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Python handlers

The sandlock.handler Python wrapper layers a pythonic API over the C ABI exposed by sandlock-ffi. This page is the single source of truth for the Python wrapper; for the underlying C/Rust contract see extension-handlers.md.

Quick start

import sandlock
from sandlock.presets import AuditPathsHandler, COMMON_PATH_SYSCALLS

audit = AuditPathsHandler(callback=lambda path, _ctx: print(f"open {path}"))
sb = sandlock.Sandbox(fs_readable=["/usr", "/etc", "/lib", "/bin"])
sb.run_with_handlers(
    cmd=["/usr/bin/cat", "/etc/hostname"],
    handlers=[(s, audit) for s in COMMON_PATH_SYSCALLS],
)

Core types

  • Handler — base class. Subclass and override handle(ctx) -> NotifAction. Define handle as async def to run it off the supervisor loop so it can await slow work without stalling other trapped syscalls; see Deferred handlers. Set the class attribute on_exception (default ExceptionPolicy.KILL) to choose what the supervisor does when the handler errors.
  • HandlerCtx — frozen dataclass with the notification fields (id, pid, flags, syscall_nr, arch, instruction_pointer, args) plus child-memory accessors.
  • NotifAction — frozen value-object. Construct via factory classmethods: continue_(), errno(value), returns(value), hold(), kill(sig, pgid), inject_fd_send(srcfd, newfd_flags), inject_bytes(data, *, seal=True, cloexec=True) (see Inject synthetic content).
  • ExceptionPolicy — IntEnum: KILL (default), DENY_EPERM, CONTINUE, DENY_EIO.

HandlerCtx accessors

read_cstr(addr, max_len) -> str | None

Read a NUL-terminated string from the child at addr. Returns the decoded string on success, None on failure (invalid address, race, or no live mem handle).

read(addr, length) -> bytes | None

Read length raw bytes. Returns the bytes on success, None on failure.

write(addr, data) -> bool

Write data into the child memory at addr. Returns True on success.

read_path(arg=None, max_len=4096) -> str | None

Resolve a path-bearing syscall argument to a Python string. With arg=None (default), the path-argument index is inferred from ctx.syscall_nr via a name-keyed table. Multi-path syscalls (renameat2, rename, linkat, link, symlinkat, symlink) and unknown syscalls raise ValueError — pass arg= explicitly in those cases.

Known single-path syscalls (auto-inferred):

Syscall path arg
openat, unlinkat, mkdirat, newfstatat, statx, faccessat, readlinkat, execveat 1
open, unlink, mkdir, rmdir, stat, lstat, access, readlink, execve 0

Multi-path syscalls — call twice with explicit arg=:

def handle(self, ctx):
    # renameat2(olddirfd, oldpath, newdirfd, newpath, flags)
    src = ctx.read_path(arg=1)
    dst = ctx.read_path(arg=3)
    return NotifAction.continue_()

A live HandlerCtx returns the decoded string; a stale or absent mem handle returns None.

Preset handlers

Imported from sandlock.presets. The preset classes are deliberately NOT re-exported from the root sandlock package — root surface stays minimal; callers reach for presets when they want them. (The core handler types — Handler, NotifAction, HandlerCtx, ExceptionPolicy — are re-exported at the root.)

COMMON_PATH_SYSCALLS

The set of modern path-bearing syscalls a generic file-operation handler is typically registered against:

COMMON_PATH_SYSCALLS = [
    "openat", "unlinkat", "newfstatat", "statx", "faccessat",
    "readlinkat", "mkdirat", "execveat", "execve",
]

Used with a list comprehension to register one handler on all of them:

handlers = [(s, my_handler) for s in COMMON_PATH_SYSCALLS]

AuditPathsHandler(callback, max_len=4096)

  • on_exception=CONTINUE — audit must never block.
  • Calls callback(path, ctx) on every intercepted syscall (including when path is None, so the caller sees "couldn't read").
  • Returns NotifAction.continue_().

PathDenyHandler(deny: list[str], errno=errno.EPERM, max_len=4096)

  • on_exception=KILL — security handler, fail-closed.
  • deny is a list[str] of fnmatch patterns; passing a single string raises TypeError (the API is uniform).
  • If path matches any pattern, returns NotifAction.errno(errno); otherwise returns NotifAction.continue_().
  • path is None → continue_(). A deny-list does not claim "everything else is allowed", so when the path cannot be classified we defer to Landlock and other handlers in the chain.

PathAllowHandler(allow: list[str], errno=errno.EACCES, max_len=4096)

  • on_exception=KILL — security handler, fail-closed.
  • allow is a list[str] of fnmatch patterns; passing a single string raises TypeError.
  • If path matches any pattern, returns NotifAction.continue_(); otherwise returns NotifAction.errno(errno).
  • path is None → errno(errno). An allow-list claims "everything except the listed paths is denied", so failing to verify means failing closed.

LogSyscallsHandler(logger=None)

  • on_exception=CONTINUE — observational.
  • Logs one line per intercepted syscall: syscall=N pid=P args=(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5).
  • Default logger is logging.getLogger("sandlock.audit").info. Any Callable[[str], None] works (e.g. list.append in tests).
  • If logger raises, the exception is absorbed by on_exception=CONTINUE — the child proceeds but the log line is silently lost.

Recipes

Audit every common path syscall

audit = AuditPathsHandler(callback=lambda path, _ctx: print(path))
sb.run_with_handlers(cmd, [(s, audit) for s in COMMON_PATH_SYSCALLS])

Deny a directory tree

deny = PathDenyHandler(deny=["/etc/*", "/var/lib/*"])
sb.run_with_handlers(cmd, [(s, deny) for s in COMMON_PATH_SYSCALLS])

Allow-list paths (fail-closed)

allow = PathAllowHandler(allow=["/tmp/sandbox/*", "/usr/lib/*"])
sb.run_with_handlers(cmd, [(s, allow) for s in COMMON_PATH_SYSCALLS])

Anything not under those prefixes returns EACCES. Any syscall whose path the handler cannot read also returns EACCES (fail-closed).

Synthesise a return value

from sandlock.handler import Handler, NotifAction, ExceptionPolicy

class FakePid(Handler):
    on_exception = ExceptionPolicy.KILL

    def handle(self, ctx):
        return NotifAction.returns(777)

sb.run_with_handlers(cmd, [("getpid", FakePid())])

Inject synthetic content

NotifAction.inject_bytes(data) serves data to the guest as the fd returned by its open/openat, backed by an in-memory file. Use it instead of hand-rolling os.memfd_create + os.write + os.lseek: it builds the memfd, rewinds it, seals it read-only, and transfers fd ownership to the supervisor (the caller must NOT close it).

from sandlock.handler import Handler, NotifAction, ExceptionPolicy

class HostnameFile(Handler):
    on_exception = ExceptionPolicy.KILL

    def handle(self, ctx):
        if ctx.read_path() == "/etc/hostname":
            return NotifAction.inject_bytes(b"sandbox\n")
        return NotifAction.continue_()

By default the fd is sealed read-only (the guest cannot modify or resize it) and O_CLOEXEC (the content does not leak into programs the guest later execs). Pass seal=False for a writable fd, or cloexec=False to mirror a guest that opened the file without O_CLOEXEC. A rare allocation failure raises OSError, which the handler's on_exception policy then governs.

Kill the child from a handler

import signal
from sandlock.handler import Handler, NotifAction

class KillOnEtc(Handler):
    def handle(self, ctx):
        path = ctx.read_path()
        if path and path.startswith("/etc/"):
            return NotifAction.kill(signal.SIGKILL, pgid=0)
        return NotifAction.continue_()

Caveat: ctx.read_path() without an explicit arg= raises ValueError for syscalls not in the known path table (see the read_path accessor section). Under the default on_exception=KILL policy that ValueError becomes a kill signal to the child. Either register the handler only against syscalls in COMMON_PATH_SYSCALLS, pass arg= explicitly, or set on_exception=ExceptionPolicy.CONTINUE on your handler.

Combine multiple handlers on one syscall

Register multiple handlers on the same syscall — the supervisor calls them in registration order, stopping at the first non-Continue action:

sb.run_with_handlers(cmd, [
    ("openat", audit),
    ("openat", deny),
])

On syscalls that already carry built-in handlers (openat for chroot path normalization, COW write redirection, procfs virtualization; clone/fork/execve for resource accounting; and others), user handlers are appended after all builtins — see build_dispatch_table in crates/sandlock-core/src/seccomp/dispatch.rs. Dispatch short-circuits on the first non-Continue action, so a user handler only fires if every built-in for that syscall first returned Continue. Built-ins cannot be overridden or removed; this is the security boundary. When testing security-critical user handlers (e.g. PathDenyHandler on openat), exercise them against the actual built-in set on your syscall list rather than against an empty dispatch table.

Threading & safety contract

  • GIL contention. Each handler dispatch holds the GIL for the duration of handle(). The supervisor may dispatch handler callbacks concurrently across different notifications, so design handle() to be fast (sub-millisecond) and to protect any mutable handler state with your own synchronization. High-frequency interception (e.g. per-SYS_openat audit on a busy workload) will serialize on the GIL and can stall the supervisor. For a handle() that must do slow work (a network call, a blocking read), define it as async def so it runs off the loop instead; see Deferred handlers.

  • Interpreter finalization. If Py_FinalizeEx runs while the sandbox is still alive (e.g. the main thread exits with handlers still registered), the trampoline checks Py_IsInitialized() and returns an error, routing the notification through the handler's on_exception policy. Do not rely on this for clean shutdown — wait for the run to finish before tearing down the interpreter.

  • Native crashes inside handle(). A segfault inside a Python handler is not recoverable: the supervisor task hangs and the trapped child is held indefinitely. Write defensive handlers; this is a user responsibility.

  • Tokio runtime reentrancy. The C ABI's sandlock_run_with_handlers builds and drives its own Tokio runtime internally. Do not call Sandbox.run_with_handlers from a thread that already runs a Tokio runtime — the FFI will panic, and the panic surfaces as a Python exception. Pure-Python use (the common case) is unaffected.

Deferred handlers

By default handle() runs synchronously inside the supervisor's notification loop, so a slow callback stalls every other trapped syscall until it returns. Define handle as async def to run it off that loop instead: the coroutine is driven to completion on a worker thread, so it can await slow work without blocking the supervisor. That is the only change; you do not set any flag.

class FetchHandler(Handler):
    def __init__(self, backend):
        self.backend = backend

    async def handle(self, ctx):
        key = ctx.read_path()              # read the path before the slow work
        if key is None:
            return NotifAction.continue_()
        data = await self.backend.get(key)  # slow network GET, awaited off-loop
        # inject_bytes builds the sealed memfd and transfers fd ownership to
        # the supervisor (see "Inject synthetic content" above).
        return NotifAction.inject_bytes(data)

Why it helps Python specifically: the coroutine runs on a worker thread, and CPython releases the GIL while it awaits I/O, so multiple async handlers doing network work genuinely overlap while the supervisor loop stays free. It does not parallelize CPU-bound Python work (the GIL still serializes that); for that, push the hot path into a C extension that releases the GIL.

ctx and its child-memory accessors (read_cstr, read, write) stay valid for the whole coroutine, so you can read paths and write results across await points.

Contract (enforced by the supervisor):

  • Terminal decision. Deferral short-circuits the handler chain, so if an async handler returns continue_() and other handlers are registered on the same syscall, those later handlers do not run. Built-ins always run first regardless.
  • Refused on execve/execveat and fork-creating syscalls. The response cannot be moved off-loop there without skipping argv-safety work, so such a call is denied with EPERM.
  • Bounded. Beyond an internal in-flight cap, further deferrals fail fast with EAGAIN rather than queuing.

Make handle async only when it must do slow work. For fast handlers (audit counters, path checks) a synchronous handle runs inline at lower latency. See extension-handlers.md for the underlying Rust/C contract.

Ownership rules

  • Handler instances must outlive the run. The Sandbox holds a strong reference for the duration of the run; the reference is released when the run completes (success or failure).

  • File descriptors passed via NotifAction.inject_fd_send(srcfd) transfer ownership to the supervisor on dispatch. The Python caller must NOT close srcfd afterwards, regardless of whether the action was actually dispatched — the supervisor handles cleanup on all paths.

C ABI

The Python wrapper sits on the C ABI declared in crates/sandlock-ffi/include/sandlock.h. For the C ABI contract, exception policies at the supervisor level, and ownership across the boundary see the C/Rust sections of extension-handlers.md.