(container, entries, depth){
           renderFileTree();
         }
       };
+    }else if(isExternalLink){
+      // Display-only: the link points outside the workspace. We do NOT disclose
+      // the resolved outside path (#4581 hardening) and do NOT call openFile —
+      // the read gate (safe_resolve_ws) blocks navigation through the link.
+      el.onclick=async(e)=>{
+        e.stopPropagation();
+        await showConfirmDialog({
+          title:item.name,
+          message:t('external_link_open_confirm'),
+          confirmLabel:t('dialog_confirm_btn'),
+          danger:false,
+          hideCancel:true,
+          focusCancel:false,
+        });
+      };
     }else{
       el.onclick=async()=>openFile(item.path);
     }
diff --git a/tests/test_1707_workspace_filename_click.py b/tests/test_1707_workspace_filename_click.py
index b0011a9f1e..a5fba85ab7 100644
--- a/tests/test_1707_workspace_filename_click.py
+++ b/tests/test_1707_workspace_filename_click.py
@@ -248,15 +248,16 @@ def _run_node_with_clicks(click_count: int, dblclick_after_first: bool, item_typ
 // Symlink locals referenced by the handler block — declared from item
 // just like _renderTreeItem does before the tooltip assignment.
 const isLk = item.type === 'symlink';
-const isDirLike = item.type === 'dir' || (isLk && item.is_dir);
+const isExternalLink = isLk && item.target_outside_workspace;
+const isDirLike = !isExternalLink && (item.type === 'dir' || (isLk && item.is_dir));
 const elideMiddle = (s) => s;
 
 const runner = new Function(
   'nameEl', 'el', 'item', 'S', 't', 'loadDir', 'document', 'showToast', 'api', 'window',
-  'setTimeout', 'clearTimeout', 'isLk', 'isDirLike', 'elideMiddle',
+  'setTimeout', 'clearTimeout', 'isLk', 'isExternalLink', 'isDirLike', 'elideMiddle',
   '(()=>{' + handlerBlock + '})();'
 );
-runner(nameEl, el, item, S, t, loadDir, document, showToast, api, {}, trackedSetTimeout, trackedClearTimeout, isLk, isDirLike, elideMiddle);
+runner(nameEl, el, item, S, t, loadDir, document, showToast, api, {}, trackedSetTimeout, trackedClearTimeout, isLk, isExternalLink, isDirLike, elideMiddle);
 
 const evt = { stopPropagation: () => {} };
 for (let i = 0; i < clickCount; i++) {
diff --git a/tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py b/tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py
index 2878c5c237..a0939e1a64 100644
--- a/tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py
+++ b/tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
 - Self-referencing symlink (ln -s . ~/workspace/loop)
 - Ancestor symlink (ln -s .. ~/workspace/up)
 - Internal symlink entries carry correct type / is_dir / target fields
-- External symlink directories are hidden from listings and cannot be traversed
+- External symlink directories are emitted as display-only rows (target_outside_workspace=True)
+  and cannot be traversed
 """
 import json
 import os
@@ -57,8 +58,8 @@ def make_session(created_list, ws=None):
 class TestSymlinkCycleDetection:
     """Symlink cycle detection in list_dir / safe_resolve_ws."""
 
-    def test_external_symlink_filtered_from_listing(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
-        """External symlink dirs should be hidden from workspace listings."""
+    def test_external_symlink_emitted_as_display_only(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
+        """External symlink dirs are emitted with target_outside_workspace=True (display-only)."""
         ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
         target = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("target")
         (target / "file.txt").write_text("hello")
@@ -67,8 +68,14 @@ def test_external_symlink_filtered_from_listing(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp
 
         sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
         listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
-        names = [e["name"] for e in listing["entries"]]
-        assert "ext" not in names
+        entries = {e["name"]: e for e in listing["entries"]}
+        assert "ext" in entries
+        assert entries["ext"]["type"] == "symlink"
+        assert entries["ext"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
+        # #4581 hardening: display-only escape rows don't disclose target-derived
+        # metadata (is_dir/target), so an external dir symlink reports is_dir=False.
+        assert entries["ext"]["is_dir"] is False
+        assert "target" not in entries["ext"]
 
     def test_internal_symlink_listed_as_symlink(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
         """Internal symlink dirs should appear with type='symlink', is_dir=True."""
@@ -149,10 +156,11 @@ def test_symlink_cycle_in_subdir(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
         (ws / "ext").symlink_to(target)
 
         sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
-        # List root — should hide the external symlink and not recurse.
+        # List root — external symlink is emitted as display-only, not traversed.
         listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
-        names = [e["name"] for e in listing["entries"]]
-        assert "ext" not in names
+        entries = {e["name"]: e for e in listing["entries"]}
+        assert "ext" in entries
+        assert entries["ext"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
 
         # Traversing into ext/subdir crosses the workspace boundary and is blocked.
         try:
@@ -177,8 +185,8 @@ def test_internal_symlink_file_entry(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_facto
         assert link[0]["is_dir"] is False
         assert link[0]["size"] == 11  # len("hello world")
 
-    def test_external_symlink_file_filtered_from_listing(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
-        """External symlink files should be hidden from workspace listings."""
+    def test_external_symlink_file_emitted_as_display_only(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
+        """External symlink files are emitted with target_outside_workspace=True (display-only)."""
         ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
         real = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("real")
         (real / "data.txt").write_text("hello world")
@@ -186,8 +194,11 @@ def test_external_symlink_file_filtered_from_listing(self, cleanup_test_sessions
 
         sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
         listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
-        names = [e["name"] for e in listing["entries"]]
-        assert "link.txt" not in names
+        entries = {e["name"]: e for e in listing["entries"]}
+        assert "link.txt" in entries
+        assert entries["link.txt"]["type"] == "symlink"
+        assert entries["link.txt"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
+        assert entries["link.txt"]["is_dir"] is False
 
     def test_path_traversal_still_blocked(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
         """Raw .. traversal must still be blocked even with symlink support."""
diff --git a/tests/test_workspace_context_menu_and_rename.py b/tests/test_workspace_context_menu_and_rename.py
index 2a8958efef..672b026cc7 100644
--- a/tests/test_workspace_context_menu_and_rename.py
+++ b/tests/test_workspace_context_menu_and_rename.py
@@ -184,6 +184,20 @@ def _slice_show_prompt_dialog(self) -> str:
                     break
         return self.src[start:end]
 
+    def test_show_prompt_dialog_restores_hidden_cancel_button(self):
+        """#4581: the outside-symlink info dialog calls showConfirmDialog with
+        hideCancel:true, which sets the shared #appDialogCancel button to
+        display:none. showPromptDialog reuses the same button, so it must restore
+        the display before showing — otherwise the next rename/new-file prompt
+        opens with no Cancel button after a user clicks an external symlink."""
+        body = self._slice_show_prompt_dialog()
+        self.assertIn(
+            "cancelBtn.style.display=''", body.replace(" ", ""),
+            "showPromptDialog must reset cancelBtn.style.display so a prior "
+            "showConfirmDialog({hideCancel:true}) can't leave the Cancel button "
+            "hidden on a subsequent prompt (#4581 regression).",
+        )
+
     def test_show_prompt_dialog_accepts_default_value_alias(self):
         body = self._slice_show_prompt_dialog()
         # Must reference `opts.defaultValue` somewhere — the alias was the
diff --git a/tests/test_workspace_symlink_containment.py b/tests/test_workspace_symlink_containment.py
index b359717e24..2710db21b0 100644
--- a/tests/test_workspace_symlink_containment.py
+++ b/tests/test_workspace_symlink_containment.py
@@ -11,13 +11,23 @@ def test_safe_resolve_blocks_external_symlink_directory(tmp_path):
     (outside / "secret.txt").write_text("outside", encoding="utf-8")
     (workspace / "escape").symlink_to(outside)
 
+    # The read/list gate still blocks navigation through the escape symlink.
     with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Path traversal blocked"):
         safe_resolve_ws(workspace, "escape")
 
     with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Path traversal blocked"):
         list_dir(workspace, "escape")
 
-    assert "escape" not in {entry["name"] for entry in list_dir(workspace, ".")}
+    # The escape symlink is now emitted (display-only) with target_outside_workspace=True.
+    entries = {e["name"]: e for e in list_dir(workspace, ".")}
+    assert "escape" in entries
+    assert entries["escape"]["type"] == "symlink"
+    assert entries["escape"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
+    # #4581 hardening: display-only escape rows are uniformly is_dir=False — the
+    # target's real dir/file nature is target-derived metadata we don't disclose
+    # (the row is non-navigable regardless).
+    assert entries["escape"]["is_dir"] is False
+    assert "target" not in entries["escape"]
 
 
 def test_read_file_blocks_external_symlink_file(tmp_path):
@@ -28,10 +38,16 @@ def test_read_file_blocks_external_symlink_file(tmp_path):
     (outside / "secret.txt").write_text("outside", encoding="utf-8")
     (workspace / "secret-link.txt").symlink_to(outside / "secret.txt")
 
+    # The read gate still blocks reading through the escape symlink.
     with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Path traversal blocked"):
         read_file_content(workspace, "secret-link.txt")
 
-    assert "secret-link.txt" not in {entry["name"] for entry in list_dir(workspace, ".")}
+    # The escape symlink is now emitted (display-only) with target_outside_workspace=True.
+    entries = {e["name"]: e for e in list_dir(workspace, ".")}
+    assert "secret-link.txt" in entries
+    assert entries["secret-link.txt"]["type"] == "symlink"
+    assert entries["secret-link.txt"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
+    assert entries["secret-link.txt"]["is_dir"] is False
 
 
 def test_internal_symlink_still_resolves_within_workspace(tmp_path):
@@ -230,7 +246,9 @@ def test_list_read_create_work_on_no_dir_fd_fallback(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
     assert "a.txt" in names
     if w._DIR_FD_OK:
         assert "internal" in names          # legit internal symlink listed
-    assert "escape" not in names        # external symlink hidden
+    assert "escape" in names            # external symlink emitted (display-only)
+    escape_entry = next(e for e in w.list_dir(workspace, ".") if e["name"] == "escape")
+    assert escape_entry["target_outside_workspace"] is True
     assert w.read_file_content(workspace, "a.txt")["content"] == "hi"
 
     fd = w.open_anchored_create_fd(workspace, workspace / "new" / "f.txt")
@@ -277,3 +295,84 @@ def racing_open(path, *args, **kwargs):
             pass  # refused — correct
     finally:
         os.open = real_open
+
+
+# ── #4510: escape-target symlinks are now emitted as display-only rows ──────
+#    The escape filter was widened (not removed): symlinks whose resolved target
+#    sits outside the workspace root are now emitted with
+#    target_outside_workspace=True instead of being silently dropped. The
+#    read/list gate (safe_resolve_ws / open_anchored_fd) is unchanged and still
+#    blocks navigation through them. ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_list_dir_in_workspace_symlink_shape(tmp_path):
+    """In-workspace symlinks emit type='symlink' with target_outside_workspace=False."""
+    import api.workspace as w
+
+    if not w._DIR_FD_OK:
+        pytest.skip("symlink listing requires dir_fd support")
+
+    workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
+    workspace.mkdir()
+    (workspace / "data.txt").write_text("hello", encoding="utf-8")
+    (workspace / "link.txt").symlink_to(workspace / "data.txt")
+
+    entries = {e["name"]: e for e in w.list_dir(workspace, ".")}
+    assert "link.txt" in entries
+    assert entries["link.txt"]["type"] == "symlink"
+    assert entries["link.txt"]["target_outside_workspace"] is False
+    assert entries["link.txt"]["is_dir"] is False
+    assert entries["link.txt"]["target"] == str((workspace / "data.txt").resolve())
+
+
+def test_list_dir_outside_workspace_symlink_emitted_with_flag(tmp_path):
+    """Escape-target symlinks are emitted with target_outside_workspace=True."""
+    workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
+    outside = tmp_path / "outside"
+    workspace.mkdir()
+    outside.mkdir()
+    (outside / "file.txt").write_text("external", encoding="utf-8")
+    (workspace / "ext-link.txt").symlink_to(outside / "file.txt")
+
+    entries = {e["name"]: e for e in list_dir(workspace, ".")}
+    assert "ext-link.txt" in entries
+    assert entries["ext-link.txt"]["type"] == "symlink"
+    assert entries["ext-link.txt"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
+    assert entries["ext-link.txt"]["is_dir"] is False
+    # #4581 hardening: a display-only escape-target row must NOT disclose where it
+    # points — no resolved outside path, no target-derived size, no target-derived
+    # metadata. Only the link name/path + the display-only flag are emitted.
+    assert "target" not in entries["ext-link.txt"]
+    assert "size" not in entries["ext-link.txt"]
+
+
+def test_list_dir_external_symlink_blocked_system_path_unchanged(tmp_path):
+    """Symlinks to blocked system paths (/etc, /usr) are still filtered out."""
+    workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
+    workspace.mkdir()
+    (workspace / "etc-link").symlink_to("/etc")
+    (workspace / "usr-link").symlink_to("/usr")
+
+    names = {e["name"] for e in list_dir(workspace, ".")}
+    assert "etc-link" not in names
+    assert "usr-link" not in names
+
+
+def test_list_dir_escape_symlink_read_still_blocked(tmp_path):
+    """Listing shows the escape symlink (display-only) but read_file_content
+    on the same target still raises ValueError — proving the read gate is intact."""
+    workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
+    outside = tmp_path / "outside"
+    workspace.mkdir()
+    outside.mkdir()
+    (outside / "secret.txt").write_text("secret", encoding="utf-8")
+    (workspace / "escape.txt").symlink_to(outside / "secret.txt")
+
+    # Listing emits the entry with target_outside_workspace=True
+    entries = {e["name"]: e for e in list_dir(workspace, ".")}
+    assert "escape.txt" in entries
+    assert entries["escape.txt"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
+
+    # But reading through it is still blocked
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Path traversal blocked"):
+        read_file_content(workspace, "escape.txt")
diff --git a/tests/test_workspace_symlink_tree_shape.py b/tests/test_workspace_symlink_tree_shape.py
index 5ccf0b418f..787c220a1d 100644
--- a/tests/test_workspace_symlink_tree_shape.py
+++ b/tests/test_workspace_symlink_tree_shape.py
@@ -27,14 +27,19 @@ def test_isLk_local_declared(self):
         assert "const isLk = item.type === 'symlink';" in block, \
             "isLk local must be declared inside the per-item loop"
 
+    def test_isExternalLink_local_declared(self):
+        block = _render_block()
+        assert "const isExternalLink = isLk && item.target_outside_workspace;" in block, \
+            "isExternalLink local must be declared for display-only external symlinks"
+
     def test_isDirLike_local_declared(self):
         block = _render_block()
-        assert "const isDirLike = item.type === 'dir' || (isLk && item.is_dir);" in block, \
+        assert "const isDirLike = !isExternalLink && (item.type === 'dir' || (isLk && item.is_dir));" in block, \
             "isDirLike local must be declared inside the per-item loop"
 
     def test_isFileLike_local_declared(self):
         block = _render_block()
-        assert "const isFileLike = !isDirLike;" in block, \
+        assert "const isFileLike = !isExternalLink && !isDirLike;" in block, \
             "isFileLike local must be declared for file-like symlink handling"
 
     def test_wsIsDir_dataset_set(self):
@@ -65,6 +70,15 @@ def test_icon_dispatch_uses_li_link(self):
         assert "li('link', 14)" in block, \
             "icon dispatch must emit li('link', 14) for symlink rows"
 
+    def test_external_link_icon_path_exists(self):
+        assert "'external-link':" in ICONS_JS, \
+            "'external-link' key must be in LI_PATHS for display-only external symlinks"
+
+    def test_icon_dispatch_uses_li_external_link(self):
+        block = _render_block()
+        assert "li('external-link', 14)" in block, \
+            "icon dispatch must emit li('external-link', 14) for external symlink rows"
+
 
 class TestSymlinkTooltip:
     def test_symlink_link_to_key_in_i18n(self):