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Talk 5, Deploying Code You Didn't Write

Subtitle: Secure Continuous Delivery for Agent Code Track: Supply-chain / platform eng · Format: 30 min Deck: ../talk-5/

Abstract

Agents get updated constantly, new skills, new versions, often pushed via Git webhooks from sources you don't fully control. That's a supply-chain attack surface hiding inside your deploy pipeline. We walk our hardened deploy path: HMAC-SHA256 verification of GitHub/GitLab/generic webhooks (with a 5-minute replay-dedup window and optional IP allowlist), archive extraction that rejects path traversal and symlinks/hardlinks, strips setuid/setgid bits (mode & 0755) so no planted binary can escalate, enforces size/file-count limits against zip-bombs, and performs an atomic versioned symlink swap so a deploy either fully lands or doesn't, with instant rollback. The theme: treat every incoming deploy as hostile until proven otherwise.

Who it's for

Platform/release engineers; anyone building plugin/skill marketplaces or webhook-driven deploys.

Key takeaways

  1. Webhook auth done right (HMAC + replay protection).
  2. Safe archive extraction (traversal, symlink, setuid, zip-bomb defenses).
  3. Atomic symlink deploys for all-or-nothing + instant rollback.
  4. A checklist for any "deploy code from outside" path.
  5. Where it sits in zero trust: config integrity + recovery (signed configs / attestation are the Advanced next rung).

Slide outline (after the 2 mandatory slides, ~11)

  1. Your deploy pipeline is an attack surface (engineer9 skills ship via git).
  2. The threat: spoofed webhook, traversal, symlink escape, setuid binary, zip-bomb.
  3. HMAC-SHA256 verification per provider.
  4. Replay-dedup window + optional IP allowlist.
  5. Extraction: strip-root + per-path containment check.
  6. Reject symlinks/hardlinks.
  7. & 0755 setuid/setgid strip.
  8. Size / file-count limits.
  9. Atomic versioned symlink swap + instant rollback.
  10. Demo: bad HMAC → 401; ../ tar → rejected; setuid bit gone after deploy.
  11. Takeaways.

Source: internal/gitdeploy/, internal/api/deploy.go.

Pitch angle

"Every webhook-driven deploy is a door. I'll try five different ways to sneak malicious code through ours, bad signature, path traversal, symlink, setuid bit, zip-bomb, and show you the check that stops each."