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draft-hallambaker-omnibroker-00.xml
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draft-hallambaker-omnibroker-00.xml
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd" [
<!ENTITY rfc2629 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2629.xml'>
<!ENTITY RFC1035 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1035.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC2119 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
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<!ENTITY RFC4366 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4366.xml">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?>
<?rfc strict="yes" ?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="4"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes" ?>
<?rfc compact="yes" ?>
<?rfc subcompact="no" ?>
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-hallambaker-omnibroker-00" ipr="trust200902">
<front>
<title abbrev="OmniBroker Protocol">OmniBroker Protocol</title>
<author fullname="Phillip Hallam-Baker" initials="P. M." surname="Hallam-Baker">
<organization>Comodo Group Inc.</organization>
<address>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>
<!--<author fullname="Rob Stradling" initials="R. N." surname="Stradling">
<organization>Comodo CA Ltd.</organization>
<address>
<email>[email protected]</email>
</address>
</author>-->
<date day="27" month="June" year="2012" />
<area>General</area>
<workgroup>Internet Engineering Task Force</workgroup>
<keyword>X.509</keyword>
<keyword>PKIX</keyword>
<keyword>OCSP</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
An Omnibroker is an agent chosen and trusted by an Internet user to
provide information such as name and certificate status information
that are in general trusted even if they are not trustworthy.
Rather than acting as a mere conduit for information provided by
existing services, an Omnibroker is responsible for curating those
sources to protect the user.
</t>
<t>
The Omnibroker Protocol (OBP) provides an aggregated interface to
trusted Internet services including DNS, OCSP and various forms
of authentication service. Multiple transport bindings are
supported to permit efficient access in virtually every common
deployment scenario and ensure access in any deployment
scenario in which access is not being purposely denied.
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Definitions">
<section title="Requirements Language">
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <xref target="RFC2119">RFC 2119</xref>.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Purpose">
<t>
An Omnibroker is an agent chosen and trusted by an Internet user to
provide information such as name and certificate status information
that are in general trusted even if they are not trustworthy.
Rather than acting as a mere conduit for information provided by
existing services, an Omnibroker is responsible for curating those
sources and providing autheticated, curated results to the endpoint
client.
</t>
<t>
Unlike the traditional trusted information services that are expected
to deliver the same response to a query regardless of who asks the
question, OBP permits an Omnibroker to return a response that is
tailored to the specific party asking the question. This permits the
use of an authentication approach that has negligible impact
on performance and permits an
Omnibroker to answer questions that a traditional public Internet
information service could not. In particular, an Omnibroker
can broker peer to peer connections
</t>
<section title="A Curated Service">
<t>
In the traditional configuration, an Internet host accepts DNS service
from the IP address specified by the local network provider, frequently
the DNS server advertised by the local DHCP service. This approach
creates an obvious security risk as DNS is clearly a trusted service
and a random DNS service advertised by the local DNS is clearly not
trustworthy.
</t>
<t>
A policy of only using a chosen DNS service provides a reduction in
risk but only a modest one since the standard DNS service does not
provide authenticated results. Many local area networks intercept all
DNS traffic and process it through the local DNS server regardless
of the intended destination IP address. This practice is highly
desirable if it would prevent a client from accessing an untrustworthy
DNS service in place of a trustworthy local DNS service and
extreemly undesirable in the contrary case.
</t>
<t>
In addition to ensuring the authenticity of DNS resolution responses,
such services frequently provide filtering of Internet addresses
the network provider considers undesirable. Many workplaces block access
to Web sites that are considered detrimental to productivity.
Many parent subscribe to services that filter content they consider
undesirable. While the value of such services is debatable they
are services that those customers have chosen to deploy on their
networks to meet their perceived security requirements. New security
proposals that do not support such capabilities or seek to
actually circumvent them will not be acceptable to those
constituencies.
</t>
<t>
While DNS filtering is a form of censorship, not all forms of
DNS filering are intrinsically undesirable censorship. Spam filtering
is also a form of censorship albeit one that is not normally
regarded as such because it most Internet users now consider it to
be an essential security control. Anti-Virus tools are also a form
of censorship. DNS filtering tools that block access to sites that
distribute malware are also a form of censorship and are rapidly
gaining popularity for the same reason.
</t>
<t>
While all forms of censorship raise civil liberties concerns,
censorship should not automatically raise civil liberties objections.
It is not the fact that filtering is taking place but
the party that is in control of the filtering that should
raise civil liberties concerns. In an Internet of
2 billion users, all users are obliged to perform some filtering.
OBP is designed to make the party that is in control of the
filtering process apparent and provide the end user with the
ability to select the Omnibroker of their choice.
</t>
<t>
DNSSEC provides a means of determining that a DNS record is the
authentic record published by the source but this capability alone
does not meet the security requirements for DNS resolution services
as they have come to be understood since the protocol was first proposed.
</t>
<t>
Internet users want to be safe from all forms of attack, not just
the DNS resolver mani-in-the-middle attack that 'end-to-end'
deployment of DNSSEC is designed to address. An Internet user is
far more likely to be directed to a site with a DNS name controlled
by a criminal gang than be subject to a man-in-the-middle attack.
</t>
<t>
Most users would prefer to have an Internet connection that is
'curated' to remove at least some of the locations they consider
to be undesirable. The fact that an organised criminal gang has put
a host on the Internet does not mean that any other Internet user
should be obliged to allow it to connect to any of the machines that
they own.
</t>
<t>
The same argument for curating the raw results applies to
other forms of trusted information service. The fact that a
Certificate Authority has issued a digital certificate and
considers it to be valid should not mean that the end party
is automatically considered trustworthy by anyone and for
any purpose.
</t>
<t>
The deployment of security policy capabilities presents another
case in which direct reliance on raw data is undesirable. While
security policies such as 'host always offers TLS' or 'mail
server always signs outgoing mail with DKIM' can provide
considerable security advantages, only some of the security
policy information that is published is accurate and kept
up to date. Curating such data sources typically proves
essential if an unacceptable rate of false positives is
to be avoided.
</t>
<t>
Although a client is permitted to curate its own data sources
it rarely has a sufficient amount of data to make decisions
as accurately as a network service that can draw on a wide
variety of additional data including tracking of communication
patterns, historical data series and third party reputation
services.
</t>
<t>
Curation in the network offers better asgility than the client
approach. Agility is an important consideration when an attacker
changes their strategy rapidly and repeatedly to counter
new defensive controls.
</t>
<t>
While curating trusted data sources is an established and
proven practice, current practice has been to curate each
source individually. This approach avoids the need to write
a new protocol but limits the information a curator can
leverage to detect potential danger. Leveraging multiple
data sources simultaneously allows better accuracy than
applying each individually.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Connection Broker">
<t>
The OBP service connection broker answers the query 'what connection
parameters should be used to establish the best connection
to interract with party X according to protocol Y. Where 'best'
is determined by the Omnibroker which MAY take into account
parameters specified by the relying party.
</t>
<section title="Service Connection Broker">
<t>
The OBP service connection broker supports and extends the traditional
DNS resolution service that resolves a DNS name (e.g. www.example.com) to
return an IP address (e.g. 10.1.2.3).
</t>
<t>
When using an Omnibroker as a service connection broker, a client
specifies both the DNS name (e.g. www.example.com) and the
Internet protocol to be used (e.g. _http._tcp). The returned
connection parameters MAY include:
</t>
<t>
<list>
<t>
The IP protocol version, address and port number to
establish a connection to.
</t>
<t>
If appropriate, a security transport such as TLS or IPSEC.
</t>
<t>
If appropriate, a description of a service credential such
as a TLS certificate or a constraint on the type of certificates
that the client should consider acceptable.
</t>
<t>
If appropriate, application protocol details such as
version and protocol options.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
If an attempt to connect with the parameters specified fails, a
client MAY report the failure and request a new set of parameters.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Peer Connection Broker">
<t>
Each OBP request identifies both the account under which the
request is made and the device from which it is made. An OBP broker
is thus capable of acting as a peer connection broker service
or providing a gateway to such a service.
</t>
<t>
When using Omnibroker as a peer connection broker, a client
specifies the account name and DNS name of the party with which
a connection is to be established (e.g. [email protected])
and the connection protocol to be used (e.g. _xmpp-client._tcp)
</t>
<t>
The returned
connection parameters are similar to those returned in response to a
service broker query.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Connection Broker API">
<t>
In the traditional BSD sockets API a network client performs
a series of calls to resolve a network name to a list of IP
addresses, selects one and establishes an IP connection to
a port specified by the chosen application protocol.
</t>
<t>
OBP anticipates a higher level abstract API that encapsulates
this complexity, hiding it from the application code.
</t>
<t>
In the case that one (or more) OBP services are configured,
the library supporting the SHOULD obtain connection parameters
from the OBP service. Otherwise, it SHOULD establish a connection
using the traditional calling sequence of resolving a host
name to obtain an IP address, etc.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Service Advertisement">
<t>
Service advertisement is the converse of service resolution. An
Internet application wishing to accept inbound connections specifies
one or more sets of connection parameters for the Omnibroker to
register with whatever naming, discovery or other services may
be appropriate.
</t>
<t>
</t>
<section title="Connection Advertisement API">
<t>
OBP anticipates the use of a high level API for connection advertisement
that is the converse of the Connection broker API. Instead
of establishing a connection, the API is used to advertise
that a connection is offered either as a service or a peer.
</t>
<t>
An application MAY offer multiple types of connection with
different connection properties (e.g. IPv4/IPv6, with and
without SSL, etc.). This MAY be supported by marking certain
properties as being optional and/or by permitting the
API to be called multiple times with different properties
specified.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Credential Validation Broker">
<t>
A credential validation broker reports on the validity and
trustworthiness of credentials presented to a client by Internet
services and/or peers.
</t>
<t>
The service provided by OBP is similar to that provided by
OCSP and SCVP. Like SCVP, OBP is an agent selected by the
relying party to validate certificates and/or construct
trust paths on its behalf.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Authentication Gateway">
<t>
Every OBP request is strongly authenticated by means of a shared
secret that is unique to the account and the device. This may be
leveraged to permit use as an authentication gateway, providing
access to other credentials that the client has established the
right to use.
</t>
<t>
An Authentication Gateway MAY provide access to account names and
passwords that the account holder has chosen to store in the cloud for
access to sites that do not support a stronger,
cryptographically based form of
authentication such as OAuth.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Credential Announcement">
<t>
An Authentication Gateway can only provide access to credentials
that it has notice of. A client uses the Credential Announcement
transaction to advise the service of a new credential.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Omnibroker Connection Maintenance Service">
<section title="Authentication">
<t>
The principle function of the OBP Connection Maintenance Protocol
is to establish and maintain the cryptographic parameters
used to authenticate and encrypt
</t>
<t>
The user needs to authenticate the broker service regardless
of any authentication requirements of the broker.
</t>
<section title="Broker Authentication">
<t>
The OBP connection maintenance protocol transport MUST provide
a trustworthy means of verifying the identity of the broker
(e.g. an Extended Validation SSL certificate).
</t>
<t>
If the device supports a display capability, authentication of the
device and user MAY be achieved by means of an authentication
image. Such an authentication image is generated by the broker and
passed to the client in the OpenResponse message. The user then
verifies that the image presented on the device display is the same
as that presented on the account maintenance console.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Device Authentication">
<t>
If device authentication is required, the mechanism to be used depends on
the capabilities of the device, the requirements of the broker and
the existing relationship between the user and the broker.
</t>
<t>
If the device supports some means of data entry, authentication
MAY be achieved by entering a passcode into the device that was
previously delivered to the user out of band.
</t>
<t>
The passcode authentication mechanism allows the device to establish
a proof that it knows the passcode without disclosing the passcode.
This property provides protection against Man-In-The-Middle type
disclosure attacks.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="OBPConnection">
<section title="Top">
<t>
OBP Connection Management Query requests and responses contain
the following common elements:
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: Request">
<t>
The following parameters MAY be specified in any request:
</t>
<t>
Ticket : Binary
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Opaque ticket issued by the server that identifies
the cryptographic parameters for encryption and
authentication of the message payload.
</t>
<t>
MAC : Binary
[1..1]
</t>
<t>
Message Authentication Code formed over the canonical
form of the message payload.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: Response">
<t>
The following parameters MAY be specified in any response:
</t>
<t>
MAC : Binary
[1..1]
</t>
<t>
Message Authentication Code formed over the canonical
form of the message payload.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Structure: Cryptographic">
<t>
Parameters describing a cryptographic context.
</t>
<t>
Protocol : Label
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
OBP tickets MAY be restricted to use with either the management
protocol (Management) or the query protocol (Query). If so a
service would typically
specify a ticket with a long expiry time or no expiry for use with
the management protocol and a separate ticket for use with the
query protocol.
</t>
<t>
Secret : Binary
[1..1]
</t>
<t>
Shared secret
</t>
<t>
Encryption : Label
[1..1]
</t>
<t>
Encryption Algorithm selected
</t>
<t>
Authentication : Label
[1..1]
</t>
<t>
Authentication Algorithm selected
</t>
<t>
Ticket : Binary
[1..1]
</t>
<t>
Opaque ticket issued by the server that identifies
the cryptographic parameters for encryption and
authentication of the message payload.
</t>
<t>
Expires : DateTime
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Date and time at which the context will expire
</t>
</section>
<section title="Structure: ImageLink">
<t>
Algorithm : Label
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Image encoding algorithm (e.g. JPG, PNG)
</t>
<t>
Image : Binary
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Image data as specified by algorithm
</t>
</section>
<section title="Structure: Connection">
<t>
Contains information describing a network connection.
</t>
<t>
Name : Name
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
DNS Name. Since one of the functions of an OBP service is name
resolution, a DNS name is only used to establish a connection if
connection by means of the IP address fails.
</t>
<t>
Port : Integer
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
TCP or UDP port number.
</t>
<t>
Address : Binary
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
IPv4 (32 bit) or IPv6 (128 bit) service address
</t>
<t>
Priority : Integer
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Service priority. Services with lower priority numbers SHOULD
be attempted before those with higher numbers.
</t>
<t>
Weight : Integer
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Weight to be used to select between services of equal priority.
</t>
<t>
Transport : Label
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
OBP Transport binding to be used valid values are HTTP, DNS and UDP.
</t>
<t>
Expires : DateTime
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Date and time at which the specified connection context will expire.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Bind">
<t>
Binding a device is a two step protocol that begins with the
Start Query followed by a sequence of Ticket queries.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: BindRequest">
<t>
The following parameters MAY occur in either a
StartRequest or TicketRequest:
</t>
<t>
Encryption : Label
[0..Many]
</t>
<t>
Encryption Algorithm that the client accepts. A Client MAY
offer multiple algorithms. If no algorithms are specified then
support for the mandatory to implement algorithm is assumed.
Otherwise mandatory to implement algorithms MUST be
specified explicitly.
</t>
<t>
Authentication : Label
[0..Many]
</t>
<t>
Authentication Algorithm that the client accepts.
If no algorithms are specified then
support for the mandatory to implement algorithm is assumed.
Otherwise mandatory to implement algorithms MUST be
specified explicitly.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: BindResponse">
<t>
The following parameters MAY occur in either a
StartResponse or TicketResponse:
</t>
<t>
Cryptographic : Cryptographic
[0..Many]
</t>
<t>
Cryptographic Parameters.
</t>
<t>
Service : Connection
[0..Many]
</t>
<t>
A Connection describing an OBP service point
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: OpenRequest">
<t>
The OpenRequest Message is used to begin a device binding transaction.
Depending on the authentication requirements of the service the
transaction may be completed in a single query or require a
further Ticket Query to complete.
</t>
<t>
If authentication is required, the mechanism to be used depends on
the capabilities of the device, the requirements of the broker and
the existing relationship between the user and the broker.
</t>
<t>
If the device supports some means of data entry, authentication
MAY be achieved by entering a passcode previously delivered out
of band into the device.
</t>
<t>
The OpenRequest specifies the properties of the service
(Account, Domain) and Device (ID, URI, Name) that will remain
constant throughout the period that the device binding is active
and parameters to be used for the mutual authentication protocol.
</t>
<t>
Account : String
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Account name of the user at the OBP service
</t>
<t>
Domain : Name
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Domain name of the OBP broker service
</t>
<t>
HavePasscode : Boolean
[0..1] Default =False
</t>
<t>
If 'true', the user has entered a passcode value for
use with passcode authentication.
</t>
<t>
HaveDisplay : Boolean
[0..1] Default =False
</t>
<t>
Specifies if the device is capable of displaying information
to the user or not.
</t>
<t>
Challenge : Binary
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Client challenge value to be used in authentication challenge
</t>
<t>
DeviceID : URI
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
</t>
<t>
DeviceURI : URI
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
</t>
<t>
DeviceName : String
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: OpenResponse">
<t>
An Open request MAY be accepted immediately or be held pending
completion of an inband or out-of-band authentication process.
</t>
<t>
The OpenResponse returns a ticket and a set of cryptographic
connection parameters in either case. If the
</t>
<t>
Challenge : Binary
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Challenge value to be used by the client to respond
to the server authentication challenge.
</t>
<t>
ChallengeResponse : Binary
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Server response to authentication challenge by the client
</t>
<t>
VerificationImage : ImageLink
[0..Many]
</t>
<t>
Link to an image to be used in an image verification mechanism.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: TicketRequest">
<t>
The TicketRequest message is used to (1) complete a binding request
begun with an OpenRequest and (2) to refresh ticket or connection
parameters as necessary.
</t>
<t>
ChallengeResponse : Binary
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
The response to a server
authentication challenge.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: TicketResponse">
<t>
The TicketResponse message returns cryptographic and/or connection
context information to a client.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Unbind">
<t>
Requests that a previous device association be deleted.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: UnbindRequest">
<t>
Since the ticket identifies the binding to be deleted, the
only thing that the unbind message need specify is that
the device wishes to cancel the binding.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message: UnbindResponse">
<t>
Reports on the success of the unbinding operation.
</t>
<t>
If the server reports success, the client SHOULD delete the
ticket and all information relating to the binding.
</t>
<t>
A service MAY continue to accept a ticket after an unbind request
has been granted but MUST NOT accept such a ticket for
a bind request.
</t>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Omnibroker Connection Query Service">
<section title="OBPQuery">
<section title="Top">
<t>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Structure: Identifier">
<t>
Specifies an Internet service by means of a DNS address and either a
DNS service prefix, an IP port number or both. An Internet peer
connection MAY be specified by additionally specifying an account.
</t>
<t>
Name : Name
[1..1]
</t>
<t>
The DNS name of the service to connect to.
</t>
<t>
Internationalized DNS names MUST be encoded in punycode
encoding.
</t>
<t>
Account : Label
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Identifies the account to connect to in the case that a peer connection
is to be established.
</t>
<t>
Service : Name
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
The DNS service prefix defined for use with DNS records that
take a service prefix including SRV.
</t>
<t>
Port : Integer
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
IP Port number.
</t>
<t>
A service identifier MUST specify either a service or a port or both.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Structure: Connection">
<t>
IPVersion : Integer
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Contains the IP version field. If absent, IPv4 is assumed.
</t>
<t>
IPProtocol : Integer
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Contains the IP protocol field. If absent, TCP is assumed.
</t>
<t>
IPAddress : Binary
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
IP address in network byte order. This will normally be an
IPv4 (32 bit) or IPv6 (128 bit) address.
</t>
<t>
IPPort : Integer
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
IP port. 1-65535
</t>
<t>
TransportPolicy : String
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Transport security policy as specified in [TBS]
</t>
<t>
ProtocolPolicy : String
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Application security policy specification as specified by
the application protocol.
</t>
<t>
Advice : Advice
[0..1]
</t>
<t>
Additional information that a service MAY return to support
a service connection identification.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Structure: Advice">
<t>
Additional information that a service MAY return to support
a service connection identification. For example, DNSSEC
signatures chains, SAML assertions, DANE records,
Certificate Transparency proof chains, etc.
</t>
<t>