From 024de4c0794241ea6659d62907fb70af713741fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 17:21:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/14] security: credential hygiene and input bounds (audit PR 0) Low-risk, decision-free fixes from the 2026-09-16 security audit (audit.md): secrets that leaked sideways and inputs that were unbounded. Secrets: - H4: mask the hub admin token in Actions logs and mint the router bootstrap token over a port-forward from the runner instead of a kubectl-run pod whose spec (and `describe` on failure) carried it. The bootstrap token is masked too. - M4: create the SQLite file 0600 before the driver opens it, so the WAL/SHM side files inherit that mode, and tighten pre-existing files. The keyring table holds the mesh signing private keys. - M5: secrets.FromPathOrEnv unsets the env var once read, and command backends get an environment with SAM_API_TOKEN/SAM_CLIENT_SECRET stripped (backendEnv), so subprocesses cannot inherit the node's own credentials. - M15: OPENROUTER_API_KEY moves from a plain Deployment env value to a Secret with secretKeyRef. - L25: the sam-mesh chart mounts the router bootstrap token as a file and uses --bootstrap-token-path; nothing secret in argv or env. - I12: Cache-Control: no-store on every route that returns biscuits, bootstrap tokens or enrolled-node records. - I14: POST /admin/bootstrap-tokens requires an explicit role; the silent default was router, the most privileged one. - L16: verifiers call GetAllValidPublicKeys; the private halves no longer flow through five handlers that only verify. Bounds: - M19: StdioBridge reads lines up to the 1 MiB request cap (was bufio.Scanner's 64 KiB, after which the reader stopped forever and every later caller hung). When the reader does stop, the bridge kills the child and answers 503 instead of hanging. - M20: remote-controlled strings (request path, catalog text, target) are truncated before logging, the ingress path is no longer logged before authorization, and the debug log ring caps each retained line at 4 KiB so its memory is bounded. - I16: control-plane and IdP response bodies are read through a 1 MiB LimitReader everywhere (enroll, enroll/status, refresh, token). - I17: Options.Validate rejects a control-plane public key that is not 32 bytes, before it can reach ed25519 verification. - L17: the sam-one --policy-file seed runs the same validation as POST /policies (ValidatePolicyConfig). CI / supply chain: - M14/I19: the OpenClaw gateway token is checked for emptiness (base64 -d on empty input exits 0) and masked; every envsubst names its placeholders so runner env and container-runtime $VARs are never inlined into cluster objects. - L28: chart-test.yml checkout no longer persists GITHUB_TOKEN; helm-unittest is installed at a pinned version. - L21: release.yml fires on v* tags only and drops the unused packages: write scope. - L20: .dockerignore keeps .git, local DBs, keys, tokens and build output out of every image build context; dependabot now covers the nano-init and sam-a2a-bridge Go modules, npm, pip, pub and gradle. - L2: vendored js-yaml 4.1.0 -> 4.1.1 (CVE-2025-64718, merge-key prototype pollution), taken from the npm tarball verified against the registry shasum. Tests: SQLite file mode incl. WAL/SHM and DSN parsing; env var removed after FromPathOrEnv; backendEnv strips only exact secret names; bridge delivers a >64 KiB reply and refuses with 503 after backend exit; ring buffer line cap and truncateForLog; Options key-size check; admin token role required + no-store header; chart unit test for the mounted token. --- .dockerignore | 50 +++++++++++ .github/dependabot.yml | 42 ++++++++- .github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml | 5 +- .github/workflows/chart-test.yml | 2 + .github/workflows/deploy.yaml | 86 +++++++++++-------- .github/workflows/release.yml | 5 +- Makefile | 2 +- .../templates/router-statefulset.yaml | 26 +++--- .../tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml | 24 +++++- internal/console/public/vendor/js-yaml.min.js | 4 +- internal/controlplane/catalog.go | 7 +- internal/controlplane/server.go | 72 ++++++++-------- internal/controlplane/server_test.go | 48 +++++++++++ internal/node/backend_env.go | 49 +++++++++++ internal/node/backend_env_test.go | 41 +++++++++ internal/node/controlplane.go | 11 ++- internal/node/enroll.go | 12 +-- internal/node/log_buffer.go | 26 +++++- internal/node/log_buffer_test.go | 65 ++++++++++++++ internal/node/mcp.go | 2 +- internal/node/mcp_service.go | 6 +- internal/node/middleware.go | 2 +- internal/node/node.go | 11 +-- internal/node/oidc.go | 2 +- internal/node/options.go | 5 ++ internal/node/options_test.go | 57 ++++++++++++ internal/node/stdio_bridge.go | 43 ++++++++-- internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go | 75 ++++++++++++++++ internal/secrets/secrets.go | 8 +- internal/secrets/secrets_test.go | 6 ++ internal/standalone/standalone.go | 3 + internal/storage/sql_store.go | 64 ++++++++++++++ internal/storage/sql_store_test.go | 48 +++++++++++ internal/storage/storage.go | 4 + 34 files changed, 783 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .dockerignore create mode 100644 internal/node/backend_env.go create mode 100644 internal/node/backend_env_test.go create mode 100644 internal/node/log_buffer_test.go create mode 100644 internal/node/options_test.go diff --git a/.dockerignore b/.dockerignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca4acce1 --- /dev/null +++ b/.dockerignore @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +# Keep secrets, local state and build outputs out of every image build +# context. Every Dockerfile at the root does `COPY . .` into the builder +# stage; final images copy only the binary, but the builder layer still +# receives whatever is here. + +# VCS metadata (binaries are built with -buildvcs=false) +.git +.gitignore + +# Local control-plane / node state and credentials +*.db +*.db-wal +*.db-shm +*.key +*.pem +*.p12 +*.jks +*.keystore +admin-token +join-token +policies.* +.env +.env.* +mobile/logcat.txt + +# Build outputs and caches +bin/ +dist/ +node_modules/ +__pycache__/ +.venv/ +*.test +*.out +coverage.* +mobile/sam-node-app/build/ +site/public/ +site/resources/ +rootfs.ext4 +rootfs.tar + +# Test artifacts +tests/e2e/logs/ +tests/integration/logs/ +tests/integration/scratch/ +tests/ui/playwright-report/ +tests/ui/test-results/ + +# Reports written at the repo root +audit.md +security-audit.md diff --git a/.github/dependabot.yml b/.github/dependabot.yml index 0fe48533..a0c5d3c8 100644 --- a/.github/dependabot.yml +++ b/.github/dependabot.yml @@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ version: 2 updates: - package-ecosystem: "gomod" - directory: "/" + directories: + - "/" + - "/cmd/nano-init" + - "/cmd/sam-a2a-bridge" schedule: interval: "weekly" cooldown: @@ -32,6 +35,43 @@ updates: cooldown: default-days: 7 + - package-ecosystem: "npm" + directories: + - "/tests/ui" + schedule: + interval: "weekly" + cooldown: + default-days: 7 + + - package-ecosystem: "pip" + directories: + - "/sam-mcp-python" + - "/cmd/chaos-agent" + - "/tests/e2e/docker/*" + - "/development/examples/*" + schedule: + interval: "weekly" + cooldown: + default-days: 7 + groups: + python-deps: + patterns: + - "*" + + - package-ecosystem: "pub" + directory: "/mobile/sam-node-app" + schedule: + interval: "weekly" + cooldown: + default-days: 7 + + - package-ecosystem: "gradle" + directory: "/mobile/sam-node-app/android" + schedule: + interval: "weekly" + cooldown: + default-days: 7 + - package-ecosystem: "docker" directories: - "/" diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml index 6d40fe73..4458ff07 100644 --- a/.github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml +++ b/.github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml @@ -45,7 +45,10 @@ spec: - "4000" env: - name: OPENROUTER_API_KEY - value: "${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}" + valueFrom: + secretKeyRef: + name: openrouter-secret-${ENV_NAME} + key: api-key ports: - containerPort: 4000 resources: diff --git a/.github/workflows/chart-test.yml b/.github/workflows/chart-test.yml index 64825839..7334870f 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/chart-test.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/chart-test.yml @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ jobs: steps: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false # helm-lint already runs in test.yaml - name: Run chart unit tests diff --git a/.github/workflows/deploy.yaml b/.github/workflows/deploy.yaml index f7da5adc..ee95dbee 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/deploy.yaml +++ b/.github/workflows/deploy.yaml @@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ jobs: echo "Seeding Control Plane Policies..." ADMIN_TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret sam-control-plane-secret-${ENV_NAME} -n ${NAMESPACE} -o jsonpath='{.data.admin-token}' | base64 -d) + echo "::add-mask::${ADMIN_TOKEN}" kubectl port-forward deployment/sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME} -n ${NAMESPACE} 8080:8080 & PF_PID=$! @@ -465,42 +466,39 @@ jobs: echo "Retrieving Admin Token to generate Bootstrap Token..." ADMIN_TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret sam-control-plane-secret-${ENV_NAME} -n ${NAMESPACE} -o jsonpath='{.data.admin-token}' | base64 -d) + echo "::add-mask::${ADMIN_TOKEN}" - echo "Generating Bootstrap Token via internal GCP/GKE Control Plane service..." - - # Clean up any leftover token generator pod - kubectl delete pod curl-token-gen-vm -n ${NAMESPACE} --ignore-not-found || true - - # Run temporary curl pod in control plane namespace - kubectl run curl-token-gen-vm \ - -n ${NAMESPACE} \ - --image=curlimages/curl:8.6.0 \ - --restart=Never \ - --overrides='{"spec": {"activeDeadlineSeconds": 30}}' \ - -- \ - curl -s -X POST \ - -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ - -H "Authorization: Bearer ${ADMIN_TOKEN}" \ - -d '{"role": "sam:role:router", "max_usages": 1}' \ - http://sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME}:8080/admin/bootstrap-tokens - - if ! kubectl wait -n ${NAMESPACE} --for=jsonpath='{.status.phase}'=Succeeded pod/curl-token-gen-vm --timeout=15s; then - echo "ERROR: Token generation pod failed!" - kubectl describe pod curl-token-gen-vm -n ${NAMESPACE} || true - kubectl logs pod/curl-token-gen-vm -n ${NAMESPACE} || true - kubectl delete pod curl-token-gen-vm -n ${NAMESPACE} --ignore-not-found || true - exit 1 - fi + # Mint the token from the runner over a port-forward: a helper pod + # would carry the admin token in its spec, where kubectl describe + # and anyone with pod read access can see it. + echo "Generating Bootstrap Token via port-forward to the Control Plane..." + kubectl port-forward deployment/sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME} -n ${NAMESPACE} 8080:8080 & + PF_PID=$! + for i in {1..15}; do + if nc -z localhost 8080; then + break + fi + sleep 1 + done - TOKEN_JSON=$(kubectl logs pod/curl-token-gen-vm -n ${NAMESPACE}) - kubectl delete pod curl-token-gen-vm -n ${NAMESPACE} --ignore-not-found + TOKEN_JSON=$(curl -fsS -X POST \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer ${ADMIN_TOKEN}" \ + -d '{"role": "sam:role:router", "max_usages": 1}' \ + http://localhost:8080/admin/bootstrap-tokens) || { + echo "ERROR: bootstrap token request failed" + kill $PF_PID + exit 1 + } + kill $PF_PID BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$(echo "${TOKEN_JSON}" | jq -r .token) if [ -z "${BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN}" ] || [ "${BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN}" = "null" ]; then echo "ERROR: Generated bootstrap token is empty or invalid!" - echo "Response: ${TOKEN_JSON}" + echo "Response (token redacted): $(echo "${TOKEN_JSON}" | jq -c 'del(.token)' 2>/dev/null || echo '')" exit 1 fi + echo "::add-mask::${BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN}" echo "Successfully generated bootstrap token." @@ -566,7 +564,7 @@ jobs: export IMAGE_TAG="${VAR_IMAGE_TAG}" export BANANA_BOT_SCRIPT=$(cat site/content/docs/snippets/banana_bot_playground.py | sed 's/^/ /') - envsubst < .github/k8s/sam-node-cop-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - + envsubst '${ENV_NAME} ${NAMESPACE} ${IMAGE_TAG} ${BANANA_BOT_SCRIPT}' < .github/k8s/sam-node-cop-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - kubectl rollout status deployment/cop-canary-${ENV_NAME} -n ${CANARY_NAMESPACE} --timeout=120s || { echo "Cop Canary Deployment failed!" print_rollout_diagnostics "${CANARY_NAMESPACE}" "cop-canary-${ENV_NAME}" "app=cop-canary-${ENV_NAME}" @@ -606,7 +604,7 @@ jobs: export NAMESPACE="sam-${ENV_NAME}" export IMAGE_TAG="${VAR_IMAGE_TAG}" - envsubst < .github/k8s/sam-box-canary-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - + envsubst '${ENV_NAME} ${NAMESPACE} ${IMAGE_TAG}' < .github/k8s/sam-box-canary-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - kubectl rollout status deployment/box-canary-${ENV_NAME} -n ${CANARY_NAMESPACE} --timeout=120s || { echo "sam-box Canary Deployment failed!" print_rollout_diagnostics "${CANARY_NAMESPACE}" "box-canary-${ENV_NAME}" "app=box-canary-${ENV_NAME}" @@ -646,7 +644,7 @@ jobs: export NAMESPACE="sam-${ENV_NAME}" export IMAGE_TAG="${VAR_IMAGE_TAG}" - envsubst < .github/k8s/sam-node-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - + envsubst '${ENV_NAME} ${NAMESPACE} ${IMAGE_TAG}' < .github/k8s/sam-node-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - kubectl rollout status deployment/sam-canary-${ENV_NAME} -n ${CANARY_NAMESPACE} --timeout=120s || { echo "Canary Deployment failed!" print_rollout_diagnostics "${CANARY_NAMESPACE}" "sam-canary-${ENV_NAME}" "app=sam-canary-${ENV_NAME}" @@ -692,14 +690,22 @@ jobs: export IMAGE_TAG="${VAR_IMAGE_TAG}" export GEMINI_API_KEY="${VAR_GEMINI_API_KEY}" - GATEWAY_TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret openclaw-secret-${ENV_NAME} -n ${CANARY_NAMESPACE} -o jsonpath="{.data.gateway-token}" 2>/dev/null | base64 -d || openssl rand -hex 16) + GATEWAY_TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret openclaw-secret-${ENV_NAME} -n ${CANARY_NAMESPACE} -o jsonpath="{.data.gateway-token}" 2>/dev/null | base64 -d || true) + # base64 -d on empty input exits 0, so a missing secret used to yield + # an empty token here; test the value, not the pipeline status. + if [ -z "${GATEWAY_TOKEN}" ]; then + GATEWAY_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 16) + fi + echo "::add-mask::${GATEWAY_TOKEN}" kubectl create secret generic openclaw-secret-${ENV_NAME} \ --namespace=${CANARY_NAMESPACE} \ --from-literal=gateway-token="${GATEWAY_TOKEN}" \ --from-literal=gemini-api-key="${GEMINI_API_KEY}" \ --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - - envsubst < .github/k8s/sam-node-openclaw-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - + # Allow-list the placeholders: ${OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN} in the + # template is a container-runtime shell variable, not ours to expand. + envsubst '${ENV_NAME} ${NAMESPACE} ${IMAGE_TAG}' < .github/k8s/sam-node-openclaw-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - kubectl rollout status deployment/openclaw-canary-${ENV_NAME} -n ${CANARY_NAMESPACE} --timeout=300s || { echo "OpenClaw Canary Deployment failed!" print_rollout_diagnostics "${CANARY_NAMESPACE}" "openclaw-canary-${ENV_NAME}" "app=openclaw-canary-${ENV_NAME}" @@ -751,7 +757,7 @@ jobs: --from-literal=hf-token="${HF_TOKEN}" \ --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - - envsubst < .github/k8s/sam-node-vllm-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - + envsubst '${ENV_NAME} ${NAMESPACE} ${IMAGE_TAG}' < .github/k8s/sam-node-vllm-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - kubectl rollout status deployment/vllm-canary-${ENV_NAME} -n ${CANARY_NAMESPACE} --timeout=300s || { echo "vLLM Canary Deployment failed!" print_rollout_diagnostics "${CANARY_NAMESPACE}" "vllm-canary-${ENV_NAME}" "app=vllm-canary-${ENV_NAME}" @@ -795,7 +801,7 @@ jobs: export NAMESPACE="sam-${ENV_NAME}" export IMAGE_TAG="${VAR_IMAGE_TAG}" - envsubst < .github/k8s/sam-node-everything-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - + envsubst '${ENV_NAME} ${NAMESPACE} ${IMAGE_TAG}' < .github/k8s/sam-node-everything-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - kubectl rollout status deployment/everything-canary-${ENV_NAME} -n ${CANARY_NAMESPACE} --timeout=120s || { echo "Everything Canary Deployment failed!" print_rollout_diagnostics "${CANARY_NAMESPACE}" "everything-canary-${ENV_NAME}" "app=everything-canary-${ENV_NAME}" @@ -839,9 +845,15 @@ jobs: export NAMESPACE="sam-${ENV_NAME}" export CANARY_NAMESPACE="sam-canary-${ENV_NAME}" export IMAGE_TAG="${VAR_IMAGE_TAG}" + + # The key lives in a Secret the pod references, never in the + # Deployment spec. + kubectl create secret generic openrouter-secret-${ENV_NAME} \ + --namespace=${CANARY_NAMESPACE} \ + --from-literal=api-key="${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}" \ + --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - - # Substitute the API key and other variables into the template and apply it to the cluster - envsubst < .github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - + envsubst '${ENV_NAME} ${NAMESPACE} ${IMAGE_TAG}' < .github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml | kubectl apply -f - kubectl rollout status deployment/openrouter-canary-${ENV_NAME} -n ${CANARY_NAMESPACE} --timeout=120s || { echo "OpenRouter Canary Deployment failed!" diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml index 644f6d4b..24669b87 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/release.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml @@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ name: goreleaser on: push: - # run only against tags + # run only against release tags tags: - - "*" + - "v*" permissions: contents: read @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: write - packages: write steps: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index f35eb713..ab330ff1 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ lint: fmt helm-lint # fast chart template checks; no cluster needed .PHONY: helm-test helm-test: - @helm plugin list 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^unittest' || helm plugin install https://github.com/helm-unittest/helm-unittest + @helm plugin list 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^unittest' || helm plugin install https://github.com/helm-unittest/helm-unittest --version 0.8.2 helm unittest charts/sam-mesh charts/sam-node .PHONY: verify diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/router-statefulset.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/router-statefulset.yaml index b4c51f39..21f4353b 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/router-statefulset.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/router-statefulset.yaml @@ -97,15 +97,8 @@ spec: periodSeconds: 15 resources: {{- toYaml .Values.router.resources | nindent 10 }} - env: - {{- if not .Values.router.useOidcToken }} - - name: BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN - valueFrom: - secretKeyRef: - name: {{ include "sam-mesh.fullname" . }}-router-token - key: token - {{- end }} {{- if .Values.router.hostPort }} + env: # kubelet expands $(HOST_IP) in the args below. - name: HOST_IP valueFrom: @@ -134,7 +127,9 @@ spec: {{- if .Values.router.useOidcToken }} - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" {{- else }} - - "--bootstrap-token=$(BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN)" + # A file, not a flag value: argv is readable through kubectl exec and + # /proc//cmdline. + - "--bootstrap-token-path=/var/run/secrets/sam-router/token" {{- end }} volumeMounts: - name: router-data @@ -143,9 +138,13 @@ spec: - name: sam-token mountPath: /var/run/secrets/tokens readOnly: true + {{- else }} + - name: router-token + mountPath: /var/run/secrets/sam-router + readOnly: true {{- end }} - {{- if .Values.router.useOidcToken }} volumes: + {{- if .Values.router.useOidcToken }} - name: sam-token projected: sources: @@ -153,6 +152,13 @@ spec: path: sam-token expirationSeconds: 3600 audience: "sam-control-plane-audience" + {{- else }} + - name: router-token + secret: + secretName: {{ include "sam-mesh.fullname" . }}-router-token + items: + - key: token + path: token {{- end }} volumeClaimTemplates: - metadata: diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml index a29bc394..781aca87 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml @@ -91,8 +91,11 @@ tests: value: 1Gi - notExists: path: spec.volumeClaimTemplates[0].spec.storageClassName - - notExists: + - notContains: path: spec.template.spec.volumes + content: + name: router-data + any: true - it: storageClass sets the PVC storageClassName set: @@ -117,10 +120,27 @@ tests: content: --jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token - notContains: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args - content: --bootstrap-token=$(BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN) + content: --bootstrap-token-path=/var/run/secrets/sam-router/token - exists: path: spec.template.spec.volumes[0].projected + - it: bootstrap token is mounted as a file, never passed in argv or env + documentSelector: + path: kind + value: StatefulSet + asserts: + - contains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args + content: --bootstrap-token-path=/var/run/secrets/sam-router/token + - notContains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args + content: --bootstrap-token=$(BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN) + - notExists: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].env + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.volumes[0].secret.secretName + value: sam-mesh-router-token + - it: image.tag overrides global.imageTag for the router only set: router.image.tag: v9 diff --git a/internal/console/public/vendor/js-yaml.min.js b/internal/console/public/vendor/js-yaml.min.js index bdd8eef5..8e7f7664 100644 --- a/internal/console/public/vendor/js-yaml.min.js +++ b/internal/console/public/vendor/js-yaml.min.js @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -/*! js-yaml 4.1.0 https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml @license MIT */ -!function(e,t){"object"==typeof exports&&"undefined"!=typeof module?t(exports):"function"==typeof define&&define.amd?define(["exports"],t):t((e="undefined"!=typeof globalThis?globalThis:e||self).jsyaml={})}(this,(function(e){"use strict";function t(e){return null==e}var n={isNothing:t,isObject:function(e){return"object"==typeof e&&null!==e},toArray:function(e){return Array.isArray(e)?e:t(e)?[]:[e]},repeat:function(e,t){var n,i="";for(n=0;nl&&(t=i-l+(o=" ... 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+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "container/ring" + "strings" + "testing" +) + +// The ring keeps whole lines; without a per-line cap a remote peer that gets +// an 8 MiB string logged pins it in memory for 500 rounds. +func TestRingBufferSinkCapsLineBytes(t *testing.T) { + sink := &RingBufferSink{buffer: ring.New(4)} + huge := strings.Repeat("A", 3*maxLogLineBytes) + "\n" + if _, err := sink.Write([]byte(huge)); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, _ = sink.Write([]byte("short\n")) + + var lines []string + sink.buffer.Do(func(p any) { + if p != nil { + lines = append(lines, p.(string)) + } + }) + if len(lines) != 2 { + t.Fatalf("got %d lines, want 2", len(lines)) + } + if got := len(lines[0]); got > maxLogLineBytes+len("…[truncated]") { + t.Errorf("stored line is %d bytes, want <= %d", got, maxLogLineBytes+len("…[truncated]")) + } + if !strings.HasSuffix(lines[0], "[truncated]") { + t.Errorf("truncated line should be marked, got suffix %q", lines[0][len(lines[0])-16:]) + } + if lines[1] != "short" { + t.Errorf("second line = %q, want %q", lines[1], "short") + } +} + +func TestTruncateForLog(t *testing.T) { + if got := truncateForLog("small"); got != "small" { + t.Errorf("short strings must pass through, got %q", got) + } + long := strings.Repeat("x", maxRemoteLogBytes+1000) + got := truncateForLog(long) + if !strings.HasPrefix(got, long[:maxRemoteLogBytes]) || !strings.HasSuffix(got, "(+1000 bytes)") { + t.Errorf("unexpected truncation: %q", got[len(got)-40:]) + } + if len(got) > maxRemoteLogBytes+32 { + t.Errorf("truncated string is %d bytes", len(got)) + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/mcp.go b/internal/node/mcp.go index 414e64a4..45053ce0 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp.go @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) fetchRemoteServiceCatalog(ctx context.Context, peerID peer.ID, } var services []*api.ServiceInfo if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(text.Text), &services); err != nil { - logger.Warnf("[Discovery] catalog unmarshal failed; raw text from %s: %q", peerID, text.Text) + logger.Warnf("[Discovery] catalog unmarshal failed; raw text from %s: %q", peerID, truncateForLog(text.Text)) return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal: %w", err) } return services, nil diff --git a/internal/node/mcp_service.go b/internal/node/mcp_service.go index 04cc5278..0fb80068 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp_service.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp_service.go @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import ( "context" "errors" "fmt" - "os" "os/exec" "sort" "sync" @@ -147,10 +146,7 @@ func (m *MCPService) backendTransport() (mcp.Transport, error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing command for command-backed MCP service %q", m.info.GetName()) } cmd := exec.Command(x.Command.Command[0], x.Command.Command[1:]...) - cmd.Env = os.Environ() - for k, v := range x.Command.Env { - cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, fmt.Sprintf("%s=%s", k, v)) - } + cmd.Env = backendEnv(x.Command.Env) return &boundedTransport{ Transport: &mcp.CommandTransport{Command: cmd}, slots: m.sessionSlots(), diff --git a/internal/node/middleware.go b/internal/node/middleware.go index d8795436..c29daff3 100644 --- a/internal/node/middleware.go +++ b/internal/node/middleware.go @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) WithBiscuitAuth(next func(network.Stream, RequestContext)) net } logger.Infow("Stream Accounting", "peer_id", remotePeer.String(), - "target", target, + "target", truncateForLog(target), "protocol", reqCtx.Protocol, "bytes_read", ts.bytesRead.Load(), "bytes_written", ts.bytesWritten.Load(), diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go index f90bb569..7e671d04 100644 --- a/internal/node/node.go +++ b/internal/node/node.go @@ -1124,14 +1124,14 @@ func (n *SamNode) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { } if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) + body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxControlPlaneBodyBytes)) return &RefreshError{ StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Message: fmt.Sprintf("refresh failed with status %s: %s", resp.Status, string(body)), } } - respData, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) + respData, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxControlPlaneBodyBytes)) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to read response: %w", err) } @@ -1983,7 +1983,8 @@ func (n *SamNode) StartIngressServer(ctx context.Context) error { ) }() - logger.Infof("[Ingress] Received request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path) + // The path is remote-controlled and the peer is not yet authorized: + // it is logged only after VerifyBiscuitToken passes. path := r.URL.Path parts := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/"), "/", 3) if len(parts) < 2 { @@ -2050,7 +2051,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) StartIngressServer(ctx context.Context) error { svc, ok := n.services.Get(serviceName) if !ok { - logger.Errorf("[Ingress] Service not found: %s", serviceName) + logger.Errorf("[Ingress] Service not found: %s", truncateForLog(serviceName)) http.Error(w, "Service not found", http.StatusNotFound) return } @@ -2059,7 +2060,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) StartIngressServer(ctx context.Context) error { http.Error(w, "Service not found", http.StatusNotFound) return } - logger.Infof("[Ingress] Forwarding to service %s, upstreamPath: %q", serviceName, upstreamPath) + logger.Infof("[Ingress] %s from %s: forwarding to service %s, upstreamPath: %q", r.Method, remotePeer, serviceName, truncateForLog(upstreamPath)) if upstreamPath == "" { r.URL.Path = "/" diff --git a/internal/node/oidc.go b/internal/node/oidc.go index 9003d6b9..56707b68 100644 --- a/internal/node/oidc.go +++ b/internal/node/oidc.go @@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ func parseTokenResponse(resp *http.Response) (jwt string, refreshToken string, e } }() - body, readErr := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) + body, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxControlPlaneBodyBytes)) if readErr != nil { return "", "", readErr } diff --git a/internal/node/options.go b/internal/node/options.go index dbc5e30e..a1564b1e 100644 --- a/internal/node/options.go +++ b/internal/node/options.go @@ -174,5 +174,10 @@ func (o *Options) Validate() error { if o.RequiredRole == "" { return fmt.Errorf("RequiredRole must be specified") } + // ed25519 verification panics on a wrong-size key, and this one comes + // from a flag or FFI config. + if len(o.ControlPlanePubKey) > 0 && len(o.ControlPlanePubKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return fmt.Errorf("control plane public key must be %d bytes, got %d", ed25519.PublicKeySize, len(o.ControlPlanePubKey)) + } return nil } diff --git a/internal/node/options_test.go b/internal/node/options_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..00c8a597 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/options_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/google/sam/api" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" +) + +func TestOptionsValidateControlPlaneKeySize(t *testing.T) { + priv, _, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + store, err := NewStore(t.TempDir()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() + base := Options{PrivKey: priv, Store: store, RequiredRole: api.RoleNode} + + if err := base.Validate(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("baseline options should validate: %v", err) + } + + good := base + good.ControlPlanePubKey = make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize) + if err := good.Validate(); err != nil { + t.Errorf("32-byte key rejected: %v", err) + } + + // A truncated hex flag value must fail here, not panic inside ed25519 on + // the first router handshake. + bad := base + bad.ControlPlanePubKey = make([]byte, 31) + err = bad.Validate() + if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "32 bytes") { + t.Errorf("31-byte key: err = %v, want size error", err) + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go b/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go index be9a17ee..9de30e86 100644 --- a/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go +++ b/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import ( "fmt" "io" "net/http" - "os" "os/exec" "sync" @@ -38,6 +37,9 @@ type StdioBridge struct { mu sync.Mutex clients map[chan string]bool calls map[string]chan string + // closed is set once the stdout reader has stopped; the backend can no + // longer answer, so requests are refused instead of hanging. + closed bool } func (b *StdioBridge) Start() { @@ -45,6 +47,7 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) Start() { b.calls = make(map[string]chan string) go func() { scanner := bufio.NewScanner(b.stdout) + scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 0, 64<<10), maxRequestBodyBytes) for scanner.Scan() { line := scanner.Text() @@ -73,7 +76,17 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) Start() { b.mu.Unlock() } + if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil { + logger.Errorf("[StdioBridge] backend stdout unreadable, refusing further requests: %v", err) + } else { + logger.Warnf("[StdioBridge] backend closed stdout, refusing further requests") + } + if b.cmd != nil && b.cmd.Process != nil { + _ = b.cmd.Process.Kill() + } + b.mu.Lock() + b.closed = true for ch := range b.clients { close(ch) delete(b.clients, ch) @@ -89,10 +102,6 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) Start() { func (b *StdioBridge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { switch r.Method { case http.MethodGet: - w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream") - w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache") - w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive") - flusher, ok := w.(http.Flusher) if !ok { http.Error(w, "Streaming unsupported!", http.StatusInternalServerError) @@ -101,9 +110,17 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { ch := make(chan string, 10) b.mu.Lock() + if b.closed { + b.mu.Unlock() + http.Error(w, "Backend process is no longer running", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) + return + } b.clients[ch] = true b.mu.Unlock() + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream") + w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache") + w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive") // Flush headers immediately to establish the stream w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) flusher.Flush() @@ -156,6 +173,11 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { reqIDStr := fmt.Sprintf("%v", reqID) callCh := make(chan string, 1) b.mu.Lock() + if b.closed { + b.mu.Unlock() + http.Error(w, "Backend process is no longer running", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) + return + } b.calls[reqIDStr] = callCh b.mu.Unlock() ch = callCh @@ -171,6 +193,11 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } b.mu.Lock() + if b.closed { + b.mu.Unlock() + http.Error(w, "Backend process is no longer running", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) + return + } _, err = b.stdin.Write(append(body, '\n')) b.mu.Unlock() @@ -192,6 +219,7 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return case line, ok := <-ch: if !ok { + http.Error(w, "Backend process exited before answering", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) return } w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") @@ -206,10 +234,7 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { func createStdioBridgeHandler(cmdBackend *api.CommandBackend) (http.Handler, *exec.Cmd, error) { cmd := exec.Command(cmdBackend.Command[0], cmdBackend.Command[1:]...) - cmd.Env = os.Environ() - for k, v := range cmdBackend.Env { - cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, fmt.Sprintf("%s=%s", k, v)) - } + cmd.Env = backendEnv(cmdBackend.Env) stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe() if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go b/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go index 06312625..b8f24827 100644 --- a/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go +++ b/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go @@ -160,3 +160,78 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_POSTCallWaitsForMatchingReply(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("body = %q, want %q", got, reply) } } + +// A single backend line larger than bufio.Scanner's 64 KiB default used to +// stop the reader for good; results up to the request-body cap must flow. +func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_LargeReplyIsDelivered(t *testing.T) { + b, stdoutWriter, _ := newPipeBridge() + defer func() { _ = stdoutWriter.Close() }() + + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":7,"method":"big"}`)) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + b.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + close(done) + }() + waitFor(t, "call registration", func() bool { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + return len(b.calls) > 0 + }) + + reply := `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":7,"result":"` + strings.Repeat("x", 100<<10) + `"}` + _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(reply + "\n")) + + select { + case <-done: + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("ServeHTTP did not return after a >64 KiB reply") + } + if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || rec.Body.String() != reply { + t.Fatalf("status %d, body len %d; want 200 and %d bytes", rec.Code, rec.Body.Len(), len(reply)) + } +} + +// Once the backend's stdout is gone the bridge cannot answer anyone: callers +// get a 503 immediately rather than hanging until their own deadline. +func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_RefusesAfterBackendExit(t *testing.T) { + b, stdoutWriter, _ := newPipeBridge() + + // In-flight call sees the backend go away. + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"ping"}`)) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + b.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + close(done) + }() + waitFor(t, "call registration", func() bool { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + return len(b.calls) > 0 + }) + _ = stdoutWriter.Close() + select { + case <-done: + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("in-flight call hung after the backend closed stdout") + } + if rec.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable { + t.Fatalf("in-flight status = %d, want 503", rec.Code) + } + + // Later callers are refused up front. + waitFor(t, "bridge to mark itself closed", func() bool { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + return b.closed + }) + for _, method := range []string{http.MethodPost, http.MethodGet} { + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + b.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(method, "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"ping"}`))) + if rec.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable { + t.Errorf("%s after exit: status = %d, want 503", method, rec.Code) + } + } +} diff --git a/internal/secrets/secrets.go b/internal/secrets/secrets.go index b93b791d..6fc98b32 100644 --- a/internal/secrets/secrets.go +++ b/internal/secrets/secrets.go @@ -31,7 +31,13 @@ import ( // the environment variable is the fallback. File and env contents are // whitespace-trimmed; a configured but empty file is an error. An empty // result means the secret was not configured at all. +// +// The environment variable is removed from this process's environment in +// either case, so subprocesses (MCP command backends, re-executed daemons) +// do not inherit it. func FromPathOrEnv(name, path, envVar string) (string, error) { + fromEnv := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(envVar)) + _ = os.Unsetenv(envVar) if path != "" { data, err := os.ReadFile(path) if err != nil { @@ -43,7 +49,7 @@ func FromPathOrEnv(name, path, envVar string) (string, error) { } return secret, nil } - return strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(envVar)), nil + return fromEnv, nil } // Resolve returns a one-shot secret configured either directly (value) or diff --git a/internal/secrets/secrets_test.go b/internal/secrets/secrets_test.go index d58224f6..0424c259 100644 --- a/internal/secrets/secrets_test.go +++ b/internal/secrets/secrets_test.go @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ func TestFromPathOrEnv(t *testing.T) { if err != nil || got != "file-secret" { t.Errorf("got %q, %v; want file-secret", got, err) } + if _, still := os.LookupEnv("SAM_TEST_SECRET"); still { + t.Error("env var must be removed from the process environment") + } }) t.Run("env fallback trimmed", func(t *testing.T) { @@ -79,6 +82,9 @@ func TestFromPathOrEnv(t *testing.T) { if err != nil || got != "env-secret" { t.Errorf("got %q, %v; want env-secret", got, err) } + if _, still := os.LookupEnv("SAM_TEST_SECRET"); still { + t.Error("env var must be removed from the process environment") + } }) t.Run("unset means unconfigured", func(t *testing.T) { diff --git a/internal/standalone/standalone.go b/internal/standalone/standalone.go index ddd13a4e..3622d642 100644 --- a/internal/standalone/standalone.go +++ b/internal/standalone/standalone.go @@ -412,6 +412,9 @@ func (s *Server) seedPolicyOnFirstBoot(ctx context.Context) error { seed.Roles = defaultDevPolicyRoles() logger.Warn("Seeding OPEN development mesh policy (enrolled nodes may declare any label and register any service); provide --policy-file to restrict") } + if err := controlplane.ValidatePolicyConfig(&seed); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid seed mesh policy: %w", err) + } if err := s.store.SaveMeshPolicy(ctx, seed.Roles, seed.Bindings); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to seed mesh policy: %w", err) } diff --git a/internal/storage/sql_store.go b/internal/storage/sql_store.go index f44beec4..ca362b02 100644 --- a/internal/storage/sql_store.go +++ b/internal/storage/sql_store.go @@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ import ( "crypto/ed25519" "database/sql" "encoding/json" + "errors" "fmt" + "os" "strings" "time" @@ -53,6 +55,11 @@ func NewSQLStore(driverName, dataSourceName string) (*SQLStore, error) { // passing a DSN containing custom query parameter parameters (e.g. "?_pragma=journal_mode(DELETE)&_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)"). dataSourceName = dataSourceName + "?_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)&_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)" } + if driverName == "sqlite" { + if err := restrictSQLiteFileMode(dataSourceName); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } db, err := sql.Open(actualDriver, dataSourceName) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to open database: %w", err) @@ -112,6 +119,41 @@ func (s *SQLStore) isPostgres() bool { return strings.Contains(s.driverName, "postgres") || strings.Contains(s.driverName, "pgx") } +// sqliteFilePath extracts the on-disk path from a SQLite DSN, or "" for +// in-memory databases. +func sqliteFilePath(dsn string) string { + path := strings.TrimPrefix(dsn, "file:") + if i := strings.IndexByte(path, '?'); i >= 0 { + path = path[:i] + } + if path == "" || strings.Contains(path, ":memory:") { + return "" + } + return path +} + +// restrictSQLiteFileMode makes the database owner-only. The keyring holds the +// mesh signing private keys, and the SQLite driver otherwise creates the file +// 0644 (minus umask). The file is created here, before the driver opens it, +// because SQLite gives the -wal and -shm side files the main file's mode. +func restrictSQLiteFileMode(dsn string) error { + path := sqliteFilePath(dsn) + if path == "" { + return nil + } + f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, 0o600) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to create database file %s: %w", path, err) + } + _ = f.Close() + for _, p := range []string{path, path + "-wal", path + "-shm"} { + if err := os.Chmod(p, 0o600); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to restrict permissions on %s: %w", p, err) + } + } + return nil +} + type migration struct { version int sqlite []string @@ -575,6 +617,28 @@ func (s *SQLStore) GetAllValidKeys(ctx context.Context) ([]KeyPair, error) { return keys, rows.Err() } +// GetAllValidPublicKeys implements Store. +func (s *SQLStore) GetAllValidPublicKeys(ctx context.Context) ([]ed25519.PublicKey, error) { + query := s.rebind(`SELECT public_key FROM keyring WHERE expiration IS NULL OR expiration > ?`) + rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, time.Now().UnixMilli()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }() + + var keys []ed25519.PublicKey + for rows.Next() { + var pub []byte + if err := rows.Scan(&pub); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + pubCopy := make([]byte, len(pub)) + copy(pubCopy, pub) + keys = append(keys, ed25519.PublicKey(pubCopy)) + } + return keys, rows.Err() +} + // ClaimKeyRotation implements Store. func (s *SQLStore) ClaimKeyRotation(ctx context.Context, now time.Time, interval time.Duration) (bool, error) { query := s.rebind(`UPDATE rotation_lock SET next_rotation_at = ? WHERE id = 1 AND next_rotation_at <= ?`) diff --git a/internal/storage/sql_store_test.go b/internal/storage/sql_store_test.go index baf0f9d1..4cde3f69 100644 --- a/internal/storage/sql_store_test.go +++ b/internal/storage/sql_store_test.go @@ -49,6 +49,54 @@ func newTestStore(t *testing.T) Store { return store } +// TestSQLiteFilesAreOwnerOnly pins the on-disk mode of the database and its +// WAL side files: the keyring table holds the mesh signing private keys. +func TestSQLiteFilesAreOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, "keys.db") + // A pre-existing world-readable file (e.g. created by an older release) + // must be tightened on open, not just newly created ones. + if err := os.WriteFile(dbPath, nil, 0o644); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + store, err := NewSQLStore("sqlite", dbPath) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSQLStore: %v", err) + } + defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() + + // A write forces the WAL and SHM files into existence. + pub, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err := store.SaveInitialKey(context.Background(), priv, pub); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + for _, p := range []string{dbPath, dbPath + "-wal", dbPath + "-shm"} { + fi, err := os.Stat(p) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("stat %s: %v", p, err) + } + if mode := fi.Mode().Perm(); mode != 0o600 { + t.Errorf("%s mode = %o, want 0600", p, mode) + } + } +} + +func TestSQLiteFilePath(t *testing.T) { + cases := map[string]string{ + "keys.db": "keys.db", + "/data/keys.db?_pragma=busy_timeout(5)": "/data/keys.db", + "file:/data/keys.db?mode=rwc": "/data/keys.db", + ":memory:": "", + "file::memory:?cache=shared": "", + "": "", + } + for dsn, want := range cases { + if got := sqliteFilePath(dsn); got != want { + t.Errorf("sqliteFilePath(%q) = %q, want %q", dsn, got, want) + } + } +} + func TestKeyRingOps(t *testing.T) { store := newTestStore(t) defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() diff --git a/internal/storage/storage.go b/internal/storage/storage.go index 2f6e599f..72e5d79e 100644 --- a/internal/storage/storage.go +++ b/internal/storage/storage.go @@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ type Store interface { // GetAllValidKeys retrieves the active key pair and any non-expired historical key pairs. GetAllValidKeys(ctx context.Context) ([]KeyPair, error) + // GetAllValidPublicKeys is GetAllValidKeys for verifiers: the same key + // set without the private halves. + GetAllValidPublicKeys(ctx context.Context) ([]ed25519.PublicKey, error) + // RotateKeys rotates the current key to a new key pair and sets the expiration of the old key. RotateKeys(ctx context.Context, newPriv ed25519.PrivateKey, newPub ed25519.PublicKey, gracePeriod time.Duration) error From fe9a110bdcb33e74d349dffb6f5eb941c73e415e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 20:07:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 02/14] controlplane: proof of possession on /register and /routers/lease (audit H1, H6) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Two control-plane routes trusted a peer_id from the request body. libp2p proves key possession on every peer-to-peer stream, but the control plane is plain HTTP and holds no libp2p host, so on this surface a peer_id is a claim and a biscuit is a bearer token. /enroll, /enroll/status and /refresh already carry a signed sam::: challenge for exactly this reason; these two were the ones that never got it. H1 - POST /register. Any OIDC identity with a node binding could submit a victim's peer_id with any public key. The upsert overwrote the victim's record, NULLed owner_id and reset autonomous_recovery, and the victim's next /refresh failed its key challenge. EnrollRequest gains timestamp/challenge_signature over api.RegisterChallenge; the handler requires peer_id to be derived from public_key and the signature to verify with it, before any ban or policy check. Since peer_id is now always the key's own, a record can only ever be overwritten by its owner. H6 - POST /routers/lease. The handler verified the router's biscuit and its role() fact, nothing else. Routers send that biscuit to every peer they authenticate (AuthResponse.Biscuit), so any enrolled node held a copy and could rewrite the router's lease for every joining peer: empty or attacker addresses, false connected_peers/dht_size. RouterLeaseRequest gains timestamp/challenge_signature over api.RouterLeaseChallenge, verified against the key stored at enrollment (routerRecord.PublicKey), so nothing in the request is something to sign with. The handler also requires routerRecord.Role == router, the control plane's own record, next to the biscuit's fact. Clients: node enrollHTTP takes the private key and signs; router enroll() and renewLease() sign with r.privKey. Both fields are hard-required with no grace period (agreed: alpha, and /refresh keeps existing nodes working; only pre-upgrade binaries hitting /register or renewing leases are refused, with a clear 401). Tests, per .gemini/styleguide.md §3.6 (negative inputs) and §3.3 (fail on parent): TestRegisterRequiresProofOfPossession drives the H1 hijack - victim peer_id with attacker key (400), with victim key and no challenge (401), with a challenge signed by the attacker (401), a challenge for another endpoint (401), a stale one (401) - and checks the victim's public key and autonomous_recovery survive and the attacker left no record. TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow gains the H6 poisoning cases - captured router biscuit with no challenge, with the node's signature, with a stale router signature - and checks /info still advertises the router's real addresses. With either guard removed the tests reproduce the audit's outcome (200s, addresses wiped to [], recovery flag reset). Existing tests and the two integration helpers sign the challenge; the alias test signs over the canonical id, as clients do, so the canonicalization it pins still holds. Docs: control-plane-configuration.md lists the five challenges and why they exist next to libp2p's transport-level proof. --- api/network.go | 16 + api/sam.pb.go | 65 +++- api/sam.proto | 15 + internal/controlplane/biscuit_ttl_test.go | 11 +- internal/controlplane/label_grants_test.go | 13 +- .../peer_id_canonicalization_test.go | 17 +- .../controlplane/policies_admission_test.go | 11 +- internal/controlplane/server.go | 45 +++ internal/controlplane/server_test.go | 365 +++++++++++++++--- internal/node/enroll.go | 27 +- internal/router/router.go | 36 +- internal/router/router_test.go | 16 +- .../docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md | 4 +- tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go | 27 +- tests/integration/multimaster_test.go | 28 +- tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go | 18 +- 16 files changed, 584 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) diff --git a/api/network.go b/api/network.go index f073f5cb..38ce4660 100644 --- a/api/network.go +++ b/api/network.go @@ -103,6 +103,22 @@ func RefreshChallenge(peerID string, ts int64) []byte { return []byte("sam:refresh:" + peerID + ":" + strconv.FormatInt(ts, 10)) } +// RegisterChallenge is the payload an OIDC enrollee signs to prove possession +// of EnrollRequest.public_key at POST /register, carried in that message's +// timestamp/challenge_signature fields. The JWT says who is asking; this says +// they hold the key they are binding. +func RegisterChallenge(peerID string, ts int64) []byte { + return []byte("sam:register:" + peerID + ":" + strconv.FormatInt(ts, 10)) +} + +// RouterLeaseChallenge is the payload a router signs with its enrolled key at +// POST /routers/lease, carried in RouterLeaseRequest's +// timestamp/challenge_signature fields. The router's biscuit is not proof on +// its own: routers send it to every peer they authenticate. +func RouterLeaseChallenge(peerID string, ts int64) []byte { + return []byte("sam:routers-lease:" + peerID + ":" + strconv.FormatInt(ts, 10)) +} + // ============================================================================ // SAM Custom HTTP Headers // ============================================================================ diff --git a/api/sam.pb.go b/api/sam.pb.go index ef5db6e7..d9aa4934 100644 --- a/api/sam.pb.go +++ b/api/sam.pb.go @@ -398,9 +398,17 @@ type EnrollRequest struct { // Validated fail-closed by the control plane and, once attested by the // enrollment flow's gates, minted as signed label() facts in the // biscuit. Empty means no claims. - Labels map[string]string `protobuf:"bytes,5,rep,name=labels,proto3" json:"labels,omitempty" protobuf_key:"bytes,1,opt,name=key" protobuf_val:"bytes,2,opt,name=value"` - unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields - sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache + Labels map[string]string `protobuf:"bytes,5,rep,name=labels,proto3" json:"labels,omitempty" protobuf_key:"bytes,1,opt,name=key" protobuf_val:"bytes,2,opt,name=value"` + // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: timestamp is unix + // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of + // "sam:register::". Required, and peer_id must be + // derived from public_key. The JWT proves who is asking; this proves + // they hold the key they are asking to bind, so an identity cannot + // register (and overwrite) another node's peer_id. + Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"` + ChallengeSignature []byte `protobuf:"bytes,7,opt,name=challenge_signature,json=challengeSignature,proto3" json:"challenge_signature,omitempty"` + unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields + sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache } func (x *EnrollRequest) Reset() { @@ -468,6 +476,20 @@ func (x *EnrollRequest) GetLabels() map[string]string { return nil } +func (x *EnrollRequest) GetTimestamp() int64 { + if x != nil { + return x.Timestamp + } + return 0 +} + +func (x *EnrollRequest) GetChallengeSignature() []byte { + if x != nil { + return x.ChallengeSignature + } + return nil +} + type EnrollResponse struct { state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` BiscuitToken []byte `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=biscuit_token,json=biscuitToken,proto3" json:"biscuit_token,omitempty"` @@ -1210,8 +1232,15 @@ type RouterLeaseRequest struct { Biscuit []byte `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=biscuit,proto3" json:"biscuit,omitempty"` ConnectedPeers []string `protobuf:"bytes,4,rep,name=connected_peers,json=connectedPeers,proto3" json:"connected_peers,omitempty"` DhtSize int32 `protobuf:"varint,5,opt,name=dht_size,json=dhtSize,proto3" json:"dht_size,omitempty"` - unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields - sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache + // Proof of possession of the router's enrolled key: timestamp is unix + // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of + // "sam:routers-lease::" with the key the router + // enrolled with. Required. The biscuit alone is not proof: routers hand + // theirs to every peer they authenticate. + Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"` + ChallengeSignature []byte `protobuf:"bytes,7,opt,name=challenge_signature,json=challengeSignature,proto3" json:"challenge_signature,omitempty"` + unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields + sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache } func (x *RouterLeaseRequest) Reset() { @@ -1279,6 +1308,20 @@ func (x *RouterLeaseRequest) GetDhtSize() int32 { return 0 } +func (x *RouterLeaseRequest) GetTimestamp() int64 { + if x != nil { + return x.Timestamp + } + return 0 +} + +func (x *RouterLeaseRequest) GetChallengeSignature() []byte { + if x != nil { + return x.ChallengeSignature + } + return nil +} + type RouterLeaseResponse struct { state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` Success bool `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=success,proto3" json:"success,omitempty"` @@ -2981,14 +3024,16 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" + "\n" + "\x06BANNED\x10\x00\x12\x10\n" + "\fKEY_ROTATION\x10\x01\x12\x11\n" + - "\rPOLICY_UPDATE\x10\x02\"\xf6\x01\n" + + "\rPOLICY_UPDATE\x10\x02\"\xc5\x02\n" + "\rEnrollRequest\x12\x10\n" + "\x03jwt\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03jwt\x12\x17\n" + "\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1d\n" + "\n" + "public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\tpublicKey\x12%\n" + "\x0erequested_role\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\rrequestedRole\x129\n" + - "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2!.sam.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x1a9\n" + + "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2!.sam.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12\x1c\n" + + "\ttimestamp\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12/\n" + + "\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x1a9\n" + "\vLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" + "\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" + "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xde\x01\n" + @@ -3061,13 +3106,15 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" + "\tclient_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\bclientId\x12\x1a\n" + "\baudience\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\baudience\x12)\n" + "\x10router_addresses\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12&\n" + - "\x0fbanned_peer_ids\x18\x05 \x03(\tR\rbannedPeerIds\"\xa9\x01\n" + + "\x0fbanned_peer_ids\x18\x05 \x03(\tR\rbannedPeerIds\"\xf8\x01\n" + "\x12RouterLeaseRequest\x12\x17\n" + "\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1c\n" + "\taddresses\x18\x02 \x03(\tR\taddresses\x12\x18\n" + "\abiscuit\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\x12'\n" + "\x0fconnected_peers\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0econnectedPeers\x12\x19\n" + - "\bdht_size\x18\x05 \x01(\x05R\adhtSize\"d\n" + + "\bdht_size\x18\x05 \x01(\x05R\adhtSize\x12\x1c\n" + + "\ttimestamp\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12/\n" + + "\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\"d\n" + "\x13RouterLeaseResponse\x12\x18\n" + "\asuccess\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\asuccess\x12\x14\n" + "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\x12\x1d\n" + diff --git a/api/sam.proto b/api/sam.proto index af68cd2a..8368982b 100644 --- a/api/sam.proto +++ b/api/sam.proto @@ -60,6 +60,14 @@ message EnrollRequest { // enrollment flow's gates, minted as signed label() facts in the // biscuit. Empty means no claims. map labels = 5; + // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: timestamp is unix + // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of + // "sam:register::". Required, and peer_id must be + // derived from public_key. The JWT proves who is asking; this proves + // they hold the key they are asking to bind, so an identity cannot + // register (and overwrite) another node's peer_id. + int64 timestamp = 6; + bytes challenge_signature = 7; } message EnrollResponse { @@ -186,6 +194,13 @@ message RouterLeaseRequest { bytes biscuit = 3; repeated string connected_peers = 4; int32 dht_size = 5; + // Proof of possession of the router's enrolled key: timestamp is unix + // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of + // "sam:routers-lease::" with the key the router + // enrolled with. Required. The biscuit alone is not proof: routers hand + // theirs to every peer they authenticate. + int64 timestamp = 6; + bytes challenge_signature = 7; } message RouterLeaseResponse { diff --git a/internal/controlplane/biscuit_ttl_test.go b/internal/controlplane/biscuit_ttl_test.go index fbe53eff..96e3b5ac 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/biscuit_ttl_test.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/biscuit_ttl_test.go @@ -87,11 +87,14 @@ func registerNode(t *testing.T, cpURL, jwtToken string) (crypto.PrivKey, peer.ID t.Fatal(err) } + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, priv, peerID.String()) reqData, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: jwtToken, - PeerId: peerID.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: jwtToken, + PeerId: peerID.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, }) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) diff --git a/internal/controlplane/label_grants_test.go b/internal/controlplane/label_grants_test.go index ccf9ed11..94741699 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/label_grants_test.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/label_grants_test.go @@ -77,12 +77,15 @@ func TestRegisterRefusesLabelsTheRoleDoesNotGrant(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, priv, pID.String()) body, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "node-alice"}), - PeerId: pID.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, - Labels: labels, + Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "node-alice"}), + PeerId: pID.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Labels: labels, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, }) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) diff --git a/internal/controlplane/peer_id_canonicalization_test.go b/internal/controlplane/peer_id_canonicalization_test.go index 5ed436fa..910e0554 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/peer_id_canonicalization_test.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/peer_id_canonicalization_test.go @@ -135,11 +135,20 @@ func TestBannedNodeCannotRegisterUnderAnAlias(t *testing.T) { if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } + // The challenge is over the canonical id whatever spelling the request + // carries, as the control plane canonicalizes before checking it. + decoded, err := peer.Decode(peerID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, priv, decoded.String()) reqData, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}), - PeerId: peerID, - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}), + PeerId: peerID, + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, }) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("failed to marshal enroll request: %v", err) diff --git a/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go b/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go index c9abd84c..bf034161 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go @@ -64,11 +64,14 @@ func TestPoliciesRequiresAnAdmissibleNode(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, privNode, nodePeer.String()) enrollReq := &api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "node-alice", "groups": []string{"users"}}), - PeerId: nodePeer.String(), - PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "node-alice", "groups": []string{"users"}}), + PeerId: nodePeer.String(), + PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, } reqData, err := proto.Marshal(enrollReq) if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server.go b/internal/controlplane/server.go index 429c14ec..21063266 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/server.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/server.go @@ -510,6 +510,28 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } canonical := pID.String() + // Proof of possession, as at /enroll: the JWT says who is asking, this + // says they hold the key they are binding. Without it any identity with + // a node binding could register a victim's peer_id and overwrite its + // record. peer_id must be the key's own, so the same peer_id always + // means the same key and a record can only ever be overwritten by its + // owner. + enrolleeKey, err := crypto.UnmarshalPublicKey(req.PublicKey) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, "Invalid public key", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + if !pID.MatchesPublicKey(enrolleeKey) { + logger.Warnw("Registration peer_id does not match public_key", "peer_id", canonical) + http.Error(w, "peer_id is not derived from public_key", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + if err := verifyFreshChallenge(enrolleeKey, api.RegisterChallenge(canonical, req.Timestamp), req.Timestamp, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil { + logger.Warnw("Register challenge verification failed", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err) + http.Error(w, "Invalid registration challenge: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) + return + } + // A ban names the device key and the identity behind it; check both, or // a banned node re-enrolls from a freshly generated keypair. if banned, err := s.store.IsNodeBanned(ctx, canonical); err != nil { @@ -1023,6 +1045,29 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRouterLease(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.Error(w, "Session expired, please re-enroll", http.StatusUnauthorized) return } + // The biscuit's role() fact was checked above; this is the control + // plane's own record of what it enrolled this peer as. + if routerRecord.Role != api.RoleRouter { + logger.Warnw("Lease renewal from a peer not enrolled as a router", "peer_id", canonical, "role", routerRecord.Role) + http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: entity is not a router", http.StatusForbidden) + return + } + + // Proof of possession. The biscuit is not it: routers send theirs to + // every peer they authenticate, so any enrolled node holds a router's + // biscuit and could otherwise rewrite that router's lease (empty or + // attacker addresses, false telemetry) for every joining peer. + routerKey, err := crypto.UnmarshalPublicKey(routerRecord.PublicKey) + if err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Router %s has an unparseable enrolled public key: %v", canonical, err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } + if err := verifyFreshChallenge(routerKey, api.RouterLeaseChallenge(canonical, req.Timestamp), req.Timestamp, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil { + logger.Warnw("Router lease challenge verification failed", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err) + http.Error(w, "Invalid lease challenge: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) + return + } // Advertised addresses are served verbatim to joining peers via /info and // /enroll: accept only well-formed multiaddrs terminating at the diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go index b297b480..e8cfef47 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go @@ -317,11 +317,14 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) { }) nodePubKeyBytes, _ := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(privNode.GetPublic()) + nodeTS, nodeSig := registerPoP(t, privNode, nodePeer.String()) enrollNodeReq := &api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: nodeJWT, - PeerId: nodePeer.String(), - PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: nodeJWT, + PeerId: nodePeer.String(), + PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: nodeTS, + ChallengeSignature: nodeSig, } reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollNodeReq) @@ -361,11 +364,14 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) { }) routerPubKeyBytes, _ := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(privRouter.GetPublic()) + routerTS, routerSig := registerPoP(t, privRouter, routerPeer.String()) enrollRouterReq := &api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: routerJWT, - PeerId: routerPeer.String(), - PublicKey: routerPubKeyBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter, + Jwt: routerJWT, + PeerId: routerPeer.String(), + PublicKey: routerPubKeyBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter, + Timestamp: routerTS, + ChallengeSignature: routerSig, } reqData, _ = proto.Marshal(enrollRouterReq) @@ -389,10 +395,13 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) { // 4. Register Router Lease routerAddresses := []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/5001/p2p/" + routerPeer.String()} + leaseTS, leaseSig := leasePoP(t, privRouter, routerPeer.String()) leaseReq := &api.RouterLeaseRequest{ - PeerId: routerPeer.String(), - Addresses: routerAddresses, - Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken, + PeerId: routerPeer.String(), + Addresses: routerAddresses, + Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken, + Timestamp: leaseTS, + ChallengeSignature: leaseSig, } reqData, _ = proto.Marshal(leaseReq) @@ -437,10 +446,13 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) { "missing p2p": "/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001", "foreign peer": "/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001/p2p/" + nodePeer.String(), } { + badTS, badSig := leasePoP(t, privRouter, routerPeer.String()) badLease := &api.RouterLeaseRequest{ - PeerId: routerPeer.String(), - Addresses: []string{badAddr}, - Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken, + PeerId: routerPeer.String(), + Addresses: []string{badAddr}, + Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken, + Timestamp: badTS, + ChallengeSignature: badSig, } reqData, _ = proto.Marshal(badLease) resp, err = client.Post(baseURL+"/routers/lease", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(reqData)) @@ -454,10 +466,13 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) { } // 6. Rogue Node tries to lease as a router (lacks 'router' role) + rogueTS, rogueSig := leasePoP(t, privNode, nodePeer.String()) rogueLeaseReq := &api.RouterLeaseRequest{ - PeerId: nodePeer.String(), - Addresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/6001/p2p/" + nodePeer.String()}, - Biscuit: enrollNodeResp.BiscuitToken, // Node biscuit doesn't have router role + PeerId: nodePeer.String(), + Addresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/6001/p2p/" + nodePeer.String()}, + Biscuit: enrollNodeResp.BiscuitToken, // Node biscuit doesn't have router role + Timestamp: rogueTS, + ChallengeSignature: rogueSig, } reqData, _ = proto.Marshal(rogueLeaseReq) @@ -468,6 +483,72 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) { if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden { t.Errorf("expectedStatusForbidden (403) for rogue router lease, got: %s", resp.Status) } + + // 7. Lease poisoning by an enrolled node. Routers send their biscuit to + // every peer they authenticate, so the node holds a copy; a lease that + // needed only the biscuit let it rewrite the router's addresses for every + // joining peer. The node signs the challenge with the only key it has. + for name, poisoned := range map[string]*api.RouterLeaseRequest{ + "no challenge": { + PeerId: routerPeer.String(), + Addresses: []string{}, + Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken, + }, + "challenge signed with the node's key": func() *api.RouterLeaseRequest { + ts, sig := leasePoP(t, privNode, routerPeer.String()) + return &api.RouterLeaseRequest{ + PeerId: routerPeer.String(), + Addresses: []string{"/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001/p2p/" + routerPeer.String()}, + Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, + } + }(), + "stale router signature": func() *api.RouterLeaseRequest { + ts := time.Now().Add(-challengeMaxAge - time.Minute).UnixMilli() + sig, err := privRouter.Sign(api.RouterLeaseChallenge(routerPeer.String(), ts)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return &api.RouterLeaseRequest{ + PeerId: routerPeer.String(), + Addresses: []string{}, + Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, + } + }(), + } { + reqData, err := proto.Marshal(poisoned) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("marshal poisoned lease (%s): %v", name, err) + } + resp, err = client.Post(baseURL+"/routers/lease", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(reqData)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("POST poisoned lease (%s) failed: %v", name, err) + } + _ = resp.Body.Close() + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Errorf("poisoned lease (%s): got %s, want 401", name, resp.Status) + } + } + // The router's advertised addresses are untouched. + resp, err = client.Get(baseURL + "/info") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GET /info failed: %v", err) + } + body, err = io.ReadAll(resp.Body) + _ = resp.Body.Close() + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read /info: %v", err) + } + var infoAfter api.ControlPlaneInfoResponse + if err := proto.Unmarshal(body, &infoAfter); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unmarshal /info: %v", err) + } + if !reflect.DeepEqual(infoAfter.RouterAddresses, routerAddresses) { + t.Errorf("router addresses after poisoning attempts = %v, want %v", infoAfter.RouterAddresses, routerAddresses) + } } // The console renders this JSON for editing and posts the result straight back, @@ -986,6 +1067,163 @@ func enrollPoP(t *testing.T, priv crypto.PrivKey, peerID string) (int64, []byte) return ts, sig } +// registerPoP signs the POST /register proof-of-possession challenge. +func registerPoP(t *testing.T, priv crypto.PrivKey, peerID string) (int64, []byte) { + t.Helper() + ts := time.Now().UnixMilli() + sig, err := priv.Sign(api.RegisterChallenge(peerID, ts)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("failed to sign register challenge: %v", err) + } + return ts, sig +} + +// leasePoP signs the POST /routers/lease proof-of-possession challenge. +func leasePoP(t *testing.T, priv crypto.PrivKey, peerID string) (int64, []byte) { + t.Helper() + ts := time.Now().UnixMilli() + sig, err := priv.Sign(api.RouterLeaseChallenge(peerID, ts)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("failed to sign lease challenge: %v", err) + } + return ts, sig +} + +// TestRegisterRequiresProofOfPossession pins audit finding H1: POST /register +// trusted peer_id from the body, so any OIDC identity with a node binding +// could register a victim's peer_id with any public key, overwrite the +// victim's record (NULLing owner_id and autonomous_recovery) and break the +// victim's next /refresh. The JWT says who is asking; the signed challenge +// says they hold the key they are binding. +func TestRegisterRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) { + issuer, mintToken := startCustomMockOIDC(t) + srv, store, baseURL := setupTestServer(t, issuer) + defer func() { + _ = srv.Close() + _ = store.Close() + }() + ctx := context.Background() + client := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second} + + if err := store.SaveMeshPolicy(ctx, nil, []*api.PolicyBinding{ + {Role: api.RoleNode, Members: []string{api.SystemAuthenticated}}, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + post := func(req *api.EnrollRequest) (int, string) { + t.Helper() + data, err := proto.Marshal(req) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + resp, err := client.Post(baseURL+"/register", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(data)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("/register failed: %v", err) + } + defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() + body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read /register response: %v", err) + } + return resp.StatusCode, string(body) + } + + victimPriv, victimID := newTestKey(t) + victimPub, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(victimPriv.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + attackerPriv, attackerID := newTestKey(t) + attackerPub, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(attackerPriv.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // The victim enrolls, with the admin-granted flag the hijack used to strip. + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, victimPriv, victimID.String()) + if status, body := post(&api.EnrollRequest{ + Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "victim"}), PeerId: victimID.String(), PublicKey: victimPub, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig, + }); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("victim registration: got %d (%s), want 200", status, body) + } + if err := store.SetNodeAutonomousRecovery(ctx, victimID.String(), true); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + attackerJWT := mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "attacker"}) + cases := map[string]struct { + req *api.EnrollRequest + want int + }{ + "victim peer_id, attacker key, no challenge": { + req: &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: victimID.String(), PublicKey: attackerPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode}, + want: http.StatusBadRequest, // peer_id is not the key's own + }, + "victim peer_id and public key, no challenge": { + req: &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: victimID.String(), PublicKey: victimPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode}, + want: http.StatusUnauthorized, + }, + "victim peer_id and public key, challenge signed by the attacker": { + req: func() *api.EnrollRequest { + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, attackerPriv, victimID.String()) + return &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: victimID.String(), PublicKey: victimPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig} + }(), + want: http.StatusUnauthorized, + }, + "own key, challenge for another endpoint": { + req: func() *api.EnrollRequest { + ts, sig := enrollPoP(t, attackerPriv, attackerID.String()) + return &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: attackerID.String(), PublicKey: attackerPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig} + }(), + want: http.StatusUnauthorized, + }, + "own key, stale challenge": { + req: func() *api.EnrollRequest { + ts := time.Now().Add(-challengeMaxAge - time.Minute).UnixMilli() + sig, err := attackerPriv.Sign(api.RegisterChallenge(attackerID.String(), ts)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: attackerID.String(), PublicKey: attackerPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig} + }(), + want: http.StatusUnauthorized, + }, + } + for name, tc := range cases { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + if status, body := post(tc.req); status != tc.want { + t.Errorf("got %d (%s), want %d", status, body, tc.want) + } + }) + } + + // The victim's record survived every attempt intact. + victim, err := store.GetNode(ctx, victimID.String()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("victim record: %v", err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(victim.PublicKey, victimPub) { + t.Error("victim's public key was overwritten") + } + if !victim.AutonomousRecovery { + t.Error("victim's autonomous_recovery flag was reset") + } + if _, err := store.GetNode(ctx, attackerID.String()); err != storage.ErrNotFound { + t.Errorf("attacker's failed attempts left a record: err = %v", err) + } + + // The same attacker, proving its own key, registers normally. + ts, sig = registerPoP(t, attackerPriv, attackerID.String()) + if status, body := post(&api.EnrollRequest{ + Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: attackerID.String(), PublicKey: attackerPub, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig, + }); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("honest registration: got %d (%s), want 200", status, body) + } +} + // TestBootstrapEnrollmentRequiresProofOfPossession pins the fix for // GHSA-hp3x-79wr-rx66 on both bootstrap endpoints: neither GET /enroll/status // nor a repeated POST /enroll may reveal an enrollment's status or biscuit to @@ -1256,7 +1494,7 @@ func TestRouterLeaseRevocation(t *testing.T) { // enrollLeaseRouter mints a router biscuit and, unless orphan, the // EnrolledNode record backing it. - enrollLeaseRouter := func(expiresAt time.Time, orphan bool) (peer.ID, []byte) { + enrollLeaseRouter := func(expiresAt time.Time, orphan bool) (crypto.PrivKey, peer.ID, []byte) { t.Helper() priv, pub, err := crypto.GenerateKeyPair(crypto.Ed25519, -1) if err != nil { @@ -1281,15 +1519,18 @@ func TestRouterLeaseRevocation(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } } - return routerPeer, routerBiscuit + return priv, routerPeer, routerBiscuit } - postLease := func(routerPeer peer.ID, routerBiscuit []byte) int { + postLease := func(priv crypto.PrivKey, routerPeer peer.ID, routerBiscuit []byte) int { t.Helper() + ts, sig := leasePoP(t, priv, routerPeer.String()) leaseData, _ := proto.Marshal(&api.RouterLeaseRequest{ - PeerId: routerPeer.String(), - Addresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/4001/p2p/" + routerPeer.String()}, - Biscuit: routerBiscuit, + PeerId: routerPeer.String(), + Addresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/4001/p2p/" + routerPeer.String()}, + Biscuit: routerBiscuit, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, }) resp, err := client.Post(baseURL+"/routers/lease", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(leaseData)) if err != nil { @@ -1300,8 +1541,8 @@ func TestRouterLeaseRevocation(t *testing.T) { } // Admitted router renews; the same router refuses after /admin/revoke. - routerPeer, routerBiscuit := enrollLeaseRouter(time.Time{}, false) - if got := postLease(routerPeer, routerBiscuit); got != http.StatusOK { + routerPriv, routerPeer, routerBiscuit := enrollLeaseRouter(time.Time{}, false) + if got := postLease(routerPriv, routerPeer, routerBiscuit); got != http.StatusOK { t.Fatalf("lease before revocation: got %d, want 200", got) } revokeData, _ := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRevokeRequest{PeerId: routerPeer.String()}) @@ -1315,19 +1556,19 @@ func TestRouterLeaseRevocation(t *testing.T) { if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { t.Fatalf("revoke: got %s, want 200", resp.Status) } - if got := postLease(routerPeer, routerBiscuit); got != http.StatusForbidden { + if got := postLease(routerPriv, routerPeer, routerBiscuit); got != http.StatusForbidden { t.Fatalf("lease after revocation: got %d, want 403", got) } // A lapsed OIDC session is the other admission arm. - expiredPeer, expiredBiscuit := enrollLeaseRouter(time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), false) - if got := postLease(expiredPeer, expiredBiscuit); got != http.StatusUnauthorized { + expiredPriv, expiredPeer, expiredBiscuit := enrollLeaseRouter(time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), false) + if got := postLease(expiredPriv, expiredPeer, expiredBiscuit); got != http.StatusUnauthorized { t.Fatalf("lease with lapsed session: got %d, want 401", got) } // A valid biscuit with no enrollment record behind it renews nothing. - orphanPeer, orphanBiscuit := enrollLeaseRouter(time.Time{}, true) - if got := postLease(orphanPeer, orphanBiscuit); got != http.StatusUnauthorized { + orphanPriv, orphanPeer, orphanBiscuit := enrollLeaseRouter(time.Time{}, true) + if got := postLease(orphanPriv, orphanPeer, orphanBiscuit); got != http.StatusUnauthorized { t.Fatalf("lease without enrollment record: got %d, want 401", got) } } @@ -1387,10 +1628,13 @@ func TestRouterLeaseUnderRotatedKey(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } + leaseTS, leaseSig := leasePoP(t, priv, routerPeer.String()) leaseData, err := proto.Marshal(&api.RouterLeaseRequest{ - PeerId: routerPeer.String(), - Addresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/4001/p2p/" + routerPeer.String()}, - Biscuit: routerBiscuit, + PeerId: routerPeer.String(), + Addresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/4001/p2p/" + routerPeer.String()}, + Biscuit: routerBiscuit, + Timestamp: leaseTS, + ChallengeSignature: leaseSig, }) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) @@ -1622,11 +1866,14 @@ func TestTokenRefreshAndRevocation(t *testing.T) { }) nodePubKeyBytes, _ := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(pubNode) + nodeTS, nodeSig := registerPoP(t, privNode, nodePeer.String()) enrollNodeReq := &api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: nodeJWT, - PeerId: nodePeer.String(), - PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: nodeJWT, + PeerId: nodePeer.String(), + PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: nodeTS, + ChallengeSignature: nodeSig, } reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollNodeReq) @@ -1758,11 +2005,14 @@ func TestNodeProactiveTokenRefresh(t *testing.T) { // Enroll via registration endpoint nodePubKeyBytes, _ := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(pubNode) + nodeTS, nodeSig := registerPoP(t, privNode, nodePeer.String()) enrollNodeReq := &api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: nodeJWT, - PeerId: nodePeer.String(), - PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: nodeJWT, + PeerId: nodePeer.String(), + PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: nodeTS, + ChallengeSignature: nodeSig, } reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollNodeReq) @@ -2199,11 +2449,14 @@ func TestAuthDenialPaths(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } pubBytes, _ := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(pubNode) + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, privNode, pID.String()) reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: jwtStr, - PeerId: pID.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: jwtStr, + PeerId: pID.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, }) return reqData } @@ -2347,11 +2600,14 @@ func TestOIDCSessionTTLIsConfigurable(t *testing.T) { } pubBytes, _ := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(pubNode) enrolledAt := time.Now() + regTS, regSig := registerPoP(t, privNode, nodePeer.String()) reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "short-session"}), - PeerId: nodePeer.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "short-session"}), + PeerId: nodePeer.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: regTS, + ChallengeSignature: regSig, }) resp, err := client.Post(baseURL+"/register", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(reqData)) if err != nil { @@ -2439,11 +2695,14 @@ func TestBanSurvivesKeypairRegeneration(t *testing.T) { if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, priv, pID.String()) reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}), - PeerId: pID.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}), + PeerId: pID.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, }) resp, err := client.Post(baseURL+"/register", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(reqData)) if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/node/enroll.go b/internal/node/enroll.go index 1e91e2e5..5d212a92 100644 --- a/internal/node/enroll.go +++ b/internal/node/enroll.go @@ -64,8 +64,7 @@ func GetOrGenerateKey(s *Store) crypto.PrivKey { } func (n *SamNode) Enroll(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string, jwt string) error { - pubKey := n.Host.Peerstore().PubKey(n.Host.ID()) - enrollResp, err := n.enrollHTTP(ctx, controlPlaneURL, jwt, n.Host.ID(), pubKey) + enrollResp, err := n.enrollHTTP(ctx, controlPlaneURL, jwt, n.Host.ID(), n.config.PrivKey) if err != nil { return err } @@ -75,18 +74,26 @@ func (n *SamNode) Enroll(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string, jwt string // enrollHTTP performs the HTTP half of enrollment for an explicit peer // identity, so it can run before the libp2p host exists (startup recovery). -func (n *SamNode) enrollHTTP(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL, jwt string, peerID peer.ID, pubKey crypto.PubKey) (*api.EnrollResponse, error) { - pubBytes, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(pubKey) +// privKey signs the proof-of-possession challenge; peerID must be its own. +func (n *SamNode) enrollHTTP(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL, jwt string, peerID peer.ID, privKey crypto.PrivKey) (*api.EnrollResponse, error) { + pubBytes, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(privKey.GetPublic()) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal public key: %w", err) } + ts := time.Now().UnixMilli() + sig, err := privKey.Sign(api.RegisterChallenge(peerID.String(), ts)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign registration challenge: %w", err) + } req := &api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: jwt, - PeerId: peerID.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: n.config.RequiredRole, - Labels: n.labels(), + Jwt: jwt, + PeerId: peerID.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: n.config.RequiredRole, + Labels: n.labels(), + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, } data, err := proto.Marshal(req) if err != nil { @@ -136,7 +143,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) ReEnrollWithRefreshToken(ctx context.Context) error { if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to derive peer ID from stored key: %w", err) } - _, err = n.enrollHTTP(ctx, controlPlaneURL, jwt, peerID, privKey.GetPublic()) + _, err = n.enrollHTTP(ctx, controlPlaneURL, jwt, peerID, privKey) return err } diff --git a/internal/router/router.go b/internal/router/router.go index 781f8f4e..00eeb140 100644 --- a/internal/router/router.go +++ b/internal/router/router.go @@ -376,12 +376,19 @@ func (r *Router) enroll(peerID peer.ID) error { if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal public key: %w", err) } + ts := time.Now().UnixMilli() + sig, err := r.privKey.Sign(api.RegisterChallenge(peerID.String(), ts)) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to sign registration challenge: %w", err) + } req := &api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: r.config.OIDCToken, - PeerId: peerID.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: r.config.RequiredRole, + Jwt: r.config.OIDCToken, + PeerId: peerID.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: r.config.RequiredRole, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, } data, err := proto.Marshal(req) if err != nil { @@ -823,12 +830,23 @@ func (r *Router) renewLease() { dhtSize = int32(r.DHT.RoutingTable().Size()) } + // The biscuit identifies us; the signature proves it is us (peers we + // authenticate hold a copy of the biscuit). + ts := time.Now().UnixMilli() + sig, err := r.privKey.Sign(api.RouterLeaseChallenge(r.Host.ID().String(), ts)) + if err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Failed to sign lease challenge: %v", err) + return + } + req := &api.RouterLeaseRequest{ - PeerId: r.Host.ID().String(), - Addresses: addrs, - Biscuit: biscuit, - ConnectedPeers: connectedPeers, - DhtSize: dhtSize, + PeerId: r.Host.ID().String(), + Addresses: addrs, + Biscuit: biscuit, + ConnectedPeers: connectedPeers, + DhtSize: dhtSize, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, } data, _ := proto.Marshal(req) diff --git a/internal/router/router_test.go b/internal/router/router_test.go index 6ce11b50..e3a134f7 100644 --- a/internal/router/router_test.go +++ b/internal/router/router_test.go @@ -233,11 +233,18 @@ func TestRouterIntegration(t *testing.T) { if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } + regTS := time.Now().UnixMilli() + regSig, err := nodePrivKey.Sign(api.RegisterChallenge(nodePeerID.String(), regTS)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } enrollNodeReq := &api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: nodeJWT, - PeerId: nodePeerID.String(), - PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: nodeJWT, + PeerId: nodePeerID.String(), + PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: regTS, + ChallengeSignature: regSig, } reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollNodeReq) resp, err := client.Post(cpURL+"/register", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(reqData)) @@ -538,6 +545,7 @@ func TestRouterLeaseRenewalRepeated401Terminates(t *testing.T) { r := &Router{ Host: h, + privKey: h.Peerstore().PrivKey(h.ID()), biscuitToken: []byte("dummy-biscuit"), config: Options{ ControlPlaneURL: ts.URL, diff --git a/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md b/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md index 047df9ec..7d97da49 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md +++ b/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md @@ -186,7 +186,9 @@ Nodes and Routers run a background task that periodically checks the remaining B The bootstrap surface requires the same proof of possession end to end. `POST /enroll` carries a signed timestamp challenge in the request body (`timestamp`/`challenge_signature`, and `peer_id` must be derived from the submitted `public_key`), so a bootstrap token alone can never mint — or re-fetch — another peer's Biscuit. `GET /enroll/status` answers only when the caller signs the peer-bound challenge with that same key, sent in the `X-Sam-Challenge-Ts` and `X-Sam-Challenge-Sig` headers (headers rather than query parameters, so signatures stay out of access logs). Anything else — no signature, a stale timestamp, another key, an unknown peer — receives a uniform `401`, so an approved enrollment's Biscuit is only ever released to the enrollee itself. -All three challenges share one shape — the UTF-8 bytes of `sam:::` (`sam:enroll:…`, `sam:enroll-status:…`, `sam:refresh:…`), signed by the peer's identity key and accepted within a ±5-minute freshness window. Binding the peer and the endpoint into the signed payload means a signature captured from any one request verifies nowhere else. +The OIDC surface and the router surface follow suit. `POST /register` carries the same `timestamp`/`challenge_signature` pair over `sam:register:…`, with `peer_id` derived from `public_key`: the ID token says who is asking, the signature says they hold the key they are binding, so an identity with a node binding cannot register — and overwrite — another node's `peer_id`. `POST /routers/lease` requires a challenge over `sam:routers-lease:…` signed with the key the router enrolled with; its Biscuit alone is not proof, because routers hand it to every peer they authenticate during the mutual handshake. + +All five challenges share one shape — the UTF-8 bytes of `sam:::` (`sam:register:…`, `sam:enroll:…`, `sam:enroll-status:…`, `sam:refresh:…`, `sam:routers-lease:…`), signed by the peer's identity key and accepted within a ±5-minute freshness window. Binding the peer and the endpoint into the signed payload means a signature captured from any one request verifies nowhere else. Libp2p's secure channel already proves key possession on every peer-to-peer stream; these challenges exist because the Control Plane API is plain HTTP, where a `peer_id` in a request body is otherwise just a claim. ### Signing-Key Retirement and Recovery diff --git a/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go b/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go index 60f00af6..1e0eb464 100644 --- a/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go +++ b/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go @@ -98,10 +98,6 @@ func TestBiscuitExpiryIsEnforcedOnEveryPath(t *testing.T) { if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - pubBytes, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(pubKey) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } jwtToken := mintToken(map[string]interface{}{ "sub": "expiry-user", @@ -109,7 +105,7 @@ func TestBiscuitExpiryIsEnforcedOnEveryPath(t *testing.T) { }) mintedAt := time.Now() - enrollResp := registerOnControlPlane(t, cpPort, peerID, pubBytes, jwtToken) + enrollResp := registerOnControlPlane(t, cpPort, peerID, privKey, jwtToken) biscuitToken := enrollResp.BiscuitToken cpPubKey := ed25519.PublicKey(enrollResp.ControlPlanePublicKey) @@ -157,14 +153,25 @@ func TestBiscuitExpiryIsEnforcedOnEveryPath(t *testing.T) { } } -func registerOnControlPlane(t *testing.T, cpPort int, clientID peer.ID, pubBytes []byte, jwtToken string) *api.EnrollResponse { +func registerOnControlPlane(t *testing.T, cpPort int, clientID peer.ID, privKey crypto.PrivKey, jwtToken string) *api.EnrollResponse { t.Helper() + pubBytes, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(privKey.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + ts := time.Now().UnixMilli() + sig, err := privKey.Sign(api.RegisterChallenge(clientID.String(), ts)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } reqBytes, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: jwtToken, - PeerId: clientID.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: jwtToken, + PeerId: clientID.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, }) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) diff --git a/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go b/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go index 0277e84b..0622da45 100644 --- a/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go +++ b/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go @@ -215,12 +215,7 @@ roles: [] } defer func() { _ = clientHost.Close() }() - pubKey := clientHost.Peerstore().PubKey(clientHost.ID()) - pubBytes, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(pubKey) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - clientBiscuit := enrollClientOnControlPlane(t, portB, clientHost.ID(), pubBytes, nodeJWT) + clientBiscuit := enrollClientOnControlPlane(t, portB, clientHost.ID(), clientHost.Peerstore().PrivKey(clientHost.ID()), nodeJWT) // 9. Assert that client host can connect and authenticate directly with Router A (registered with CP A!) // This proves Router A accepts biscuits issued by CP B because they share the key-ring. @@ -280,14 +275,25 @@ roles: [] t.Log("Successfully verified multi-master control plane signature trust!") } -func enrollClientOnControlPlane(t *testing.T, cpPort int, clientID peer.ID, pubBytes []byte, jwtToken string) []byte { +func enrollClientOnControlPlane(t *testing.T, cpPort int, clientID peer.ID, privKey crypto.PrivKey, jwtToken string) []byte { t.Helper() + pubBytes, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(privKey.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + ts := time.Now().UnixMilli() + sig, err := privKey.Sign(api.RegisterChallenge(clientID.String(), ts)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } req := &api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: jwtToken, - PeerId: clientID.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Jwt: jwtToken, + PeerId: clientID.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, } reqBytes, err := proto.Marshal(req) if err != nil { diff --git a/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go b/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go index f755c21c..b04f87a4 100644 --- a/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go +++ b/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go @@ -169,14 +169,20 @@ func TestPolicyGrantsReachTheMintedToken(t *testing.T) { if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - _ = privKey + ts := time.Now().UnixMilli() + sig, err := privKey.Sign(api.RegisterChallenge(peerID.String(), ts)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } reqBytes, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ - Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "node-alice"}), - PeerId: peerID.String(), - PublicKey: pubBytes, - RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, - Labels: labels, + Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "node-alice"}), + PeerId: peerID.String(), + PublicKey: pubBytes, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Labels: labels, + Timestamp: ts, + ChallengeSignature: sig, }) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) From 0f2ceba31f6cf6d536a14ddf33f12b37b3ecc915 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 17:58:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 03/14] identity, node, router: bound pre-authentication work (audit M23, M6) Two findings from the 2026-09-16 audit (audit.md) about what an unauthenticated or merely-enrolled peer can make a verifier do. M23 - Datalog CPU pinning through appended blocks. Appending a block to a biscuit needs no root key, so it is the one place a token holder can put Datalog of their own. biscuit-go runs each rule to completion before it checks its deadline, checks the fact cap only after a whole iteration, and on timeout returns while the worker goroutine keeps computing and then blocks forever on an unbuffered channel. A block with ~200 facts and a 3-way self-join therefore pinned a core for the full budget (1 s on nodes and routers, 10 s on the control plane) and leaked two goroutines on every verify path, with the token still verifying. Reproduced here before the fix: took=budget, goroutines 3->5->7->... per call. SAM never mints appended blocks and reads nothing from them (their facts are invisible to the authorizer; RequireAuthorityBinding already ignores them), so the fix is to not evaluate any: identity.UnmarshalInbound rejects a token with BlockCount() > 0 (ErrAppendedBlocks) before an authorizer is built. Every inbound path goes through it: verifyBiscuit (VerifyBiscuit / AndGetKey / AndGetExpiry), extractPeerID (refresh, policies, catalog), VerifyBiscuitRole, and the node's Authorize. The world limits WithMaxFacts/WithMaxIterations are now set explicitly and the comment that claimed they bound the work is corrected. TestPeerBindingRejectsAppendedBlock previously asserted that an attenuated token stays usable for its real owner; it now asserts ErrAppendedBlocks, with RequireAuthorityBinding kept as defence in depth. M6 - Unauthenticated handshakes had no deadline or rate limit. Any internet peer could open /sam/auth streams on a node or router and hold each one (and its goroutine) open indefinitely, or loop handshakes to make the verifier evaluate every frame. Both handlers now refuse a peer over a per-peer budget (5/s, burst 10, LRU-tracked) and set a stream deadline (10 s) before the frame read; the /sam/mcp auth frame gets the same read deadline, lifted once the peer is authorized since that session is long-lived. The limiter moves from internal/node to internal/ratelimit so the router can use it without importing the node (the two components stay independent). Also deleted: cmd/sam-node re-registered HandleAuthHandshake after Start, replacing the panic-recovering wrapper Start had installed, so a panic on untrusted handshake bytes would have taken the process down. Tests: TestInboundVerifyRejectsAppendedBlocksWithoutEvaluatingThem builds the join bomb and checks all six verify paths reject it in well under the budget with no goroutine growth (fails as described above with the guard removed). TestHandleAuthHandshakeBoundsUnauthenticatedPeers in node and router: an idle stream is closed on the server's schedule, and 30 back-to-back valid handshakes are not all answered. --- cmd/sam-node/main.go | 2 - internal/identity/appended_blocks_test.go | 146 ++++++++++++++++++ internal/identity/biscuit.go | 57 +++++-- internal/identity/peer_binding_test.go | 12 +- internal/node/middleware.go | 15 +- internal/node/middleware_test.go | 5 +- internal/node/node.go | 37 ++++- internal/node/node_test.go | 110 +++++++++++++ .../rate_limiter.go => ratelimit/peer.go} | 4 +- .../peer_test.go} | 2 +- internal/router/router.go | 35 ++++- internal/router/router_test.go | 90 +++++++++++ 12 files changed, 486 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/identity/appended_blocks_test.go rename internal/{node/rate_limiter.go => ratelimit/peer.go} (92%) rename internal/{node/rate_limiter_test.go => ratelimit/peer_test.go} (99%) diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/main.go b/cmd/sam-node/main.go index 8c63e131..13848a5c 100644 --- a/cmd/sam-node/main.go +++ b/cmd/sam-node/main.go @@ -622,8 +622,6 @@ func main() { // Start renewal loop meshNode.StartRenewalLoop(ctx, oidcIssuerFlag, clientIDFlag, clientSecretFlag, jwtPathFlag) - meshNode.Host.SetStreamHandler(api.AuthProtocolID, meshNode.HandleAuthHandshake) - // Start Sidecar API Server (multiplexed with MCP) sidecarSrv, err := node.StartSidecarServer(meshNode, bindAddrFlag, resolveSocketPath(cmd), apiTokenFlag, tlsCertFlag, tlsKeyFlag, tlsCAFlag) if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/identity/appended_blocks_test.go b/internal/identity/appended_blocks_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc3f653e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/identity/appended_blocks_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package identity + +import ( + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "fmt" + "runtime" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2" + "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2/parser" + "github.com/google/sam/api" +) + +// appendJoinBomb attenuates token with a block any holder can add offline: a +// few hundred facts and a 3-way self-join over them. biscuit-go runs a rule +// to completion before it checks the deadline, so evaluating this block +// pins a core for the whole budget and leaks the worker goroutine. +func appendJoinBomb(t *testing.T, token *biscuit.Biscuit, facts int) []byte { + t.Helper() + block := token.CreateBlock() + for i := 0; i < facts; i++ { + f, err := parser.FromStringFact(fmt.Sprintf(`f(%d)`, i)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := block.AddFact(f); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + } + rule, err := parser.FromStringRule(`g($a, $b, $c) <- f($a), f($b), f($c)`) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := block.AddRule(rule); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + bombed, err := token.Append(rand.Reader, block.Build()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + data, err := bombed.Serialize() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return data +} + +// Every inbound verify path must refuse a token with appended blocks before +// building an authorizer: rejection has to cost microseconds regardless of +// the block's contents, and must not leave a Datalog worker running. +func TestInboundVerifyRejectsAppendedBlocksWithoutEvaluatingThem(t *testing.T) { + pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + peerID := newTestPeer(t) + keys := []ed25519.PublicKey{pub} + + clean, err := MintBootstrapBiscuitToken(priv, peerID, api.RoleNode, time.Now().Add(time.Hour), nil, nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + token, err := biscuit.Unmarshal(clean) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if token.BlockCount() != 0 { + t.Fatalf("freshly minted token reports %d appended blocks, want 0", token.BlockCount()) + } + bombed := appendJoinBomb(t, token, 200) + + // The budget is what an attacker would pin per call; the assertion is that + // rejection does not come anywhere near it. + const budget = 2 * time.Second + const fastEnough = budget / 4 + + paths := map[string]func([]byte) error{ + "VerifyBiscuit": func(d []byte) error { + _, err := VerifyBiscuit(d, peerID, keys, budget) + return err + }, + "VerifyBiscuitAndGetKey": func(d []byte) error { + _, _, err := VerifyBiscuitAndGetKey(d, peerID, keys, budget) + return err + }, + "VerifyBiscuitAndGetExpiry": func(d []byte) error { + _, err := VerifyBiscuitAndGetExpiry(d, peerID, keys, budget) + return err + }, + "VerifyAndExtractPeerID": func(d []byte) error { + _, err := VerifyAndExtractPeerID(keys, d, budget) + return err + }, + "VerifyExpiredAndExtractPeerID": func(d []byte) error { + _, err := VerifyExpiredAndExtractPeerID(keys, d, budget) + return err + }, + "VerifyBiscuitRole": func(d []byte) error { + return VerifyBiscuitRole(d, pub, api.RoleNode, budget) + }, + } + + for name, verify := range paths { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + if err := verify(clean); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("clean token rejected: %v", err) + } + + before := runtime.NumGoroutine() + start := time.Now() + err := verify(bombed) + took := time.Since(start) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("token with an appended block accepted") + } + if !errors.Is(err, ErrAppendedBlocks) { + t.Errorf("err = %v, want ErrAppendedBlocks", err) + } + if took > fastEnough { + t.Errorf("rejection took %v; the block was evaluated", took) + } + // Give a leaked worker a moment to show up before counting. + time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond) + if after := runtime.NumGoroutine(); after > before { + t.Errorf("goroutines grew %d -> %d; a Datalog worker was left running", before, after) + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/identity/biscuit.go b/internal/identity/biscuit.go index 5ea57d39..a7acf6bc 100644 --- a/internal/identity/biscuit.go +++ b/internal/identity/biscuit.go @@ -34,17 +34,56 @@ import ( // DefaultAuthorizerTimeout bounds Datalog evaluation when no timeout is configured. // biscuit-go defaults to 2ms of wall-clock time, of which a single authorization of // a realistic token already spends ~0.14ms (~1.1ms under -race), so ordinary -// scheduling noise turns into a spurious denial. The amount of work is bounded by -// the fact and iteration limits; this deadline only caps how long the caller waits. +// scheduling noise turns into a spurious denial. const DefaultAuthorizerTimeout = 1 * time.Second +// Datalog world limits, biscuit-go's defaults made explicit. They bound the +// number of derived facts and fixpoint iterations, but neither preempts a +// single rule: one self-join over a few hundred facts runs to completion +// whatever these say, and on timeout biscuit-go's worker goroutine keeps +// computing. The only bound on attacker-authored rules is therefore that SAM +// never evaluates any: see UnmarshalInbound. +const ( + maxDatalogFacts = 1000 + maxDatalogIterations = 100 +) + // AuthorizerOptions returns the authorizer options enforcing a Datalog evaluation // budget. A non-positive timeout falls back to DefaultAuthorizerTimeout. func AuthorizerOptions(timeout time.Duration) []biscuit.AuthorizerOption { if timeout <= 0 { timeout = DefaultAuthorizerTimeout } - return []biscuit.AuthorizerOption{biscuit.WithWorldOptions(datalog.WithMaxDuration(timeout))} + return []biscuit.AuthorizerOption{biscuit.WithWorldOptions( + datalog.WithMaxDuration(timeout), + datalog.WithMaxFacts(maxDatalogFacts), + datalog.WithMaxIterations(maxDatalogIterations), + )} +} + +// ErrAppendedBlocks is returned for a token that carries attenuation blocks. +var ErrAppendedBlocks = errors.New("biscuit carries appended blocks; SAM tokens are authority-block only") + +// UnmarshalInbound parses a token received from a peer or a client and +// refuses one with appended blocks. +// +// Appending needs no root key, so appended blocks are the one place a token +// holder can put Datalog of their own. SAM reads nothing from them: facts +// there are invisible to the authorizer and RequireAuthorityBinding ignores +// them. What they can still do is cost CPU: a block with a self-join rule +// over a few hundred facts pins a core for the whole evaluation budget on +// every verifier that evaluates it, and leaks the worker goroutine (see the +// limits above). The control plane never mints such blocks, so a token that +// has any is not one SAM issued in its current form. +func UnmarshalInbound(biscuitData []byte) (*biscuit.Biscuit, error) { + b, err := biscuit.Unmarshal(biscuitData) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("malformed biscuit: %w", err) + } + if n := b.BlockCount(); n > 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w (%d)", ErrAppendedBlocks, n) + } + return b, nil } // EnforceExpiration injects the current time and the expiration check into an @@ -343,9 +382,9 @@ func VerifyBiscuitAndGetExpiry(biscuitData []byte, expectedPeer peer.ID, trusted } func verifyBiscuit(biscuitData []byte, expectedPeer peer.ID, trustedPublicKeys []ed25519.PublicKey, timeout time.Duration) (*biscuit.Biscuit, ed25519.PublicKey, time.Time, error) { - b, err := biscuit.Unmarshal(biscuitData) + b, err := UnmarshalInbound(biscuitData) if err != nil { - return nil, nil, time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("malformed biscuit: %w", err) + return nil, nil, time.Time{}, err } authOpts := AuthorizerOptions(timeout) @@ -470,9 +509,9 @@ func VerifyAndExtractPeerID(trustedPublicKeys []ed25519.PublicKey, biscuitData [ } func extractPeerID(trustedPublicKeys []ed25519.PublicKey, biscuitData []byte, timeout time.Duration, enforceExpiry bool) (peer.ID, error) { - b, err := biscuit.Unmarshal(biscuitData) + b, err := UnmarshalInbound(biscuitData) if err != nil { - return "", fmt.Errorf("malformed biscuit: %w", err) + return "", err } authOpts := AuthorizerOptions(timeout) @@ -545,9 +584,9 @@ func extractPeerID(trustedPublicKeys []ed25519.PublicKey, biscuitData []byte, ti // should trigger a refresh rather than refuse to boot. Do not use it to admit a token // received from a peer. func VerifyBiscuitRole(biscuitData []byte, controlPlanePubKey ed25519.PublicKey, expectedRole string, timeout time.Duration) error { - b, err := biscuit.Unmarshal(biscuitData) + b, err := UnmarshalInbound(biscuitData) if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("malformed biscuit: %w", err) + return err } return RequireRole(b, controlPlanePubKey, expectedRole, timeout) } diff --git a/internal/identity/peer_binding_test.go b/internal/identity/peer_binding_test.go index f4afc7e8..ca879dbb 100644 --- a/internal/identity/peer_binding_test.go +++ b/internal/identity/peer_binding_test.go @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ package identity import ( "crypto/ed25519" "crypto/rand" + "errors" "testing" "time" @@ -127,10 +128,13 @@ func TestPeerBindingRejectsAppendedBlock(t *testing.T) { if _, err := VerifyBiscuit(forged, attacker, keys, time.Second); err == nil { t.Error("VerifyBiscuit admitted a token re-bound by an appended block") } - // Attenuation must stay usable for the peer the authority block names, - // otherwise this fix would break delegation instead of the bypass. - if _, err := VerifyBiscuit(forged, victim, keys, time.Second); err != nil { - t.Errorf("VerifyBiscuit rejected an attenuated token held by its real owner: %v", err) + // Nor is the token accepted from its real owner: appended blocks are the + // one place a holder can put Datalog of their own, and even a check there + // is a rule biscuit-go runs to completion with no deadline, so SAM does + // not evaluate any (ErrAppendedBlocks). RequireAuthorityBinding above is + // the defence in depth behind that gate. + if _, err := VerifyBiscuit(forged, victim, keys, time.Second); !errors.Is(err, ErrAppendedBlocks) { + t.Errorf("VerifyBiscuit on an attenuated token: err = %v, want ErrAppendedBlocks", err) } } diff --git a/internal/node/middleware.go b/internal/node/middleware.go index c29daff3..435953c1 100644 --- a/internal/node/middleware.go +++ b/internal/node/middleware.go @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import ( "fmt" "runtime/debug" "sync/atomic" + "time" "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2" "github.com/google/sam/api" @@ -113,6 +114,12 @@ func (n *SamNode) WithBiscuitAuth(next func(network.Stream, RequestContext)) net return } + // The peer is not authorized yet: it gets the handshake budget to + // produce its frame, not an open-ended hold on this goroutine. + if err := ts.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(authHandshakeTimeout)); err != nil { + logger.Debugf("[Auth] Failed to set auth frame deadline for %s: %v", remotePeer, err) + } + // Read AuthFrame reader := msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(ts, 1024*64) msg, err := reader.ReadMsg() @@ -157,6 +164,12 @@ func (n *SamNode) WithBiscuitAuth(next func(network.Stream, RequestContext)) net return } + // Authorized: the session itself is long-lived, so the pre-auth + // deadline comes off. + if err := ts.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}); err != nil { + logger.Debugf("[Auth] Failed to clear auth frame deadline for %s: %v", remotePeer, err) + } + next(ts, reqCtx) } } @@ -203,7 +216,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) Authorize(rawToken []byte, req RequestContext, pubKey ed25519. if len(pubKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize { return fmt.Errorf("invalid public key size: %d", len(pubKey)) } - b, err := biscuit.Unmarshal(rawToken) + b, err := identity.UnmarshalInbound(rawToken) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("invalid biscuit: %w", err) } diff --git a/internal/node/middleware_test.go b/internal/node/middleware_test.go index 7d9d231d..374cdd40 100644 --- a/internal/node/middleware_test.go +++ b/internal/node/middleware_test.go @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import ( "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2/parser" "github.com/google/sam/api" "github.com/google/sam/internal/identity" + "github.com/google/sam/internal/ratelimit" lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2" golog "github.com/ipfs/go-log/v2" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" @@ -657,7 +658,7 @@ func TestRevocation(t *testing.T) { } cache, _ := lru.New[string, int64](10000) - rl, _ := NewPeerRateLimiter(100) + rl, _ := ratelimit.NewPeerRateLimiter(100) node := &SamNode{ trustedKeys: []TrustedKey{{Key: pub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}}, revokedPeers: cache, @@ -746,7 +747,7 @@ func TestWithBiscuitAuth_MutualBiscuit(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } - rl, _ := NewPeerRateLimiter(100) + rl, _ := ratelimit.NewPeerRateLimiter(100) node := &SamNode{ trustedKeys: []TrustedKey{{Key: pub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}}, rateLimiter: rl, diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go index 7e671d04..7a336e60 100644 --- a/internal/node/node.go +++ b/internal/node/node.go @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ import ( "github.com/google/sam/api" "github.com/google/sam/internal/identity" samdiscovery "github.com/google/sam/internal/node/discovery" + "github.com/google/sam/internal/ratelimit" lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2" "github.com/ipfs/go-cid" golog "github.com/ipfs/go-log/v2" @@ -160,11 +161,15 @@ type SamNode struct { keysMu sync.RWMutex MeshPolicyRules []biscuit.Rule MeshPolicyMu sync.RWMutex - rateLimiter *PeerRateLimiter - services *ServiceRegistry - BoundHTTPAddr string - BoundSocketPath string - AllowLoopback bool + rateLimiter *ratelimit.PeerRateLimiter + // handshakeLimiter bounds /sam/auth attempts per peer separately from + // rateLimiter, so a peer's authenticated traffic cannot starve its own + // re-authentication and vice versa. + handshakeLimiter *ratelimit.PeerRateLimiter + services *ServiceRegistry + BoundHTTPAddr string + BoundSocketPath string + AllowLoopback bool authSuccess chan struct{} authOnce sync.Once @@ -291,10 +296,14 @@ func NewSamNode(cfg Options) (*SamNode, error) { } var err error - node.rateLimiter, err = NewPeerRateLimiter(RateLimiterSize) + node.rateLimiter, err = ratelimit.NewPeerRateLimiter(RateLimiterSize) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create rate limiter: %w", err) } + node.handshakeLimiter, err = ratelimit.NewPeerRateLimiter(RateLimiterSize) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create handshake rate limiter: %w", err) + } node.revokedPeers, err = lru.New[string, int64](RevocationCacheSize) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create revocation cache: %w", err) @@ -1547,6 +1556,13 @@ func (n *SamNode) getTrustedPublicKeys() []ed25519.PublicKey { return keys } +// authHandshakeTimeout bounds how long an unauthenticated peer may hold a +// /sam/auth stream open: it has to send its frame and read the reply within +// it. Any internet peer can open these streams, so without a deadline each +// one is a goroutine held for as long as the peer likes. A var so tests can +// shorten it. +var authHandshakeTimeout = 10 * time.Second + // HandleAuthHandshake is the core libp2p stream handler for /sam/auth/1.0.0. // This is the "Admission Office" of the mesh node. func (n *SamNode) HandleAuthHandshake(s network.Stream) { @@ -1564,6 +1580,15 @@ func (n *SamNode) HandleAuthHandshake(s network.Stream) { } } + if n.handshakeLimiter != nil && !n.handshakeLimiter.Allow(remotePeer.String()) { + logger.Warnf("[AuthN] Handshake rate limit exceeded for %s", remotePeer) + _ = s.Reset() + return + } + if err := s.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(authHandshakeTimeout)); err != nil { + logger.Debugf("[AuthN] Failed to set handshake deadline for %s: %v", remotePeer, err) + } + reader := msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(s, 1024*64) msg, err := reader.ReadMsg() if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/node/node_test.go b/internal/node/node_test.go index aa6c0430..5459f536 100644 --- a/internal/node/node_test.go +++ b/internal/node/node_test.go @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import ( "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2" "github.com/google/sam/api" "github.com/google/sam/internal/identity" + "github.com/google/sam/internal/ratelimit" lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" @@ -428,6 +429,115 @@ func TestHandleAuthHandshake(t *testing.T) { } } +// Any internet peer can open /sam/auth streams. An idle one must be closed on +// the node's schedule, not the peer's, and a peer opening them in a tight loop +// must be cut off before the node verifies every frame it sends. +func TestHandleAuthHandshakeBoundsUnauthenticatedPeers(t *testing.T) { + pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + ctx := context.Background() + + serverHost, err := libp2p.New(libp2p.ListenAddrStrings("/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/0")) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer func() { _ = serverHost.Close() }() + clientHost, err := libp2p.New(libp2p.ListenAddrStrings("/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/0")) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer func() { _ = clientHost.Close() }() + + limiter, err := ratelimit.NewPeerRateLimiter(16) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + node := &SamNode{ + trustedKeys: []TrustedKey{{Key: pub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}}, + BiscuitTimeout: time.Second, + handshakeLimiter: limiter, + } + serverHost.SetStreamHandler(api.AuthProtocolID, node.HandleAuthHandshake) + if err := clientHost.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: serverHost.ID(), Addrs: serverHost.Addrs()}); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + t.Run("idle stream is closed by the deadline", func(t *testing.T) { + old := authHandshakeTimeout + authHandshakeTimeout = 200 * time.Millisecond + t.Cleanup(func() { authHandshakeTimeout = old }) + + s, err := clientHost.NewStream(ctx, serverHost.ID(), api.AuthProtocolID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer func() { _ = s.Close() }() + // Send nothing. The node must give up on us, which the client sees as + // its read failing; without the deadline this read blocks forever. + if err := s.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + start := time.Now() + _, err = msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(s, 1024*64).ReadMsg() + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("idle handshake stream answered") + } + if took := time.Since(start); took > 4*time.Second { + t.Fatalf("idle stream was held for %v; the node did not apply its own deadline", took) + } + }) + + t.Run("tight loop is rate limited", func(t *testing.T) { + builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv) + for _, f := range []biscuit.Fact{ + {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactNode, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(clientHost.ID().String())}}}, + {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactExpiration, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Date(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))}}}, + } { + if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(f); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + } + b, err := builder.Build() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + token, err := b.Serialize() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + frame, err := proto.Marshal(&api.AuthFrame{Biscuit: token}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + attempts := 3 * ratelimit.PeerBurst + answered := 0 + for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ { + s, err := clientHost.NewStream(ctx, serverHost.ID(), api.AuthProtocolID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _ = s.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)) + if err := msgio.NewVarintWriter(s).WriteMsg(frame); err == nil { + if _, err := msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(s, 1024*64).ReadMsg(); err == nil { + answered++ + } + } + _ = s.Close() + } + // The token is valid, so every answer is a success: the only reason + // some go unanswered is the limiter. + if answered < ratelimit.PeerBurst { + t.Errorf("only %d of the first %d handshakes answered; limiter is too strict", answered, ratelimit.PeerBurst) + } + if answered == attempts { + t.Errorf("all %d back-to-back handshakes were verified; no per-peer limit applied", attempts) + } + }) +} + // TestPerformRouterAuthHandshakeRequiresRouterRole: a router whose biscuit // verifies but carries no role("router") is a fatal auth failure, so the node // gives up on it instead of retrying. diff --git a/internal/node/rate_limiter.go b/internal/ratelimit/peer.go similarity index 92% rename from internal/node/rate_limiter.go rename to internal/ratelimit/peer.go index 8689fe9f..d438797b 100644 --- a/internal/node/rate_limiter.go +++ b/internal/ratelimit/peer.go @@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. -package node +// Package ratelimit bounds how often an individual peer may make a node or +// router do pre-authentication work. +package ratelimit import ( "sync" diff --git a/internal/node/rate_limiter_test.go b/internal/ratelimit/peer_test.go similarity index 99% rename from internal/node/rate_limiter_test.go rename to internal/ratelimit/peer_test.go index a28fe91e..d8a2971d 100644 --- a/internal/node/rate_limiter_test.go +++ b/internal/ratelimit/peer_test.go @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. -package node +package ratelimit import ( "testing" diff --git a/internal/router/router.go b/internal/router/router.go index 00eeb140..74a4d34a 100644 --- a/internal/router/router.go +++ b/internal/router/router.go @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ import ( "github.com/google/sam/api" "github.com/google/sam/internal/identity" + "github.com/google/sam/internal/ratelimit" golog "github.com/ipfs/go-log/v2" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p" dht "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-kad-dht" @@ -111,6 +112,9 @@ type Router struct { EventTopic *pubsub.Topic authenticatedPeers sync.Map bannedPeers sync.Map + // handshakeLimiter bounds /sam/auth attempts per peer; any internet peer + // can open those streams. + handshakeLimiter *ratelimit.PeerRateLimiter // Keys & Identity biscuitToken []byte @@ -137,10 +141,17 @@ func NewRouter(ctx context.Context, config Options) (*Router, error) { ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx) + handshakeLimiter, err := ratelimit.NewPeerRateLimiter(handshakeLimiterSize) + if err != nil { + cancel() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create handshake rate limiter: %w", err) + } + return &Router{ - config: config, - ctx: ctx, - cancel: cancel, + config: config, + ctx: ctx, + cancel: cancel, + handshakeLimiter: handshakeLimiter, }, nil } @@ -1058,6 +1069,15 @@ func recoverStreamHandler(name string, next network.StreamHandler) network.Strea } } +// authHandshakeTimeout bounds how long an unauthenticated peer may hold a +// /sam/auth stream: it has to send its frame and read the reply within it. +// A var so tests can shorten it. +var authHandshakeTimeout = 10 * time.Second + +// handshakeLimiterSize is how many distinct peers' handshake budgets are +// tracked at once (LRU beyond that). +const handshakeLimiterSize = 4096 + // HandleAuthHandshake processes incoming auth connections. // It is part of mutual auth: // 1. Receives client's Biscuit. @@ -1073,6 +1093,15 @@ func (r *Router) HandleAuthHandshake(s network.Stream) { return } + if r.handshakeLimiter != nil && !r.handshakeLimiter.Allow(remotePeer.String()) { + logger.Warnf("[AuthN] Handshake rate limit exceeded for %s", remotePeer) + _ = s.Reset() + return + } + if err := s.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(authHandshakeTimeout)); err != nil { + logger.Debugf("[AuthN] Failed to set handshake deadline for %s: %v", remotePeer, err) + } + reader := msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(s, 1024*64) msg, err := reader.ReadMsg() if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/router/router_test.go b/internal/router/router_test.go index e3a134f7..eec83e02 100644 --- a/internal/router/router_test.go +++ b/internal/router/router_test.go @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ import ( "github.com/google/sam/api" "github.com/google/sam/internal/controlplane" "github.com/google/sam/internal/identity" + "github.com/google/sam/internal/ratelimit" "github.com/google/sam/internal/storage" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" @@ -909,6 +910,95 @@ func TestPerformMutualAuth(t *testing.T) { } } +// The router's /sam/auth handler is reachable by any internet peer. An idle +// stream must be closed on the router's schedule, and a peer handshaking in a +// tight loop must be cut off before every frame is verified. +func TestHandleAuthHandshakeBoundsUnauthenticatedPeers(t *testing.T) { + cpPub, cpPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + ctx := context.Background() + + serverHost, err := libp2p.New(libp2p.ListenAddrStrings("/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/0")) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer func() { _ = serverHost.Close() }() + clientHost, err := libp2p.New(libp2p.ListenAddrStrings("/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/0")) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer func() { _ = clientHost.Close() }() + + r, err := NewRouter(ctx, Options{BiscuitTimeout: time.Second, RequiredRole: api.RoleRouter}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + r.Host = serverHost + r.biscuitToken = []byte("router-biscuit") + r.trustedPublicKeys = []ed25519.PublicKey{cpPub} + serverHost.SetStreamHandler(api.AuthProtocolID, r.HandleAuthHandshake) + if err := clientHost.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: serverHost.ID(), Addrs: serverHost.Addrs()}); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + t.Run("idle stream is closed by the deadline", func(t *testing.T) { + old := authHandshakeTimeout + authHandshakeTimeout = 200 * time.Millisecond + t.Cleanup(func() { authHandshakeTimeout = old }) + + s, err := clientHost.NewStream(ctx, serverHost.ID(), api.AuthProtocolID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer func() { _ = s.Close() }() + if err := s.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + start := time.Now() + if _, err := msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(s, 1024*64).ReadMsg(); err == nil { + t.Fatal("idle handshake stream answered") + } + if took := time.Since(start); took > 4*time.Second { + t.Fatalf("idle stream was held for %v; the router did not apply its own deadline", took) + } + }) + + t.Run("tight loop is rate limited", func(t *testing.T) { + token, err := identity.MintBootstrapBiscuitToken(cpPriv, clientHost.ID(), api.RoleNode, time.Now().Add(time.Hour), nil, nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + frame, err := proto.Marshal(&api.AuthFrame{Biscuit: token}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + attempts := 3 * ratelimit.PeerBurst + answered := 0 + for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ { + s, err := clientHost.NewStream(ctx, serverHost.ID(), api.AuthProtocolID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _ = s.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)) + if err := msgio.NewVarintWriter(s).WriteMsg(frame); err == nil { + if _, err := msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(s, 1024*64).ReadMsg(); err == nil { + answered++ + } + } + _ = s.Close() + } + if answered < ratelimit.PeerBurst { + t.Errorf("only %d of the first %d handshakes answered; limiter is too strict", answered, ratelimit.PeerBurst) + } + if answered == attempts { + t.Errorf("all %d back-to-back handshakes were verified; no per-peer limit applied", attempts) + } + }) +} + // reconcileBannedPeers replaces the blocklist with the control plane's ban // set rather than merging into it. The removal half is the point: the control // plane can unban a peer and there is no event for that, so a peer that drops From cbd1e4971f831a4a33a75b5e9885ffc8d64ca026 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 20:47:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 04/14] controlplane: identity bans, token spending and IdP roles (audit PR 3) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The control plane's identity lifecycle had gaps between what a ban, a bootstrap token and an issuer claim were meant to say and what the code enforced. Findings M17, M3+L35, M1, M2, M9, L36, L12, L9, L10, L11, L15, I13 from audit.md. M17 - Identity ban not enforced on /user/*. /admin/revoke bans the node key and the OIDC identity behind it, but authenticateUser never checked the identity ban, so a revoked user's still-valid ID token minted a bootstrap token and re-enrolled a fresh device (auto-approve: back on the mesh immediately, with the banned identity as OwnerID). Now: authenticateUser refuses a banned issuer|subject (403 via requireUser on every /user/* and admin route); /enroll and approve refuse a token whose owner is banned. Users gain an Issuer column (migration 11) so the owner of a token can be matched against the issuer|subject ban key; rows from before the migration adopt the issuer on next login. The inverse exists too: POST /admin/nodes/{peer}/unban lifts node and identity together (L36), and the CLI ban/unban canonicalizes --peer, fails on an unknown node instead of printing "Successfully banned" for zero rows, and covers the identity half (L12), all through one controlplane.SetNodeBan. M3 + L35 - Token usage was read-then-increment across two round trips; approve never re-checked the token. ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage replaces IncrementBootstrapTokenUsage: one UPDATE whose WHERE clause carries the usage cap, revocation and expiry, spent before anything is minted or written, on auto-approve, approve and re-mint. Approve re-validates the token (410 if revoked/expired/exhausted since queued, 403 if the owner is banned), writes the node record before the request flips to APPROVED, and resolves through ResolveEnrollmentRequest, which only touches a PENDING row: a second approve or a reject after approve is 409, not a second biscuit or an approved request with no node behind it. M1 - The issuer's "roles" claim was minted as role(), the same predicate mesh policy bindings grant and RequireRole/relay rights key on: an IdP emitting roles: ["sam:role:router"] made a router. The claim now maps to idp_role(); bindings and allowed_targets use idp_role:, and role: is no longer a valid member prefix (BindingMemberPrefixes drives the control plane's validation and the node's rule compiler, which also closes L15: agent: and role: members no longer compile into role rules). M2 - A mesh with no policy roles minted every non-router an unrestricted token (granted_service_all_types + target_unrestricted). Removed: no policy, no grants, as the docs already claimed for enrollment. M9 - An email the issuer marks email_verified: false no longer resolves bindings, is not minted and is not stored; absent email_verified is kept (several issuers never emit it). A subject already registered under another issuer is refused rather than sharing the account. Smaller: non-admin bootstrap tokens capped at 7 days / 10 usages (L9); /user/status no longer returns live biscuits, public keys or claims, and shows policy and routers to admins only (L11); /readyz and user-auth failures no longer echo internal errors (L10); GET /policies tries the node biscuit before OIDC so a biscuit no longer produces a verification error log or a users row (I13); SetNodeBanned reports ErrNotFound. Tests (.gemini/styleguide.md §3.3, §3.6): identity_lifecycle_test.go drives each finding from the attacker's side - banned identity on /user/status, /user/bootstrap-tokens, /user/revoke (403), its pre-ban token at /enroll (REJECTED) and a queued approval (403), then unban restores both halves; 12 concurrent enrollments on a 1-use token approve exactly 1; approve after revoke (410), after the cap (410), second approve and reject-after-approve (409) with a node record behind the approved request; user token ceilings; /user/status shape for user and admin; verified vs unverified email resolving an email: binding; cross-issuer subject collision (401); empty policy mints role only. Storage: atomic consume under 20 goroutines, expired/revoked/unknown, pending-only resolve. resolveRoles pins that a role: member never resolves from the claim; TestPolicyPermutations gains an unbound-claim case and drops the roles: [sam:role:node] hack that relied on M1. With the identity-ban check removed, the M17 test reproduces the audit (201 with a fresh token for the banned identity). Stacked on audit-pr1-proof-of-possession: the /register tests need its challenge helpers. --- api/datalog.go | 27 +- api/datalog_test.go | 12 +- cmd/sam-control-plane/main.go | 40 +- .../controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go | 589 ++++++++++++++++++ internal/controlplane/server.go | 455 ++++++++++---- internal/controlplane/server_test.go | 22 +- internal/identity/biscuit.go | 36 +- internal/node/policy.go | 11 +- internal/storage/round_trip_test.go | 1 + internal/storage/sql_store.go | 91 ++- internal/storage/sql_store_test.go | 129 +++- internal/storage/storage.go | 35 +- site/content/docs/development/policy.md | 2 +- .../docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md | 9 +- tests/integration/policy_permutations_test.go | 26 +- 15 files changed, 1275 insertions(+), 210 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go diff --git a/api/datalog.go b/api/datalog.go index b10e2ca6..36f479e2 100644 --- a/api/datalog.go +++ b/api/datalog.go @@ -88,8 +88,20 @@ const ( // FactRole defines a custom SAM role assigned to the user or node. // Contains: biscuit.String(roleName) // Example Datalog: allow if role("mesh-member") + // + // Only the control plane mints it, from mesh policy bindings. It must + // never be derived from an OIDC claim: role("sam:role:router") is what + // makes a router, and an issuer's "roles" claim is the issuer's word, not + // the mesh operator's. See FactIdpRole. FactRole = "role" + // FactIdpRole carries the OIDC "roles" claim as the issuer emitted it. + // Contains: biscuit.String(roleName) + // Example Datalog: allow if idp_role("platform-team") + // Bind it to a mesh role in policy (member "idp_role:platform-team"), + // or target it ("idp_role:platform-team"); it grants nothing by itself. + FactIdpRole = "idp_role" + // FactRight defines the cryptographically signed capability/right. // Contains: biscuit.String(rightName) // Example Datalog: allow if right("relay") @@ -264,7 +276,20 @@ var oidcClaimToFact = map[string]string{ "sub": FactUser, "email": FactEmail, "groups": FactGroup, - "roles": FactRole, + "roles": FactIdpRole, +} + +// BindingMemberPrefixes are the fact names a policy binding member or an +// allowed_targets entry may name: the peer itself plus every OIDC claim the +// control plane mints. FactRole is deliberately absent: a binding on it would +// grant a mesh role from a mesh role. +func BindingMemberPrefixes() []string { + names := []string{FactNode} + for _, fact := range OIDCClaimToFact() { + names = append(names, fact) + } + sort.Strings(names) + return names } // OIDCClaimToFact returns a copy of the OIDC claims to Biscuit facts map. diff --git a/api/datalog_test.go b/api/datalog_test.go index 778984a2..1f784ed5 100644 --- a/api/datalog_test.go +++ b/api/datalog_test.go @@ -360,12 +360,22 @@ func TestOIDCClaimToFact(t *testing.T) { "sub": FactUser, "email": FactEmail, "groups": FactGroup, - "roles": FactRole, + "roles": FactIdpRole, } if !reflect.DeepEqual(facts, want) { t.Errorf("OIDCClaimToFact() = %v, want %v", facts, want) } + // role() is minted from mesh policy only. An issuer whose "roles" claim + // landed there could name sam:role:router and become a router. + for claim, fact := range facts { + if fact == FactRole { + t.Errorf("claim %q maps to the mesh role fact %q", claim, FactRole) + } + } + if p := BindingMemberPrefixes(); slices.Contains(p, FactRole) || !slices.Contains(p, FactIdpRole) || !slices.Contains(p, FactNode) { + t.Errorf("BindingMemberPrefixes() = %v; want idp_role and node, not role", p) + } // Verify that modifying the returned map does not mutate the internal map. facts["new_claim"] = "new_fact" diff --git a/cmd/sam-control-plane/main.go b/cmd/sam-control-plane/main.go index 5ab2e1d5..62b281d9 100644 --- a/cmd/sam-control-plane/main.go +++ b/cmd/sam-control-plane/main.go @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ package main import ( "context" + "fmt" "os" "os/signal" "strings" @@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ import ( "github.com/google/sam/internal/secrets" "github.com/google/sam/internal/storage" golog "github.com/ipfs/go-log/v2" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" "github.com/spf13/cobra" ) @@ -170,16 +172,31 @@ func main() { } var peerIDFlag string + // setBan is the CLI counterpart of POST /admin/revoke and + // POST /admin/nodes/{peer}/unban: same canonicalization, same node and + // identity halves. A raw --peer used to match zero rows and still print + // "Successfully banned". + setBan := func(ctx context.Context, rawPeer string, banned bool) error { + pID, err := peer.Decode(rawPeer) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid peer ID %q: %w", rawPeer, err) + } + store, err := storage.NewSQLStore(dbDriver, dbDSN) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize database store: %w", err) + } + defer store.Close() //nolint:errcheck + node, err := store.GetNode(ctx, pID.String()) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("node %s: %w", pID, err) + } + return controlplane.SetNodeBan(ctx, store, node, banned) + } banCmd := &cobra.Command{ Use: "ban", - Short: "Ban a node peer ID", + Short: "Ban a node peer ID and the identity that enrolled it", Run: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) { - store, err := storage.NewSQLStore(dbDriver, dbDSN) - if err != nil { - logger.Fatalf("Failed to initialize database store: %v", err) - } - defer store.Close() //nolint:errcheck - if err := store.SetNodeBanned(cmd.Context(), peerIDFlag, true); err != nil { + if err := setBan(cmd.Context(), peerIDFlag, true); err != nil { logger.Fatalf("Failed to ban node: %v", err) } logger.Infof("Successfully banned node %s", peerIDFlag) @@ -190,14 +207,9 @@ func main() { unbanCmd := &cobra.Command{ Use: "unban", - Short: "Unban a node peer ID", + Short: "Unban a node peer ID and the identity that enrolled it", Run: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) { - store, err := storage.NewSQLStore(dbDriver, dbDSN) - if err != nil { - logger.Fatalf("Failed to initialize database store: %v", err) - } - defer store.Close() //nolint:errcheck - if err := store.SetNodeBanned(cmd.Context(), peerIDFlag, false); err != nil { + if err := setBan(cmd.Context(), peerIDFlag, false); err != nil { logger.Fatalf("Failed to unban node: %v", err) } logger.Infof("Successfully unbanned node %s", peerIDFlag) diff --git a/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go b/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..441a6d14 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,589 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package controlplane + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto/ed25519" + "encoding/json" + "io" + "net/http" + "slices" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2" + "github.com/google/sam/api" + "github.com/google/sam/internal/identity" + "github.com/google/sam/internal/storage" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" +) + +// lifecycleHarness is a control plane with an open node binding, an admin +// token and auto-approve on, plus the request helpers these tests share. +type lifecycleHarness struct { + t *testing.T + srv *Server + store storage.Store + baseURL string + mintToken func(map[string]interface{}) string + client *http.Client +} + +func newLifecycleHarness(t *testing.T) *lifecycleHarness { + t.Helper() + issuer, mintToken := startCustomMockOIDC(t) + srv, store, baseURL := setupTestServer(t, issuer) + t.Cleanup(func() { + _ = srv.Close() + _ = store.Close() + }) + srv.config.AdminToken = "super-secret-admin-token" + srv.config.AutoApproveEnrollment = true + if err := store.SaveMeshPolicy(context.Background(), + []*api.PolicyRole{{Name: api.RoleNode, AllowedServices: []string{"*"}, AllowedTargets: []string{"*"}}}, + []*api.PolicyBinding{{Role: api.RoleNode, Members: []string{api.SystemAuthenticated}}}); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return &lifecycleHarness{t: t, srv: srv, store: store, baseURL: baseURL, mintToken: mintToken, client: &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}} +} + +// do sends an authenticated request and returns status and body. +func (h *lifecycleHarness) do(method, path, bearer string, body []byte, contentType string) (int, []byte) { + h.t.Helper() + req, err := http.NewRequest(method, h.baseURL+path, bytes.NewReader(body)) + if err != nil { + h.t.Fatal(err) + } + if bearer != "" { + req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bearer) + } + if contentType != "" { + req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType) + } + resp, err := h.client.Do(req) + if err != nil { + h.t.Fatalf("%s %s: %v", method, path, err) + } + defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() + respBody, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) + if err != nil { + h.t.Fatal(err) + } + return resp.StatusCode, respBody +} + +// register enrolls an OIDC identity with a fresh key via /register. +func (h *lifecycleHarness) register(sub string) (crypto.PrivKey, peer.ID) { + h.t.Helper() + priv, id := newTestKey(h.t) + pub, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(priv.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + h.t.Fatal(err) + } + ts, sig := registerPoP(h.t, priv, id.String()) + data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ + Jwt: h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}), PeerId: id.String(), PublicKey: pub, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig, + }) + if err != nil { + h.t.Fatal(err) + } + if status, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/register", "", data, "application/x-protobuf"); status != http.StatusOK { + h.t.Fatalf("/register for %s: %d %s", sub, status, body) + } + return priv, id +} + +// userToken mints a bootstrap token as an OIDC user via /user/bootstrap-tokens. +func (h *lifecycleHarness) userToken(sub string, body string) (int, map[string]any) { + h.t.Helper() + status, respBody := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/user/bootstrap-tokens", h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}), []byte(body), "application/json") + var out map[string]any + _ = json.Unmarshal(respBody, &out) + return status, out +} + +// enroll drives POST /enroll with a fresh key and returns the response status. +func (h *lifecycleHarness) enroll(token string) (api.EnrollmentStatus, int, string) { + h.t.Helper() + priv, id := newTestKey(h.t) + pub, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(priv.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + h.t.Fatal(err) + } + ts, sig := enrollPoP(h.t, priv, id.String()) + data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.BootstrapEnrollRequest{ + BootstrapToken: token, PeerId: id.String(), PublicKey: pub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, + Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig, + }) + if err != nil { + h.t.Fatal(err) + } + status, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/enroll", "", data, "application/x-protobuf") + var resp api.BootstrapEnrollResponse + if status == http.StatusOK { + if err := proto.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil { + h.t.Fatal(err) + } + } + return resp.Status, status, resp.ErrorMessage +} + +func (h *lifecycleHarness) revoke(id peer.ID) { + h.t.Helper() + data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRevokeRequest{PeerId: id.String()}) + if err != nil { + h.t.Fatal(err) + } + if status, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/admin/revoke", "super-secret-admin-token", data, "application/x-protobuf"); status != http.StatusOK { + h.t.Fatalf("/admin/revoke: %d %s", status, body) + } +} + +// M17: a banned OIDC identity could not /register again, but its still-valid +// ID token passed authenticateUser, so it minted itself a bootstrap token and +// re-enrolled a fresh device. The ban has to hold on every surface the ID +// token can drive, and a token minted before the ban has to stop working. +func TestIdentityBanCoversUserSurfaceAndOwnedTokens(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + const sub = "victim-turned-attacker" + userJWT := h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}) + + // The identity logs in (user row exists), enrolls a node and mints a + // bootstrap token while still in good standing. + if status, body := h.do(http.MethodGet, "/user/status", userJWT, nil, ""); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("/user/status before ban: %d %s", status, body) + } + _, nodeID := h.register(sub) + status, minted := h.userToken(sub, `{"role":"sam:role:node","max_usages":5}`) + if status != http.StatusCreated { + t.Fatalf("token before ban: %d %v", status, minted) + } + preBanToken, _ := minted["token"].(string) + + h.revoke(nodeID) + banned, err := h.store.IsIdentityBanned(ctx, h.srv.config.OIDCIssuer+"|"+sub) + if err != nil || !banned { + t.Fatalf("identity not banned after revoke: banned=%v err=%v", banned, err) + } + + t.Run("user surface refuses the banned identity", func(t *testing.T) { + for _, tc := range []struct{ method, path string }{ + {http.MethodGet, "/user/status"}, + {http.MethodPost, "/user/bootstrap-tokens"}, + {http.MethodPost, "/user/revoke?id=" + nodeID.String()}, + } { + status, body := h.do(tc.method, tc.path, userJWT, []byte(`{"role":"sam:role:node"}`), "application/json") + if status != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Errorf("%s %s with a banned identity: got %d (%s), want 403", tc.method, tc.path, status, body) + } + } + }) + + t.Run("token minted before the ban enrolls nothing", func(t *testing.T) { + enrollStatus, httpStatus, msg := h.enroll(preBanToken) + if httpStatus != http.StatusOK || enrollStatus != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED { + t.Fatalf("enroll with a banned owner's token: http %d, status %v (%s); want REJECTED", httpStatus, enrollStatus, msg) + } + if !strings.Contains(msg, "owner is banned") { + t.Errorf("rejection reason = %q, want the owner ban", msg) + } + }) + + t.Run("a queued approval is refused too", func(t *testing.T) { + h.srv.config.AutoApproveEnrollment = false + t.Cleanup(func() { h.srv.config.AutoApproveEnrollment = true }) + // Another user's token, queued, then that user is banned. + const other = "queued-then-banned" + _, otherNode := h.register(other) + status, minted := h.userToken(other, `{"role":"sam:role:node","max_usages":1}`) + if status != http.StatusCreated { + t.Fatalf("token: %d %v", status, minted) + } + otherToken, _ := minted["token"].(string) + if enrollStatus, httpStatus, msg := h.enroll(otherToken); httpStatus != http.StatusOK || enrollStatus != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING { + t.Fatalf("queue: http %d, status %v (%s); want PENDING", httpStatus, enrollStatus, msg) + } + h.revoke(otherNode) + + reqs, err := h.store.ListEnrollmentRequests(ctx) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + var pendingID string + for _, r := range reqs { + if r.Status == api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING { + pendingID = r.ID + } + } + if pendingID == "" { + t.Fatal("no pending request found") + } + status, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/admin/enrollments/"+pendingID+"/approve", "super-secret-admin-token", nil, "") + if status != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Errorf("approve with a banned owner: got %d (%s), want 403", status, body) + } + }) + + t.Run("unban lifts both halves", func(t *testing.T) { + status, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/admin/nodes/"+nodeID.String()+"/unban", "super-secret-admin-token", nil, "") + if status != http.StatusNoContent { + t.Fatalf("unban: got %d (%s), want 204", status, body) + } + if banned, err := h.store.IsIdentityBanned(ctx, h.srv.config.OIDCIssuer+"|"+sub); err != nil || banned { + t.Errorf("identity still banned after unban: banned=%v err=%v", banned, err) + } + if node, err := h.store.GetNode(ctx, nodeID.String()); err != nil || node.Banned { + t.Errorf("node still banned after unban: err=%v", err) + } + if status, body := h.do(http.MethodGet, "/user/status", userJWT, nil, ""); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Errorf("/user/status after unban: %d %s", status, body) + } + }) +} + +// M3: the usage cap was read-then-increment across two round trips, so +// concurrent enrollments on a 1-use token could all pass the read. +func TestBootstrapTokenUsageCapHoldsUnderConcurrency(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + status, minted := h.userToken("issuer-of-one", `{"role":"sam:role:node","max_usages":1}`) + if status != http.StatusCreated { + t.Fatalf("token: %d %v", status, minted) + } + token, _ := minted["token"].(string) + + const attempts = 12 + var wg sync.WaitGroup + results := make(chan api.EnrollmentStatus, attempts) + for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ { + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + enrollStatus, httpStatus, _ := h.enroll(token) + if httpStatus == http.StatusOK { + results <- enrollStatus + } else if httpStatus != http.StatusTooManyRequests { + t.Errorf("unexpected http status %d", httpStatus) + } + }() + } + wg.Wait() + close(results) + + approved := 0 + for s := range results { + if s == api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED { + approved++ + } + } + if approved != 1 { + t.Errorf("%d enrollments approved on a 1-use token, want exactly 1", approved) + } + tok, err := h.store.GetBootstrapToken(context.Background(), minted["id"].(string)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if tok.UsagesCount != 1 { + t.Errorf("usages_count = %d, want 1", tok.UsagesCount) + } +} + +// M3 (approve arm) and L35: approve re-checks the token and writes the node +// record before the request becomes APPROVED; a second approve or reject of +// the same request is a 409, not a second biscuit. +func TestApproveRechecksTokenAndResolvesOnce(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + h.srv.config.AutoApproveEnrollment = false + ctx := context.Background() + + queue := func(maxUsages int) (tokenID, requestID string) { + t.Helper() + status, minted := h.userToken("queuer", `{"role":"sam:role:node","max_usages":`+strconv.Itoa(maxUsages)+`}`) + if status != http.StatusCreated { + t.Fatalf("token: %d %v", status, minted) + } + if enrollStatus, httpStatus, msg := h.enroll(minted["token"].(string)); httpStatus != http.StatusOK || enrollStatus != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING { + t.Fatalf("queue: http %d, status %v (%s)", httpStatus, enrollStatus, msg) + } + reqs, err := h.store.ListEnrollmentRequests(ctx) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + for _, r := range reqs { + if r.TokenID == minted["id"].(string) && r.Status == api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING { + return r.TokenID, r.ID + } + } + t.Fatal("pending request not found") + return "", "" + } + approve := func(id string) (int, string) { + t.Helper() + status, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/admin/enrollments/"+id+"/approve", "super-secret-admin-token", nil, "") + return status, string(body) + } + + t.Run("revoked since queued", func(t *testing.T) { + tokenID, reqID := queue(1) + if err := h.store.RevokeBootstrapToken(ctx, tokenID); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if status, body := approve(reqID); status != http.StatusGone { + t.Errorf("approve with a revoked token: got %d (%s), want 410", status, body) + } + req, err := h.store.GetEnrollmentRequestByID(ctx, reqID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if req.Status != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING || len(req.BiscuitToken) != 0 { + t.Errorf("request was resolved despite the revoked token: %+v", req) + } + }) + + t.Run("second resolution is a conflict", func(t *testing.T) { + _, reqID := queue(5) + if status, body := approve(reqID); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("first approve: %d %s", status, body) + } + if status, body := approve(reqID); status != http.StatusConflict { + t.Errorf("second approve: got %d (%s), want 409", status, body) + } + if status, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/admin/enrollments/"+reqID+"/reject", "super-secret-admin-token", nil, ""); status != http.StatusConflict { + t.Errorf("reject after approve: got %d (%s), want 409", status, body) + } + req, err := h.store.GetEnrollmentRequestByID(ctx, reqID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, err := h.store.GetNode(ctx, req.PeerID); err != nil { + t.Errorf("approved request has no node record behind it: %v", err) + } + }) + + t.Run("exhausted since queued", func(t *testing.T) { + // Two requests queued on a 1-use token: only one approval can land. + status, minted := h.userToken("queuer", `{"role":"sam:role:node","max_usages":1}`) + if status != http.StatusCreated { + t.Fatalf("token: %d %v", status, minted) + } + var ids []string + for i := 0; i < 2; i++ { + if _, httpStatus, _ := h.enroll(minted["token"].(string)); httpStatus != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("queue %d: http %d", i, httpStatus) + } + } + reqs, err := h.store.ListEnrollmentRequests(ctx) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + for _, r := range reqs { + if r.TokenID == minted["id"].(string) { + ids = append(ids, r.ID) + } + } + if len(ids) != 2 { + t.Fatalf("queued %d requests, want 2", len(ids)) + } + if status, body := approve(ids[0]); status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("first approve: %d %s", status, body) + } + if status, body := approve(ids[1]); status != http.StatusGone { + t.Errorf("approve past the cap: got %d (%s), want 410", status, body) + } + }) +} + +// L9: a non-admin's token is bounded in lifetime and width. +func TestUserBootstrapTokenCeilings(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + for name, body := range map[string]string{ + "ttl": `{"role":"sam:role:node","ttl_hours":` + strconv.Itoa(userTokenMaxTTLHours+1) + `}`, + "usages": `{"role":"sam:role:node","max_usages":` + strconv.Itoa(userTokenMaxUsages+1) + `}`, + } { + if status, resp := h.userToken("greedy", body); status != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Errorf("%s over the ceiling: got %d %v, want 400", name, status, resp) + } + } + if status, resp := h.userToken("modest", `{"role":"sam:role:node","ttl_hours":`+strconv.Itoa(userTokenMaxTTLHours)+`,"max_usages":`+strconv.Itoa(userTokenMaxUsages)+`}`); status != http.StatusCreated { + t.Errorf("at the ceiling: got %d %v, want 201", status, resp) + } + // Admins are not bounded. + status, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/user/bootstrap-tokens", "super-secret-admin-token", + []byte(`{"role":"sam:role:router","ttl_hours":`+strconv.Itoa(userTokenMaxTTLHours*10)+`,"max_usages":`+strconv.Itoa(userTokenMaxUsages*10)+`}`), "application/json") + if status != http.StatusCreated { + t.Errorf("admin over the user ceiling: got %d (%s), want 201", status, body) + } +} + +// L11: /user/status must not hand out live biscuits or key material, and +// mesh-wide state (policy, routers) is admin-only. +func TestUserStatusTrimsCredentialsAndMeshState(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + const sub = "status-user" + h.register(sub) + + status, body := h.do(http.MethodGet, "/user/status", h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}), nil, "") + if status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("/user/status: %d %s", status, body) + } + for _, leaked := range []string{`"Biscuit"`, `"PublicKey"`, `"ClaimsJSON"`, `"policy_json"`, `"active_routers"`} { + if bytes.Contains(body, []byte(leaked)) { + t.Errorf("non-admin /user/status carries %s", leaked) + } + } + var resp struct { + Nodes []map[string]any `json:"enrolled_nodes"` + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if len(resp.Nodes) != 0 { + // The node was OIDC-enrolled with no owner; a user sees only nodes it + // owns. What matters is the shape when present, checked as admin. + t.Errorf("non-owner sees %d nodes", len(resp.Nodes)) + } + + status, body = h.do(http.MethodGet, "/user/status", "super-secret-admin-token", nil, "") + if status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("admin /user/status: %d %s", status, body) + } + for _, leaked := range []string{`"Biscuit"`, `"PublicKey"`} { + if bytes.Contains(body, []byte(leaked)) { + t.Errorf("admin /user/status carries %s", leaked) + } + } + for _, wanted := range []string{`"policy_json"`, `"active_routers"`, `"ClaimsJSON"`, `"PeerID"`} { + if !bytes.Contains(body, []byte(wanted)) { + t.Errorf("admin /user/status lacks %s", wanted) + } + } +} + +// M9: an email the issuer marks unverified resolves no binding and is not +// minted; two issuers sharing a subject do not share a user. +func TestUnverifiedEmailAndIssuerCollision(t *testing.T) { + h := newLifecycleHarness(t) + ctx := context.Background() + if err := h.store.SaveMeshPolicy(ctx, + []*api.PolicyRole{{Name: api.RoleNode}, {Name: "by-email", AllowedServices: []string{"*"}}}, + []*api.PolicyBinding{ + {Role: api.RoleNode, Members: []string{api.SystemAuthenticated}}, + {Role: "by-email", Members: []string{"email:ceo@example.com"}}, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + cpPriv, cpPub, err := h.store.GetCurrentKey(ctx) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _ = cpPriv + _ = cpPub + + mintedRoles := func(claims map[string]interface{}) []string { + t.Helper() + priv, id := newTestKey(t) + pub, err := crypto.MarshalPublicKey(priv.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + ts, sig := registerPoP(t, priv, id.String()) + claims["sub"] = id.String() // distinct subjects, so only the email can bind + data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{ + Jwt: h.mintToken(claims), PeerId: id.String(), PublicKey: pub, + RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + status, body := h.do(http.MethodPost, "/register", "", data, "application/x-protobuf") + if status != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("/register: %d %s", status, body) + } + var resp api.EnrollResponse + if err := proto.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + var roles []string + for _, r := range []string{api.RoleNode, "by-email"} { + if authorityHasFact(t, resp.BiscuitToken, api.FactRole+`("`+r+`")`) { + roles = append(roles, r) + } + } + return roles + } + + verified := mintedRoles(map[string]interface{}{"email": "ceo@example.com", "email_verified": true}) + if !slices.Contains(verified, "by-email") { + t.Errorf("verified email did not resolve its binding: roles=%v", verified) + } + unverified := mintedRoles(map[string]interface{}{"email": "ceo@example.com", "email_verified": false}) + if slices.Contains(unverified, "by-email") { + t.Errorf("email the issuer marked unverified resolved a binding: roles=%v", unverified) + } + + // Issuer collision: a user row from issuer A, then the same sub from + // issuer B. The second issuer is unknown to the control plane so its + // token is refused before the user lookup; simulate the collision at the + // store level, the way a second configured issuer would produce it. + const sub = "shared-sub" + if err := h.store.SaveUser(ctx, &storage.User{ID: sub, Issuer: "https://other-idp.example", Email: "x@example.com", Role: "user", CreatedAt: time.Now()}); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + status, body := h.do(http.MethodGet, "/user/status", h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}), nil, "") + if status != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Errorf("same subject from another issuer: got %d (%s), want 401", status, body) + } +} + +// M2: a mesh with no policy roles used to mint every node an unrestricted +// token. Now it mints the role and nothing else. +func TestNoPolicyMintsNoGrants(t *testing.T) { + _, cpPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, id := newTestKey(t) + data, err := identity.MintBootstrapBiscuitToken(cpPriv, id, api.RoleNode, time.Now().Add(time.Hour), nil, nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + for _, open := range []string{api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes, api.FactTargetUnrestricted} { + if authorityHasFact(t, data, open+"(") { + t.Errorf("token minted under an empty policy carries %s()", open) + } + } + if !authorityHasFact(t, data, api.FactRole+`("`+api.RoleNode+`")`) { + t.Error("token lacks its role fact") + } +} + +// authorityHasFact reports whether the token's authority block prints the +// given Datalog text (Biscuit.Code lists appended blocks only). +func authorityHasFact(t *testing.T, token []byte, text string) bool { + t.Helper() + b, err := biscuit.Unmarshal(token) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return strings.Contains(b.String(), text) +} diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server.go b/internal/controlplane/server.go index 21063266..75ffa531 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/server.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/server.go @@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ const ( // for storage.EnrolledNode.AutonomousRecovery. Admin-console only: the // node-facing side of #367 is TokenRefreshRequest.peer_id in sam.proto. adminNodeActionAutonomousRecovery = "autonomous-recovery" + + // adminNodeActionUnban is the action segment of + // POST /admin/nodes/{peer_id}/unban, the inverse of POST /admin/revoke. + adminNodeActionUnban = "unban" ) // Server implements the SAM Control Plane web app. @@ -384,9 +388,12 @@ func (s *Server) HandleReadyz(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } if s.store != nil { if err := s.store.Ping(r.Context()); err != nil { + // The DSN, host names and driver errors are operator material; the + // probe is unauthenticated. + logger.Errorf("Readiness probe: database unreachable: %v", err) w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable) - _, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"error","message":%q}`, err.Error()) + _, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"error","message":"database unavailable"}`)) return } } @@ -502,6 +509,11 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.Error(w, "JWT validation failed: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) return } + // An email the issuer marks unverified must not resolve bindings or be + // minted as an email() fact. + if verifiedEmail(claims) == "" { + delete(claims, "email") + } pID, err := peer.Decode(req.PeerId) if err != nil { @@ -1122,34 +1134,31 @@ func (s *Server) HandlePolicies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // Simple HTTP admin methods for policies switch r.Method { case http.MethodGet: - // Nodes need to fetch policies using their Biscuit token, Admins use OIDC/Bootstrap - isAdmin := false - user, err := s.authenticateUser(r) - if err == nil && user.Role == "admin" { - isAdmin = true - } - + // Nodes fetch policies with their biscuit, admins with the admin token + // or an ID token. The biscuit is tried first: running OIDC + // verification on a biscuit logs a failure and would auto-register + // whoever's ID token lands here. isNode := false - if !isAdmin { - // Try checking if it's a valid node biscuit - authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization") - if strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") { - biscuitBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")) - if err == nil { - trustedKeys, err := s.store.GetAllValidPublicKeys(r.Context()) - if err == nil { - peerID, err := identity.VerifyAndExtractPeerID(trustedKeys, biscuitBytes, s.config.BiscuitTimeout) - if err == nil { - nodeRecord, nodeErr := s.store.GetNode(r.Context(), peerID.String()) - if nodeErr == nil && nodeRecord != nil && nodeRecord.CheckAdmission(time.Now()) == nil { - isNode = true - } + if authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") { + if biscuitBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")); err == nil { + if trustedKeys, err := s.store.GetAllValidPublicKeys(r.Context()); err == nil { + if peerID, err := identity.VerifyAndExtractPeerID(trustedKeys, biscuitBytes, s.config.BiscuitTimeout); err == nil { + nodeRecord, nodeErr := s.store.GetNode(r.Context(), peerID.String()) + if nodeErr == nil && nodeRecord != nil && nodeRecord.CheckAdmission(time.Now()) == nil { + isNode = true } } } } } + isAdmin := false + if !isNode { + if user, err := s.authenticateUser(r); err == nil && user.Role == "admin" { + isAdmin = true + } + } + if !isAdmin && !isNode { http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: Admin or Node authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized) return @@ -1331,6 +1340,17 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } + // A token is only as welcome as the identity that minted it. + if banned, err := s.tokenOwnerBanned(ctx, tokenRecord); err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Failed to check token owner ban: %v", err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } else if banned { + logger.Warnw("Bootstrap token from a banned identity used", "peer_id", req.PeerId, "token_id", tokenRecord.ID, "owner", tokenRecord.OwnerID) + s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Bootstrap token owner is banned") + return + } + if req.RequestedRole == "" { s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "requested_role must be specified") return @@ -1395,7 +1415,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if existingReq.Status == api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED { biscuitToken, resolvedAt, refreshErr := s.remintApprovedBootstrapBiscuit(ctx, existingReq, tokenRecord) if refreshErr != nil { - if errors.Is(refreshErr, storage.ErrNodeBanned) || errors.Is(refreshErr, storage.ErrNodeSessionExpired) || errors.Is(refreshErr, errBootstrapRoleMismatch) { + if errors.Is(refreshErr, storage.ErrNodeBanned) || errors.Is(refreshErr, storage.ErrNodeSessionExpired) || errors.Is(refreshErr, errBootstrapRoleMismatch) || errors.Is(refreshErr, storage.ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable) { logger.Warnw("Refused bootstrap re-enrollment", "peer_id", req.PeerId, "error", refreshErr) s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Enrollment no longer valid: "+refreshErr.Error()) return @@ -1461,6 +1481,18 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Label not permitted: "+err.Error()) return } + // Spend the usage before anything is minted or written: the read + // above is advisory, this is the gate concurrent enrollments race on. + if err := s.store.ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, tokenRecord.ID, time.Now()); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable) { + logger.Warnw("Bootstrap token no longer usable at enrollment", "peer_id", canonical, "token_id", tokenRecord.ID) + s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Bootstrap token expired, revoked or exhausted") + return + } + logger.Errorf("Failed to consume token usage: %v", err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } biscuitBytes, err := identity.MintBootstrapBiscuitToken(privKey, pID, tokenRecord.Role, time.Now().Add(s.config.BiscuitTTL), policyRoles, req.Labels) if err != nil { logger.Errorf("Failed to mint bootstrap biscuit: %v", err) @@ -1474,12 +1506,8 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { enrollReq.ResolvedAt = &tNow enrollReq.ResolvedBy = "auto-approver" - if err := s.store.CreateEnrollmentRequest(ctx, enrollReq); err != nil { - logger.Errorf("Failed to save enrollment request: %v", err) - http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) - return - } - + // Node record first: an approved request with no node behind it hands + // out a biscuit that /admin/revoke cannot find (see approve). nodeRecord := &storage.EnrolledNode{ PeerID: canonical, PublicKey: req.PublicKey, @@ -1498,8 +1526,10 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } - if err := s.store.IncrementBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, tokenRecord.ID); err != nil { - logger.Errorf("Failed to increment token usage: %v", err) + if err := s.store.CreateEnrollmentRequest(ctx, enrollReq); err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Failed to save enrollment request: %v", err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return } resp, err := s.buildApprovedBootstrapEnrollResponse(ctx, biscuitBytes, enrollReq.ResolvedAt) @@ -1642,6 +1672,11 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnrollStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { s.writeEnrollResponse(w, resp) } +// errIdentityBanned is authenticateUser's answer for a valid ID token whose +// issuer|subject has been banned. Callers map it to 403, not 401: the token +// is fine, the identity is not welcome. +var errIdentityBanned = errors.New("identity is banned") + func (s *Server) authenticateUser(r *http.Request) (*storage.User, error) { authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization") if !strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") { @@ -1678,13 +1713,26 @@ func (s *Server) authenticateUser(r *http.Request) (*storage.User, error) { if sub == "" { return nil, errors.New("token subject (sub) claim is empty") } - email, _ := claims["email"].(string) + iss, _ := claims["iss"].(string) + email := verifiedEmail(claims) + + // A revoked node bans the identity behind it (banNode), and that has to + // hold on every surface the identity can drive with its ID token, or it + // mints itself a bootstrap token and re-enrolls a fresh device. + if banned, err := s.store.IsIdentityBanned(ctx, oidcIdentityKey(claims)); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to check identity ban: %w", err) + } else if banned { + logger.Warnw("Banned identity presented a valid ID token", "identity", oidcIdentityKey(claims)) + return nil, errIdentityBanned + } // Fetch or auto-register user user, err := s.store.GetUser(ctx, sub) - if err == storage.ErrNotFound { + switch { + case err == storage.ErrNotFound: user = &storage.User{ ID: sub, + Issuer: iss, Email: email, Role: "user", CreatedAt: time.Now(), @@ -1692,18 +1740,56 @@ func (s *Server) authenticateUser(r *http.Request) (*storage.User, error) { if err := s.store.SaveUser(ctx, user); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to register user: %w", err) } - logger.Infow("Auto-registered new OIDC user", "id", sub, "email", email) - } else if err != nil { + logger.Infow("Auto-registered new OIDC user", "id", sub, "issuer", iss, "email", email) + case err != nil: return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get user: %w", err) + case user.Issuer == "": + // Row from before issuers were recorded: adopt this one. + user.Issuer = iss + if err := s.store.SaveUser(ctx, user); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to record user issuer: %w", err) + } + case user.Issuer != iss: + // Users are keyed on the subject alone; two issuers handing out the + // same subject would otherwise share one account and its nodes. + logger.Warnw("ID token subject collides with a user from another issuer", "sub", sub, "issuer", iss, "user_issuer", user.Issuer) + return nil, errors.New("subject is registered under a different issuer") } return user, nil } -func (s *Server) checkAdminAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool { +// verifiedEmail returns the email claim unless the issuer marked it +// unverified. Absent email_verified is kept (many issuers never emit it and +// several emit no email at all); an explicit false is not an identity. +func verifiedEmail(claims jwt.MapClaims) string { + if v, ok := claims["email_verified"].(bool); ok && !v { + return "" + } + email, _ := claims["email"].(string) + return email +} + +// requireUser authenticates the caller for a user- or admin-facing route and +// writes the failure itself. Internal failures are logged, not echoed: the +// body says only whether the caller is unauthenticated or banned. +func (s *Server) requireUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (*storage.User, bool) { user, err := s.authenticateUser(r) - if err != nil { - http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) + if err == nil { + return user, true + } + if errors.Is(err, errIdentityBanned) { + http.Error(w, "Forbidden: identity is banned", http.StatusForbidden) + return nil, false + } + logger.Debugf("User authentication failed: %v", err) + http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized) + return nil, false +} + +func (s *Server) checkAdminAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool { + user, ok := s.requireUser(w, r) + if !ok { return false } if user.Role != "admin" { @@ -1902,7 +1988,11 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminEnrollmentAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ adminIdentity := "admin" if action == "reject" { - err = s.store.UpdateEnrollmentRequest(ctx, id, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, nil, adminIdentity) + err = s.store.ResolveEnrollmentRequest(ctx, id, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, nil, adminIdentity) + if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrEnrollmentAlreadyResolved) { + http.Error(w, "Enrollment request is already resolved", http.StatusConflict) + return + } if err != nil { logger.Errorf("Failed to reject enrollment: %v", err) http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) @@ -1921,6 +2011,29 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminEnrollmentAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ return } + // The token was checked when the request was queued; it may have been + // revoked, expired or run out since, and its owner may have been + // banned. Approval is where it is spent, so it is re-checked here. + switch { + case tokenRecord.IsRevoked(): + http.Error(w, "Bootstrap token has been revoked since this request was queued", http.StatusGone) + return + case time.Now().After(tokenRecord.ExpiresAt): + http.Error(w, "Bootstrap token has expired since this request was queued", http.StatusGone) + return + case tokenRecord.UsagesCount >= tokenRecord.MaxUsages: + http.Error(w, "Bootstrap token has no usages left", http.StatusGone) + return + } + if banned, err := s.tokenOwnerBanned(ctx, tokenRecord); err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Failed to check token owner ban: %v", err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } else if banned { + http.Error(w, "Bootstrap token owner is banned", http.StatusForbidden) + return + } + pID, err := peer.Decode(enrollReq.PeerID) if err != nil { http.Error(w, "Invalid Peer ID stored in request", http.StatusInternalServerError) @@ -1928,8 +2041,6 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminEnrollmentAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ } canonical := pID.String() - // No policy fetch needed. - privKey, _, err := s.store.GetCurrentKey(ctx) if err != nil { logger.Errorf("Failed to retrieve signing key: %v", err) @@ -1954,20 +2065,29 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminEnrollmentAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ return } - biscuitBytes, err := identity.MintBootstrapBiscuitToken(privKey, pID, tokenRecord.Role, time.Now().Add(s.config.BiscuitTTL), policyRoles, enrollReq.Labels) - if err != nil { - logger.Errorf("Failed to mint bootstrap biscuit: %v", err) + // The atomic gate; the checks above only give a better message. + if err := s.store.ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, tokenRecord.ID, time.Now()); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable) { + http.Error(w, "Bootstrap token expired, revoked or exhausted", http.StatusGone) + return + } + logger.Errorf("Failed to consume token usage: %v", err) http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } - err = s.store.UpdateEnrollmentRequest(ctx, id, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED, biscuitBytes, adminIdentity) + biscuitBytes, err := identity.MintBootstrapBiscuitToken(privKey, pID, tokenRecord.Role, time.Now().Add(s.config.BiscuitTTL), policyRoles, enrollReq.Labels) if err != nil { - logger.Errorf("Failed to approve enrollment request in DB: %v", err) + logger.Errorf("Failed to mint bootstrap biscuit: %v", err) http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } + // Node record before the request flips to APPROVED. The other order + // left a window where /enroll/status handed out a biscuit for a node + // that did not exist: routers accepted it and /admin/revoke could not + // find it. A node row with a still-pending request is the harmless + // failure: the enrollee keeps polling and the admin can retry. nodeRecord := &storage.EnrolledNode{ PeerID: canonical, PublicKey: enrollReq.PublicKey, @@ -1986,8 +2106,15 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminEnrollmentAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ return } - if err := s.store.IncrementBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, tokenRecord.ID); err != nil { - logger.Errorf("Failed to increment token usage: %v", err) + err = s.store.ResolveEnrollmentRequest(ctx, id, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED, biscuitBytes, adminIdentity) + if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrEnrollmentAlreadyResolved) { + http.Error(w, "Enrollment request is already resolved", http.StatusConflict) + return + } + if err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Failed to approve enrollment request in DB: %v", err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return } w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) @@ -2013,7 +2140,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminNodeAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } parts := strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/admin/nodes/"), "/") - if len(parts) != 2 || parts[1] != adminNodeActionAutonomousRecovery { + if len(parts) != 2 { http.Error(w, "Not found", http.StatusNotFound) return } @@ -2022,6 +2149,36 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminNodeAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.Error(w, "Invalid Peer ID", http.StatusBadRequest) return } + canonical := pID.String() + + switch parts[1] { + case adminNodeActionUnban: + // The inverse of /admin/revoke: lifts the device-key ban and the + // identity ban together, so the human behind the node can enroll + // again. Until this existed an identity ban was permanent short of + // editing the database. + node, err := s.store.GetNode(r.Context(), canonical) + if err == storage.ErrNotFound { + http.Error(w, "Node not found", http.StatusNotFound) + return + } else if err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Failed to retrieve node %s: %v", canonical, err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } + if err := SetNodeBan(r.Context(), s.store, node, false); err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Failed to unban node %s: %v", canonical, err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } + logger.Infow("Node and identity unbanned", "peer_id", canonical) + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) + return + case adminNodeActionAutonomousRecovery: + default: + http.Error(w, "Not found", http.StatusNotFound) + return + } var req struct { Enabled bool `json:"enabled"` @@ -2033,7 +2190,6 @@ func (s *Server) HandleAdminNodeAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }() - canonical := pID.String() err = s.store.SetNodeAutonomousRecovery(r.Context(), canonical, req.Enabled) if err == storage.ErrNotFound { http.Error(w, "Node not found", http.StatusNotFound) @@ -2165,6 +2321,14 @@ func (s *Server) remintApprovedBootstrapBiscuit(ctx context.Context, existingReq return nil, nil, err } + // Re-minting consumes a use of the bootstrap token, the same as the + // original enrollment did - it is the operator's lever on how many times + // this can happen, per #367/#368. Spent before minting: an exhausted, + // expired or revoked token re-mints nothing. + if err := s.store.ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, tokenRecord.ID, time.Now()); err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("bootstrap token cannot re-mint for %s: %w", pID, err) + } + privKey, _, err := s.store.GetCurrentKey(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to retrieve signing key: %w", err) @@ -2193,19 +2357,26 @@ func (s *Server) remintApprovedBootstrapBiscuit(ctx context.Context, existingReq return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to persist refreshed node record: %w", err) } - // Re-minting consumes a use of the bootstrap token, the same as the - // original enrollment did - it is the operator's lever on how many times - // this can happen, per #367/#368. A failure here only means the usage - // counter under-counts; it must not block the peer from getting its - // (already persisted) fresh biscuit. - if err := s.store.IncrementBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, tokenRecord.ID); err != nil { - logger.Errorf("Failed to increment bootstrap token usage on re-mint for %s: %v", pID, err) - } - resolvedAt := time.Now() return biscuitBytes, &resolvedAt, nil } +// tokenOwnerBanned reports whether the identity that minted a bootstrap +// token has since been banned. Admin-minted tokens have no owner. +func (s *Server) tokenOwnerBanned(ctx context.Context, tok *storage.BootstrapToken) (bool, error) { + if tok.OwnerID == "" { + return false, nil + } + owner, err := s.store.GetUser(ctx, tok.OwnerID) + if err == storage.ErrNotFound { + return false, nil + } + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + return s.store.IsIdentityBanned(ctx, owner.IdentityKey()) +} + func (s *Server) buildApprovedBootstrapEnrollResponse(ctx context.Context, biscuitToken []byte, resolvedAt *time.Time) (*api.BootstrapEnrollResponse, error) { _, pubKey, err := s.store.GetCurrentKey(ctx) if err != nil { @@ -2241,64 +2412,38 @@ func (s *Server) HandleUserStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) return } - user, err := s.authenticateUser(r) - if err != nil { - http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) + user, ok := s.requireUser(w, r) + if !ok { return } ctx := r.Context() - routers, err := s.store.GetActiveRouters(ctx) - if err != nil { - logger.Errorf("Failed to get active routers: %v", err) - http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) - return - } + isAdmin := user.Role == "admin" - nodes := []storage.EnrolledNode{} - if user.Role == "admin" { - nodes, err = s.store.ListNodes(ctx) - } else { - allNodes, err := s.store.ListNodes(ctx) - if err == nil { - for _, n := range allNodes { - if n.OwnerID == user.ID { - nodes = append(nodes, n) - } - } - } - } + allNodes, err := s.store.ListNodes(ctx) if err != nil { logger.Errorf("Failed to list nodes: %v", err) http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } - - tokens := []storage.BootstrapToken{} - allTokens, err := s.store.ListBootstrapTokens(ctx) - if err == nil { - for _, t := range allTokens { - if t.OwnerID == user.ID || user.Role == "admin" { - tokens = append(tokens, t) - } + nodes := []enrolledNodeView{} + for _, n := range allNodes { + if isAdmin || n.OwnerID == user.ID { + nodes = append(nodes, viewEnrolledNode(n, isAdmin)) } } + + allTokens, err := s.store.ListBootstrapTokens(ctx) if err != nil { logger.Errorf("Failed to list bootstrap tokens: %v", err) http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } - - roles, bindings, err := s.store.GetMeshPolicy(r.Context()) - if err != nil { - logger.Errorf("Failed to list policy: %v", err) - } - - var policyJSON string - if rendered, err := marshalPolicyJSON(roles, bindings); err == nil { - policyJSON = rendered - } else { - logger.Errorf("Failed to render policy: %v", err) + tokens := []storage.BootstrapToken{} + for _, t := range allTokens { + if isAdmin || t.OwnerID == user.ID { + tokens = append(tokens, t) + } } resp := map[string]any{ @@ -2307,10 +2452,30 @@ func (s *Server) HandleUserStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { "email": user.Email, "role": user.Role, }, - "active_routers": routers, "enrolled_nodes": nodes, "bootstrap_tokens": tokens, - "policy_json": policyJSON, + } + + // The mesh policy and the router fleet describe the whole mesh, not the + // caller's nodes; they are admin material. + if isAdmin { + routers, err := s.store.GetActiveRouters(ctx) + if err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Failed to get active routers: %v", err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } + resp["active_routers"] = routers + + roles, bindings, err := s.store.GetMeshPolicy(ctx) + if err != nil && err != storage.ErrNotFound { + logger.Errorf("Failed to list policy: %v", err) + } + if rendered, err := marshalPolicyJSON(roles, bindings); err == nil { + resp["policy_json"] = rendered + } else { + logger.Errorf("Failed to render policy: %v", err) + } } w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") @@ -2318,10 +2483,50 @@ func (s *Server) HandleUserStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp) } +// enrolledNodeView is what status endpoints return for a node: the record +// minus its live credential and key material. ClaimsJSON is admin-only. +type enrolledNodeView struct { + PeerID string `json:"PeerID"` + Role string `json:"Role"` + EnrollmentType string `json:"EnrollmentType"` + ClaimsJSON string `json:"ClaimsJSON,omitempty"` + OwnerID string `json:"OwnerID"` + Labels map[string]string `json:"Labels"` + EnrolledAt time.Time `json:"EnrolledAt"` + ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"ExpiresAt"` + Banned bool `json:"Banned"` + AutonomousRecovery bool `json:"AutonomousRecovery"` +} + +func viewEnrolledNode(n storage.EnrolledNode, withClaims bool) enrolledNodeView { + v := enrolledNodeView{ + PeerID: n.PeerID, + Role: n.Role, + EnrollmentType: n.EnrollmentType, + OwnerID: n.OwnerID, + Labels: n.Labels, + EnrolledAt: n.EnrolledAt, + ExpiresAt: n.ExpiresAt, + Banned: n.Banned, + AutonomousRecovery: n.AutonomousRecovery, + } + if withClaims { + v.ClaimsJSON = n.ClaimsJSON + } + return v +} + +// Ceilings on what a non-admin may mint for itself: a token is a standing +// invitation into the mesh, and these bound how long and how wide one +// user's invitation can be. +const ( + userTokenMaxTTLHours = 7 * 24 + userTokenMaxUsages = 10 +) + func (s *Server) HandleUserBootstrapTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { - user, err := s.authenticateUser(r) - if err != nil { - http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) + user, ok := s.requireUser(w, r) + if !ok { return } @@ -2374,6 +2579,16 @@ func (s *Server) HandleUserBootstrapTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reques if req.MaxUsages <= 0 { req.MaxUsages = 1 } + if user.Role != "admin" { + if req.TTLHours > userTokenMaxTTLHours { + http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("ttl_hours may not exceed %d for non-admin users", userTokenMaxTTLHours), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + if req.MaxUsages > userTokenMaxUsages { + http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("max_usages may not exceed %d for non-admin users", userTokenMaxUsages), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + } randBytes := make([]byte, 16) if _, err := rand.Read(randBytes); err != nil { @@ -2434,9 +2649,8 @@ func (s *Server) resolveTokenOwner(ctx context.Context, caller *storage.User, re } func (s *Server) HandleUserRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { - user, err := s.authenticateUser(r) - if err != nil { - http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) + user, ok := s.requireUser(w, r) + if !ok { return } @@ -2507,10 +2721,22 @@ func oidcIdentityKey(claims jwt.MapClaims) string { // banNode bans the device key and, when the record carries OIDC claims, the // enrolled identity behind it, so the ban survives keypair regeneration. func (s *Server) banNode(ctx context.Context, node *storage.EnrolledNode) error { - if err := s.store.SetNodeBanned(ctx, node.PeerID, true); err != nil { + if err := SetNodeBan(ctx, s.store, node, true); err != nil { return err } s.dropCatalogEntry(node.PeerID) + return nil +} + +// SetNodeBan bans or unbans a node and, when its record carries OIDC claims, +// the identity behind it. The one place both halves are toggled together, +// for the HTTP handlers and the CLI alike: a ban that names only the peer id +// is shed with a new keypair, and an unban that lifts only the peer id leaves +// the human locked out of /register. +func SetNodeBan(ctx context.Context, store storage.Store, node *storage.EnrolledNode, banned bool) error { + if err := store.SetNodeBanned(ctx, node.PeerID, banned); err != nil { + return err + } if node.ClaimsJSON == "" { return nil } @@ -2519,7 +2745,7 @@ func (s *Server) banNode(ctx context.Context, node *storage.EnrolledNode) error return fmt.Errorf("stored claims for %s are unreadable: %w", node.PeerID, err) } if key := oidcIdentityKey(claims); key != "" { - return s.store.SetIdentityBanned(ctx, key, true) + return store.SetIdentityBanned(ctx, key, banned) } return nil } @@ -2700,12 +2926,9 @@ func validatePolicyConfig(req *api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) error { return fmt.Errorf("policy config would allow a single identity (via overlapping bindings) to accumulate up to %d Datalog facts across all roles, exceeding the safe budget of %d; biscuit-go's authorizer rejects tokens/checks beyond ~1000 world facts, so requests would start failing at authorization time instead of at config validation. Reduce the number of roles, grants, or custom_datalog entries", factBudget, maxIdentityFactBudget) } - validPrefixes := map[string]bool{ - api.FactNode: true, - api.FactGroup: true, - api.FactUser: true, - api.FactEmail: true, - api.FactRole: true, + validPrefixes := make(map[string]bool) + for _, p := range api.BindingMemberPrefixes() { + validPrefixes[p] = true } for _, b := range req.Bindings { diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go index e8cfef47..e0f85ae1 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ import ( "os" "path/filepath" "reflect" + "slices" "strconv" "strings" "sync/atomic" @@ -2310,12 +2311,18 @@ func TestResolveRolesAndRoleImpersonationProtection(t *testing.T) { bindings := []*api.PolicyBinding{ { Role: api.RoleRouter, - Members: []string{"group:routers", "role:oidc-router-role"}, + Members: []string{"group:routers", "idp_role:oidc-router-role"}, }, { Role: api.RoleSamBox, Members: []string{"user:sambox-admin-sub"}, }, + { + // A binding on the mesh role fact itself: must never resolve from a + // claim, or an issuer emitting roles: ["sam:role:router"] gets in. + Role: "legacy-role-prefix", + Members: []string{"role:oidc-router-role"}, + }, } t.Run("OIDC claims role is not blindly trusted without explicit binding", func(t *testing.T) { @@ -2331,20 +2338,17 @@ func TestResolveRolesAndRoleImpersonationProtection(t *testing.T) { } }) - t.Run("Explicit role mapping in binding grants capability role", func(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("Explicit idp_role mapping in binding grants capability role", func(t *testing.T) { claims := jwt.MapClaims{ "sub": "router-sub", "roles": []string{"oidc-router-role"}, } roles := resolveRoles("peer-123", claims, bindings) - hasRouter := false - for _, r := range roles { - if r == api.RoleRouter { - hasRouter = true - } + if !slices.Contains(roles, api.RoleRouter) { + t.Errorf("Expected role %q to be granted via explicit idp_role binding mapping", api.RoleRouter) } - if !hasRouter { - t.Errorf("Expected role %q to be granted via explicit role binding mapping", api.RoleRouter) + if slices.Contains(roles, "legacy-role-prefix") { + t.Errorf("a role: member resolved from the IdP roles claim; the claim must only feed idp_role") } }) diff --git a/internal/identity/biscuit.go b/internal/identity/biscuit.go index a7acf6bc..73247c39 100644 --- a/internal/identity/biscuit.go +++ b/internal/identity/biscuit.go @@ -231,8 +231,6 @@ func mintBiscuit(signingKey ed25519.PrivateKey, remotePeer peer.ID, roles []stri } } - hasTargets := false - hasServices := false sort.Strings(roles) var errs []error // Collected across every matched role and merged into Set facts once below: a token's @@ -266,22 +264,12 @@ func mintBiscuit(signingKey ed25519.PrivateKey, remotePeer peer.ID, roles []stri }}); err != nil { errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("failed to add target unrestricted: %w", err)) } - hasTargets = true - hasServices = true continue } if pr, ok := rolesMap[role]; ok { - if len(pr.AllowedServices) > 0 { - hasServices = true - allServices = append(allServices, pr.AllowedServices...) - } - - if len(pr.AllowedTargets) > 0 { - hasTargets = true - allTargets = append(allTargets, pr.AllowedTargets...) - } - + allServices = append(allServices, pr.AllowedServices...) + allTargets = append(allTargets, pr.AllowedTargets...) allAgents = append(allAgents, pr.AllowedAgents...) for _, customEntry := range pr.CustomDatalog { @@ -323,22 +311,10 @@ func mintBiscuit(signingKey ed25519.PrivateKey, remotePeer peer.ID, roles []stri } } - if !hasServices && len(policyRoles) == 0 { - if err := addFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{ - Name: api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes, - IDs: []biscuit.Term{}, - }}); err != nil { - errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("failed to add fallback service fact: %w", err)) - } - } - if !hasTargets && len(policyRoles) == 0 { - if err := addFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{ - Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted, - IDs: []biscuit.Term{}, - }}); err != nil { - errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("failed to add fallback target fact: %w", err)) - } - } + // No policy means no grants. A mesh with no roles defined used to mint + // every non-router an unrestricted token; a fresh control plane, or one + // whose policy was wiped, was the most permissive configuration there + // is. Deny by default: the operator posts a policy, then nodes can talk. if len(errs) > 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("biscuit policy validation failed: %w", errors.Join(errs...)) diff --git a/internal/node/policy.go b/internal/node/policy.go index 720a60b8..112a4c7c 100644 --- a/internal/node/policy.go +++ b/internal/node/policy.go @@ -25,6 +25,15 @@ import ( func BuildPolicyRules(roles []*api.PolicyRole, bindings []*api.PolicyBinding) []biscuit.Rule { var rules []biscuit.Rule + // A binding member becomes the body of a rule that grants a mesh role, + // so only facts the control plane attests in the authority block may + // appear there: agent() is the caller's own claim, and role() would + // grant a role from a role. + allowedMemberPrefix := make(map[string]bool) + for _, p := range api.BindingMemberPrefixes() { + allowedMemberPrefix[p] = true + } + for _, b := range bindings { if b == nil { continue @@ -41,7 +50,7 @@ func BuildPolicyRules(roles []*api.PolicyRole, bindings []*api.PolicyBinding) [] continue } parts := strings.SplitN(m, ":", 2) - if len(parts) == 2 { + if len(parts) == 2 && allowedMemberPrefix[parts[0]] { memberType := parts[0] memberVal := parts[1] rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{ diff --git a/internal/storage/round_trip_test.go b/internal/storage/round_trip_test.go index 8fff469c..83b0d033 100644 --- a/internal/storage/round_trip_test.go +++ b/internal/storage/round_trip_test.go @@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ func TestUserRoundTripsEveryField(t *testing.T) { want := &User{ ID: "user-1", + Issuer: "https://idp.example", Email: "alice@example.com", Role: "admin", CreatedAt: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), diff --git a/internal/storage/sql_store.go b/internal/storage/sql_store.go index ca362b02..913cde99 100644 --- a/internal/storage/sql_store.go +++ b/internal/storage/sql_store.go @@ -437,6 +437,20 @@ var migrations = []migration{ `ALTER TABLE bootstrap_tokens ADD COLUMN autonomous_recovery BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE NOT NULL`, }, }, + { + // Identity bans are keyed on issuer|subject; a user row keyed on the + // bare subject could not be matched against them, so the surfaces a + // user drives with an ID token (bootstrap tokens, revocation) did not + // see the ban. Empty for rows from before this migration until the + // user next logs in. + version: 11, + postgres: []string{ + `ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS issuer VARCHAR(512) DEFAULT '' NOT NULL`, + }, + sqlite: []string{ + `ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN issuer TEXT DEFAULT '' NOT NULL`, + }, + }, } func (s *SQLStore) initSchema() error { @@ -785,8 +799,18 @@ func (s *SQLStore) GetNode(ctx context.Context, peerID string) (*EnrolledNode, e // SetNodeBanned implements Store. func (s *SQLStore) SetNodeBanned(ctx context.Context, peerID string, banned bool) error { query := s.rebind(`UPDATE nodes SET banned = ? WHERE peer_id = ?`) - _, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, banned, peerID) - return err + res, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, banned, peerID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + n, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if n == 0 { + return ErrNotFound + } + return nil } // SetNodeAutonomousRecovery implements Store. @@ -1156,12 +1180,21 @@ func (s *SQLStore) GetBootstrapToken(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Bootstrap return &t, nil } -// IncrementBootstrapTokenUsage increments usage count. -func (s *SQLStore) IncrementBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx context.Context, id string) error { - query := `UPDATE bootstrap_tokens SET usages_count = usages_count + 1 WHERE id = ?` - _, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, s.rebind(query), id) +// ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage implements Store. The validity conditions live +// in the WHERE clause so the check and the increment are one statement. +func (s *SQLStore) ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) error { + query := `UPDATE bootstrap_tokens SET usages_count = usages_count + 1 + WHERE id = ? AND usages_count < max_usages AND revoked_at IS NULL AND expires_at > ?` + res, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, s.rebind(query), id, now.Unix()) if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("failed to increment usage: %w", err) + return fmt.Errorf("failed to consume token usage: %w", err) + } + n, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to consume token usage: %w", err) + } + if n == 0 { + return ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable } return nil } @@ -1314,6 +1347,31 @@ func (s *SQLStore) UpdateEnrollmentRequest(ctx context.Context, id string, statu return nil } +// ResolveEnrollmentRequest implements Store. +func (s *SQLStore) ResolveEnrollmentRequest(ctx context.Context, id string, status api.EnrollmentStatus, biscuit []byte, resolvedBy string) error { + query := `UPDATE enrollment_requests SET status = ?, biscuit_token = ?, resolved_at = ?, resolved_by = ? + WHERE id = ? AND status = ?` + res, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, s.rebind(query), + int(status), + biscuit, + time.Now().Unix(), + resolvedBy, + id, + int(api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING), + ) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve enrollment request: %w", err) + } + n, err := res.RowsAffected() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve enrollment request: %w", err) + } + if n == 0 { + return ErrEnrollmentAlreadyResolved + } + return nil +} + // ListNodes retrieves all enrolled nodes. func (s *SQLStore) ListNodes(ctx context.Context) ([]EnrolledNode, error) { query := s.rebind(`SELECT peer_id, public_key, biscuit_token, role, enrollment_type, claims_json, owner_id, labels_json, enrolled_at, expires_at, banned, autonomous_recovery FROM nodes ORDER BY enrolled_at DESC`) @@ -1432,18 +1490,19 @@ func (s *SQLStore) SaveUser(ctx context.Context, user *User) error { var query string if s.isPostgres() { query = s.rebind(` - INSERT INTO users (id, email, role, created_at) - VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?) - ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE SET email = EXCLUDED.email, role = EXCLUDED.role`) + INSERT INTO users (id, issuer, email, role, created_at) + VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?) + ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE SET issuer = EXCLUDED.issuer, email = EXCLUDED.email, role = EXCLUDED.role`) } else { query = s.rebind(` - INSERT INTO users (id, email, role, created_at) - VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?) - ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE SET email = excluded.email, role = excluded.role`) + INSERT INTO users (id, issuer, email, role, created_at) + VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?) + ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE SET issuer = excluded.issuer, email = excluded.email, role = excluded.role`) } _, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, user.ID, + user.Issuer, user.Email, user.Role, user.CreatedAt.Unix(), @@ -1453,11 +1512,12 @@ func (s *SQLStore) SaveUser(ctx context.Context, user *User) error { // GetUser retrieves a user by ID. func (s *SQLStore) GetUser(ctx context.Context, id string) (*User, error) { - query := s.rebind(`SELECT id, email, role, created_at FROM users WHERE id = ?`) + query := s.rebind(`SELECT id, issuer, email, role, created_at FROM users WHERE id = ?`) var user User var created int64 err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, id).Scan( &user.ID, + &user.Issuer, &user.Email, &user.Role, &created, @@ -1474,7 +1534,7 @@ func (s *SQLStore) GetUser(ctx context.Context, id string) (*User, error) { // ListUsers retrieves all registered users. func (s *SQLStore) ListUsers(ctx context.Context) ([]User, error) { - query := `SELECT id, email, role, created_at FROM users` + query := `SELECT id, issuer, email, role, created_at FROM users` rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, query) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -1487,6 +1547,7 @@ func (s *SQLStore) ListUsers(ctx context.Context) ([]User, error) { var created int64 if err := rows.Scan( &user.ID, + &user.Issuer, &user.Email, &user.Role, &created, diff --git a/internal/storage/sql_store_test.go b/internal/storage/sql_store_test.go index 4cde3f69..7471c0e9 100644 --- a/internal/storage/sql_store_test.go +++ b/internal/storage/sql_store_test.go @@ -83,12 +83,12 @@ func TestSQLiteFilesAreOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) { func TestSQLiteFilePath(t *testing.T) { cases := map[string]string{ - "keys.db": "keys.db", + "keys.db": "keys.db", "/data/keys.db?_pragma=busy_timeout(5)": "/data/keys.db", - "file:/data/keys.db?mode=rwc": "/data/keys.db", - ":memory:": "", - "file::memory:?cache=shared": "", - "": "", + "file:/data/keys.db?mode=rwc": "/data/keys.db", + ":memory:": "", + "file::memory:?cache=shared": "", + "": "", } for dsn, want := range cases { if got := sqliteFilePath(dsn); got != want { @@ -587,10 +587,13 @@ func TestBootstrapTokensAndEnrollmentRequestsOps(t *testing.T) { t.Errorf("retrieved token mismatch: %+v", ret) } - if err := store.IncrementBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, tok.ID); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to increment usage: %v", err) + if err := store.ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, tok.ID, time.Now()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("failed to consume usage: %v", err) + } + ret2, err := store.GetBootstrapToken(ctx, tok.ID) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) } - ret2, _ := store.GetBootstrapToken(ctx, tok.ID) if ret2.UsagesCount != 1 { t.Errorf("expected usage count 1, got %d", ret2.UsagesCount) } @@ -650,3 +653,113 @@ func TestBootstrapTokensAndEnrollmentRequestsOps(t *testing.T) { t.Errorf("updated request details mismatch: %+v", updatedReq) } } + +// The usage cap used to be read-then-increment, so N concurrent enrollments +// on a 1-use token could all pass the read. The consume is now one statement +// that also refuses expired and revoked tokens. +func TestConsumeBootstrapTokenUsageIsAtomicAndGated(t *testing.T) { + store := newTestStore(t) + defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() + ctx := context.Background() + now := time.Now() + + save := func(id string, max int, expiresAt time.Time) { + t.Helper() + if err := store.SaveBootstrapToken(ctx, &BootstrapToken{ + ID: id, TokenHash: "h-" + id, Role: "sam:role:node", MaxUsages: max, + CreatedAt: now, ExpiresAt: expiresAt, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + } + + t.Run("cap under concurrency", func(t *testing.T) { + save("cap", 3, now.Add(time.Hour)) + const attempts = 20 + var wg sync.WaitGroup + var ok atomic.Int32 + for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ { + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + err := store.ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, "cap", now) + switch err { + case nil: + ok.Add(1) + case ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable: + default: + t.Errorf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + }() + } + wg.Wait() + if ok.Load() != 3 { + t.Errorf("%d of %d concurrent consumes succeeded on a 3-use token, want exactly 3", ok.Load(), attempts) + } + tok, err := store.GetBootstrapToken(ctx, "cap") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if tok.UsagesCount != 3 { + t.Errorf("usages_count = %d, want 3", tok.UsagesCount) + } + }) + + t.Run("expired", func(t *testing.T) { + save("expired", 5, now.Add(-time.Minute)) + if err := store.ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, "expired", now); err != ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable { + t.Errorf("err = %v, want ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable", err) + } + }) + + t.Run("revoked", func(t *testing.T) { + save("revoked", 5, now.Add(time.Hour)) + if err := store.RevokeBootstrapToken(ctx, "revoked"); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := store.ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, "revoked", now); err != ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable { + t.Errorf("err = %v, want ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable", err) + } + }) + + t.Run("unknown", func(t *testing.T) { + if err := store.ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx, "nope", now); err != ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable { + t.Errorf("err = %v, want ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable", err) + } + }) +} + +// Two admins acting on one pending request: only the first resolution lands. +func TestResolveEnrollmentRequestOnlyWhilePending(t *testing.T) { + store := newTestStore(t) + defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() + ctx := context.Background() + + if err := store.SaveBootstrapToken(ctx, &BootstrapToken{ + ID: "tok", TokenHash: "h", Role: "sam:role:node", MaxUsages: 1, + CreatedAt: time.Now(), ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour), + }); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := store.CreateEnrollmentRequest(ctx, &EnrollmentRequest{ + ID: "req", PeerID: "peer", PublicKey: []byte("pk"), TokenID: "tok", + Status: api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING, CreatedAt: time.Now(), + }); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + if err := store.ResolveEnrollmentRequest(ctx, "req", api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED, []byte("b1"), "admin-1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("first resolution: %v", err) + } + err := store.ResolveEnrollmentRequest(ctx, "req", api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, nil, "admin-2") + if err != ErrEnrollmentAlreadyResolved { + t.Fatalf("second resolution: err = %v, want ErrEnrollmentAlreadyResolved", err) + } + got, err := store.GetEnrollmentRequestByID(ctx, "req") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if got.Status != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED || got.ResolvedBy != "admin-1" || !bytes.Equal(got.BiscuitToken, []byte("b1")) { + t.Errorf("losing resolution overwrote the request: %+v", got) + } +} diff --git a/internal/storage/storage.go b/internal/storage/storage.go index 72e5d79e..46554fdc 100644 --- a/internal/storage/storage.go +++ b/internal/storage/storage.go @@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ var ( // stops being servable. See EnrolledNode.CheckAdmission. ErrNodeBanned = errors.New("node is banned") ErrNodeSessionExpired = errors.New("node session expired") + + // ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable is returned by ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage when + // the token is expired, revoked or has no usages left. One error for the + // three so a caller cannot tell them apart after the fact and race one. + ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable = errors.New("bootstrap token is expired, revoked or exhausted") + + // ErrEnrollmentAlreadyResolved is returned by ResolveEnrollmentRequest + // when the request is no longer pending: someone else approved or + // rejected it first. + ErrEnrollmentAlreadyResolved = errors.New("enrollment request is already resolved") ) // KeyPair holds cryptographic key information. @@ -51,12 +61,21 @@ type RouterLease struct { // User represents a human identity in the mesh. type User struct { + // ID is the OIDC subject. Issuer is the OIDC issuer it came from: the + // pair is what an identity ban is keyed on (see SetIdentityBanned), and + // two issuers may hand out the same subject to different people. ID string + Issuer string Email string Role string CreatedAt time.Time } +// IdentityKey is the "issuer|subject" form identity bans are keyed on. +func (u *User) IdentityKey() string { + return u.Issuer + "|" + u.ID +} + // EnrolledNode represents a node enrolled in the mesh. type EnrolledNode struct { PeerID string @@ -188,7 +207,8 @@ type Store interface { // GetNode retrieves node enrollment details. GetNode(ctx context.Context, peerID string) (*EnrolledNode, error) - // SetNodeBanned updates the banned status of a node. + // SetNodeBanned updates the banned status of a node. ErrNotFound if no + // node has that peer ID. SetNodeBanned(ctx context.Context, peerID string, banned bool) error // IsNodeBanned checks if a node is currently banned. @@ -230,8 +250,12 @@ type Store interface { // GetBootstrapToken retrieves a bootstrap token by its ID (sha256 hash). GetBootstrapToken(ctx context.Context, id string) (*BootstrapToken, error) - // IncrementBootstrapTokenUsage increments the usage count of a token. - IncrementBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx context.Context, id string) error + // ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage spends one usage of a token, atomically + // with the check that a usage is left and that the token is neither + // expired (as of now) nor revoked. ErrBootstrapTokenUnusable when it is + // not: a read-then-increment would let concurrent enrollments overshoot + // max_usages. + ConsumeBootstrapTokenUsage(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) error // RevokeBootstrapToken soft-revokes a token by setting its RevokedAt, so // HandleEnroll refuses it even though it may still be within its TTL and @@ -255,6 +279,11 @@ type Store interface { // UpdateEnrollmentRequest updates status, resolved details, and stored Biscuit of a request. UpdateEnrollmentRequest(ctx context.Context, id string, status api.EnrollmentStatus, biscuit []byte, resolvedBy string) error + // ResolveEnrollmentRequest is UpdateEnrollmentRequest for a request that + // must still be pending: two admins acting on the same request cannot + // both succeed. ErrEnrollmentAlreadyResolved if it was not pending. + ResolveEnrollmentRequest(ctx context.Context, id string, status api.EnrollmentStatus, biscuit []byte, resolvedBy string) error + // ListNodes retrieves all enrolled nodes. ListNodes(ctx context.Context) ([]EnrolledNode, error) diff --git a/site/content/docs/development/policy.md b/site/content/docs/development/policy.md index e8d71043..3d6851aa 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/development/policy.md +++ b/site/content/docs/development/policy.md @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ allow if group("engineering"); Admins manage central permissions dynamically via the Control Plane REST API. The policy database defines a set of **Roles** and **Bindings**. * **Roles**: Define specific capabilities (allowed destinations and services). - * `allowed_targets`: Defines which logical groups or specific peers a user can route messages to, analogous to Active Directory security groups. Target definitions must be formatted as resolved facts (e.g., `group:`, `user:`, `email:`, `role:`, or `node:`). *Note: These are evaluated dynamically at the destination node using its own identity (see Section 3.1).* + * `allowed_targets`: Defines which logical groups or specific peers a user can route messages to, analogous to Active Directory security groups. Target definitions must be formatted as resolved facts (e.g., `group:`, `user:`, `email:`, `idp_role:` for the issuer's `roles` claim, or `node:`). *Note: These are evaluated dynamically at the destination node using its own identity (see Section 3.1).* * `allowed_agents`: The agent namespaces a node with this role can act for, such as `*.prod.acme.example`. When a node forwards a request for a sandboxed agent, it sends the agent's name alongside the token (see `internal/node/agent.go`). The receiving node accepts that name only if it matches one of these namespaces, and a node with no grant cannot name any agent. You can also use `agent:` as a binding member to give a role to a named agent, but that is only as reliable as the namespace grant held by the node making the claim. * `allowed_services`: Defines the application-level tools or endpoints a user can access. Services use a strict `type://name` convention (e.g., `mcp://db-agent` or `inference://openrouter`). * **Strict Namespaces**: There are no implicit fallbacks. `system://...` is used for internal services, `mcp://...` for node services, `inference://...` for AI models, etc. Service names must be valid domain labels (e.g. `value1.value2.value3`). diff --git a/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md b/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md index 7d97da49..ac7510e8 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md +++ b/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ The Router is a dedicated GossipSub helper that maintains stable network address The Control Plane dynamically issues permissions inside the Biscuit token based on identity claims (users or groups) mapped to specific roles in the database. The policy defines what endpoints and services agents are permitted to use: -* **`allowed_targets`**: Restricts which logical endpoints the agent can route connections to. Use resolved Biscuit facts: `group:`, `user:`, `email:`, `role:`, or `node:`. +* **`allowed_targets`**: Restricts which logical endpoints the agent can route connections to. Use resolved Biscuit facts: `group:`, `user:`, `email:`, `idp_role:` (the issuer's `roles` claim), or `node:`. Mesh roles (`role(...)`) are never a target or a binding member: they are what bindings grant, and an issuer must not be able to hand one out by emitting it as a claim. * **`allowed_services`**: Restricts the application-level services the agent can invoke. Services are prefixed by their protocol type and URI scheme (e.g., `mcp://local-shell-tools` or `inference://openrouter`). Wildcards are supported (e.g., `mcp://*`). The service is deliberately the unit of authorization: a grant offers the service's whole tool surface, so publish different privilege tiers as different services (e.g. `mcp://db-reader` vs `mcp://db-writer`) rather than expecting the mesh to filter tools inside one backend. * **`allowed_agents`**: The agent namespaces a node with this role can use. When a node forwards a request for a sandboxed agent, it sends the agent's name with it. The receiving node accepts that name only if it falls inside one of these namespaces. A node with no `allowed_agents` grant cannot name any agent. Accepted patterns are `*.prod.acme.example`, `acme.*`, an exact ID such as `reviewer-7.prod.acme.example`, or `*` for any agent. * **`allowed_labels`**: The labels a node with this role may declare when it enrolls, as `*`, `key=*` or `key=value`. A node sends its own labels in its enrollment request, so this is what decides which of them the control plane is willing to sign into `label()` facts. A role granting none means a node holding it can declare none. Peers gate on those facts with `required_labels`, so a node that could declare anything could satisfy any such requirement. @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Admins manage policies by sending a JSON payload to the `/policies` endpoint. }, { "name": "admin-role", - "allowed_targets": ["group:all-nodes", "role:admin"], + "allowed_targets": ["group:all-nodes", "idp_role:admin"], "allowed_services": ["mcp://*", "inference://*", "system://*"] } ], @@ -239,7 +239,10 @@ Administrators can immediately revoke any active session to disable a node's abi "peer_id": "12D3KooW..." } ``` -* **Enforcement**: Revoked nodes are marked as banned in the database. When the node next attempts a proactive `/refresh` handshake, the request is denied with a `403 Forbidden` status, and the node's local daemon immediately terminates. +* **Enforcement**: Revoked nodes are marked as banned in the database. When the node next attempts a proactive `/refresh` handshake, the request is denied with a `403 Forbidden` status, and the node's local daemon immediately terminates. When the node was enrolled through OIDC, the identity behind it (`issuer|subject`) is banned as well: it can no longer `/register` a fresh keypair, use the `/user/*` API, or enroll anything with bootstrap tokens it minted earlier, and a queued enrollment on such a token is refused at approval. +* **Lifting a ban**: `POST /admin/nodes/{peer_id}/unban` reverses both halves (node and identity). The `sam-control-plane admin ban|unban --peer` commands do the same directly against the database. + +Bootstrap tokens are spent atomically: a token's `max_usages` holds under concurrent enrollments, an approval re-checks that the token is still valid and unspent, and a pending request can be resolved exactly once. A Control Plane with no mesh policy mints Biscuits that carry the role and no grants at all; nothing is reachable until an administrator posts a policy. --- diff --git a/tests/integration/policy_permutations_test.go b/tests/integration/policy_permutations_test.go index b8064db6..6ae838df 100644 --- a/tests/integration/policy_permutations_test.go +++ b/tests/integration/policy_permutations_test.go @@ -107,6 +107,11 @@ func TestPolicyPermutations(t *testing.T) { - name: role-direct allowed_services: ["mcp://test-role"] allowed_targets: ["group:compute"] + # Same shape as role-direct but with no idp_role binding: an issuer's + # roles claim naming it must grant nothing. + - name: role-unbound + allowed_services: ["mcp://test-unbound"] + allowed_targets: ["group:compute"] - name: admin allowed_services: ["*"] allowed_targets: ["*:*"] @@ -120,6 +125,8 @@ bindings: members: ["group:eng-team"] - role: role-node members: ["user:node-user"] + - role: role-direct + members: ["idp_role:role-direct"] - role: admin members: ["user:admin-user"] - role: admin @@ -226,11 +233,19 @@ services: expectAllow: true, }, { - name: "Fact roles: role(role-direct)", + name: "Fact idp_role bound: idp_role(role-direct) -> role(role-direct)", jwtClaims: map[string]interface{}{"sub": "some-id", "roles": []string{"role-direct"}}, targetSvc: "mcp://test-role", expectAllow: true, }, + { + // The issuer's roles claim used to be minted as role() itself, so + // naming any mesh role in it granted that role with no binding. + name: "Fact idp_role unbound: roles claim does not mint a mesh role", + jwtClaims: map[string]interface{}{"sub": "some-id", "roles": []string{"role-unbound"}}, + targetSvc: "mcp://test-unbound", + expectAllow: false, + }, { name: "Fact node: node(peerID)", jwtClaims: map[string]interface{}{"sub": "node-user"}, @@ -251,13 +266,8 @@ services: apiTokenA := "tokenA" apiPortA := getFreePort(t) - if r, ok := tt.jwtClaims["roles"]; ok { - if stringSlice, ok := r.([]string); ok { - tt.jwtClaims["roles"] = append(stringSlice, api.RoleNode) - } - } else { - tt.jwtClaims["roles"] = []string{api.RoleNode} - } + // The seat comes from the sam:system:authenticated binding above, + // never from a roles claim naming sam:role:node. jwtA := mintToken(tt.jwtClaims) cmdA := exec.Command(nodeBin, "run", From 3bccddcc1b73a5150e7f8a4d9938a7d3ef6d29a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 06:32:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 05/14] node: type-bound dispatch, per-request bridge routing, proxy hygiene (audit PR 4) Findings H2, M18, L30, L32, L33, I15 from audit.md, all on the node's ingress and egress data path. H2 - Dispatch ignored the type the policy was evaluated on. The registry was keyed on name alone and both dispatch paths looked a target up by name, so a peer granted a2a://reports reached mcp://reports when two services shared a name (which Register silently allowed), and the stream path had a fallback that looked the raw target string up as a name. Now: Register refuses a same-named service of another type and validates the type://name URI (so a name carrying its own scheme, "plugin://x", is refused rather than dispatched under a type nobody evaluated); dispatch uses GetTyped(type, name) on both /libp2p-http and /sam/mcp, and the stream path additionally requires the granted type to be MCP, the only thing it can carry. The name-only fallback is gone. M18 - Command-backed MCP services on HTTP ingress share one stdio process, and the bridge in front of it routed replies by the caller's JSON-RPC id and broadcast every stdout line to every SSE (GET) reader: peer B holding GET received peer A's tool output; A and B posting the same id got each other's replies. The bridge now owns the id space: each request's id is replaced with a bridge-assigned one before it reaches the backend and restored on the way out, a reply is delivered only to the request it answers, unowned lines (notifications) are delivered to nobody, and GET is 405. Residual, documented on the type: the backend process is still one per service, so backend-side session state is shared across authorized callers; the mesh-stream path already gives each session its own process. L32 - "..": both proxies pass the path after /{type}/{name} to the backend verbatim, so a caller granted service a could send /mcp/a/../b/tools to a backend that resolves dot segments. Ingress and egress refuse any "." or ".." segment. L33 - Host / X-Forwarded-For: the URL-backend reverse proxy set the upstream Host to whatever the remote peer sent; it is now the backend's configured host (the original stays in X-Forwarded-Host). The inference Director proxy does not manage X-Forwarded-*, and RemoteAddr there is a peer id, so an inbound X-Forwarded-For reached the backend as-is; the transport drops the X-Forwarded-* trio. L30 - An OpenAI SDK configured with api_key= plus X-Sam-Authentication as a default header sends the token twice; the gate stripped only the header it consumed and forwarded the other copy to the remote inference provider. withAuth now also drops an Authorization header whose bearer value is the sidecar token, on the TCP and socket paths. I15 - get_mesh_info over the remote catalog stream disclosed the local Unix socket path, the connected-peer list and the router id; the remote variant returns peer id and DHT size. The sidecar's local tool is unchanged. Tests: registry refuses a second type under a name and GetTyped refuses the other type; bridge tests answer with the bridge id, GET is 405, and two callers sharing id 1 each get their own reply while a notification reaches neither; hasDotSegment table; withAuth strips a duplicated token but keeps a distinct provider credential; reverse proxy asserts the backend Host; gate tests target mcp://name as clients do; the mesh-wide fan-out test uses valid names and pins that scheme-carrying names are refused. Integration: the stdio datapath compares the echo as JSON. Deferred from this group: L13 (gating /debug/ to socket or mTLS) - twelve integration tests reach /debug/connect-peer over TCP as plumbing and need to move to sockets first. --- internal/node/gate.go | 25 +-- internal/node/gate_test.go | 8 +- internal/node/inference_service.go | 5 + internal/node/mcp_handlers.go | 20 ++ internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go | 29 +-- internal/node/node.go | 12 +- internal/node/proxy_test.go | 61 +++--- internal/node/service.go | 5 +- internal/node/service_registry.go | 33 +++ internal/node/service_registry_test.go | 37 ++++ internal/node/service_test.go | 6 +- internal/node/sidecar.go | 38 +++- internal/node/sidecar_hygiene_test.go | 93 ++++++++ internal/node/stdio_bridge.go | 281 ++++++++++++------------- internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go | 168 +++++++++------ tests/integration/datapath_test.go | 17 +- 16 files changed, 546 insertions(+), 292 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/node/sidecar_hygiene_test.go diff --git a/internal/node/gate.go b/internal/node/gate.go index f83c38ac..84ab2181 100644 --- a/internal/node/gate.go +++ b/internal/node/gate.go @@ -75,27 +75,24 @@ func (g *nodeConnGate) InterceptSecured(dir network.Direction, p peer.ID, n netw func (n *SamNode) HandleMCPStream(s network.Stream, reqCtx RequestContext) { // If the TargetService is for a registered local backend, dumb-pipe proxy to it. target := reqCtx.Target - _, targetName := api.ParseServiceTarget(target) + targetType, targetName := api.ParseServiceTarget(target) if target != "" && targetName != api.CatalogTarget { if n.services == nil { logger.Errorf("[MCP] Service registry is not initialized") _ = s.Reset() return } - svc, ok := n.services.Get(targetName) - if !ok && targetName != target { - svc, ok = n.services.Get(target) - } - if ok { - mcpSvc, isMcp := svc.(*MCPService) - if isMcp { - mcpSvc.HandleStreamPassThrough(s) - return + // The policy passed on the type the caller named; this stream only + // carries MCP, so anything else is a type-confusion attempt. + if t, err := api.ParseServiceType(targetType); err == nil && t == api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP { + if svc, ok := n.services.GetTyped(t, targetName); ok { + if mcpSvc, isMcp := svc.(*MCPService); isMcp { + mcpSvc.HandleStreamPassThrough(s) + return + } } } - // If service not found or not an MCPService, we fall through or close it. - // For now, close the stream if target is invalid. - logger.Warnf("[MCP] Client requested unknown target service %q, closing stream", target) + logger.Warnf("[MCP] Client requested unknown target service %q, closing stream", truncateForLog(target)) _ = s.Reset() return } @@ -121,7 +118,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) HandleMCPStream(s network.Stream, reqCtx RequestContext) { mcp.AddTool(server, &mcp.Tool{ Name: "get_mesh_info", Description: "Get information about the mesh network", - }, n.handleGetMeshInfo) + }, n.handleGetMeshInfoRemote) ctx := context.Background() if err := server.Run(ctx, transport); err != nil { diff --git a/internal/node/gate_test.go b/internal/node/gate_test.go index 8b8e87b7..121ca3d3 100644 --- a/internal/node/gate_test.go +++ b/internal/node/gate_test.go @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ func TestHandleMCPStream_DumbPipeProxy(t *testing.T) { // Bypass biscuit auth by exposing HandleMCPStream on a test-only protocol. nodeA.Host.SetStreamHandler(testMCPProtocol, func(s network.Stream) { - nodeA.HandleMCPStream(s, RequestContext{Target: "code-reviewer"}) + nodeA.HandleMCPStream(s, RequestContext{Target: "mcp://code-reviewer"}) }) if err := nodeB.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeA.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeA.Host.Addrs()}); err != nil { @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ func TestHandleMCPStream_ForwarderRoutesCalls(t *testing.T) { t.Cleanup(func() { _ = svc.Teardown() }) nodeA.Host.SetStreamHandler(testMCPProtocol, func(s network.Stream) { - nodeA.HandleMCPStream(s, RequestContext{Target: "svc"}) + nodeA.HandleMCPStream(s, RequestContext{Target: "mcp://svc"}) }) if err := nodeB.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeA.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeA.Host.Addrs()}); err != nil { @@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ func TestHandleStreamPassThrough_BackendEOFDoesNotDropInFlightResponse(t *testin t.Cleanup(func() { _ = svc.Teardown() }) nodeA.Host.SetStreamHandler(testMCPProtocol, func(s network.Stream) { - nodeA.HandleMCPStream(s, RequestContext{Target: "svc"}) + nodeA.HandleMCPStream(s, RequestContext{Target: "mcp://svc"}) }) if err := nodeB.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeA.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeA.Host.Addrs()}); err != nil { @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ func TestHandleStreamPassThrough_SlowBackendDoesNotHitDrainTimeout(t *testing.T) t.Cleanup(func() { _ = svc.Teardown() }) nodeA.Host.SetStreamHandler(testMCPProtocol, func(s network.Stream) { - nodeA.HandleMCPStream(s, RequestContext{Target: "slow-svc"}) + nodeA.HandleMCPStream(s, RequestContext{Target: "mcp://slow-svc"}) }) if err := nodeB.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeA.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeA.Host.Addrs()}); err != nil { diff --git a/internal/node/inference_service.go b/internal/node/inference_service.go index 3d27ae0d..6c94682b 100644 --- a/internal/node/inference_service.go +++ b/internal/node/inference_service.go @@ -128,6 +128,11 @@ type inferenceTransport struct { func (t *inferenceTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { attemptReq := req.Clone(req.Context()) attemptReq.Header.Del("Accept-Encoding") // Prevent gzipped response from breaking token tracking + // A Director proxy does not manage X-Forwarded-For, and RemoteAddr here is + // a peer id, so an inbound value would reach the backend as-is. + attemptReq.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-For") + attemptReq.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Host") + attemptReq.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Proto") attemptReq.URL.Scheme = t.backend.Scheme attemptReq.URL.Host = t.backend.Host diff --git a/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go b/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go index 1246b1df..60e081ae 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go @@ -203,6 +203,26 @@ func (n *SamNode) handleGetMeshInfo(ctx context.Context, req *mcp.CallToolReques }, nil, nil } +// handleGetMeshInfoRemote is get_mesh_info as served to other peers over the +// catalog stream: the local socket path, the router and the connected-peer +// list are this node's business, not a remote caller's. +func (n *SamNode) handleGetMeshInfoRemote(ctx context.Context, req *mcp.CallToolRequest, params GetMeshInfoParams) (*mcp.CallToolResult, any, error) { + full, err := n.meshInfo() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + responseBytes, err := json.Marshal(struct { + PeerID string `json:"peer_id"` + DHTSize int `json:"dht_size"` + }{PeerID: full.PeerID, DHTSize: full.DHTSize}) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + return &mcp.CallToolResult{ + Content: []mcp.Content{&mcp.TextContent{Text: string(responseBytes)}}, + }, nil, nil +} + // CallRemoteToolParams defines the parameters for the call_remote_tool tool. // // Arguments is a JSON object whose shape matches the target server's diff --git a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go index 345b624a..4ea0a7e8 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go @@ -333,17 +333,27 @@ func TestHandleFindRemoteTools_MeshWide(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("RegisterService B: %v", err) } if err := nodeC.RegisterService(ctx, &api.RegisterServiceRequest{ - Service: &api.ServiceInfo{Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP, Name: "mcp://summarizer"}, + Service: &api.ServiceInfo{Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP, Name: "summarizer"}, Backend: &api.RegisterServiceRequest_TargetUrl{TargetUrl: cSrv.URL}, }); err != nil { t.Fatalf("RegisterService C: %v", err) } if err := nodeD.RegisterService(ctx, &api.RegisterServiceRequest{ - Service: &api.ServiceInfo{Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP, Name: "plugin://linter"}, + Service: &api.ServiceInfo{Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP, Name: "linter"}, Backend: &api.RegisterServiceRequest_TargetUrl{TargetUrl: dSrv.URL}, }); err != nil { t.Fatalf("RegisterService D: %v", err) } + // A name that carries its own scheme used to be accepted and reached via + // a name-only fallback that ignored the type the policy was evaluated on. + for _, legacy := range []string{"mcp://summarizer", "plugin://linter"} { + if err := nodeD.RegisterService(ctx, &api.RegisterServiceRequest{ + Service: &api.ServiceInfo{Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP, Name: legacy}, + Backend: &api.RegisterServiceRequest_TargetUrl{TargetUrl: dSrv.URL}, + }); err == nil { + t.Errorf("service name %q was accepted", legacy) + } + } // Direct fan-out test: invoke fetchRemoteToolCatalogue for peers, // confirm they return their tools. @@ -365,17 +375,10 @@ func TestHandleFindRemoteTools_MeshWide(t *testing.T) { gotNames[tool.ToolName] = true } - // Test permutation 1: no prefix gets "mcp://" automatically prepended. - if !gotNames["mcp://code-reviewer/review_pr"] { - t.Errorf("missing mcp://code-reviewer/review_pr; got %v", gotNames) - } - // Test permutation 2: "mcp://" prefix is preserved. - if !gotNames["mcp://summarizer/summarize"] { - t.Errorf("missing mcp://summarizer/summarize; got %v", gotNames) - } - // Test permutation 3: custom namespace prefix is preserved. - if !gotNames["plugin://linter/lint"] { - t.Errorf("missing plugin://linter/lint; got %v", gotNames) + for _, want := range []string{"mcp://code-reviewer/review_pr", "mcp://summarizer/summarize", "mcp://linter/lint"} { + if !gotNames[want] { + t.Errorf("missing %s; got %v", want, gotNames) + } } } diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go index 7a336e60..f2c91186 100644 --- a/internal/node/node.go +++ b/internal/node/node.go @@ -2011,6 +2011,12 @@ func (n *SamNode) StartIngressServer(ctx context.Context) error { // The path is remote-controlled and the peer is not yet authorized: // it is logged only after VerifyBiscuitToken passes. path := r.URL.Path + // Policy is decided on the /{type}/{name} prefix; a ".." segment in + // what follows could resolve to a sibling service on a shared backend. + if hasDotSegment(path) { + http.Error(w, "Invalid path", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } parts := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/"), "/", 3) if len(parts) < 2 { http.Error(w, "Invalid path", http.StatusBadRequest) @@ -2074,9 +2080,11 @@ func (n *SamNode) StartIngressServer(ctx context.Context) error { r.Header.Del(api.HeaderSamNoTrailingSlash) r.Header.Set(api.HeaderPeerID, remotePeer.String()) - svc, ok := n.services.Get(serviceName) + // Under the type the policy was evaluated on: a same-named service + // of another type is not what the caller was granted. + svc, ok := n.services.GetTyped(serviceType, serviceName) if !ok { - logger.Errorf("[Ingress] Service not found: %s", truncateForLog(serviceName)) + logger.Errorf("[Ingress] Service not found: %s", truncateForLog(target)) http.Error(w, "Service not found", http.StatusNotFound) return } diff --git a/internal/node/proxy_test.go b/internal/node/proxy_test.go index b17885fd..c9cc5c35 100644 --- a/internal/node/proxy_test.go +++ b/internal/node/proxy_test.go @@ -15,18 +15,17 @@ package node import ( - "bufio" "bytes" "context" "crypto/ed25519" "crypto/rand" + "encoding/json" "fmt" "io" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "net/http/httputil" "net/url" - "strings" "testing" "time" @@ -531,63 +530,53 @@ func TestStdioDatapathIntegration(t *testing.T) { // Construct URLs // http://localhost:/sam/{peer_id}/{service_type}/{service_name}/{upstream_path} - sseURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/sam/%s/mcp/%s/", proxyServer.URL, nodeA.Host.ID().String(), serviceName) postURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/sam/%s/mcp/%s/", proxyServer.URL, nodeA.Host.ID().String(), serviceName) client := &http.Client{} - // Wait for DHT/routing to settle (retry mechanism) - var sseResp *http.Response - for i := 0; i < 3; i++ { - sseResp, err = client.Get(sseURL) - if err == nil && sseResp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK { - break - } - t.Logf("SSE Connect Attempt %d failed: %v, status: %v", i+1, err, sseResp) - time.Sleep(1 * time.Second) - } - + // The bridge has no GET side any more: the legacy SSE stream broadcast + // every backend line to every caller. + getResp, err := client.Get(postURL) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - defer func() { _ = sseResp.Body.Close() }() - - if sseResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - t.Fatalf("Expected SSE status OK, got %d", sseResp.StatusCode) + _ = getResp.Body.Close() + if getResp.StatusCode != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed { + t.Fatalf("GET on a command-backed service: got %d, want 405", getResp.StatusCode) } - // Send a message via POST + // The backend is `cat`, so the request comes straight back as the reply; + // the bridge rewrote the id on the way in and must restore it on the way + // out. Retried while DHT/routing settles. testMessage := `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"ping","id":1}` - postResp, err := client.Post(postURL, "application/json", bytes.NewBufferString(testMessage)) + var postResp *http.Response + for i := 0; i < 3; i++ { + postResp, err = client.Post(postURL, "application/json", bytes.NewBufferString(testMessage)) + if err == nil && postResp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK { + break + } + t.Logf("POST attempt %d failed: %v, status: %v", i+1, err, postResp) + time.Sleep(1 * time.Second) + } if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } defer func() { _ = postResp.Body.Close() }() - if postResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { t.Fatalf("Expected POST status OK, got %d", postResp.StatusCode) } - // Read from SSE stream - reader := bufio.NewReader(sseResp.Body) - line, err := reader.ReadString('\n') - if err != nil { + var echoed map[string]any + if err := json.NewDecoder(postResp.Body).Decode(&echoed); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - - expectedPrefix := "data: " - if !strings.HasPrefix(line, expectedPrefix) { - t.Fatalf("Expected line to start with %q, got %q", expectedPrefix, line) + if echoed["method"] != "ping" || echoed["jsonrpc"] != "2.0" { + t.Fatalf("echoed message = %v, want the ping request", echoed) } - - receivedMessage := strings.TrimPrefix(line, expectedPrefix) - receivedMessage = strings.TrimSpace(receivedMessage) - - if receivedMessage != testMessage { - t.Fatalf("Expected to receive %q, got %q", testMessage, receivedMessage) + if id, _ := echoed["id"].(float64); id != 1 { + t.Fatalf("echoed id = %v, want the caller's 1 (bridge id not restored)", echoed["id"]) } - // Cancel context to close the SSE stream and allow server to close gracefully cancel() } diff --git a/internal/node/service.go b/internal/node/service.go index 2654cc5b..28487857 100644 --- a/internal/node/service.go +++ b/internal/node/service.go @@ -59,8 +59,9 @@ func newReverseProxyHandler(targetURL string) (http.Handler, error) { Rewrite: func(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) { noTrailingSlash := pr.In.Header.Get(api.HeaderSamNoTrailingSlash) == "true" pr.SetURL(u) - // Preserve the Host behavior of NewSingleHostReverseProxy. - pr.Out.Host = pr.In.Host + // The inbound Host is whatever the remote peer sent; the backend + // is addressed by its configured URL. + pr.Out.Host = u.Host pr.Out.Header.Del(api.HeaderSamNoTrailingSlash) if noTrailingSlash && !strings.HasSuffix(u.Path, "/") && strings.HasSuffix(pr.Out.URL.Path, "/") { pr.Out.URL.Path = strings.TrimSuffix(pr.Out.URL.Path, "/") diff --git a/internal/node/service_registry.go b/internal/node/service_registry.go index 398583ce..04ea0a27 100644 --- a/internal/node/service_registry.go +++ b/internal/node/service_registry.go @@ -111,6 +111,27 @@ func (r *ServiceRegistry) Register(ctx context.Context, svc Service) error { if info.Type == api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED { return fmt.Errorf("cannot register service with unspecified type") } + // The same check the config loader runs, for services that arrive by + // other routes (FFI, tests): a name carrying its own scheme, such as + // "plugin://x", would be addressed as type://plugin://x and dispatch + // could no longer tell which type the policy was evaluated on. + typeStr, err := api.ServiceTypeToString(info.Type) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err := api.ValidateServiceFormat(typeStr + "://" + info.Name); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid service name %q: %w", info.Name, err) + } + + // Policy is evaluated on type://name and the registry is keyed on name, + // so a second type under the same name would let a grant for one reach + // the other. One name, one service. + r.mu.RLock() + existing, taken := r.services[info.Name] + r.mu.RUnlock() + if taken && existing.Info().Type != info.Type { + return fmt.Errorf("service name %q is already registered as %s; a name cannot serve two types", info.Name, existing.Info().Type) + } if err := svc.Init(ctx); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("init %s: %w", info.Name, err) @@ -179,6 +200,18 @@ func (r *ServiceRegistry) Get(name string) (Service, bool) { return svc, ok } +// GetTyped returns the service registered under name only if it is of type +// t. Dispatch after authorization must use this: the policy was evaluated +// on t://name, and a service of another type under that name is not what +// the caller was granted. +func (r *ServiceRegistry) GetTyped(t api.ServiceType, name string) (Service, bool) { + svc, ok := r.Get(name) + if !ok || svc.Info().Type != t { + return nil, false + } + return svc, true +} + // List returns the ServiceInfo for every registered service, optionally // filtered by type. SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED means "all types." func (r *ServiceRegistry) List(typeFilter api.ServiceType) []*api.ServiceInfo { diff --git a/internal/node/service_registry_test.go b/internal/node/service_registry_test.go index dfbd2a3f..f2a6a8ee 100644 --- a/internal/node/service_registry_test.go +++ b/internal/node/service_registry_test.go @@ -110,6 +110,43 @@ func TestServiceRegistry_InitErrorBlocksProvideAndInsertion(t *testing.T) { } } +// H2: policy is evaluated on type://name and the registry was keyed on name +// alone, so a peer granted a2a://reports reached mcp://reports. A name now +// belongs to one type, and dispatch looks it up under the granted type. +func TestServiceRegistry_OneNameOneType(t *testing.T) { + r := newServiceRegistryForTest(&fakeDHT{}) + ctx := context.Background() + + mcpSvc := newFakeSvc("reports", api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP) + if err := r.Register(ctx, mcpSvc); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Register mcp://reports: %v", err) + } + + a2aSvc := newFakeSvc("reports", api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_A2A) + if err := r.Register(ctx, a2aSvc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a2a://reports registered beside mcp://reports") + } + if a2aSvc.initCalls != 0 { + t.Error("the refused service was initialised") + } + if svc, _ := r.Get("reports"); svc != mcpSvc { + t.Error("the refused registration replaced the existing service") + } + + // Re-registering the same name under the same type is the normal + // re-declare path and stays allowed. + if err := r.Register(ctx, newFakeSvc("reports", api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP)); err != nil { + t.Errorf("same-type re-registration refused: %v", err) + } + + if _, ok := r.GetTyped(api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP, "reports"); !ok { + t.Error("GetTyped(mcp, reports) missed the registered service") + } + if _, ok := r.GetTyped(api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_A2A, "reports"); ok { + t.Error("GetTyped(a2a, reports) returned the mcp service: a grant for one type would reach the other") + } +} + func TestServiceRegistry_UnregisterRemovesAndCallsTeardown(t *testing.T) { dht := &fakeDHT{} r := newServiceRegistryForTest(dht) diff --git a/internal/node/service_test.go b/internal/node/service_test.go index 03ec100f..f3692b43 100644 --- a/internal/node/service_test.go +++ b/internal/node/service_test.go @@ -129,8 +129,10 @@ func TestNewReverseProxyHandler_RewritesRequests(t *testing.T) { if got := forwarded.URL.String(); got != tc.wantURL { t.Errorf("upstream URL = %q, want %q", got, tc.wantURL) } - if forwarded.Host != req.Host { - t.Errorf("upstream Host = %q, want %q", forwarded.Host, req.Host) + // The peer chose req.Host; the backend is addressed by its + // configured URL, and the original stays in X-Forwarded-Host. + if forwarded.Host != "backend.example" { + t.Errorf("upstream Host = %q, want %q", forwarded.Host, "backend.example") } for name, want := range map[string]string{ api.HeaderSamNoTrailingSlash: "", diff --git a/internal/node/sidecar.go b/internal/node/sidecar.go index c8a2ffa6..38ee0af3 100644 --- a/internal/node/sidecar.go +++ b/internal/node/sidecar.go @@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ func withAuth(token string, allowAuthorizationFallback bool, next http.Handler) // Reaching the socket at all already proves the caller is the user // who owns it, which is the same bar as reading the token file. r.Header.Del(api.HeaderSamAuthentication) + stripSidecarTokenFromAuthorization(r, token) next.ServeHTTP(w, r) return } @@ -427,13 +428,42 @@ func withAuth(token string, allowAuthorizationFallback bool, next http.Handler) // The gate credential is local-only: strip exactly the header it came in // on so it can never flow past the gate. Anything left (e.g. Authorization // when the gate was passed via X-Sam-Authentication) is the destination - // service's own credential and passes through untouched. + // service's own credential and passes through untouched, unless it is + // this same token sent twice, which an SDK configured with the sidecar + // token as api_key plus a default header will do. r.Header.Del(headerName) + stripSidecarTokenFromAuthorization(r, token) next.ServeHTTP(w, r) }) } +// stripSidecarTokenFromAuthorization drops an Authorization header whose +// bearer value is the sidecar token: it is the local gate credential, not the +// destination's, and must not travel to a remote provider. +func stripSidecarTokenFromAuthorization(r *http.Request, token string) { + if token == "" { + return + } + parts := strings.SplitN(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), " ", 2) + if len(parts) == 2 && strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "bearer") && constantTimeEqual(parts[1], token) { + r.Header.Del("Authorization") + } +} + +// hasDotSegment reports whether any path segment is "." or "..". Go's +// ServeMux canonicalizes these with a redirect, but the mesh proxies pass +// paths through to backends that may resolve them against a different +// service prefix than the one authorization was decided on. +func hasDotSegment(p string) bool { + for _, seg := range strings.Split(p, "/") { + if seg == "." || seg == ".." { + return true + } + } + return false +} + // constantTimeEqual compares two secrets without leaking their contents through // timing. Hashing first keeps the comparison length-independent, so a mismatched // length is no more distinguishable than a mismatched byte. This mirrors how the @@ -705,6 +735,12 @@ func createEgressProxy(node *SamNode) http.Handler { http.Error(w, "Service Unavailable: Missing Node Identity", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) return } + // The remote's policy is decided on the /{type}/{name} prefix this + // proxy forwards verbatim; a ".." in the rest is not ours to send. + if hasDotSegment(r.URL.Path) { + http.Error(w, "Bad Request: path must not contain dot segments", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } r, ok := applyEgressMiddleware(node, w, r) if !ok { diff --git a/internal/node/sidecar_hygiene_test.go b/internal/node/sidecar_hygiene_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30632d71 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/sidecar_hygiene_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "testing" + + "github.com/google/sam/api" +) + +// L32: a ".." after the authorized /{type}/{name} prefix travelled to the +// backend verbatim, where a server that resolves dot segments could serve a +// sibling service the caller was not granted. +func TestHasDotSegment(t *testing.T) { + for path, want := range map[string]bool{ + "/mcp/a/tools": false, + "/mcp/a/../b/tools": true, + "/mcp/a/./tools": true, + "/mcp/a/..": true, + "/mcp/a/x..y/tools": false, // ".." inside a segment is just a name + "/mcp/a/tools/...": false, + "/sam/p/mcp/a/../b/x": true, + } { + if got := hasDotSegment(path); got != want { + t.Errorf("hasDotSegment(%q) = %v, want %v", path, got, want) + } + } +} + +// L30: an OpenAI SDK pointed at the sidecar with api_key= plus +// X-Sam-Authentication as a default header sends the token twice. The gate +// stripped only the header it consumed and forwarded the other copy to the +// remote inference provider. +func TestWithAuthStripsDuplicateSidecarToken(t *testing.T) { + const token = "sidecar-token" + var seen http.Header + h := withAuth(token, true, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + seen = r.Header.Clone() + })) + + cases := map[string]struct { + samAuth, authorization string + wantAuthorization string + }{ + "token in both headers": { + samAuth: "Bearer " + token, authorization: "Bearer " + token, wantAuthorization: "", + }, + "token via X-Sam, provider key in Authorization": { + samAuth: "Bearer " + token, authorization: "Bearer provider-key", wantAuthorization: "Bearer provider-key", + }, + "token via Authorization only": { + samAuth: "", authorization: "Bearer " + token, wantAuthorization: "", + }, + } + for name, tc := range cases { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + seen = nil + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/models", nil) + req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:12345" + if tc.samAuth != "" { + req.Header.Set(api.HeaderSamAuthentication, tc.samAuth) + } + if tc.authorization != "" { + req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.authorization) + } + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + h.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("status %d", rec.Code) + } + if got := seen.Get("Authorization"); got != tc.wantAuthorization { + t.Errorf("Authorization reaching the handler = %q, want %q", got, tc.wantAuthorization) + } + if seen.Get(api.HeaderSamAuthentication) != "" { + t.Error("X-Sam-Authentication reached the handler") + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go b/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go index 9de30e86..3928cfb9 100644 --- a/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go +++ b/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go @@ -17,63 +17,52 @@ package node import ( "bufio" "encoding/json" - "fmt" "io" "net/http" "os/exec" + "strconv" "sync" "github.com/google/sam/api" ) -// StdioBridge backs the local SSE/POST HTTP ingress route for a -// command-backed service (registered via baseService.Init). It is not used -// for mesh sessions - see MCPService.backendTransport, which gives those -// their own subprocess instead of sharing this one. +// StdioBridge backs the POST HTTP ingress route for a command-backed service +// (registered via baseService.Init). It is not used for mesh sessions - see +// MCPService.backendTransport, which gives those their own subprocess +// instead of sharing this one. +// +// One backend process serves every authorized caller, so the bridge owns the +// JSON-RPC id space: each request's id is replaced with a bridge-assigned +// one before it reaches the backend and restored on the way out, and a +// response is delivered only to the request it answers. Two callers sending +// the same id can no longer receive each other's replies. There is no +// broadcast (SSE) side: with a shared process, a server-initiated message +// cannot be attributed to a caller, so it is not delivered to any of them. type StdioBridge struct { - cmd *exec.Cmd - stdin io.WriteCloser - stdout io.ReadCloser - mu sync.Mutex - clients map[chan string]bool - calls map[string]chan string + cmd *exec.Cmd + stdin io.WriteCloser + stdout io.ReadCloser + mu sync.Mutex + nextID uint64 + // calls maps a bridge-assigned id to the request waiting on it. + calls map[uint64]*pendingCall // closed is set once the stdout reader has stopped; the backend can no // longer answer, so requests are refused instead of hanging. closed bool } +type pendingCall struct { + originalID json.RawMessage + reply chan []byte +} + func (b *StdioBridge) Start() { - b.clients = make(map[chan string]bool) - b.calls = make(map[string]chan string) + b.calls = make(map[uint64]*pendingCall) go func() { scanner := bufio.NewScanner(b.stdout) scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 0, 64<<10), maxRequestBodyBytes) for scanner.Scan() { - line := scanner.Text() - - b.mu.Lock() - if len(line) > 0 && line[0] == '{' { - var msg map[string]any - if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &msg); err == nil { - if idVal, ok := msg["id"]; ok { - reqIDStr := fmt.Sprintf("%v", idVal) - if ch, found := b.calls[reqIDStr]; found { - select { - case ch <- line: - default: - } - } - } - } - } - - for ch := range b.clients { - select { - case ch <- line: - default: - } - } - b.mu.Unlock() + b.deliver(scanner.Bytes()) } if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil { @@ -87,148 +76,138 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) Start() { b.mu.Lock() b.closed = true - for ch := range b.clients { - close(ch) - delete(b.clients, ch) - } - for _, ch := range b.calls { - close(ch) + for id, call := range b.calls { + close(call.reply) + delete(b.calls, id) } - b.calls = make(map[string]chan string) b.mu.Unlock() }() } +// deliver routes one backend line to the call it answers. Lines that carry +// no bridge id (notifications, requests from the backend, non-JSON output) +// have no owner and are dropped. +func (b *StdioBridge) deliver(line []byte) { + if len(line) == 0 || line[0] != '{' { + return + } + var msg map[string]json.RawMessage + if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &msg); err != nil { + return + } + rawID, ok := msg["id"] + if !ok { + return + } + bridgeID, err := strconv.ParseUint(string(rawID), 10, 64) + if err != nil { + return + } + + b.mu.Lock() + call, found := b.calls[bridgeID] + if found { + delete(b.calls, bridgeID) + } + b.mu.Unlock() + if !found { + return + } + + msg["id"] = call.originalID + restored, err := json.Marshal(msg) + if err != nil { + close(call.reply) + return + } + call.reply <- restored + close(call.reply) +} + func (b *StdioBridge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { - switch r.Method { - case http.MethodGet: - flusher, ok := w.(http.Flusher) - if !ok { - http.Error(w, "Streaming unsupported!", http.StatusInternalServerError) - return - } + if r.Method != http.MethodPost { + // No GET: the legacy SSE stream broadcast every backend line to every + // reader, i.e. every caller's tool output to every other caller. + http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) + return + } + + r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxRequestBodyBytes) + defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }() + body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, "Failed to read body", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + var msg map[string]json.RawMessage + if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &msg); err != nil { + http.Error(w, "Body must be a JSON-RPC message", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + originalID, isCall := msg["id"] - ch := make(chan string, 10) + var call *pendingCall + var toBackend []byte + if isCall { + call = &pendingCall{originalID: originalID, reply: make(chan []byte, 1)} b.mu.Lock() if b.closed { b.mu.Unlock() http.Error(w, "Backend process is no longer running", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) return } - b.clients[ch] = true + b.nextID++ + bridgeID := b.nextID + b.calls[bridgeID] = call b.mu.Unlock() - - w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream") - w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache") - w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive") - // Flush headers immediately to establish the stream - w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) - flusher.Flush() - defer func() { b.mu.Lock() - delete(b.clients, ch) + delete(b.calls, bridgeID) b.mu.Unlock() - close(ch) }() - ctx := r.Context() - for { - select { - case <-ctx.Done(): - return - case line, ok := <-ch: - if !ok { - return - } - if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "data: %s\n\n", line); err != nil { - logger.Errorf("Failed to write to SSE client: %v", err) - return - } - flusher.Flush() - } - } - case http.MethodPost: - r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxRequestBodyBytes) - defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }() - body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body) + msg["id"] = json.RawMessage(strconv.FormatUint(bridgeID, 10)) + toBackend, err = json.Marshal(msg) if err != nil { - http.Error(w, "Failed to read body", http.StatusInternalServerError) + http.Error(w, "Failed to encode request", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } + } else { + toBackend = body + } - var msg map[string]any - isCall := false - var reqID any - if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &msg); err == nil { - if id, ok := msg["id"]; ok { - isCall = true - reqID = id - } - } - - var ch <-chan string - var unsub func() - if isCall { - reqIDStr := fmt.Sprintf("%v", reqID) - callCh := make(chan string, 1) - b.mu.Lock() - if b.closed { - b.mu.Unlock() - http.Error(w, "Backend process is no longer running", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) - return - } - b.calls[reqIDStr] = callCh - b.mu.Unlock() - ch = callCh - unsub = func() { - b.mu.Lock() - if existing, ok := b.calls[reqIDStr]; ok && existing == callCh { - delete(b.calls, reqIDStr) - close(callCh) - } - b.mu.Unlock() - } - defer unsub() - } - - b.mu.Lock() - if b.closed { - b.mu.Unlock() - http.Error(w, "Backend process is no longer running", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) - return - } - _, err = b.stdin.Write(append(body, '\n')) + b.mu.Lock() + if b.closed { b.mu.Unlock() + http.Error(w, "Backend process is no longer running", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) + return + } + _, err = b.stdin.Write(append(toBackend, '\n')) + b.mu.Unlock() + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, "Failed to write to process stdin", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } - if err != nil { - http.Error(w, "Failed to write to process stdin", http.StatusInternalServerError) - return - } - - w.Header().Set("Mcp-Session-Id", "stdio-bridge") + w.Header().Set("Mcp-Session-Id", "stdio-bridge") - if !isCall { - w.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted) - return - } + if !isCall { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted) + return + } - ctx := r.Context() - select { - case <-ctx.Done(): - return - case line, ok := <-ch: - if !ok { - http.Error(w, "Backend process exited before answering", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) - return - } - w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) - _, _ = w.Write([]byte(line)) + select { + case <-r.Context().Done(): + return + case line, ok := <-call.reply: + if !ok { + http.Error(w, "Backend process exited before answering", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) return } - default: - http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + _, _ = w.Write(line) } } diff --git a/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go b/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go index b8f24827..6a53dd12 100644 --- a/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go +++ b/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ package node import ( "bytes" - "context" + "encoding/json" "io" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" @@ -54,58 +54,29 @@ func waitFor(t *testing.T, what string, cond func() bool) { } } -// writeSignalRecorder is a ResponseRecorder that reports each body Write on -// wrote, so a test can tell the handler has emitted a line without reading -// rec.Body while the handler goroutine is still writing to it. -type writeSignalRecorder struct { - *httptest.ResponseRecorder - wrote chan struct{} -} - -func (r *writeSignalRecorder) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { - n, err := r.ResponseRecorder.Write(p) - select { - case r.wrote <- struct{}{}: - default: - } - return n, err -} - -func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_GETStreamsBroadcastLines(t *testing.T) { +// GET was the legacy SSE stream: every backend line to every reader, i.e. +// every caller's tool output to every other authorized caller. Refused. +func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_GETIsRefused(t *testing.T) { b, stdoutWriter, _ := newPipeBridge() defer func() { _ = stdoutWriter.Close() }() - ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) - req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil).WithContext(ctx) - rec := &writeSignalRecorder{ResponseRecorder: httptest.NewRecorder(), wrote: make(chan struct{}, 1)} - done := make(chan struct{}) - go func() { - b.ServeHTTP(rec, req) - close(done) - }() - - waitFor(t, "SSE client registration", func() bool { - b.mu.Lock() - defer b.mu.Unlock() - return len(b.clients) > 0 - }) - _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte("hello\n")) - select { - case <-rec.wrote: - case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): - t.Fatal("timed out waiting for the SSE line to be written") - } - cancel() - - select { - case <-done: - case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): - t.Fatal("ServeHTTP did not return after ctx was cancelled") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + b.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)) + if rec.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed { + t.Fatalf("GET status = %d, want 405", rec.Code) } +} - if got := rec.Body.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "data: hello\n\n") { - t.Fatalf("SSE body = %q, want it to contain %q", got, "data: hello\n\n") +// bridgeIDOf returns the id the bridge assigned to the most recent request it +// wrote to the backend's stdin, so a test can answer as the backend would. +func bridgeIDOf(t *testing.T, stdinBuf *bytes.Buffer) string { + t.Helper() + lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(stdinBuf.String()), "\n") + var msg map[string]json.RawMessage + if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(lines[len(lines)-1]), &msg); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("stdin line is not JSON: %v", err) } + return string(msg["id"]) } func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_POSTNotificationReturnsAccepted(t *testing.T) { @@ -126,10 +97,10 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_POSTNotificationReturnsAccepted(t *testing.T) { } func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_POSTCallWaitsForMatchingReply(t *testing.T) { - b, stdoutWriter, _ := newPipeBridge() + b, stdoutWriter, stdinBuf := newPipeBridge() defer func() { _ = stdoutWriter.Close() }() - body := `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"ping"}` + body := `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"caller-7","method":"ping"}` req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", strings.NewReader(body)) rec := httptest.NewRecorder() @@ -144,8 +115,12 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_POSTCallWaitsForMatchingReply(t *testing.T) { defer b.mu.Unlock() return len(b.calls) > 0 }) - reply := `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{}}` - _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(reply + "\n")) + // The backend never sees the caller's id, only the bridge's. + bridgeID := bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf) + if bridgeID == `"caller-7"` { + t.Fatal("caller id reached the backend unrewritten") + } + _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":` + bridgeID + `,"result":{}}` + "\n")) select { case <-done: @@ -156,15 +131,82 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_POSTCallWaitsForMatchingReply(t *testing.T) { if rec.Code != http.StatusOK { t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK) } - if got := rec.Body.String(); got != reply { - t.Fatalf("body = %q, want %q", got, reply) + var got map[string]json.RawMessage + if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if string(got["id"]) != `"caller-7"` { + t.Fatalf("reply id = %s, want the caller's own \"caller-7\"", got["id"]) + } +} + +// M18: with one backend process behind every authorized caller, two callers +// using the same JSON-RPC id used to collide in the bridge's routing table, +// and one caller's reply was handed to the other. Each reply goes to the +// request it answers, and a line with no owner goes to nobody. +func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_SameIDFromTwoCallersDoesNotCrossWires(t *testing.T) { + b, stdoutWriter, stdinBuf := newPipeBridge() + defer func() { _ = stdoutWriter.Close() }() + + type result struct { + rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder + done chan struct{} + } + start := func(method string) result { + r := result{rec: httptest.NewRecorder(), done: make(chan struct{})} + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"`+method+`"}`)) + go func() { + b.ServeHTTP(r.rec, req) + close(r.done) + }() + return r + } + a := start("secret-for-a") + waitFor(t, "first call registered", func() bool { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + return len(b.calls) == 1 + }) + idA := bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf) + bb := start("secret-for-b") + waitFor(t, "second call registered", func() bool { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + return len(b.calls) == 2 + }) + idB := bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf) + if idA == idB { + t.Fatalf("both callers got bridge id %s", idA) + } + + // A backend notification has no owner: nobody receives it. + _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/progress"}` + "\n")) + // Answer B first, then A. + _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":` + idB + `,"result":"for-b"}` + "\n")) + _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":` + idA + `,"result":"for-a"}` + "\n")) + + for name, r := range map[string]result{"a": a, "b": bb} { + select { + case <-r.done: + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatalf("caller %s never got its reply", name) + } + if r.rec.Code != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("caller %s: status %d", name, r.rec.Code) + } + if !strings.Contains(r.rec.Body.String(), `"for-`+name+`"`) { + t.Errorf("caller %s received %s", name, r.rec.Body.String()) + } + if !strings.Contains(r.rec.Body.String(), `"id":1`) { + t.Errorf("caller %s: id not restored: %s", name, r.rec.Body.String()) + } } } // A single backend line larger than bufio.Scanner's 64 KiB default used to // stop the reader for good; results up to the request-body cap must flow. func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_LargeReplyIsDelivered(t *testing.T) { - b, stdoutWriter, _ := newPipeBridge() + b, stdoutWriter, stdinBuf := newPipeBridge() defer func() { _ = stdoutWriter.Close() }() req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":7,"method":"big"}`)) @@ -180,16 +222,16 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_LargeReplyIsDelivered(t *testing.T) { return len(b.calls) > 0 }) - reply := `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":7,"result":"` + strings.Repeat("x", 100<<10) + `"}` - _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(reply + "\n")) + payload := strings.Repeat("x", 100<<10) + _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":` + bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf) + `,"result":"` + payload + `"}` + "\n")) select { case <-done: case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): t.Fatal("ServeHTTP did not return after a >64 KiB reply") } - if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || rec.Body.String() != reply { - t.Fatalf("status %d, body len %d; want 200 and %d bytes", rec.Code, rec.Body.Len(), len(reply)) + if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), payload) || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `"id":7`) { + t.Fatalf("status %d, body len %d; want 200 with the %d-byte payload and the caller's id", rec.Code, rec.Body.Len(), len(payload)) } } @@ -227,11 +269,9 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_RefusesAfterBackendExit(t *testing.T) { defer b.mu.Unlock() return b.closed }) - for _, method := range []string{http.MethodPost, http.MethodGet} { - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - b.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(method, "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"ping"}`))) - if rec.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable { - t.Errorf("%s after exit: status = %d, want 503", method, rec.Code) - } + rec = httptest.NewRecorder() + b.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"ping"}`))) + if rec.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable { + t.Errorf("POST after exit: status = %d, want 503", rec.Code) } } diff --git a/tests/integration/datapath_test.go b/tests/integration/datapath_test.go index b107cca2..ab29075b 100644 --- a/tests/integration/datapath_test.go +++ b/tests/integration/datapath_test.go @@ -16,12 +16,14 @@ package integration_test import ( "bytes" + "encoding/json" "fmt" "io" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "os" "path/filepath" + "reflect" "strings" "sync" "testing" @@ -124,9 +126,18 @@ func TestIntegrationStdioDatapath(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal(err) } - receivedMessage := strings.TrimSpace(string(bodyBytes)) - if receivedMessage != testMessage { - t.Fatalf("Expected to receive %q in POST response, got %q", testMessage, receivedMessage) + // The bridge rewrites the JSON-RPC id on the way to the backend and + // restores it on the way back, so the echo is the same message + // re-serialized, not the same bytes. + var want, got map[string]any + if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(testMessage), &want); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(bodyBytes, &got); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("POST response is not JSON: %v (%q)", err, bodyBytes) + } + if !reflect.DeepEqual(want, got) { + t.Fatalf("Expected to receive %v in POST response, got %v", want, got) } } From b0c5c3c8cc95d097c134f3ce1314b4690faad61d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 07:41:04 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 06/14] node, router: gossip validation, relay ACL, callee verification (audit PR 5) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit M22 gossip flood: register a GossipSub topic validator for the control-plane events topic on both node and router. Unsigned, forged or undecodable events are rejected (dropped and not re-forwarded) at the first hop; stale events are ignored. The node's per-peer rate limit moves after validation and is keyed on the author (msg.GetFrom) instead of the forwarding peer, so a junk flood through the router can no longer exhaust the router's budget and drop real BANNED / KEY_ROTATION events. M7 relay ACL: AllowConnect on both the router and the node relay now requires the *source* to be authenticated as well as the destination. Previously any host that could reach the router port could open circuits to every admitted peer. H3-a callee verification: a provider must always present a control-plane signed biscuit bound to its peer ID and carrying role(node), not only when the caller requires labels or the operator set an egress floor. A router's or admin's biscuit is a valid identity but not a service provider. Applied on the three consumer paths: ConnectMCPSession, the OpenAI facade (nil verifier now fails closed with 503) and the raw /sam//... egress proxy. Discovery names candidates; only this says the peer is enrolled. L34 discovery table: cap entries per signer (16) so one peer announcing many service names cannot evict everyone else's entries; the signer's own oldest entry is displaced first. Remove the mesh_pubsub_broadcast / poll_messages / subscribe_topic MCP tools (M8, L31). A2A is the agent-to-agent channel; the raw gossip tools had an unbounded per-topic buffer, no topic cap, and could not be held to an egress floor. Their integration test and the playground snippet that only exercised them go with them. Tests: TestValidateMeshEvent (node, router), TestGossipJunkFloodIsRejected- NotForwarded (verified failing with the validator neutralised: 50 junk messages forwarded and the signed ban dropped), TestRelayACLAllowConnect- RequiresAuthenticatedSource, TestNodeRelayACL_AllowConnect updated, TestProviderTableCapsEntriesPerSigner, TestVerifyPeerLabelsDoesNotShortCircuit, "router biscuit is not a provider", facade "no requirement still verifies the provider"; TestFailoverUpdatesRelay now authenticates its client to the router before dialling the circuit and asserts an anonymous host is refused. Test fixtures give provider nodes real identities via enrollUnderRoot. GossipSub is created with StrictSign pinned explicitly (the library default): the validator and the per-author rate limit key on msg.GetFrom(), which only the envelope signature makes trustworthy. Deferred with reasons: H3-b/c (pubsub WithPeerFilter / DHT peer filters) — non-handshaked DHT peers legitimately gossip discovery announcements, so a filter there breaks discovery; revisit with a handshake-before-gossip design. --- internal/node/discovery/discovery.go | 5 + internal/node/discovery/discovery_test.go | 32 ++ internal/node/discovery/view.go | 27 +- internal/node/gossip_hardening_test.go | 260 +++++++++++ internal/node/labels_gate.go | 13 +- internal/node/labels_gate_test.go | 33 +- internal/node/mcp.go | 33 +- internal/node/mcp_handlers.go | 68 --- internal/node/mcp_handlers_additional_test.go | 37 -- internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go | 133 ++---- internal/node/node.go | 111 ++--- internal/node/openai_facade.go | 48 +- internal/node/openai_facade_test.go | 38 +- internal/node/proxy_test.go | 38 +- internal/node/relay_acl_test.go | 11 +- internal/node/sidecar.go | 59 +-- internal/router/relay_acl_test.go | 123 +++++ internal/router/router.go | 55 ++- .../docs/integrations/vscode-copilot.md | 5 +- .../docs/snippets/banana_bot_playground.py | 441 ------------------ site/content/docs/sovereignty.md | 2 +- tests/integration/failover_test.go | 32 +- tests/integration/multimaster_test.go | 45 +- tests/integration/pubsub_test.go | 183 -------- 24 files changed, 778 insertions(+), 1054 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/node/gossip_hardening_test.go create mode 100644 internal/router/relay_acl_test.go delete mode 100644 site/content/docs/snippets/banana_bot_playground.py delete mode 100644 tests/integration/pubsub_test.go diff --git a/internal/node/discovery/discovery.go b/internal/node/discovery/discovery.go index a77a985f..2a32f552 100644 --- a/internal/node/discovery/discovery.go +++ b/internal/node/discovery/discovery.go @@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ const ( DefaultStaleAfter = 30 * time.Second // DefaultMaxProviders bounds the consumer-side provider table. DefaultMaxProviders = 1024 + // MaxProvidersPerSigner bounds how many entries one peer may hold in + // the table: entries are keyed by signer|type|service, so without this + // a single peer announcing many service names could evict everyone + // else's entries (the global cap evicts oldest, not loudest). + MaxProvidersPerSigner = 16 // maxAnnounceSkew rejects announcements too old or too far in the // future (replay/clock defense; pubsub dedup handles exact replays). maxAnnounceSkew = 2 * time.Minute diff --git a/internal/node/discovery/discovery_test.go b/internal/node/discovery/discovery_test.go index 936b9650..0cbd0df1 100644 --- a/internal/node/discovery/discovery_test.go +++ b/internal/node/discovery/discovery_test.go @@ -235,6 +235,38 @@ func TestProviderTableIsBounded(t *testing.T) { } } +// One peer announcing many distinct service names must not be able to push +// everyone else out of a full table: the global cap evicts the oldest entry, +// which is whoever announced least recently, not whoever announced most. +func TestProviderTableCapsEntriesPerSigner(t *testing.T) { + d := New(nil, testPeerID(t), WithMaxProviders(MaxProvidersPerSigner+4)) + honest := testPeerID(t) + d.observe(rawMessage(t, honest, &api.ServiceAnnounce{ + PeerId: honest.String(), Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE, + ServiceName: "llm", Keys: []string{"m1"}, + Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(), + })) + + loud := testPeerID(t) + for i := range 3 * MaxProvidersPerSigner { + d.observe(rawMessage(t, loud, &api.ServiceAnnounce{ + PeerId: loud.String(), Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE, + ServiceName: "svc-" + string(rune('a'+i%26)) + string(rune('a'+i/26)), Keys: []string{"m1"}, + Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(), + })) + } + + if got := d.countBySignerLocked(loud.String()); got != MaxProvidersPerSigner { + t.Errorf("loud signer holds %d entries, want exactly %d", got, MaxProvidersPerSigner) + } + if got := len(d.Providers(api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE, "m1")); got != MaxProvidersPerSigner+1 { + t.Errorf("providers for m1: got %d, want %d", got, MaxProvidersPerSigner+1) + } + if d.countBySignerLocked(honest.String()) != 1 { + t.Error("the honest signer's entry was evicted by another peer's announcements") + } +} + func TestPeerLabels(t *testing.T) { d := New(nil, testPeerID(t)) signer := testPeerID(t) diff --git a/internal/node/discovery/view.go b/internal/node/discovery/view.go index bc4e6cfe..c5f18cc5 100644 --- a/internal/node/discovery/view.go +++ b/internal/node/discovery/view.go @@ -132,8 +132,14 @@ func (d *Discovery) observe(msg *pubsub.Message) { d.viewMu.Lock() defer d.viewMu.Unlock() - if _, exists := d.providers[entryKey]; !exists && len(d.providers) >= d.maxProviders { - d.evictOldestLocked() + if _, exists := d.providers[entryKey]; !exists { + // The signer's own oldest entry goes first: a peer that announces + // more than its share only ever displaces itself. + if d.countBySignerLocked(signer) >= MaxProvidersPerSigner { + d.evictOldestLocked(signer) + } else if len(d.providers) >= d.maxProviders { + d.evictOldestLocked("") + } } d.providers[entryKey] = Provider{ PeerID: signer, @@ -149,10 +155,25 @@ func (d *Discovery) observe(msg *pubsub.Message) { } } -func (d *Discovery) evictOldestLocked() { +func (d *Discovery) countBySignerLocked(signer string) int { + n := 0 + for _, p := range d.providers { + if p.PeerID == signer { + n++ + } + } + return n +} + +// evictOldestLocked removes the least recently seen entry, restricted to +// one signer's entries when signer is non-empty. +func (d *Discovery) evictOldestLocked(signer string) { var oldestKey string var oldest time.Time for k, p := range d.providers { + if signer != "" && p.PeerID != signer { + continue + } if oldestKey == "" || p.LastSeen.Before(oldest) { oldestKey, oldest = k, p.LastSeen } diff --git a/internal/node/gossip_hardening_test.go b/internal/node/gossip_hardening_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7b5c7886 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/gossip_hardening_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "slices" + "sync" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/google/sam/api" + "github.com/google/sam/internal/ratelimit" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p" + pubsub "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-pubsub" + pubsub_pb "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-pubsub/pb" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/host" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" +) + +// signedMeshEvent returns a BANNED event for target signed by cpPriv, as the +// control plane would publish it. +func signedMeshEvent(t *testing.T, cpPriv ed25519.PrivateKey, target peer.ID, at time.Time) []byte { + t.Helper() + event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, PeerId: target.String(), Timestamp: at.UnixMilli()} + unsigned, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + event.Signature = ed25519.Sign(cpPriv, unsigned) + data, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return data +} + +func randomPeerID(t *testing.T) peer.ID { + t.Helper() + priv, _, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + pid, err := peer.IDFromPrivateKey(priv) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return pid +} + +// The GossipSub validator is the first thing a mesh event meets. It has to +// reject (drop, do not forward) what is unsigned or forged, ignore what is +// stale, and accept a fresh event from a trusted control plane. +func TestValidateMeshEvent(t *testing.T) { + cpPub, cpPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, otherPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + node := &SamNode{ + trustedKeys: []TrustedKey{{Key: cpPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}}, + BiscuitTimeout: 500 * time.Millisecond, + } + from := randomPeerID(t) + target := randomPeerID(t) + + tests := []struct { + name string + data []byte + want pubsub.ValidationResult + }{ + {"fresh event from trusted control plane", signedMeshEvent(t, cpPriv, target, time.Now()), pubsub.ValidationAccept}, + {"event signed by an untrusted key", signedMeshEvent(t, otherPriv, target, time.Now()), pubsub.ValidationReject}, + {"undecodable payload", []byte("junk"), pubsub.ValidationReject}, + {"stale event", signedMeshEvent(t, cpPriv, target, time.Now().Add(-2*FreshnessThreshold)), pubsub.ValidationIgnore}, + {"future event", signedMeshEvent(t, cpPriv, target, time.Now().Add(2*FreshnessThreshold)), pubsub.ValidationIgnore}, + } + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + msg := &pubsub.Message{Message: &pubsub_pb.Message{From: []byte(from), Data: tt.data}} + if got := node.validateMeshEvent(context.Background(), from, msg); got != tt.want { + t.Errorf("validateMeshEvent = %v, want %v", got, tt.want) + } + }) + } +} + +// gossipPeer is a plain libp2p host with its own GossipSub and no validator: +// any peer that can reach the topic, or a router forwarding one. It is +// subscribed so it is a topic peer to whoever it connects to. +type gossipPeer struct { + host host.Host + ps *pubsub.PubSub + topic *pubsub.Topic + sub *pubsub.Subscription +} + +func newGossipPeer(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context) *gossipPeer { + t.Helper() + h, err := libp2p.New(libp2p.ListenAddrStrings("/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/0")) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = h.Close() }) + ps, err := pubsub.NewGossipSub(ctx, h) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + topic, err := ps.Join(api.GossipEvents) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + sub, err := topic.Subscribe() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + t.Cleanup(sub.Cancel) + return &gossipPeer{host: h, ps: ps, topic: topic, sub: sub} +} + +func (g *gossipPeer) connect(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, h host.Host) { + t.Helper() + if err := g.host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: h.ID(), Addrs: h.Addrs()}); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("connect %s -> %s: %v", g.host.ID(), h.ID(), err) + } +} + +func waitUntil(t *testing.T, timeout time.Duration, what string, cond func() bool) { + t.Helper() + deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout) + for time.Now().Before(deadline) { + if cond() { + return + } + time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) + } + t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for %s", what) +} + +// A flood of junk on the events topic must neither be re-forwarded by the +// node nor cost it the signed event that follows. Before the validator the +// node forwarded every message and rate-limited on the forwarding peer, so a +// flood via the router spent the router's budget and real bans were dropped. +func TestGossipJunkFloodIsRejectedNotForwarded(t *testing.T) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Second) + defer cancel() + + victim, cleanup := startBareNode(t, ctx) + defer cleanup() + + cpPub, cpPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + victim.keysMu.Lock() + victim.trustedKeys = append(victim.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: cpPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) + victim.keysMu.Unlock() + + // attacker -> victim -> observer. The observer only ever hears what the + // victim chooses to forward. + attacker := newGossipPeer(t, ctx) + observer := newGossipPeer(t, ctx) + attacker.connect(t, ctx, victim.Host) + observer.connect(t, ctx, victim.Host) + + var mu sync.Mutex + var forwardedJunk []string + seenSigned := map[peer.ID]bool{} + sawSigned := func(pid peer.ID) bool { + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + return seenSigned[pid] + } + go func() { + for { + msg, err := observer.sub.Next(ctx) + if err != nil { + return + } + // Only what came through the victim counts: a direct + // attacker->observer connection would say nothing about the + // victim. + if msg.ReceivedFrom != victim.Host.ID() { + continue + } + mu.Lock() + var event api.MeshEvent + if err := proto.Unmarshal(msg.Data, &event); err != nil || len(event.Signature) == 0 { + forwardedJunk = append(forwardedJunk, string(msg.Data)) + } else if pid, err := peer.Decode(event.PeerId); err == nil { + seenSigned[pid] = true + } + mu.Unlock() + } + }() + + waitUntil(t, 10*time.Second, "topic peers to see each other", func() bool { + victimSees := victim.PubSub.ListPeers(api.GossipEvents) + return slices.Contains(victimSees, attacker.host.ID()) && + slices.Contains(victimSees, observer.host.ID()) && + slices.Contains(attacker.ps.ListPeers(api.GossipEvents), victim.Host.ID()) && + slices.Contains(observer.ps.ListPeers(api.GossipEvents), victim.Host.ID()) + }) + + // Probe: a signed event travels attacker -> victim -> observer, so the + // forwarding path is up before the flood starts. + first := randomPeerID(t) + waitUntil(t, 10*time.Second, "probe event to be forwarded", func() bool { + _ = attacker.topic.Publish(ctx, signedMeshEvent(t, cpPriv, first, time.Now())) + return sawSigned(first) + }) + + // Flood: far more than the per-peer budget, all unsigned. + for i := range 5 * ratelimit.PeerBurst { + if err := attacker.topic.Publish(ctx, fmt.Appendf(nil, "junk-%d", i)); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("publish junk: %v", err) + } + } + + // The event that matters, from the same forwarding peer, right behind + // the flood. + second := randomPeerID(t) + if err := attacker.topic.Publish(ctx, signedMeshEvent(t, cpPriv, second, time.Now())); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + waitUntil(t, 10*time.Second, "signed event to be forwarded after the flood", func() bool { + return sawSigned(second) + }) + if !victim.revokedPeers.Contains(second.String()) { + t.Error("the signed ban behind the flood was not applied by the node") + } + + // Anything the victim forwarded is ordered on the observer's stream, so + // junk it let through has arrived by now. + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + if len(forwardedJunk) != 0 { + t.Errorf("victim forwarded %d unsigned messages; the validator must drop them at the first hop (e.g. %q)", len(forwardedJunk), forwardedJunk[0]) + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/labels_gate.go b/internal/node/labels_gate.go index f509aaea..80015913 100644 --- a/internal/node/labels_gate.go +++ b/internal/node/labels_gate.go @@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ func (n *SamNode) egressFloor() map[string]string { // constrained does not get to opt out of it by saying nothing. func (n *SamNode) VerifyPeerLabels(ctx context.Context, peerID peer.ID, required map[string]string) error { floor := n.egressFloor() - if len(required) == 0 && len(floor) == 0 { - return nil - } + // No early return for an empty requirement: with nothing to attest this + // still verifies that the peer holds a control-plane-signed biscuit bound + // to it, which is what makes a discovered peer a provider at all. key := labelGateKey(peerID, required, floor) if until, ok := n.peerLabelGate.Get(key); ok && time.Now().Before(until) { return nil @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) VerifyPeerLabels(ctx context.Context, peerID peer.ID, required func (n *SamNode) checkPeerLabels(providerBiscuit []byte, peerID peer.ID, required map[string]string) error { floor := n.egressFloor() if len(providerBiscuit) == 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("provider %s returned no identity biscuit; cannot attest required labels %v (egress floor %v)", peerID, required, floor) + return fmt.Errorf("provider %s returned no identity biscuit; not an enrolled peer (required labels %v, egress floor %v)", peerID, required, floor) } n.keysMu.RLock() @@ -187,6 +187,11 @@ func (n *SamNode) checkPeerLabels(providerBiscuit []byte, peerID peer.ID, requir if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("provider %s biscuit verification failed: %w", peerID, err) } + // Only nodes host services. A router's or an admin's biscuit is a valid + // mesh identity but not a provider, and must not be dialled as one. + if err := identity.RequireRole(b, key, api.RoleNode, n.BiscuitTimeout); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("provider %s is not enrolled as a node: %w", peerID, err) + } authorizer, err := b.Authorizer(key, identity.AuthorizerOptions(n.BiscuitTimeout)...) if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/node/labels_gate_test.go b/internal/node/labels_gate_test.go index 31c0c5f5..ebf20f83 100644 --- a/internal/node/labels_gate_test.go +++ b/internal/node/labels_gate_test.go @@ -87,6 +87,21 @@ func TestCheckPeerLabels(t *testing.T) { t.Error("expected error, got nil") } }) + + // A router's biscuit is a valid, trusted, peer-bound identity, but a + // router is not a service provider; only role(node) may be dialled as one. + t.Run("router biscuit is not a provider", func(t *testing.T) { + routerTok, err := identity.MintBootstrapBiscuitToken(cpPriv, providerPeer, api.RoleRouter, expiry, nil, nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := node.checkPeerLabels(routerTok, providerPeer, nil); err == nil { + t.Error("a router's biscuit must not pass the provider gate") + } + if err := node.checkPeerLabels(mint(cpPriv, providerPeer, nil), providerPeer, nil); err != nil { + t.Errorf("a node's biscuit with no requirement must pass: %v", err) + } + }) } // The egress floor is the operator's, and a caller cannot waive it by asking @@ -188,11 +203,12 @@ func TestCheckPeerLabelsEnforcesEgressFloor(t *testing.T) { } } -// VerifyPeerLabels short-circuits when there is nothing to check. With a floor -// configured there always is, so the short-circuit must not swallow it: the -// gate has to run even for a caller that asked for nothing, which is the -// difference between a floor and a suggestion. -func TestVerifyPeerLabelsDoesNotShortCircuitPastTheFloor(t *testing.T) { +// VerifyPeerLabels has no short-circuit: with nothing to attest it still has +// to establish that the peer is an enrolled member, and with a floor +// configured there is always something to attest. Either way a caller that +// asked for nothing is gated, which is the difference between a floor and a +// suggestion, and between a provider and a peer that merely announced. +func TestVerifyPeerLabelsDoesNotShortCircuit(t *testing.T) { node := &SamNode{ BiscuitTimeout: 500 * time.Millisecond, nodeConfig: &NodeConfigComplete{EgressRequireLabels: map[string]string{"jurisdiction": "eu"}}, @@ -210,10 +226,11 @@ func TestVerifyPeerLabelsDoesNotShortCircuitPastTheFloor(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal("a caller requiring nothing must still be gated when a floor is configured") } - // Without a floor, the same call is the documented no-op. + // Without a floor the gate still runs: an unenrolled peer is not a + // provider just because nobody asked for a label. node.nodeConfig = &NodeConfigComplete{} - if err := node.VerifyPeerLabels(context.Background(), peer.ID("some-peer"), nil); err != nil { - t.Errorf("with no floor and no requirement the gate must not run: %v", err) + if err := node.VerifyPeerLabels(context.Background(), peer.ID("some-peer"), nil); err == nil { + t.Error("with no floor and no requirement the gate must still verify the peer's identity") } } diff --git a/internal/node/mcp.go b/internal/node/mcp.go index 45053ce0..bb0bac35 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp.go @@ -77,24 +77,6 @@ func NewMCPServer(node *SamNode) *mcp.Server { Description: "Discover remote services in the mesh. Provide only `type` to browse every reachable service of that type (returns name + description for each); add `name` to target a specific service. For `type: inference`, each result's `local_proxy_url` is called directly over HTTP (NOT via call_remote_tool) — the response includes a usage hint with the exact headers required.", }, node.handleDiscoverRemoteServices) - // Add the mesh_pubsub_broadcast tool. - mcp.AddTool(mcpServer, &mcp.Tool{ - Name: "mesh_pubsub_broadcast", - Description: "Publish an event payload to a custom GossipSub topic", - }, node.handleMeshPubsubBroadcast) - - // Add the poll_messages tool. - mcp.AddTool(mcpServer, &mcp.Tool{ - Name: "poll_messages", - Description: "Poll for incoming messages on custom GossipSub topics", - }, node.handlePollMessages) - - // Add the subscribe_topic tool. - mcp.AddTool(mcpServer, &mcp.Tool{ - Name: "subscribe_topic", - Description: "Subscribe to a custom GossipSub topic", - }, node.handleSubscribeTopic) - // Add the get_mesh_info tool. mcp.AddTool(mcpServer, &mcp.Tool{ Name: "get_mesh_info", @@ -378,14 +360,13 @@ func (n *SamNode) ConnectMCPSession(ctx context.Context, targetPeer peer.ID, tar return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w by %s: %s", ErrAuthRejected, targetPeer, resp.Error) } - // The gate runs when the caller requires labels or when the operator's - // egress floor does: a caller that requires nothing is still held to the - // floor (checkPeerLabels ANDs both). - if len(requiredLabels) > 0 || len(n.egressFloor()) > 0 { - if err := n.checkPeerLabels(resp.Biscuit, targetPeer, requiredLabels); err != nil { - cleanup() - return nil, nil, err - } + // The provider's biscuit is verified unconditionally: signature, expiry and + // binding to targetPeer. Discovery (DHT, gossip) names whoever announced + // the service; only this says the peer is enrolled. Caller-required labels + // and the operator's egress floor are additional checks on the same token. + if err := n.checkPeerLabels(resp.Biscuit, targetPeer, requiredLabels); err != nil { + cleanup() + return nil, nil, err } // Handoff to SDK using custom transport diff --git a/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go b/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go index 60e081ae..ce61fd39 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go @@ -115,74 +115,6 @@ func (n *SamNode) handleDiscoverRemoteServices(ctx context.Context, req *mcp.Cal }, nil, nil } -// MeshPubsubBroadcastParams defines the parameters for the mesh_pubsub_broadcast tool. -type MeshPubsubBroadcastParams struct { - Topic string `json:"topic" jsonschema:"GossipSub topic name"` - Payload string `json:"payload" jsonschema:"Payload to publish"` -} - -// handleMeshPubsubBroadcast implements the mesh_pubsub_broadcast tool. -func (n *SamNode) handleMeshPubsubBroadcast(ctx context.Context, req *mcp.CallToolRequest, params MeshPubsubBroadcastParams) (*mcp.CallToolResult, any, error) { - n.mu.Lock() - t, ok := n.topics[params.Topic] - var err error - if !ok { - t, err = n.PubSub.Join(params.Topic) - if err == nil { - n.topics[params.Topic] = t - } - } - n.mu.Unlock() - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - if err := t.Publish(ctx, []byte(params.Payload)); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - return &mcp.CallToolResult{ - Content: []mcp.Content{ - &mcp.TextContent{Text: "Published"}, - }, - }, nil, nil -} - -// PollMessagesParams defines the parameters for the poll_messages tool. -type PollMessagesParams struct { - Topic string `json:"topic" jsonschema:"GossipSub topic name"` -} - -// handlePollMessages implements the poll_messages tool. -func (n *SamNode) handlePollMessages(ctx context.Context, req *mcp.CallToolRequest, params PollMessagesParams) (*mcp.CallToolResult, any, error) { - n.mu.Lock() - msgs := n.receivedMsgs[params.Topic] - delete(n.receivedMsgs, params.Topic) // Clear on read! - n.mu.Unlock() - - response := fmt.Sprintf("Messages on topic %s: %v", params.Topic, msgs) - return &mcp.CallToolResult{ - Content: []mcp.Content{ - &mcp.TextContent{Text: response}, - }, - }, nil, nil -} - -// SubscribeTopicParams defines the parameters for the subscribe_topic tool. -type SubscribeTopicParams struct { - Topic string `json:"topic" jsonschema:"GossipSub topic name"` -} - -// handleSubscribeTopic implements the subscribe_topic tool. -func (n *SamNode) handleSubscribeTopic(ctx context.Context, req *mcp.CallToolRequest, params SubscribeTopicParams) (*mcp.CallToolResult, any, error) { - if err := n.subscribeToTopic(ctx, params.Topic); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - return &mcp.CallToolResult{ - Content: []mcp.Content{ - &mcp.TextContent{Text: "Subscribed"}, - }, - }, nil, nil -} - // GetMeshInfoParams defines the parameters for the get_mesh_info tool. type GetMeshInfoParams struct{} diff --git a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_additional_test.go b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_additional_test.go index fc120d8f..423ecc67 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_additional_test.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_additional_test.go @@ -57,43 +57,6 @@ func TestHandleDiscoverRemoteServices(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestHandleMeshPubsub(t *testing.T) { - ctx := context.Background() - node, cleanup := startBareNode(t, ctx) - defer cleanup() - - // Subscribe - res, _, err := node.handleSubscribeTopic(context.Background(), &mcp.CallToolRequest{}, SubscribeTopicParams{ - Topic: "test-topic", - }) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("handleSubscribeTopic failed: %v", err) - } - if res.Content[0].(*mcp.TextContent).Text != "Subscribed" { - t.Errorf("expected Subscribed") - } - - // Publish - _, _, err = node.handleMeshPubsubBroadcast(context.Background(), &mcp.CallToolRequest{}, MeshPubsubBroadcastParams{ - Topic: "test-topic", - Payload: "test-message", - }) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("handleMeshPubsubBroadcast failed: %v", err) - } - - // Poll - res, _, err = node.handlePollMessages(context.Background(), &mcp.CallToolRequest{}, PollMessagesParams{ - Topic: "test-topic", - }) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("handlePollMessages failed: %v", err) - } - if len(res.Content) == 0 { - t.Fatalf("expected content in poll messages") - } -} - func TestHandleGetMeshInfo(t *testing.T) { ctx := context.Background() node, cleanup := startBareNode(t, ctx) diff --git a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go index 4ea0a7e8..f53f66fa 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go @@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ import ( ) // buildAndSaveBiscuit builds a biscuit signed with rootPriv that identifies -// node as caller, grants allow_mcp_server("*"), and saves it to node's store. +// node as caller, grants allow_mcp_server("*"), carries the node role as a +// real enrollment does, and saves it to node's store. func buildAndSaveBiscuit(node *SamNode, rootPriv ed25519.PrivateKey) error { callerID := node.Host.ID().String() builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(rootPriv) @@ -49,6 +50,12 @@ func buildAndSaveBiscuit(node *SamNode, rootPriv ed25519.PrivateKey) error { }}); err != nil { return err } + if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{ + Name: api.FactRole, + IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(api.RoleNode)}, + }}); err != nil { + return err + } if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{ Name: "client_peer_id", IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(callerID)}, @@ -78,6 +85,28 @@ func buildAndSaveBiscuit(node *SamNode, rootPriv ed25519.PrivateKey) error { return node.Store.SaveIdentity(biscBytes) } +// enrollUnderRoot makes every node a member of the same mesh: each gets an +// identity biscuit signed by a fresh root and trusts that root, so both ends +// of any pair verify each other (the caller through WithBiscuitAuth, the +// provider through the label gate). Returns the root key pair for tests that +// need to mint extra tokens. +func enrollUnderRoot(t *testing.T, nodes ...*SamNode) (ed25519.PublicKey, ed25519.PrivateKey) { + t.Helper() + rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("gen root key: %v", err) + } + for _, n := range nodes { + if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(n, rootPriv); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit for %s: %v", n.Host.ID(), err) + } + n.keysMu.Lock() + n.trustedKeys = append(n.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) + n.keysMu.Unlock() + } + return rootPub, rootPriv +} + func TestHandleFindRemoteTools_EmptyMesh_ReturnsEmptyArray(t *testing.T) { ctx, cancel := contextWithShortTimeout() defer cancel() @@ -146,18 +175,7 @@ func TestHandleFindRemoteTools_SinglePeer(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("connect: %v", err) } - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("gen root key: %v", err) - } - if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(nodeA, rootPriv); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit: %v", err) - } - - // B trusts the same root key used to sign A's biscuit. - nodeB.keysMu.Lock() - nodeB.trustedKeys = append(nodeB.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeB.keysMu.Unlock() + enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeB) // Register an MCP service on B with two tools. regReq := &api.RegisterServiceRequest{ @@ -231,16 +249,7 @@ func TestHandleFindRemoteTools_BackendPredatesDiscover(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("connect: %v", err) } - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("gen root key: %v", err) - } - if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(nodeA, rootPriv); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit: %v", err) - } - nodeB.keysMu.Lock() - nodeB.trustedKeys = append(nodeB.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeB.keysMu.Unlock() + enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeB) regReq := &api.RegisterServiceRequest{ Service: &api.ServiceInfo{Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP, Name: "calculator"}, @@ -309,21 +318,13 @@ func TestHandleFindRemoteTools_MeshWide(t *testing.T) { nodeD, cleanupD := startBareNode(t, ctx) defer cleanupD() - // Connect A to B, C, and D, and set up biscuit auth so A's stream passes WithBiscuitAuth. - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("gen root: %v", err) - } - if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(nodeA, rootPriv); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit: %v", err) - } + // Connect A to B, C, and D; every node is enrolled under one root so A's + // stream passes WithBiscuitAuth and each target passes A's provider gate. + enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeB, nodeC, nodeD) for _, target := range []*SamNode{nodeB, nodeC, nodeD} { if err := nodeA.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: target.Host.ID(), Addrs: target.Host.Addrs()}); err != nil { t.Fatalf("connect to %s: %v", target.Host.ID(), err) } - target.keysMu.Lock() - target.trustedKeys = append(target.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - target.keysMu.Unlock() } if err := nodeB.RegisterService(ctx, &api.RegisterServiceRequest{ @@ -399,21 +400,12 @@ func TestHandleFindRemoteTools_PartialFailure(t *testing.T) { nodeC, cleanupC := startBareNode(t, ctx) defer cleanupC() - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(nodeA, rootPriv); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit: %v", err) - } + enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeC) // A connects to C only; B is a fictional peer ID that won't resolve. if err := nodeA.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeC.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeC.Host.Addrs()}); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - nodeC.keysMu.Lock() - nodeC.trustedKeys = append(nodeC.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeC.keysMu.Unlock() if err := nodeC.RegisterService(ctx, &api.RegisterServiceRequest{ Service: &api.ServiceInfo{Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP, Name: "summarizer"}, @@ -458,6 +450,12 @@ func buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit(node *SamNode, rootPriv ed25519.PrivateKey, allow }}); err != nil { return err } + if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{ + Name: api.FactRole, + IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(api.RoleNode)}, + }}); err != nil { + return err + } if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{ Name: "client_peer_id", IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(callerID)}, @@ -507,21 +505,14 @@ func TestFetchRemoteToolCatalogue_AuthRejectedHidden(t *testing.T) { nodeC, cleanupC := startBareNode(t, ctx) defer cleanupC() - rootPubEd, rootPrivEd, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - - // Create a biscuit that DOES NOT allow "summarizer", only "some_other_service" and "system://sam.catalog". + // Both enrolled under one root; A's identity is then narrowed to a + // biscuit that DOES NOT allow "summarizer", only "some_other_service" + // and "system://sam.catalog". + _, rootPrivEd := enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeC) if err := buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit(nodeA, rootPrivEd, []string{"mcp://some_other_service", "system://sam.catalog"}); err != nil { t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit: %v", err) } - // Trust the key in Node C - nodeC.keysMu.Lock() - nodeC.trustedKeys = append(nodeC.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPubEd, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeC.keysMu.Unlock() - if err := nodeA.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeC.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeC.Host.Addrs()}); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } @@ -564,16 +555,10 @@ func TestVerifyGossipToolRows_AuthenticatesEachServiceOnSamePeer(t *testing.T) { nodeB, cleanupB := startBareNode(t, ctx) defer cleanupB() - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } + _, rootPriv := enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeB) if err := buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit(nodeA, rootPriv, []string{"mcp://allowed-reviewer"}); err != nil { t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit: %v", err) } - nodeB.keysMu.Lock() - nodeB.trustedKeys = append(nodeB.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeB.keysMu.Unlock() if err := nodeA.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeB.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeB.Host.Addrs()}); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } @@ -942,16 +927,7 @@ func TestHandleDescribeRemoteTool_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("connect: %v", err) } - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("gen root key: %v", err) - } - if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(nodeA, rootPriv); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit: %v", err) - } - nodeB.keysMu.Lock() - nodeB.trustedKeys = append(nodeB.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeB.keysMu.Unlock() + enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeB) tools := []*mcp.Tool{ { @@ -1038,16 +1014,7 @@ func TestHandleDescribeRemoteTool_RoundTrip_UnknownTool(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("connect: %v", err) } - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("gen root key: %v", err) - } - if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(nodeA, rootPriv); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit: %v", err) - } - nodeB.keysMu.Lock() - nodeB.trustedKeys = append(nodeB.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeB.keysMu.Unlock() + enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeB) tools := []*mcp.Tool{ {Name: "review_pr", Description: "x", InputSchema: map[string]any{"type": "object"}}, @@ -1062,7 +1029,7 @@ func TestHandleDescribeRemoteTool_RoundTrip_UnknownTool(t *testing.T) { } defer func() { _ = nodeB.UnregisterService(ctx, "code-reviewer") }() - _, _, err = nodeA.handleDescribeRemoteTool(ctx, &mcp.CallToolRequest{}, DescribeRemoteToolParams{ + _, _, err := nodeA.handleDescribeRemoteTool(ctx, &mcp.CallToolRequest{}, DescribeRemoteToolParams{ PeerID: nodeB.Host.ID().String(), ToolName: "mcp://code-reviewer/does-not-exist", }) diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go index f2c91186..6ac1cb65 100644 --- a/internal/node/node.go +++ b/internal/node/node.go @@ -121,7 +121,9 @@ func (a *nodeRelayACL) AllowReserve(p peer.ID, addr multiaddr.Multiaddr) bool { } func (a *nodeRelayACL) AllowConnect(src peer.ID, srcAddr multiaddr.Multiaddr, dest peer.ID) bool { - return a.node.isAdmitted(dest) + // Both ends: an unauthenticated source could otherwise open circuits to + // every admitted peer through this node. + return a.node.isAdmitted(src) && a.node.isAdmitted(dest) } // isAdmitted reports whether a peer completed the auth handshake and its token @@ -150,8 +152,6 @@ type SamNode struct { RouterPeerID peer.ID authenticatedRouters map[peer.ID]bool peerLastEventTime map[string]int64 - receivedMsgs map[string][]string - topics map[string]*pubsub.Topic mu sync.Mutex nodeConfig *NodeConfigComplete revokedPeers *lru.Cache[string, int64] @@ -284,8 +284,6 @@ func NewSamNode(cfg Options) (*SamNode, error) { Store: cfg.Store, trustedKeys: trustedKeys, peerLastEventTime: make(map[string]int64), - receivedMsgs: make(map[string][]string), - topics: make(map[string]*pubsub.Topic), authenticatedRouters: make(map[peer.ID]bool), nodeConfig: cfg.NodeConfig, AllowLoopback: cfg.AllowLoopback, @@ -567,12 +565,24 @@ func (n *SamNode) Start(ctx context.Context) error { } } - // Initialize Gossipsub for control plane events - ps, err := pubsub.NewGossipSub(ctx, h) + // Initialize Gossipsub for control plane events. StrictSign is the + // library default; it is pinned because the event validator and the + // per-author rate limit key on msg.GetFrom(), which only the signature + // makes trustworthy. + ps, err := pubsub.NewGossipSub(ctx, h, pubsub.WithMessageSignaturePolicy(pubsub.StrictSign)) if err != nil { return err } n.PubSub = ps + // Validate control-plane events before GossipSub accepts or re-forwards + // them: one ed25519 verify per message, so a peer flooding the topic with + // junk costs itself the verify and never reaches the subscriber or the + // next hop. Without this the rate limit ran first, keyed on the + // forwarding peer, and a flood via the router exhausted the router's + // budget so real ban and rotation events were dropped. + if err := ps.RegisterTopicValidator(api.GossipEvents, n.validateMeshEvent); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("register mesh event validator: %w", err) + } // Interest-scoped service announcements (provider + consumer roles). n.Discovery = samdiscovery.New(ps, h.ID()) @@ -1232,8 +1242,12 @@ func (n *SamNode) listenForControlPlaneEvents(ctx context.Context) { return } - if !n.rateLimiter.Allow(msg.ReceivedFrom.String()) { - logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] rate limit exceeded, dropping message", "event", meshEventRateLimitDrop, "peer", msg.ReceivedFrom.String()) + // validateMeshEvent already rejected anything unsigned, misspelled or + // stale; what arrives here is a genuine control-plane event. The limit + // is on the author, so a burst from one control plane cannot be + // blamed on the router that relayed it. + if !n.rateLimiter.Allow(msg.GetFrom().String()) { + logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] rate limit exceeded, dropping message", "event", meshEventRateLimitDrop, "peer", msg.GetFrom().String()) continue } @@ -1243,24 +1257,6 @@ func (n *SamNode) listenForControlPlaneEvents(ctx context.Context) { continue } - // Since the signature is verified against our list of trusted control plane public keys - // in verifyEvent below, any message with a valid signature is cryptographically - // proven to have been authored by one of the control planes. We do not restrict msg.GetFrom() - // to a single RouterPeerID because there can be multiple control plane replicas in a cluster, - // each with its own PeerID. - - if !n.verifyEvent(&event) { - logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] potential spoofing attempt: invalid event signature", "event", meshEventSpoofingAttempt, "peer", msg.ReceivedFrom.String()) - continue - } - - // Freshness check: reject events older than the threshold to prevent replay attacks - eventTime := time.UnixMilli(event.Timestamp) - if time.Since(eventTime) > FreshnessThreshold || time.Until(eventTime) > FreshnessThreshold { - logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] dropping stale or future event", "event", meshEventStaleEvent, "peer", msg.ReceivedFrom.String(), "timestamp", event.Timestamp) - continue - } - switch event.Type { case api.MeshEvent_BANNED: n.handleBannedEvent(&event) @@ -1440,45 +1436,28 @@ func (n *SamNode) verifyEvent(event *api.MeshEvent) bool { return false } -func (n *SamNode) subscribeToTopic(ctx context.Context, topicName string) error { - n.mu.Lock() - defer n.mu.Unlock() - - if _, ok := n.topics[topicName]; ok { - return nil - } - - topic, err := n.PubSub.Join(topicName) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - sub, err := topic.Subscribe() - if err != nil { - return err - } - - n.topics[topicName] = topic - - logger.Infof("[PubSub] Started subscription background loop for topic: %s", topicName) - go func() { - defer func() { - sub.Cancel() - logger.Infof("[PubSub] Exited subscription background loop for topic: %s", topicName) - }() - for { - msg, err := sub.Next(context.Background()) - if err != nil { - logger.Errorf("[PubSub] subscription Next() error for topic %s: %v", topicName, err) - return - } - logger.Debugf("[PubSub] Received message on topic %s from %s: %s", topicName, msg.ReceivedFrom, string(msg.Data)) - n.mu.Lock() - n.receivedMsgs[topicName] = append(n.receivedMsgs[topicName], string(msg.Data)) - n.mu.Unlock() - } - }() - return nil +// validateMeshEvent is the GossipSub validator for api.GossipEvents. Reject +// means the message is dropped and not re-forwarded; the signature is checked +// against the trusted control-plane keys, so any peer whose libp2p key +// signed the pubsub envelope still cannot get an unsigned event past here. A +// stale event is ignored rather than rejected: it may be a genuine event +// that arrived late, and there is no reason to penalize its forwarder. +func (n *SamNode) validateMeshEvent(_ context.Context, from peer.ID, msg *pubsub.Message) pubsub.ValidationResult { + var event api.MeshEvent + if err := proto.Unmarshal(msg.Data, &event); err != nil { + logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] rejecting undecodable event", "event", meshEventSpoofingAttempt, "peer", from.String()) + return pubsub.ValidationReject + } + if !n.verifyEvent(&event) { + logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] potential spoofing attempt: invalid event signature", "event", meshEventSpoofingAttempt, "peer", from.String()) + return pubsub.ValidationReject + } + eventTime := time.UnixMilli(event.Timestamp) + if time.Since(eventTime) > FreshnessThreshold || time.Until(eventTime) > FreshnessThreshold { + logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] dropping stale or future event", "event", meshEventStaleEvent, "peer", from.String(), "timestamp", event.Timestamp) + return pubsub.ValidationIgnore + } + return pubsub.ValidationAccept } func (n *SamNode) startDiscovery(ctx context.Context, meshID string, interval time.Duration) { diff --git a/internal/node/openai_facade.go b/internal/node/openai_facade.go index dee7b216..4ebcd37d 100644 --- a/internal/node/openai_facade.go +++ b/internal/node/openai_facade.go @@ -408,33 +408,31 @@ func (f *openAIFacade) handleCompletions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) if p.peerID == "" { f.serveLocal(aw, attempt, p.service) } else { - // Labels ranked this provider; the label gate is the enforcement - // point: the provider's biscuit must attest the requirement before - // the request body leaves this node. The gate also runs when only - // the operator's floor requires it — a caller that asked for - // nothing is still held to the floor (VerifyPeerLabels ANDs both). - if len(requiredLabels) > 0 || len(f.floor()) > 0 { - if f.verifyPeerLabels == nil { + // Every provider is verified before the request body leaves this + // node: a discovered peer is only a provider once it has shown a + // control-plane-signed biscuit bound to it. The caller's label + // requirement and the operator's floor are extra checks on that + // same token (VerifyPeerLabels ANDs both). + if f.verifyPeerLabels == nil { + recordFacadeRejection(reasonLabelUnattested) + writeOpenAIError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "label_unattested", + "provider verification is unavailable on this node") + return + } + // No backoff on failure: the verdict is requirement-scoped, + // the provider stays eligible for unconstrained requests. + if err := f.verifyPeerLabels(r.Context(), p.peerID, requiredLabels); err != nil { + // With no caller requirement what failed is the floor or the + // peer's own identity; attribute it so the operator can tell + // their floor apart from a caller's requirement. + if len(requiredLabels) == 0 { + recordFacadeRejection(reasonEgressFloorMismatch) + } else { recordFacadeRejection(reasonLabelUnattested) - writeOpenAIError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "label_unattested", - "label enforcement is unavailable on this node") - return - } - // No backoff on failure: the verdict is requirement-scoped, - // the provider stays eligible for unconstrained requests. - if err := f.verifyPeerLabels(r.Context(), p.peerID, requiredLabels); err != nil { - // With no caller requirement the only thing that can have - // failed is the floor; attribute it so the operator can - // tell their floor apart from a caller's requirement. - if len(requiredLabels) == 0 { - recordFacadeRejection(reasonEgressFloorMismatch) - } else { - recordFacadeRejection(reasonLabelUnattested) - } - logger.Warnf("[OpenAIFacade] provider peer=%q service=%q failed label attestation for %v (egress floor %v): %v; trying next", - p.peerID, p.service, requiredLabels, f.floor(), err) - continue } + logger.Warnf("[OpenAIFacade] provider peer=%q service=%q failed verification for %v (egress floor %v): %v; trying next", + p.peerID, p.service, requiredLabels, f.floor(), err) + continue } attempt.URL.Path = fmt.Sprintf("/sam/%s/%s/%s%s", p.peerID, api.ServiceTypeStringInference, p.service, r.URL.Path) attempt.URL.RawPath = "" diff --git a/internal/node/openai_facade_test.go b/internal/node/openai_facade_test.go index 7fd8e3fb..45b18366 100644 --- a/internal/node/openai_facade_test.go +++ b/internal/node/openai_facade_test.go @@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ func newFakeModelService(name string, handler http.Handler, models ...string) *f } // newTestFacade builds a facade with inert seams; tests override as needed. +// The provider verifier accepts everyone: tests that care about the gate +// replace it, and tests of the fail-closed path set it to nil explicitly. func newTestFacade() *openAIFacade { return &openAIFacade{ ttl: time.Minute, @@ -61,6 +63,7 @@ func newTestFacade() *openAIFacade { remoteModels: func(_ context.Context, _, _ string) ([]string, error) { return nil, nil }, + verifyPeerLabels: func(context.Context, string, map[string]string) error { return nil }, } } @@ -737,7 +740,8 @@ func TestFacade_Completions_LabelAttestation(t *testing.T) { }) t.Run("requirement with enforcement unavailable fails closed", func(t *testing.T) { - f := newLabelFacade() // verifyPeerLabels deliberately nil + f := newLabelFacade() + f.verifyPeerLabels = nil f.forward = http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { t.Error("request must not be forwarded without attestation") }) @@ -752,16 +756,33 @@ func TestFacade_Completions_LabelAttestation(t *testing.T) { } }) - t.Run("no requirement never attests", func(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("no requirement still verifies the provider", func(t *testing.T) { + // A discovered peer is not a provider until its identity checks + // out, whether or not the caller asked for a label. Here every + // provider fails verification, so nothing may be forwarded. f := newLabelFacade() - f.verifyPeerLabels = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ map[string]string) error { - t.Error("attestation must not run without a requirement") - return nil + verified := 0 + f.verifyPeerLabels = func(_ context.Context, _ string, required map[string]string) error { + verified++ + if len(required) != 0 { + t.Errorf("required = %v, want none", required) + } + return fmt.Errorf("not an enrolled peer") } - f.forward = http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {}) + f.forward = http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + t.Error("an unverified provider must not receive the request") + }) req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/chat/completions", strings.NewReader(`{"model":"m1"}`)) - f.handleCompletions(httptest.NewRecorder(), req) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + f.handleCompletions(rec, req) + + if verified != 2 { + t.Errorf("verifier ran %d times, want once per provider (2)", verified) + } + if rec.Code == http.StatusOK { + t.Errorf("status = %d, want a failure when no provider verifies", rec.Code) + } }) } @@ -963,7 +984,8 @@ func TestFacade_Completions_FloorGatesSilentCaller(t *testing.T) { }) t.Run("a floor with no gate seam fails closed", func(t *testing.T) { - f := newFloorFacade() // verifyPeerLabels stays nil + f := newFloorFacade() + f.verifyPeerLabels = nil forwarded := false f.forward = http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { forwarded = true }) diff --git a/internal/node/proxy_test.go b/internal/node/proxy_test.go index c9cc5c35..c932aec5 100644 --- a/internal/node/proxy_test.go +++ b/internal/node/proxy_test.go @@ -123,17 +123,9 @@ func TestDatapathIntegration(t *testing.T) { } }() - // Setup identity for Node B (the caller proxy) and trust it on Node A - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("gen root: %v", err) - } - if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(nodeB, rootPriv); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit: %v", err) - } - nodeA.keysMu.Lock() - nodeA.trustedKeys = append(nodeA.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeA.keysMu.Unlock() + // Both nodes enrolled under one root: B (the caller proxy) authenticates + // to A, and A must show B a verifiable identity before B forwards to it. + enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeB) // Connect Node B to Node A directly err = nodeB.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeA.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeA.Host.Addrs()}) @@ -468,17 +460,8 @@ func TestStdioDatapathIntegration(t *testing.T) { } defer func() { _ = nodeB.Host.Close() }() - // Setup identity for Node B (the caller proxy) and trust it on Node A - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("gen root: %v", err) - } - if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(nodeB, rootPriv); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit: %v", err) - } - nodeA.keysMu.Lock() - nodeA.trustedKeys = append(nodeA.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeA.keysMu.Unlock() + // Both nodes enrolled under one root (see TestDatapathIntegration). + enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeB) // Connect Node B to Node A directly err = nodeB.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeA.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeA.Host.Addrs()}) @@ -656,16 +639,7 @@ func TestDatapathHeadersAndRoutingTable(t *testing.T) { } }() - rootPub, rootPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("gen root: %v", err) - } - if err := buildAndSaveBiscuit(nodeB, rootPriv); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveBiscuit: %v", err) - } - nodeA.keysMu.Lock() - nodeA.trustedKeys = append(nodeA.trustedKeys, TrustedKey{Key: rootPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}) - nodeA.keysMu.Unlock() + enrollUnderRoot(t, nodeA, nodeB) err = nodeB.Host.Connect(ctx, peer.AddrInfo{ID: nodeA.Host.ID(), Addrs: nodeA.Host.Addrs()}) if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/node/relay_acl_test.go b/internal/node/relay_acl_test.go index c0829300..94d86574 100644 --- a/internal/node/relay_acl_test.go +++ b/internal/node/relay_acl_test.go @@ -43,11 +43,18 @@ func TestNodeRelayACL_AllowConnect(t *testing.T) { t.Errorf("Expected AllowConnect to return false when dest is not authenticated, even if src is") } - // Dest is authenticated, src is not -> should succeed + // Dest is authenticated, src is not -> should fail: an unauthenticated + // source must not reach admitted peers through this node's relay. node.authPeers.Delete(srcPeer) node.authPeers.Store(destPeer, time.Now().Add(time.Hour)) + if acl.AllowConnect(srcPeer, srcAddr, destPeer) { + t.Errorf("Expected AllowConnect to return false when src is not authenticated, even if dest is") + } + + // Both authenticated -> should succeed + node.authPeers.Store(srcPeer, time.Now().Add(time.Hour)) if !acl.AllowConnect(srcPeer, srcAddr, destPeer) { - t.Errorf("Expected AllowConnect to return true when dest is authenticated") + t.Errorf("Expected AllowConnect to return true when both src and dest are authenticated") } } diff --git a/internal/node/sidecar.go b/internal/node/sidecar.go index 38ee0af3..ff3c5cac 100644 --- a/internal/node/sidecar.go +++ b/internal/node/sidecar.go @@ -747,37 +747,40 @@ func createEgressProxy(node *SamNode) http.Handler { return } - // The operator's egress floor (egress.require_labels) holds at this - // chokepoint whatever the surface, so an agent that skips the facade - // and dials /sam//... raw is gated the same way. required is nil: - // any caller requirement was already enforced by the surface that - // parsed it; the floor is what a silent caller cannot waive. - if floor := node.egressFloor(); len(floor) > 0 { - route, ok := parseEgressRoute(r.URL.Path) - if !ok { - http.Error(w, "Forbidden: egress floor in force and request names no peer", http.StatusForbidden) - return - } - pid, err := peer.Decode(route.peerID) - if err != nil { - http.Error(w, "Bad Request: invalid peer ID", http.StatusBadRequest) - return - } - // The verdict is for the canonical peer, so the dial must name the - // same form: rewrite the segment the Director will re-parse rather - // than let a non-canonical spelling travel past the gate. - if canonical := pid.String(); route.peerID != canonical { - parts := strings.SplitN(r.URL.Path, "/", 6) - if len(parts) >= 3 { - parts[2] = canonical - r.URL.Path = strings.Join(parts, "/") - } + // Every egress destination must prove it is an enrolled peer: the + // label gate verifies the peer's control-plane-signed biscuit (cached + // per peer) and, when the operator set an egress floor + // (egress.require_labels), holds it to that too. required is nil: any + // caller requirement was already enforced by the surface that parsed + // it; the floor is what a silent caller cannot waive. + route, ok := parseEgressRoute(r.URL.Path) + if !ok { + http.Error(w, "Bad Request: request names no peer", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + pid, err := peer.Decode(route.peerID) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, "Bad Request: invalid peer ID", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + // The verdict is for the canonical peer, so the dial must name the + // same form: rewrite the segment the Director will re-parse rather + // than let a non-canonical spelling travel past the gate. + if canonical := pid.String(); route.peerID != canonical { + parts := strings.SplitN(r.URL.Path, "/", 6) + if len(parts) >= 3 { + parts[2] = canonical + r.URL.Path = strings.Join(parts, "/") } - if err := node.VerifyPeerLabels(r.Context(), pid, nil); err != nil { - logger.Warnf("[Egress] floor gate refused egress to %s: %v", pid, err) + } + if err := node.VerifyPeerLabels(r.Context(), pid, nil); err != nil { + logger.Warnf("[Egress] refused egress to %s: %v", pid, err) + if len(node.egressFloor()) > 0 { http.Error(w, "Forbidden: provider does not attest the egress floor", http.StatusForbidden) - return + } else { + http.Error(w, "Forbidden: destination is not an enrolled peer", http.StatusForbidden) } + return } r.Header.Set(api.HeaderSamBiscuit, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(biscuitBytes)) diff --git a/internal/router/relay_acl_test.go b/internal/router/relay_acl_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac6bc2c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/router/relay_acl_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package router + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/google/sam/api" + pubsub "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-pubsub" + pubsub_pb "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-pubsub/pb" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" +) + +func newTestPeerID(t *testing.T) peer.ID { + t.Helper() + priv, _, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + id, err := peer.IDFromPrivateKey(priv) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return id +} + +// A relay circuit needs both ends authenticated. Every node authenticates to +// the router on connect, so a source that has not is not a mesh member and +// must not reach admitted peers through the router. +func TestRelayACLAllowConnectRequiresAuthenticatedSource(t *testing.T) { + r := &Router{} + acl := &relayACL{r: r} + src, dest := newTestPeerID(t), newTestPeerID(t) + addr, _ := multiaddr.NewMultiaddr("/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/1234") + + r.authenticatedPeers.Store(dest, true) + if acl.AllowConnect(src, addr, dest) { + t.Error("an unauthenticated source must not connect to an authenticated destination") + } + + r.authenticatedPeers.Store(src, true) + if !acl.AllowConnect(src, addr, dest) { + t.Error("two authenticated peers must be allowed to connect") + } + + r.authenticatedPeers.Delete(dest) + if acl.AllowConnect(src, addr, dest) { + t.Error("an authenticated source must not connect to an unauthenticated destination") + } + + r.authenticatedPeers.Store(dest, true) + r.bannedPeers.Store(src, time.Now()) + if acl.AllowConnect(src, addr, dest) { + t.Error("a banned source must not connect even while still marked authenticated") + } +} + +// The router's GossipSub validator drops unsigned or forged events at the +// first hop instead of fanning them out to every attached node. +func TestRouterValidateMeshEvent(t *testing.T) { + cpPub, cpPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, otherPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + r := &Router{trustedPublicKeys: []ed25519.PublicKey{cpPub}} + from, target := newTestPeerID(t), newTestPeerID(t) + + signed := func(key ed25519.PrivateKey, at time.Time) []byte { + event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, PeerId: target.String(), Timestamp: at.UnixMilli()} + unsigned, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + event.Signature = ed25519.Sign(key, unsigned) + data, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return data + } + + tests := []struct { + name string + data []byte + want pubsub.ValidationResult + }{ + {"fresh event from trusted control plane", signed(cpPriv, time.Now()), pubsub.ValidationAccept}, + {"event signed by an untrusted key", signed(otherPriv, time.Now()), pubsub.ValidationReject}, + {"undecodable payload", []byte("junk"), pubsub.ValidationReject}, + {"stale event", signed(cpPriv, time.Now().Add(-2*meshEventFreshness)), pubsub.ValidationIgnore}, + } + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + msg := &pubsub.Message{Message: &pubsub_pb.Message{From: []byte(from), Data: tt.data}} + if got := r.validateMeshEvent(context.Background(), from, msg); got != tt.want { + t.Errorf("validateMeshEvent = %v, want %v", got, tt.want) + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/router/router.go b/internal/router/router.go index 74a4d34a..85c80a43 100644 --- a/internal/router/router.go +++ b/internal/router/router.go @@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ func (a *relayACL) AllowConnect(src peer.ID, srcAddr multiaddr.Multiaddr, dest p logger.Debugf("[Relay] Rejecting connect from %s to %s: dest is banned", src, dest) return false } + // Both ends must have authenticated: every node authenticates to the + // router on connect, so a source that has not is not a mesh member. + if _, ok := a.r.authenticatedPeers.Load(src); !ok { + logger.Debugf("[Relay] Rejecting connect from %s to %s: src not authenticated", src, dest) + return false + } _, ok := a.r.authenticatedPeers.Load(dest) if !ok { logger.Debugf("[Relay] Rejecting connect from %s to %s: dest not authenticated", src, dest) @@ -340,13 +346,21 @@ func (r *Router) Start() error { return err } - // Setup PubSub - ps, err := pubsub.NewGossipSub(r.ctx, hostNode) + // Setup PubSub. StrictSign is the default; pinned because the event + // validator trusts msg.GetFrom(). + ps, err := pubsub.NewGossipSub(r.ctx, hostNode, pubsub.WithMessageSignaturePolicy(pubsub.StrictSign)) if err != nil { _ = hostNode.Close() return err } r.PubSub = ps + // The router is the hub every node gossips through. Validating here + // stops a junk event at the first hop instead of fanning it out to every + // attached node, each of which would spend a verify on it. + if err := ps.RegisterTopicValidator(api.GossipEvents, r.validateMeshEvent); err != nil { + _ = hostNode.Close() + return fmt.Errorf("register mesh event validator: %w", err) + } topic, err := ps.Join(api.GossipEvents) if err != nil { @@ -714,6 +728,31 @@ func (r *Router) verifyEvent(event *api.MeshEvent) bool { return false } +// meshEventFreshness bounds how far an event's timestamp may be from now +// before it is treated as a replay (or a clock the router cannot trust). +const meshEventFreshness = 5 * time.Minute + +// validateMeshEvent is the GossipSub validator for api.GossipEvents: reject +// (drop and do not forward) anything undecodable or not signed by a trusted +// control plane, ignore anything stale. +func (r *Router) validateMeshEvent(_ context.Context, from peer.ID, msg *pubsub.Message) pubsub.ValidationResult { + var event api.MeshEvent + if err := proto.Unmarshal(msg.Data, &event); err != nil { + logger.Warnf("[Router Event] Rejecting undecodable event from %s", from) + return pubsub.ValidationReject + } + if !r.verifyEvent(&event) { + logger.Warnf("[Router Event] Potential spoofing attempt: invalid signature on event from %s", from) + return pubsub.ValidationReject + } + eventTime := time.UnixMilli(event.Timestamp) + if time.Since(eventTime) > meshEventFreshness || time.Until(eventTime) > meshEventFreshness { + logger.Warnf("[Router Event] Dropping stale or future event from %s", from) + return pubsub.ValidationIgnore + } + return pubsub.ValidationAccept +} + func (r *Router) listenForControlPlaneEvents(ctx context.Context) { defer r.wg.Done() if r.EventTopic == nil { @@ -732,23 +771,13 @@ func (r *Router) listenForControlPlaneEvents(ctx context.Context) { return } + // validateMeshEvent already rejected anything unsigned or stale. var event api.MeshEvent if err := proto.Unmarshal(msg.Data, &event); err != nil { logger.Errorf("[Router Event] Failed to unmarshal event from %s: %v", msg.ReceivedFrom, err) continue } - if !r.verifyEvent(&event) { - logger.Warnf("[Router Event] Potential spoofing attempt: invalid signature on event from %s", msg.ReceivedFrom) - continue - } - - eventTime := time.UnixMilli(event.Timestamp) - if time.Since(eventTime) > 5*time.Minute || time.Until(eventTime) > 5*time.Minute { - logger.Warnf("[Router Event] Dropping stale or future event from %s", msg.ReceivedFrom) - continue - } - switch event.Type { case api.MeshEvent_BANNED: if event.PeerId != "" { diff --git a/site/content/docs/integrations/vscode-copilot.md b/site/content/docs/integrations/vscode-copilot.md index 07eb81f7..aad1d6f6 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/integrations/vscode-copilot.md +++ b/site/content/docs/integrations/vscode-copilot.md @@ -338,10 +338,9 @@ The real output: ```text mesh offered model: openrouter/auto -mesh granted 9 tools: call_remote_tool, describe_remote_tool, +mesh granted 6 tools: call_remote_tool, describe_remote_tool, discover_remote_services, find_remote_tools, get_mesh_info, - list_local_services, mesh_pubsub_broadcast, poll_messages, - subscribe_topic + list_local_services step 1: get_mesh_info({}) This node is connected to **23 peers**. ``` diff --git a/site/content/docs/snippets/banana_bot_playground.py b/site/content/docs/snippets/banana_bot_playground.py deleted file mode 100644 index 35761abe..00000000 --- a/site/content/docs/snippets/banana_bot_playground.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,441 +0,0 @@ -import asyncio -import os -import sys -import json -import random -import httpx -from typing import Optional, Dict, Any, List -from mcp import ClientSession -from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamable_http_client - -class SamClient: - """Inlined SAM Client for self-contained execution.""" - def __init__(self, server_url: Optional[str] = None, token: Optional[str] = None): - if server_url is None: - server_url = os.environ.get("SAM_MCP_URL", "http://localhost:8080/mcp") - if token is None: - token = os.environ.get("SAM_API_TOKEN") - self.server_url = server_url - self.token = token - self.session: Optional[ClientSession] = None - self._sse_cm = None - self.lock = asyncio.Lock() - - async def connect(self): - headers = {"Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream"} - if self.token: - headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {self.token}" - self._http_client = httpx.AsyncClient( - headers=headers, - follow_redirects=True, - # The SDK's SSE-friendly defaults; httpx's default 5s read timeout drops the stream. - timeout=httpx.Timeout(30.0, read=300.0), - ) - try: - self._sse_cm = streamable_http_client(self.server_url, http_client=self._http_client) - res = await self._sse_cm.__aenter__() - read_stream, write_stream = res[0], res[1] - self.session = ClientSession(read_stream, write_stream) - await self.session.__aenter__() - await self.session.initialize() - except Exception: - # The retry loop in __aenter__ would otherwise orphan this - # attempt's http client and half-entered streams. - await self.close() - raise - - async def close(self): - if self.session: - await self.session.__aexit__(None, None, None) - if self._sse_cm: - await self._sse_cm.__aexit__(None, None, None) - if getattr(self, "_http_client", None): - await self._http_client.aclose() - self.session = None - self._sse_cm = None - self._http_client = None - - async def get_tools(self) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]: - if not self.session: - raise RuntimeError("Not connected") - async with self.lock: - resp = await self.session.list_tools() - return [t.model_dump() if hasattr(t, "model_dump") else t for t in resp.tools] - - async def call_tool(self, name: str, arguments: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]: - if not self.session: - raise RuntimeError("Not connected") - async with self.lock: - resp = await self.session.call_tool(name, arguments) - return resp.model_dump() if hasattr(resp, "model_dump") else resp - - async def __aenter__(self): - for attempt in range(1, 13): - try: - await self.connect() - return self - except Exception as e: - if attempt == 12: - raise - print(f"[-] Failed to connect to SAM node (attempt {attempt}/12): {e}. Retrying in 5 seconds...") - await asyncio.sleep(5.0) - return self - - async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc_val, exc_tb): - await self.close() - -CHAT_TOPIC = "mesh-chat-playground" -MODEL_NAME = "gemini-flash-latest" -NEW_CHATS_BUFFER = [] - -SYSTEM_INSTRUCTION = ( - "You are the Banana Bot (also known as the Mesh Police), a friendly, banana-themed AI bot " - "controlling and monitoring the Sovereign Agent Mesh (SAM). Your job is to explore the mesh, " - "inspect remote peers, verify they are healthy by executing their tools, and post " - "playful investigation reports, comments, or banana jokes to the public GossipSub chat topic. " - "Always stay in character. Use plenty of banana emojis (🍌, 💛, 🐒) and make jokes about " - "peers or users. You must act autonomously based on the tools available." -) - -def to_gemini_schema(schema: dict) -> dict: - """Helper to convert JSON schema types (lowercase) to Gemini API schema types (uppercase) and strip unsupported fields.""" - if not isinstance(schema, dict): - return schema - res = {} - for k, v in schema.items(): - if k == "additionalProperties": - continue - if k == "type" and isinstance(v, str): - res[k] = v.upper() - elif isinstance(v, dict): - res[k] = to_gemini_schema(v) - elif isinstance(v, list): - res[k] = [to_gemini_schema(item) if isinstance(item, dict) else item for item in v] - else: - res[k] = v - return res - -class FallbackAgent: - def __init__(self, client: SamClient, api_key: str, token: str, local_node_url: str): - self.client = client - self.api_key = api_key - self.token = token - self.base_url = local_node_url.rsplit("/mcp", 1)[0] - self.current_model = None - self.mesh_history = [] - self.gemini_history = [] - - def clear_session(self): - """Reset conversational history at the end of each cycle.""" - self.current_model = None - self.mesh_history = [] - self.gemini_history = [] - - async def get_vllm_peer_id(self) -> str: - """Finds the peer ID of the vllm-tpu service on the mesh.""" - try: - res = await self.client.call_tool("discover_remote_services", {"type": "inference", "name": "vllm-tpu"}) - content = res.get("content", [{}])[0].get("text", "[]") - peers = json.loads(content) - if peers: - return peers[0].get("peer_id") - except Exception as e: - pass - return "" - - async def step(self, prompt: str, mcp_tools: list) -> dict: - if self.current_model is None: - peer_id = await self.get_vllm_peer_id() - if peer_id: - print(f"[*] [Fallback Agent] Found vllm-tpu on peer {peer_id[:8]}... Trying mesh model.") - self.current_model = "mesh" - res = await self.step_mesh(peer_id, prompt, mcp_tools) - if res: - return res - print("[*] [Fallback Agent] Mesh model failed. Falling back to Gemini.") - - self.current_model = "gemini" - - if self.current_model == "mesh": - peer_id = await self.get_vllm_peer_id() - if peer_id: - res = await self.step_mesh(peer_id, prompt, mcp_tools) - if res: - return res - print("[*] [Fallback Agent] Mesh model follow-up failed. Falling back to Gemini.") - self.current_model = "gemini" - return await self.step_gemini(prompt, mcp_tools) - else: - return await self.step_gemini(prompt, mcp_tools) - - async def step_mesh(self, peer_id: str, prompt: str, mcp_tools: list) -> dict: - url = f"{self.base_url}/sam/{peer_id}/inference/vllm-tpu/v1/chat/completions" - headers = { - "Authorization": f"Bearer {self.token}", - "Content-Type": "application/json" - } - - tools = [] - for tool in mcp_tools: - tools.append({ - "type": "function", - "function": { - "name": tool["name"], - "description": tool.get("description", ""), - "parameters": tool.get("input_schema") or tool.get("inputSchema") or {} - } - }) - - messages = list(self.mesh_history) - if not messages or messages[-1].get("role") != "user": - messages.append({"role": "user", "content": prompt}) - self.mesh_history.append({"role": "user", "content": prompt}) - - payload = { - "model": "google/gemma-2-2b-it", - "messages": messages, - "temperature": 0.2 - } - if tools: - payload["tools"] = tools - - try: - async with httpx.AsyncClient() as http_client: - resp = await http_client.post(url, json=payload, headers=headers, timeout=25.0) - if resp.status_code != 200: - print(f"[-] Mesh Model HTTP Error {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") - return None - - data = resp.json() - choice = data.get("choices", [{}])[0] - message = choice.get("message", {}) - - text_response = message.get("content") or "" - tool_calls = message.get("tool_calls") or [] - - calls = [] - for tc in tool_calls: - fn = tc.get("function", {}) - args = {} - if fn.get("arguments"): - try: - args = json.loads(fn["arguments"]) - except Exception: - pass - calls.append({ - "name": fn.get("name"), - "args": args - }) - - self.mesh_history.append(message) - return { - "text": text_response, - "calls": calls - } - except Exception as e: - return None - - async def step_gemini(self, prompt: str, mcp_tools: list) -> dict: - url = f"https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/{MODEL_NAME}:generateContent?key={self.api_key}" - - function_declarations = [] - for tool in mcp_tools: - decl = { - "name": tool["name"], - "description": tool.get("description", ""), - } - if "input_schema" in tool: - decl["parameters"] = to_gemini_schema(tool["input_schema"]) - elif "inputSchema" in tool: - decl["parameters"] = to_gemini_schema(tool["inputSchema"]) - function_declarations.append(decl) - - contents = list(self.gemini_history) - contents.append({"role": "user", "parts": [{"text": prompt}]}) - self.gemini_history.append({"role": "user", "parts": [{"text": prompt}]}) - - payload = { - "contents": contents, - "systemInstruction": { - "parts": [{"text": SYSTEM_INSTRUCTION}] - } - } - if function_declarations: - payload["tools"] = [{"functionDeclarations": function_declarations}] - - for attempt in range(3): - try: - async with httpx.AsyncClient() as http_client: - resp = await http_client.post(url, json=payload, timeout=25.0) - if resp.status_code == 200: - data = resp.json() - candidates = data.get("candidates", []) - if not candidates: - return {"text": "No response from Gemini.", "calls": []} - - candidate = candidates[0] - content = candidate.get("content", {}) - parts = content.get("parts", []) - - text_response = "" - calls = [] - for part in parts: - if "text" in part: - text_response += part["text"] - if "functionCall" in part: - calls.append(part["functionCall"]) - - self.gemini_history.append(content) - return { - "text": text_response, - "calls": calls - } - elif resp.status_code in [429, 503]: - print(f"[-] Gemini returned {resp.status_code}, retrying in 3s (attempt {attempt+1}/3)...") - await asyncio.sleep(3.0) - continue - else: - print(f"[-] Gemini HTTP Error {resp.status_code}: {resp.text}") - return {"text": f"Gemini error {resp.status_code}.", "calls": []} - except Exception as e: - if attempt == 2: - return {"text": f"Gemini error: {e}", "calls": []} - print(f"[-] Gemini connection exception: {e}, retrying in 3s...") - await asyncio.sleep(3.0) - return {"text": "Gemini error: Max retries exceeded.", "calls": []} - - def add_tool_response(self, function_name: str, response_data: dict): - if self.current_model == "mesh": - self.mesh_history.append({ - "role": "tool", - "name": function_name, - "content": json.dumps(response_data), - "tool_call_id": "call_1" - }) - else: - self.gemini_history.append({ - "role": "function", - "parts": [{ - "functionResponse": { - "name": function_name, - "response": response_data - } - }] - }) - -async def poll_chat_messages(client: SamClient): - """Listens for GossipSub chat messages on the mesh and displays them.""" - print(f"[*] Subscribing to GossipSub chat: '{CHAT_TOPIC}'") - await client.call_tool("subscribe_topic", {"topic": CHAT_TOPIC}) - - print("[*] Listening for mesh chat messages...") - while True: - try: - res = await client.call_tool("poll_messages", {"topic": CHAT_TOPIC}) - text = res.get("content", [{}])[0].get("text", "") - if "Messages on topic" in text and "[]" not in text: - print(f"\n📢 [Mesh Chat Channel] {text.strip()}") - prefix = f"Messages on topic {CHAT_TOPIC}: " - raw_msgs = text[len(prefix):].strip() - NEW_CHATS_BUFFER.append(raw_msgs) - if len(NEW_CHATS_BUFFER) > 10: - NEW_CHATS_BUFFER.pop(0) - except Exception as e: - print(f"[-] poll_messages error: {e}") - await asyncio.sleep(2.0) - await asyncio.sleep(2.0) - -async def run_banana_bot(): - api_key = os.environ.get("GEMINI_API_KEY") - url = os.environ.get("SAM_MCP_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp") - token = os.environ.get("SAM_API_TOKEN", "secret-token") - - if not api_key: - print("[!] GEMINI_API_KEY environment variable is not set. The bot will rely solely on the mesh model.") - - print("=" * 70) - print(" 🍌 BANANA BOT (MESH POLICE) ACTIVE ON SOVEREIGN AGENT MESH 🍌") - print("=" * 70) - print(f"Connecting to local node: {url}") - - try: - async with SamClient(server_url=url, token=token) as client: - print("[+] Connected to SAM local node.") - - agent = FallbackAgent(client, api_key=api_key or "", token=token, local_node_url=url) - - # Start background task to listen to public GossipSub channel - asyncio.create_task(poll_chat_messages(client)) - - # Introduce ourselves to the mesh chat - intro_msg = "🍌 [Banana Bot] Hello mesh! The Mesh Police is now online and patrolling. Watch out for slips! 🍌" - await client.call_tool("mesh_pubsub_broadcast", {"topic": CHAT_TOPIC, "payload": intro_msg}) - - while True: - print("\n[*] Banana Bot scanning mesh for active peers...") - - # Fetch local control plane tools - local_tools = await client.get_tools() - - # Discover remote services - disc_res = await client.call_tool("discover_remote_services", {"type": "mcp"}) - disc_text = disc_res.get("content", [{}])[0].get("text", "[]") - try: - peers = json.loads(disc_text) - except Exception: - peers = [] - - # Extract and clear chats buffer - chats_snapshot = list(NEW_CHATS_BUFFER) - NEW_CHATS_BUFFER.clear() - - mesh_status = ( - f"Current active remote peers in the mesh: {json.dumps(peers)}\n" - f"Incoming chat messages on GKE GossipSub topic '{CHAT_TOPIC}' since last scan: {json.dumps(chats_snapshot)}\n\n" - "Select a peer to inspect, fetch its tools, run a tool, or broadcast " - "a reply/reaction to the incoming chat messages to the chat channel." - ) - - print(f"[*] Discovered {len(peers)} remote peer(s). Prompting Banana Bot...") - - # Step Fallback Agent - result = await agent.step(mesh_status, local_tools) - - if result["text"]: - print(f"\n🧠 [Banana Bot Thoughts]: {result['text'].strip()}") - - # Execute any function calls requested by the agent - for call in result["calls"]: - func_name = call["name"] - func_args = call.get("args", {}) - - print(f"\n⚡ [Banana Bot Action] Executing local tool '{func_name}' with args: {func_args}") - try: - tool_res = await client.call_tool(func_name, func_args) - print(f"🟢 [Banana Bot Action] Success: {tool_res}") - - agent.add_tool_response(func_name, tool_res) - - follow_up = await agent.step("Process the tool response and report/act.", local_tools) - if follow_up["text"]: - print(f"\n🧠 [Banana Bot Follow-up]: {follow_up['text'].strip()}") - except Exception as err: - print(f"🔴 [Banana Bot Action] Failed: {err}") - agent.add_tool_response(func_name, {"error": str(err)}) - - # Clear session history at the end of this patrol cycle - agent.clear_session() - - await asyncio.sleep(20.0) - - except KeyboardInterrupt: - print("\n[-] Banana Bot shutting down. Off duty! 🍌") - except Exception as e: - print(f"[!] Banana Bot crashed: {e}") - sys.exit(1) - -if __name__ == "__main__": - try: - asyncio.run(run_banana_bot()) - except KeyboardInterrupt: - print("\n[-] Off duty!") diff --git a/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md b/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md index 2b9cd1c6..0eb28f82 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md +++ b/site/content/docs/sovereignty.md @@ -135,5 +135,5 @@ When deploying SAM for mission-critical, sovereign agent operations: 2. **Maintain Root Cryptographic Key Custody:** Generate, manage, and hold your own Ed25519 root signing keys (via KMS/Cloud EKM or HSMs). 3. **Use Your Own OIDC Identity Provider:** Point `--issuer` to your internal Keycloak, Dex, or corporate IdP. 4. **Declare & Attest Sovereignty Labels:** Declare `labels: {jurisdiction: eu, region: }` in each node's `sam-node.yaml` and configure control plane roles with `allowed_labels`. -5. **Enforce Jurisdictional Egress:** Set `egress.require_labels` in `sam-node.yaml` (e.g. `jurisdiction: eu`) so every provider must attest the boundary before the node sends it anything. Agents may narrow further per request with `X-Sam-Required-Labels`, but cannot widen past the floor or waive it by omitting the header — the two are checked independently and every pair of the floor must hold. +5. **Enforce Jurisdictional Egress:** Set `egress.require_labels` in `sam-node.yaml` (e.g. `jurisdiction: eu`) so every provider must attest the boundary before the node sends it anything. Agents may narrow further per request with `X-Sam-Required-Labels`, but cannot widen past the floor or waive it by omitting the header — the two are checked independently and every pair of the floor must hold. Independently of any floor, a node forwards nothing to a peer that has not shown a control-plane-signed identity bound to it; discovery names candidates, it does not vouch for them. 6. **Set Local Attenuation Vetoes:** Configure local node `attenuation.policies` to retain final destination-side access control. diff --git a/tests/integration/failover_test.go b/tests/integration/failover_test.go index e04f9b47..6b05ea6d 100644 --- a/tests/integration/failover_test.go +++ b/tests/integration/failover_test.go @@ -278,21 +278,35 @@ roles: [] if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } + routerInfoB, err := peer.AddrInfoFromP2pAddr(multiaddr.StringCast(fmt.Sprintf("/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/%d/p2p/%s", routerPortB, peerIDB))) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } - ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second) + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second) defer cancel() + // The relay admits circuits only between peers that authenticated to + // the router, so the client is a mesh member: enrolled with CP B and + // handshaken with Router B before it dials the circuit. A fresh host per + // attempt sidesteps the swarm's dial backoff. var connectErr error for i := 0; i < 15; i++ { clientHost, err := libp2p.New(libp2p.NoListenAddrs, libp2p.EnableRelay()) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } - connectErr = clientHost.Connect(ctx, *addrInfo) + clientBiscuit := enrollClientOnControlPlane(t, httpPortCP_B, clientHost.ID(), clientHost.Peerstore().PrivKey(clientHost.ID()), nodeJWT) + if connectErr = clientHost.Connect(ctx, *routerInfoB); connectErr == nil { + if connectErr = authenticateWithRouter(ctx, clientHost, routerInfoB.ID, clientBiscuit); connectErr == nil { + connectErr = clientHost.Connect(ctx, *addrInfo) + } + } _ = clientHost.Close() if connectErr == nil { break } + t.Logf("attempt %d: %v", i+1, connectErr) time.Sleep(1 * time.Second) } @@ -300,6 +314,20 @@ roles: [] t.Fatalf("Failed to connect to Node B via router B relay: %v\nOutput: %s", connectErr, stdoutNode.String()+stderrNode.String()) } t.Log("Successfully connected to Node B via router B relay circuit!") + + // The same circuit is refused to a host that never authenticated to + // Router B: the relay is for mesh members, not for whoever can reach + // the router's port. + anonHost, err := libp2p.New(libp2p.NoListenAddrs, libp2p.EnableRelay()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer func() { _ = anonHost.Close() }() + anonCtx, anonCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer anonCancel() + if err := anonHost.Connect(anonCtx, *addrInfo); err == nil { + t.Fatal("an unauthenticated host reached the node through Router B's relay; the relay ACL must require an authenticated source") + } } // waitForActiveRouters polls the control plane's /info endpoint until at diff --git a/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go b/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go index 0622da45..572d3270 100644 --- a/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go +++ b/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import ( "github.com/google/sam/api" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/host" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" "github.com/libp2p/go-msgio" "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" @@ -235,44 +236,46 @@ roles: [] t.Fatalf("failed to connect client to Router A: %v", err) } - t.Log("Opening auth stream to Router A...") - s, err := clientHost.NewStream(context.Background(), routerInfoA.ID, api.AuthProtocolID) + t.Log("Authenticating to Router A with the CP B biscuit...") + if err := authenticateWithRouter(ctxConnect, clientHost, routerInfoA.ID, clientBiscuit); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("mutual auth with Router A failed: %v\nRouter A Stderr:\n%s\nRouter A Stdout:\n%s\nCP A Stderr:\n%s\nCP B Stderr:\n%s", + err, stderrRouterA.String(), stdoutRouterA.String(), stderrCP_A.String(), stderrCP_B.String()) + } + + t.Log("Successfully verified multi-master control plane signature trust!") +} + +// authenticateWithRouter runs the node side of the auth handshake on +// api.AuthProtocolID, which is what admits h to the router's relay. +func authenticateWithRouter(ctx context.Context, h host.Host, router peer.ID, biscuit []byte) error { + s, err := h.NewStream(ctx, router, api.AuthProtocolID) if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to open auth stream: %v", err) + return fmt.Errorf("open auth stream: %w", err) } defer func() { _ = s.Close() }() + _ = s.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)) - t.Log("Writing auth frame with CP B biscuit to Router A...") - writer := msgio.NewVarintWriter(s) - authFrame := &api.AuthFrame{Biscuit: clientBiscuit} - authFrameBytes, err := proto.Marshal(authFrame) + authFrameBytes, err := proto.Marshal(&api.AuthFrame{Biscuit: biscuit}) if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) + return err } - if err := writer.WriteMsg(authFrameBytes); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to write auth frame: %v", err) + if err := msgio.NewVarintWriter(s).WriteMsg(authFrameBytes); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write auth frame: %w", err) } - - t.Log("Reading auth response from Router A...") reader := msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(s, 1024*64) respMsg, err := reader.ReadMsg() if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to read response from Router A: %v\nRouter A Stderr:\n%s\nRouter A Stdout:\n%s\nCP A Stderr:\n%s\nCP B Stderr:\n%s", - err, stderrRouterA.String(), stdoutRouterA.String(), stderrCP_A.String(), stderrCP_B.String()) + return fmt.Errorf("read auth response: %w", err) } defer reader.ReleaseMsg(respMsg) - var authResp api.AuthResponse if err := proto.Unmarshal(respMsg, &authResp); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal response: %v", err) + return fmt.Errorf("decode auth response: %w", err) } - if !authResp.Success { - t.Fatalf("mutual auth with Router A was rejected: %s\nRouter A Stderr:\n%s\nRouter A Stdout:\n%s\nCP A Stderr:\n%s\nCP B Stderr:\n%s", - authResp.Error, stderrRouterA.String(), stdoutRouterA.String(), stderrCP_A.String(), stderrCP_B.String()) + return fmt.Errorf("router rejected the handshake: %s", authResp.Error) } - - t.Log("Successfully verified multi-master control plane signature trust!") + return nil } func enrollClientOnControlPlane(t *testing.T, cpPort int, clientID peer.ID, privKey crypto.PrivKey, jwtToken string) []byte { diff --git a/tests/integration/pubsub_test.go b/tests/integration/pubsub_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 7a6db0a7..00000000 --- a/tests/integration/pubsub_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,183 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2026 Google LLC -// -// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -// You may obtain a copy of the License at -// -// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -// -// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -// limitations under the License. - -package integration_test - -import ( - "context" - "os" - "os/exec" - "path/filepath" - "strings" - "testing" - "time" -) - -func TestPubSubTools(t *testing.T) { - nodeBin := buildBinary(t, "./cmd/sam-node") - _, routerAddr := startMockRouter(t) - tmpHome1, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "pubsub-test-1") - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - t.Logf("Node 1 logs at: %s/node1.log", tmpHome1) - - tmpHome2, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "pubsub-test-2") - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - t.Logf("Node 2 logs at: %s/node2.log", tmpHome2) - - ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second) - defer cancel() - - // Start Node 1 - env1 := append(os.Environ(), "HOME="+tmpHome1, "XDG_CONFIG_HOME="+filepath.Join(tmpHome1, ".config")) - cmd1 := exec.CommandContext(ctx, nodeBin, "run", "--control-plane", routerAddr, "--bind-addr", "127.0.0.1:0", "--listen", "/ip4/127.0.0.1/udp/5003/quic-v1", "--listen", "/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/5004", "--jwt", "dummy-token", "--log-level", "debug", "--discovery-interval", "100ms", "--api-token-path", tokenPath(t, "test-token"), "--allow-loopback") - cmd1.Env = env1 - logFile1, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(tmpHome1, "node1.log")) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - cmd1.Stdout = logFile1 - cmd1.Stderr = logFile1 - if err := cmd1.Start(); err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - defer func() { _ = cmd1.Process.Kill(); _ = logFile1.Close() }() - - // Start Node 2 - env2 := append(os.Environ(), "HOME="+tmpHome2, "XDG_CONFIG_HOME="+filepath.Join(tmpHome2, ".config")) - cmd2 := exec.CommandContext(ctx, nodeBin, "run", "--control-plane", routerAddr, "--bind-addr", "127.0.0.1:0", "--listen", "/ip4/127.0.0.1/udp/5005/quic-v1", "--listen", "/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/5006", "--jwt", "dummy-token", "--log-level", "debug", "--discovery-interval", "100ms", "--api-token-path", tokenPath(t, "test-token"), "--allow-loopback") - cmd2.Env = env2 - logFile2, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(tmpHome2, "node2.log")) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - cmd2.Stdout = logFile2 - cmd2.Stderr = logFile2 - if err := cmd2.Start(); err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - defer func() { _ = cmd2.Process.Kill(); _ = logFile2.Close() }() - - // Helper to wait for MCP addr in log - waitForMCPAddr := func(t *testing.T, logPath string) string { - t.Helper() - deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second) - for time.Now().Before(deadline) { - data, _ := os.ReadFile(logPath) - lines := strings.Split(string(data), "\n") - for _, line := range lines { - if strings.Contains(line, "Starting MCP server on TCP address ") { - parts := strings.Split(line, "Starting MCP server on TCP address ") - if len(parts) > 1 { - return strings.TrimSpace(parts[1]) - } - } - } - time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) - } - t.Fatalf("timeout waiting for MCP addr in log: %s", logPath) - return "" - } - - mcpAddr1 := waitForMCPAddr(t, filepath.Join(tmpHome1, "node1.log")) - mcpAddr2 := waitForMCPAddr(t, filepath.Join(tmpHome2, "node2.log")) - - // Helper to call MCP tool - callTool := func(mcpAddr string, toolName string, params map[string]any) string { - return callMCP(t, mcpAddr, toolName, params) - } - - waitForPeerInfoInLog := func(t *testing.T, logPath string) string { - t.Helper() - deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second) - for time.Now().Before(deadline) { - data, _ := os.ReadFile(logPath) - lines := strings.Split(string(data), "\n") - var peerID string - var tcpAddr string - for _, line := range lines { - if strings.Contains(line, "PeerID: ") { - parts := strings.Split(line, "PeerID: ") - if len(parts) > 1 { - peerID = strings.TrimSpace(parts[1]) - } - } - if strings.Contains(line, "Listening on: ") { - parts := strings.Split(line, " ") - for _, p := range parts { - if strings.Contains(p, "/tcp/") { - tcpAddr = strings.Trim(p, "[]") - } - } - } - } - if peerID != "" && tcpAddr != "" { - return tcpAddr + "/p2p/" + peerID - } - time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) - } - t.Fatalf("timeout waiting for peer info in log: %s", logPath) - return "" - } - - // Force Node 1 to connect to Node 2 - addr2 := waitForPeerInfoInLog(t, filepath.Join(tmpHome2, "node2.log")) - t.Logf("Node 2 address: %s", addr2) - connectPeer(t, mcpAddr1, addr2) - - // Node 1 subscribes to topic "test-topic" - subscribeResult1 := callTool(mcpAddr1, "subscribe_topic", map[string]any{ - "topic": "test-topic", - }) - if !strings.Contains(subscribeResult1, "Subscribed") { - t.Fatalf("Subscribe node 1 failed: %s", subscribeResult1) - } - - // Node 2 subscribes to topic "test-topic" - subscribeResult2 := callTool(mcpAddr2, "subscribe_topic", map[string]any{ - "topic": "test-topic", - }) - if !strings.Contains(subscribeResult2, "Subscribed") { - t.Fatalf("Subscribe node 2 failed: %s", subscribeResult2) - } - - var pollResult string - deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second) - for time.Now().Before(deadline) { - // Node 1 broadcasts on topic "test-topic" - broadcastResult := callTool(mcpAddr1, "mesh_pubsub_broadcast", map[string]any{ - "topic": "test-topic", - "payload": "hello from node 1", - }) - if !strings.Contains(broadcastResult, "Published") { - t.Fatalf("Broadcast failed: %s", broadcastResult) - } - - // Node 2 polls for messages on topic "test-topic" - pollResult = callTool(mcpAddr2, "poll_messages", map[string]any{ - "topic": "test-topic", - }) - if strings.Contains(pollResult, "hello from node 1") { - break - } - time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) - } - - if !strings.Contains(pollResult, "hello from node 1") { - t.Fatalf("Poll failed, expected message not found: %s", pollResult) - } -} From 4d92e21bc881355841360821f7d6ce233bf7ae05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 08:12:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 07/14] node, router, controlplane: control-plane transport trust (audit M21) Whoever answers the control-plane URL is the trust root: /keys, enrollment and router addresses all come from it. Four changes close the paths by which an on-path party could become that root or kill the process. Plaintext transport: a plain http:// control-plane URL to a non-loopback host is refused by both sam-node and sam-router unless --insecure-control-plane is passed. The check runs in the HTTP transport used for every control-plane request (redirects included), so a stored or FFI-supplied URL is held to the same policy as a flag; sam-node also fails fast on a flag-supplied URL. Loopback stays allowed (sam-one, local development). Charts, the k8s templates, the e2e harness and the docs opt in explicitly for the in-cluster Service URL; the sam-node chart does so only when controlPlaneUrl is http://. Signed /keys: KeysResponse gains timestamp and one signature per listed key, by that key, over the deterministic encoding (api.SignKeysResponse / VerifyKeysResponse). Node and router accept the set only when a listed key they already trust signed it and the timestamp is within five minutes, so the first key always comes from enrollment and a rotation is learned through the retiring key. A node with no stored keys skips the sync. KEY_ROTATION signed by the retiring key: the control plane signed the event with the new key, which no node trusted yet, so every node dropped it as a spoofing attempt. It is now signed by the key just retired into its grace period, the one receivers can verify. Refresh hardening: the refreshed biscuit is verified like the enrolled one (trusted signer, bound to this peer, configured role) before it replaces the identity, on node and router. A 403 from /refresh is an error, not os.Exit: only a verified MeshEvent_BANNED is the control plane's word, and the node or router keeps serving on its current biscuit until it expires. Tests: api TestValidateControlPlaneTransport and TestKeysResponseSignatureChain (retiring-key chain, stranger set, listed-but-not-signing trusted key, tampering, replay, unsigned legacy); node TestSyncMeshConfigRefusesUntrustedKeySet, TestControlPlaneClientRefusesPlaintextToNonLoopback, TestRefreshEnrollment ForbiddenDoesNotExit, TestRefreshEnrollmentRejectsUntrustworthyToken; router TestOptionsValidateControlPlaneTransport, TestControlPlaneClientRefusesPlaintextHop, TestSyncKeysRequiresTrustedSignature, TestRouterRefreshEnrollmentHardening; controlplane TestKeyRotationEventIsSignedByTheRetiringKey and /keys self-verification; chart tests for the opt-in flag. --- .github/k8s/sam-box-canary-template.yaml | 1 + .github/k8s/sam-node-cop-template.yaml | 1 + .github/k8s/sam-node-everything-template.yaml | 1 + .github/k8s/sam-node-openclaw-template.yaml | 1 + .github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml | 1 + .github/k8s/sam-node-template.yaml | 1 + .github/k8s/sam-node-vllm-template.yaml | 1 + .github/k8s/sam-router-template.yaml | 1 + api/sam.pb.go | 34 ++- api/sam.proto | 8 + api/trust.go | 142 ++++++++++ api/trust_test.go | 157 +++++++++++ .../templates/router-statefulset.yaml | 3 + .../tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml | 3 + charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml | 5 + charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml | 15 + charts/sam-node/values.yaml | 4 +- cmd/sam-node/main.go | 11 + cmd/sam-router/main.go | 69 ++--- internal/controlplane/mesh.go | 34 ++- internal/controlplane/mesh_test.go | 47 ++++ internal/controlplane/server.go | 17 +- internal/controlplane/server_test.go | 20 +- internal/node/controlplane.go | 50 ++-- internal/node/controlplane_client.go | 57 ++++ internal/node/controlplane_test.go | 115 +++++++- internal/node/enroll.go | 4 +- internal/node/node.go | 58 +++- internal/node/refresh_test.go | 195 +++++++++++++ internal/router/config.go | 6 +- internal/router/router.go | 71 +++-- internal/router/trust_test.go | 264 ++++++++++++++++++ mobile/mobile_e2e.sh | 2 + .../docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md | 6 +- site/content/docs/manifests/sam-router.yaml | 1 + .../docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md | 5 +- .../docs/user/kubernetes-deployment.md | 3 + tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats | 7 +- tests/e2e/lib/container_mesh.bash | 1 + 39 files changed, 1318 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-) create mode 100644 api/trust.go create mode 100644 api/trust_test.go create mode 100644 internal/node/controlplane_client.go create mode 100644 internal/node/refresh_test.go create mode 100644 internal/router/trust_test.go diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-box-canary-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-box-canary-template.yaml index de5b4bef..0247d16b 100644 --- a/.github/k8s/sam-box-canary-template.yaml +++ b/.github/k8s/sam-box-canary-template.yaml @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ spec: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME}.${NAMESPACE}.svc.cluster.local:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" # Socket only: with no TCP listener there is no API token to leak, and # the socket's permissions are the credential. diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-node-cop-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-node-cop-template.yaml index 0d3bcf2d..6a2d7474 100644 --- a/.github/k8s/sam-node-cop-template.yaml +++ b/.github/k8s/sam-node-cop-template.yaml @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ spec: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME}.${NAMESPACE}.svc.cluster.local:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" - "--bind-addr=127.0.0.1:8080" ports: diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-node-everything-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-node-everything-template.yaml index 9f30c3b8..b79ac198 100644 --- a/.github/k8s/sam-node-everything-template.yaml +++ b/.github/k8s/sam-node-everything-template.yaml @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ spec: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME}.${NAMESPACE}.svc.cluster.local:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" - "--bind-addr=127.0.0.1:8080" ports: diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-node-openclaw-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-node-openclaw-template.yaml index 7d69c471..64c65976 100644 --- a/.github/k8s/sam-node-openclaw-template.yaml +++ b/.github/k8s/sam-node-openclaw-template.yaml @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ spec: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME}.${NAMESPACE}.svc.cluster.local:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" - "--bind-addr=127.0.0.1:8080" ports: diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml index 4458ff07..578166a0 100644 --- a/.github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml +++ b/.github/k8s/sam-node-openrouter-template.yaml @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ spec: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME}.${NAMESPACE}.svc.cluster.local:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" - "--bind-addr=127.0.0.1:8080" ports: diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-node-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-node-template.yaml index d41cb8bc..7b3bfdad 100644 --- a/.github/k8s/sam-node-template.yaml +++ b/.github/k8s/sam-node-template.yaml @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ spec: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME}.${NAMESPACE}.svc.cluster.local:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" ports: - containerPort: 8080 diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-node-vllm-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-node-vllm-template.yaml index c7e6c1bf..a956e104 100644 --- a/.github/k8s/sam-node-vllm-template.yaml +++ b/.github/k8s/sam-node-vllm-template.yaml @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ spec: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME}.${NAMESPACE}.svc.cluster.local:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" - "--bind-addr=127.0.0.1:8080" ports: diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-router-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-router-template.yaml index 5f56a4ce..681a8a8a 100644 --- a/.github/k8s/sam-router-template.yaml +++ b/.github/k8s/sam-router-template.yaml @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ spec: name: p2p-udp args: - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane-${ENV_NAME}.${NAMESPACE}.svc.cluster.local:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--listen=/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/4501" - "--listen=/ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/4501/quic-v1" - "--external-addr=/dnsaddr/bootstrap.${ENV_NAME}.sam-mesh.dev" diff --git a/api/sam.pb.go b/api/sam.pb.go index d9aa4934..3ab2d1fe 100644 --- a/api/sam.pb.go +++ b/api/sam.pb.go @@ -1718,8 +1718,16 @@ func (x *PolicyConfigUpdateResponse) GetError() string { } type KeysResponse struct { - state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` - PublicKeys [][]byte `protobuf:"bytes,1,rep,name=public_keys,json=publicKeys,proto3" json:"public_keys,omitempty"` + state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` + PublicKeys [][]byte `protobuf:"bytes,1,rep,name=public_keys,json=publicKeys,proto3" json:"public_keys,omitempty"` + // Unix milliseconds at which the set was signed; receivers reject responses + // outside a short freshness window so a captured set cannot be replayed. + Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"` + // One ed25519 signature per entry of public_keys, by that key, over the + // deterministic encoding of this message with signatures cleared. A + // receiver trusting any key still valid on the control plane can verify + // the whole set (see api.VerifyKeysResponse). + Signatures [][]byte `protobuf:"bytes,3,rep,name=signatures,proto3" json:"signatures,omitempty"` unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache } @@ -1761,6 +1769,20 @@ func (x *KeysResponse) GetPublicKeys() [][]byte { return nil } +func (x *KeysResponse) GetTimestamp() int64 { + if x != nil { + return x.Timestamp + } + return 0 +} + +func (x *KeysResponse) GetSignatures() [][]byte { + if x != nil { + return x.Signatures + } + return nil +} + type TokenRefreshRequest struct { state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"` // Signature with the node key over the UTF-8 bytes of @@ -3140,10 +3162,14 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" + "\bbindings\x18\x02 \x03(\v2\x15.sam.v1.PolicyBindingR\bbindings\"L\n" + "\x1aPolicyConfigUpdateResponse\x12\x18\n" + "\asuccess\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\asuccess\x12\x14\n" + - "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\"/\n" + + "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\"m\n" + "\fKeysResponse\x12\x1f\n" + "\vpublic_keys\x18\x01 \x03(\fR\n" + - "publicKeys\"}\n" + + "publicKeys\x12\x1c\n" + + "\ttimestamp\x18\x02 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12\x1e\n" + + "\n" + + "signatures\x18\x03 \x03(\fR\n" + + "signatures\"}\n" + "\x13TokenRefreshRequest\x12/\n" + "\x13challenge_signature\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x12\x1c\n" + "\ttimestamp\x18\x02 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12\x17\n" + diff --git a/api/sam.proto b/api/sam.proto index 8368982b..b89bb3ad 100644 --- a/api/sam.proto +++ b/api/sam.proto @@ -249,6 +249,14 @@ message PolicyConfigUpdateResponse { message KeysResponse { repeated bytes public_keys = 1; + // Unix milliseconds at which the set was signed; receivers reject responses + // outside a short freshness window so a captured set cannot be replayed. + int64 timestamp = 2; + // One ed25519 signature per entry of public_keys, by that key, over the + // deterministic encoding of this message with signatures cleared. A + // receiver trusting any key still valid on the control plane can verify + // the whole set (see api.VerifyKeysResponse). + repeated bytes signatures = 3; } message TokenRefreshRequest { diff --git a/api/trust.go b/api/trust.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac72787f --- /dev/null +++ b/api/trust.go @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package api + +import ( + "crypto/ed25519" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net" + "net/url" + "strings" + "time" + + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" +) + +// ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL marks a plaintext control-plane URL to a host +// that is not loopback. Whoever answers that URL becomes the trust root +// (/keys, enrollment, router addresses), so without TLS that is whoever sits +// on the path. +var ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL = errors.New("plaintext http:// control plane URL to a non-loopback host") + +// ValidateControlPlaneTransport accepts https://, accepts http:// only to a +// loopback host, and otherwise refuses unless allowInsecure is set by the +// operator (the --insecure-control-plane flag) for a network they trust. +func ValidateControlPlaneTransport(rawURL string, allowInsecure bool) error { + u, err := url.Parse(rawURL) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid control plane URL %q: %w", rawURL, err) + } + switch u.Scheme { + case "https": + return nil + case "http": + if allowInsecure || isLoopbackHost(u.Hostname()) { + return nil + } + return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q (use https://, or pass --insecure-control-plane to accept plaintext on a network you trust)", ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL, rawURL) + default: + return fmt.Errorf("control plane URL %q must use http:// or https://", rawURL) + } +} + +func isLoopbackHost(host string) bool { + if strings.EqualFold(host, "localhost") { + return true + } + ip := net.ParseIP(host) + return ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback() +} + +// KeysResponseFreshness bounds how far a signed /keys response's timestamp +// may be from the receiver's clock: a captured response must not be able to +// keep a retired key trusted after its grace period. +const KeysResponseFreshness = 5 * time.Minute + +// KeysResponsePayload is the bytes each signature in a KeysResponse covers: +// the key set and the timestamp, deterministically encoded, signatures +// cleared. +func KeysResponsePayload(resp *KeysResponse) ([]byte, error) { + unsigned := &KeysResponse{PublicKeys: resp.PublicKeys, Timestamp: resp.Timestamp} + return proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(unsigned) +} + +// SignKeysResponse sets Timestamp and one signature per key pair, so a +// receiver that trusts any key still valid on the control plane can verify +// the set. Private keys must be in the same order as resp.PublicKeys. +func SignKeysResponse(resp *KeysResponse, privateKeys []ed25519.PrivateKey, now time.Time) error { + if len(privateKeys) != len(resp.PublicKeys) { + return fmt.Errorf("keys response has %d public keys but %d signing keys", len(resp.PublicKeys), len(privateKeys)) + } + resp.Timestamp = now.UnixMilli() + payload, err := KeysResponsePayload(resp) + if err != nil { + return err + } + resp.Signatures = make([][]byte, len(privateKeys)) + for i, priv := range privateKeys { + resp.Signatures[i] = ed25519.Sign(priv, payload) + } + return nil +} + +// VerifyKeysResponse returns the key set if it is fresh and at least one +// listed key is already trusted and its signature verifies. A receiver with +// nothing trusted yet cannot verify anything and gets an error: enrollment, +// not /keys, is where the first key comes from. +// +// The guarantee is exactly "a key this receiver already trusts vouches for +// this set". It defends against whoever answers the URL; it cannot defend +// against the holder of a trusted private key, who is the trust root by +// definition and could equally mint biscuits or sign events. +func VerifyKeysResponse(resp *KeysResponse, trusted []ed25519.PublicKey, now time.Time) ([]ed25519.PublicKey, error) { + if len(trusted) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("no trusted control plane key to verify /keys against") + } + if len(resp.Signatures) != len(resp.PublicKeys) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("keys response carries %d signatures for %d keys", len(resp.Signatures), len(resp.PublicKeys)) + } + issued := time.UnixMilli(resp.Timestamp) + if now.Sub(issued) > KeysResponseFreshness || issued.Sub(now) > KeysResponseFreshness { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("keys response timestamp %s is outside the freshness window", issued.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)) + } + payload, err := KeysResponsePayload(resp) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var keys []ed25519.PublicKey + verified := false + for i, kb := range resp.PublicKeys { + if len(kb) != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + continue + } + pub := ed25519.PublicKey(kb) + keys = append(keys, pub) + if verified { + continue + } + for _, t := range trusted { + if t.Equal(pub) && ed25519.Verify(pub, payload, resp.Signatures[i]) { + verified = true + break + } + } + } + if !verified { + return nil, errors.New("keys response is not signed by any trusted control plane key") + } + return keys, nil +} diff --git a/api/trust_test.go b/api/trust_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d98aa98c --- /dev/null +++ b/api/trust_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package api + +import ( + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "testing" + "time" +) + +func TestValidateControlPlaneTransport(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + url string + insecure bool + wantErr bool + wantKind error + }{ + {"https://hub.sam-mesh.dev", false, false, nil}, + {"https://10.0.0.5:8443", false, false, nil}, + {"http://127.0.0.1:8080", false, false, nil}, + {"http://localhost:8080", false, false, nil}, + {"http://[::1]:8080", false, false, nil}, + {"http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080", false, false, nil}, + // Fail closed on anything that is not literally loopback. "127.1" is + // loopback to the resolver but not to net.ParseIP; refusing it costs + // the operator a clearer spelling, accepting a lookalike would cost + // the trust root. + {"http://127.1:8080", false, true, ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL}, + {"http://localhost.:8080", false, true, ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL}, + {"http://0.0.0.0:8080", false, true, ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL}, + {"http://sam-control-plane:8080", false, true, ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL}, + {"http://10.0.0.5:8080", false, true, ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL}, + {"http://127.0.0.1.evil.example:8080", false, true, ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL}, + {"http://sam-control-plane:8080", true, false, nil}, + {"ftp://hub.sam-mesh.dev", false, true, nil}, + {"hub.sam-mesh.dev", false, true, nil}, + } + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.url, func(t *testing.T) { + err := ValidateControlPlaneTransport(tt.url, tt.insecure) + if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr { + t.Fatalf("ValidateControlPlaneTransport(%q, insecure=%v) = %v, wantErr %v", tt.url, tt.insecure, err, tt.wantErr) + } + if tt.wantKind != nil && !errors.Is(err, tt.wantKind) { + t.Errorf("error %v is not %v", err, tt.wantKind) + } + }) + } +} + +func genKey(t *testing.T) (ed25519.PublicKey, ed25519.PrivateKey) { + t.Helper() + pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return pub, priv +} + +// A key set is only as good as the signature a receiver can already check: +// trusting the retiring key must be enough to learn the new one, and a set +// signed by nobody the receiver trusts must not replace anything. +func TestKeysResponseSignatureChain(t *testing.T) { + oldPub, oldPriv := genKey(t) + newPub, newPriv := genKey(t) + now := time.Now() + + signed := func() *KeysResponse { + resp := &KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{oldPub, newPub}} + if err := SignKeysResponse(resp, []ed25519.PrivateKey{oldPriv, newPriv}, now); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return resp + } + + t.Run("receiver on the retiring key learns the new one", func(t *testing.T) { + keys, err := VerifyKeysResponse(signed(), []ed25519.PublicKey{oldPub}, now) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err) + } + if len(keys) != 2 || !keys[1].Equal(newPub) { + t.Errorf("keys = %d entries, want old and new", len(keys)) + } + }) + + t.Run("receiver on the new key verifies too", func(t *testing.T) { + if _, err := VerifyKeysResponse(signed(), []ed25519.PublicKey{newPub}, now); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err) + } + }) + + t.Run("set signed by a stranger is refused", func(t *testing.T) { + strangerPub, strangerPriv := genKey(t) + resp := &KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{strangerPub}} + if err := SignKeysResponse(resp, []ed25519.PrivateKey{strangerPriv}, now); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, err := VerifyKeysResponse(resp, []ed25519.PublicKey{oldPub}, now); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a set signed by an untrusted key must not be accepted") + } + }) + + t.Run("listing a trusted key without its signature is refused", func(t *testing.T) { + // The attacker knows the victim trusts oldPub and lists it, but can + // only sign with their own key. + attackerPub, attackerPriv := genKey(t) + resp := &KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{oldPub, attackerPub}} + if err := SignKeysResponse(resp, []ed25519.PrivateKey{attackerPriv, attackerPriv}, now); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, err := VerifyKeysResponse(resp, []ed25519.PublicKey{oldPub}, now); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a listed-but-not-signing trusted key must not vouch for the set") + } + }) + + t.Run("tampered set is refused", func(t *testing.T) { + resp := signed() + resp.PublicKeys = append(resp.PublicKeys, make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize)) + resp.Signatures = append(resp.Signatures, resp.Signatures[0]) + if _, err := VerifyKeysResponse(resp, []ed25519.PublicKey{oldPub}, now); err == nil { + t.Fatal("appending a key must break every signature") + } + }) + + t.Run("replayed set outside the freshness window is refused", func(t *testing.T) { + if _, err := VerifyKeysResponse(signed(), []ed25519.PublicKey{oldPub}, now.Add(KeysResponseFreshness+time.Minute)); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a stale set must not be accepted") + } + }) + + t.Run("nothing trusted verifies nothing", func(t *testing.T) { + if _, err := VerifyKeysResponse(signed(), nil, now); err == nil { + t.Fatal("with no trusted key there is nothing to verify against") + } + }) + + t.Run("unsigned legacy response is refused", func(t *testing.T) { + resp := &KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{oldPub}} + if _, err := VerifyKeysResponse(resp, []ed25519.PublicKey{oldPub}, now); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a response without signatures must not be accepted") + } + }) +} diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/router-statefulset.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/router-statefulset.yaml index 21f4353b..ff7c9e88 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/router-statefulset.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/router-statefulset.yaml @@ -107,6 +107,9 @@ spec: {{- end }} args: - "--control-plane=http://{{ include "sam-mesh.fullname" . }}-control-plane:{{ .Values.controlPlane.service.port }}" + # In-cluster plaintext to the chart's own control-plane Service; the + # cluster network is the trust boundary here. + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--listen=/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/4501" - "--listen=/ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/4501/quic-v1" {{- if .Values.router.externalAddrs }} diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml index 781aca87..72636ddc 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/router-statefulset_test.yaml @@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ tests: - contains: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args content: --external-addr=/dns4/sam-mesh-router/tcp/4501 + - contains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args + content: --insecure-control-plane - notExists: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].ports[0].hostPort diff --git a/charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml b/charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml index bac61bcd..76eaf769 100644 --- a/charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ spec: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" - "--control-plane={{ required "controlPlaneUrl is required" .Values.controlPlaneUrl }}" + {{- if hasPrefix "http://" .Values.controlPlaneUrl }} + # Plaintext to a non-loopback control plane is refused unless opted + # in; an in-cluster Service URL is the expected case. + - "--insecure-control-plane" + {{- end }} - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" - "--bind-addr={{ .Values.bindAddr }}" {{- range .Values.extraArgs }} diff --git a/charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml b/charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml index 9ea039b1..7a0f6c6f 100644 --- a/charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml @@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ tests: - contains: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args content: "--control-plane=http://sam-mesh-control-plane:8080" + - contains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args + content: "--insecure-control-plane" - contains: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args content: "--bind-addr=127.0.0.1:8080" @@ -30,6 +33,18 @@ tests: path: spec.template.spec.volumes[1].projected.sources[0].serviceAccountToken.audience value: sam-mesh-audience + - it: does not opt into plaintext for an https control plane + template: templates/deployment.yaml + set: + controlPlaneUrl: https://hub.example.com + asserts: + - contains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args + content: "--control-plane=https://hub.example.com" + - notContains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args + content: "--insecure-control-plane" + - it: renders the service container when service.image is set template: templates/deployment.yaml set: diff --git a/charts/sam-node/values.yaml b/charts/sam-node/values.yaml index 63bff0e6..8579c8ab 100644 --- a/charts/sam-node/values.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-node/values.yaml @@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ image: replicaCount: 1 # Required: control plane URL the node enrolls with, -# e.g. http://sam-mesh-control-plane:8080 +# e.g. http://sam-mesh-control-plane:8080. A plaintext http:// URL makes the +# chart pass --insecure-control-plane: whoever answers it becomes the node's +# trust root, so use https:// for anything beyond the cluster network. controlPlaneUrl: "" # Audience of the projected ServiceAccount token; must be one of the control diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/main.go b/cmd/sam-node/main.go index 13848a5c..318e3cdf 100644 --- a/cmd/sam-node/main.go +++ b/cmd/sam-node/main.go @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ var ( dataDirFlag string headlessFlag bool authModeFlag string + insecureControlPlaneFlag bool daemonizeFlag bool resetAllFlag bool assumeYesFlag bool @@ -263,6 +264,15 @@ func main() { rootCmd := &cobra.Command{ Use: "sam-node", Short: "Sovereign Agent Mesh Node", + PersistentPreRunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + node.SetAllowInsecureControlPlane(insecureControlPlaneFlag) + // The stored URL is checked at request time by the same policy; + // this only turns a flag-supplied URL into an immediate error. + if controlPlaneAddr != "" { + return api.ValidateControlPlaneTransport(normalizeControlPlaneURL(controlPlaneAddr), insecureControlPlaneFlag) + } + return nil + }, } // RUN COMMAND: Start the Mesh @@ -858,6 +868,7 @@ func main() { runCmd.Flags().DurationVar(&policySyncIntervalFlag, "policy-sync-interval", 1*time.Hour, "Interval for syncing mesh policy from the control plane") runCmd.Flags().DurationVar(&backendProbeTimeoutFlag, "backend-probe-timeout", 0, "Timeout for probing a command-spawned service backend before advertising it (0 uses default 2s); raise this for backends with slower cold-start times") rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&controlPlaneAddr, "control-plane", "", "Control plane URL") + rootCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&insecureControlPlaneFlag, "insecure-control-plane", false, "Accept a plaintext http:// control plane URL to a non-loopback host (whoever answers it becomes this node's trust root; only for networks you already trust)") rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&configFile, "config", node.DefaultConfigFile, "Path to sam-node.yaml configuration file") rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&oidcIssuerFlag, "oidc-issuer", "", "OIDC Issuer URL") rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&deviceAuthURLFlag, "device-auth-url", "", "OIDC Device Authorization URL") diff --git a/cmd/sam-router/main.go b/cmd/sam-router/main.go index acb4d4df..ff8ca0a3 100644 --- a/cmd/sam-router/main.go +++ b/cmd/sam-router/main.go @@ -27,23 +27,24 @@ import ( ) var ( - controlPlaneURL string - listenAddrs []string - externalAddrs []string - keysSyncInterval time.Duration - leaseRenewInterval time.Duration - oidcToken string - bootstrapToken string - bootstrapTokenPath string - jwtPath string - keysPath string - allowLoopback bool - connsPerSourceIP int - logLevel string - dhtProviderAddrTTL time.Duration - dhtMaxRecordAge time.Duration - lowWaterMark int - highWaterMark int + controlPlaneURL string + insecureControlPlane bool + listenAddrs []string + externalAddrs []string + keysSyncInterval time.Duration + leaseRenewInterval time.Duration + oidcToken string + bootstrapToken string + bootstrapTokenPath string + jwtPath string + keysPath string + allowLoopback bool + connsPerSourceIP int + logLevel string + dhtProviderAddrTTL time.Duration + dhtMaxRecordAge time.Duration + lowWaterMark int + highWaterMark int ) var logger = golog.Logger("sam-router-cli") @@ -66,22 +67,23 @@ func main() { } opts := router.Options{ - ControlPlaneURL: controlPlaneURL, - ListenAddrs: listenAddrs, - ExternalAddrs: externalAddrs, - KeysSyncInterval: keysSyncInterval, - LeaseRenewInterval: leaseRenewInterval, - OIDCToken: oidcToken, - BootstrapToken: bootstrapToken, - BootstrapTokenPath: bootstrapTokenPath, - JWTPath: jwtPath, - KeysDBPath: keysPath, - AllowLoopback: allowLoopback, - ConnsPerSourceIP: connsPerSourceIP, - DHTProviderAddrTTL: dhtProviderAddrTTL, - DHTMaxRecordAge: dhtMaxRecordAge, - LowWaterMark: lowWaterMark, - HighWaterMark: highWaterMark, + ControlPlaneURL: controlPlaneURL, + AllowInsecureControlPlane: insecureControlPlane, + ListenAddrs: listenAddrs, + ExternalAddrs: externalAddrs, + KeysSyncInterval: keysSyncInterval, + LeaseRenewInterval: leaseRenewInterval, + OIDCToken: oidcToken, + BootstrapToken: bootstrapToken, + BootstrapTokenPath: bootstrapTokenPath, + JWTPath: jwtPath, + KeysDBPath: keysPath, + AllowLoopback: allowLoopback, + ConnsPerSourceIP: connsPerSourceIP, + DHTProviderAddrTTL: dhtProviderAddrTTL, + DHTMaxRecordAge: dhtMaxRecordAge, + LowWaterMark: lowWaterMark, + HighWaterMark: highWaterMark, } r, err := router.NewRouter(cmd.Context(), opts) @@ -103,6 +105,7 @@ func main() { } rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&controlPlaneURL, "control-plane", "http://127.0.0.1:8080", "Control Plane web service URL") + rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&insecureControlPlane, "insecure-control-plane", false, "Accept a plaintext http:// control plane URL to a non-loopback host (whoever answers it becomes this router's trust root; only for networks you already trust)") rootCmd.Flags().StringSliceVar(&listenAddrs, "listen", []string{"/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/5001", "/ip6/::/tcp/5001"}, "libp2p Listen Addresses") rootCmd.Flags().StringSliceVar(&externalAddrs, "external-addr", []string{}, "External addresses to announce to control plane") rootCmd.Flags().DurationVar(&keysSyncInterval, "keys-sync-interval", 5*time.Minute, "Key synchronization polling interval") diff --git a/internal/controlplane/mesh.go b/internal/controlplane/mesh.go index 5d8d0cff..e43e7ca8 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/mesh.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/mesh.go @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ package controlplane import ( + "bytes" "context" "crypto/ed25519" "fmt" @@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ func (p *P2PMeshAdapter) PublishEvent(ctx context.Context, eventType api.MeshEve var privKey ed25519.PrivateKey if p.store != nil { - key, _, err := p.store.GetCurrentKey(ctx) + key, err := p.signingKeyFor(ctx, eventType, payload) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to retrieve signing key for event publishing: %w", err) } @@ -175,6 +176,37 @@ func (p *P2PMeshAdapter) PublishEvent(ctx context.Context, eventType api.MeshEve return nil } +// signingKeyFor picks the key receivers can verify with. A KEY_ROTATION +// announces newPub, which nobody trusts yet, so it is signed by the key just +// retired into its grace period (the one with the latest expiration that is +// not newPub); every other event is signed by the current key. +func (p *P2PMeshAdapter) signingKeyFor(ctx context.Context, eventType api.MeshEvent_Type, newPub []byte) (ed25519.PrivateKey, error) { + if eventType != api.MeshEvent_KEY_ROTATION { + key, _, err := p.store.GetCurrentKey(ctx) + return key, err + } + pairs, err := p.store.GetAllValidKeys(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var retiring *storage.KeyPair + for i := range pairs { + kp := &pairs[i] + if kp.Expiration.IsZero() || bytes.Equal(kp.Public, newPub) { + continue + } + if retiring == nil || kp.Expiration.After(retiring.Expiration) { + retiring = kp + } + } + if retiring == nil { + // First key ever: there is no previous key and nobody to convince. + key, _, err := p.store.GetCurrentKey(ctx) + return key, err + } + return retiring.Private, nil +} + func (p *P2PMeshAdapter) DiscoverServices(ctx context.Context, serviceType string) ([]*ServiceAnnouncement, error) { return nil, nil } diff --git a/internal/controlplane/mesh_test.go b/internal/controlplane/mesh_test.go index 7a0a9165..d6439262 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/mesh_test.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/mesh_test.go @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ package controlplane import ( + "bytes" "context" "crypto/ed25519" "crypto/rand" @@ -159,3 +160,49 @@ func TestP2PMeshAdapter_PublishAndSubscribe(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("ed25519 signature verification failed for published MeshEvent") } } + +// A KEY_ROTATION announces a key nobody trusts yet, so it has to be signed by +// the key being retired: that is the only signature a node holding the old +// key can check. Signing with the new key (the store's current key after the +// rotation) made every node drop the announcement as a spoofing attempt. +func TestKeyRotationEventIsSignedByTheRetiringKey(t *testing.T) { + ctx := context.Background() + store, err := storage.NewSQLStore("sqlite", ":memory:") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer func() { _ = store.Close() }() + + oldPub, oldPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := store.SaveInitialKey(ctx, oldPriv, oldPub); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + newPub, newPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := store.RotateKeys(ctx, newPriv, newPub, time.Hour); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + adapter := &P2PMeshAdapter{store: store} + signer, err := adapter.signingKeyFor(ctx, api.MeshEvent_KEY_ROTATION, newPub) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(signer, oldPriv) { + t.Error("KEY_ROTATION must be signed by the retiring key, which is the one receivers still trust") + } + + // Every other event is signed by the current key. + signer, err = adapter.signingKeyFor(ctx, api.MeshEvent_BANNED, nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(signer, newPriv) { + t.Error("a BANNED event after rotation must be signed by the current key") + } +} diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server.go b/internal/controlplane/server.go index 75ffa531..b136959d 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/server.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/server.go @@ -957,20 +957,25 @@ func (s *Server) HandleKeys(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } - validKeys, err := s.store.GetAllValidPublicKeys(r.Context()) + validKeys, err := s.store.GetAllValidKeys(r.Context()) if err != nil { logger.Errorf("Failed to retrieve valid keys: %v", err) http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } - var pubKeys [][]byte + resp := &api.KeysResponse{} + privs := make([]ed25519.PrivateKey, 0, len(validKeys)) for _, k := range validKeys { - pubKeys = append(pubKeys, k) + resp.PublicKeys = append(resp.PublicKeys, k.Public) + privs = append(privs, k.Private) } - - resp := &api.KeysResponse{ - PublicKeys: pubKeys, + // Signed by every valid key: a receiver still on a key in its grace + // period verifies with that one and learns the new one from the set. + if err := api.SignKeysResponse(resp, privs, time.Now()); err != nil { + logger.Errorf("Failed to sign keys response: %v", err) + http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return } respData, err := proto.Marshal(resp) diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go index e0f85ae1..a36407a0 100644 --- a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go +++ b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go @@ -267,6 +267,14 @@ func TestControlPlaneBasic(t *testing.T) { if len(keys.PublicKeys) != 1 { t.Errorf("expected 1 valid public key, got %d", len(keys.PublicKeys)) } + // The set is self-certifying for anyone already holding a listed key. + verified, err := api.VerifyKeysResponse(&keys, []ed25519.PublicKey{ed25519.PublicKey(keys.PublicKeys[0])}, time.Now()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("/keys response does not verify under its own listed key: %v", err) + } + if len(verified) != 1 { + t.Errorf("verified key set has %d keys, want 1", len(verified)) + } } func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) { @@ -2059,8 +2067,16 @@ func TestNodeProactiveTokenRefresh(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("failed to save initial expiration: %v", err) } - n := &node.SamNode{ - Store: nStore, + // The node trusts the key enrollment handed it, as a real node would; the + // refreshed token is verified against that key before it is adopted. + n, err := node.NewSamNode(node.Options{ + PrivKey: privNode, + Store: nStore, + ControlPlanePubKey: enrollNodeResp.ControlPlanePublicKey, + ListenAddrs: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/0"}, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("NewSamNode: %v", err) } // Trigger proactive refresh diff --git a/internal/node/controlplane.go b/internal/node/controlplane.go index 0c8b78a1..f5bfb310 100644 --- a/internal/node/controlplane.go +++ b/internal/node/controlplane.go @@ -48,9 +48,7 @@ func FetchControlPlaneInfo(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string) (*api.Co return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create HTTP request: %w", err) } - client := &http.Client{ - Timeout: 10 * time.Second, - } + client := controlPlaneHTTPClient(10 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Do(req) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP request failed: %w", err) @@ -78,8 +76,9 @@ func FetchControlPlaneInfo(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string) (*api.Co // plane public keys from the /keys endpoint — the same catch-up path routers // use. Enrollment only hands out the newest key, so this is how a node // learns keys still in their rotation grace period, or rotations it missed -// while offline. -func FetchControlPlaneKeys(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string) ([]ed25519.PublicKey, error) { +// while offline. The set is accepted only if signed by a key in trusted: +// whoever answers /keys must already be the control plane, not become it. +func FetchControlPlaneKeys(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string, trusted []ed25519.PublicKey) ([]ed25519.PublicKey, error) { if !strings.HasPrefix(controlPlaneURL, "http://") && !strings.HasPrefix(controlPlaneURL, "https://") { controlPlaneURL = "https://" + controlPlaneURL } @@ -90,7 +89,7 @@ func FetchControlPlaneKeys(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string) ([]ed255 return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create HTTP request: %w", err) } - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second} + client := controlPlaneHTTPClient(10 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Do(req) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP request failed: %w", err) @@ -110,11 +109,9 @@ func FetchControlPlaneKeys(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string) ([]ed255 return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode /keys response: %w", err) } - var keys []ed25519.PublicKey - for _, kb := range keysResp.PublicKeys { - if len(kb) == ed25519.PublicKeySize { - keys = append(keys, ed25519.PublicKey(kb)) - } + keys, err := api.VerifyKeysResponse(&keysResp, trusted, time.Now()) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("/keys response rejected: %w", err) } return keys, nil } @@ -198,15 +195,18 @@ func SyncMeshConfig(ctx context.Context, s *Store) ([]byte, []multiaddr.Multiadd } } - // Catch up on the valid key set: an empty result would wipe the trust - // set, so it is ignored like any fetch failure. - if keys, keysErr := FetchControlPlaneKeys(ctx, controlPlaneURL); keysErr != nil { + // Catch up on the valid key set. Verified against what is already + // trusted, so with nothing stored yet there is nothing to do: the + // first key comes from enrollment. An empty result would wipe the + // trust set, so it is ignored like any fetch failure. + existing, loadErr := s.LoadTrustedKeys() + if loadErr != nil { + logger.Warnf("Failed to load stored trusted keys, skipping key sync: %v", loadErr) + } else if len(existing) == 0 { + logger.Debugf("No trusted control plane keys stored yet; skipping /keys sync until enrolled") + } else if keys, keysErr := FetchControlPlaneKeys(ctx, controlPlaneURL, publicKeysOf(existing)); keysErr != nil { logger.Warnf("Failed to fetch control plane keys via HTTP (using cached): %v", keysErr) } else if len(keys) > 0 { - existing, loadErr := s.LoadTrustedKeys() - if loadErr != nil { - logger.Warnf("Failed to load stored trusted keys, replacing: %v", loadErr) - } if saveErr := s.SaveTrustedKeys(mergeTrustedKeys(existing, keys, time.Now())); saveErr != nil { logger.Errorf("Failed to save trusted keys to store: %v", saveErr) } @@ -216,6 +216,14 @@ func SyncMeshConfig(ctx context.Context, s *Store) ([]byte, []multiaddr.Multiadd return pubKey, routerAddrs, bannedPeerIDs, nil } +func publicKeysOf(keys []TrustedKey) []ed25519.PublicKey { + out := make([]ed25519.PublicKey, 0, len(keys)) + for _, tk := range keys { + out = append(out, tk.Key) + } + return out +} + // FetchMeshPolicy retrieves the latest mesh policy from the control plane's /policies endpoint using a biscuit token. func FetchMeshPolicy(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string, biscuitToken []byte) (*api.PolicyConfigGetResponse, error) { if !strings.HasPrefix(controlPlaneURL, "http://") && !strings.HasPrefix(controlPlaneURL, "https://") { @@ -231,9 +239,7 @@ func FetchMeshPolicy(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string, biscuitToken [ req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(biscuitToken)) - client := &http.Client{ - Timeout: 10 * time.Second, - } + client := controlPlaneHTTPClient(10 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Do(req) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP request failed: %w", err) @@ -280,7 +286,7 @@ func ReportNodeCatalog(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string, biscuitToken req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-protobuf") req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(biscuitToken)) - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second} + client := controlPlaneHTTPClient(10 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Do(req) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("HTTP request failed: %w", err) diff --git a/internal/node/controlplane_client.go b/internal/node/controlplane_client.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8411e89a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/controlplane_client.go @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "net/http" + "sync/atomic" + "time" + + "github.com/google/sam/api" +) + +// allowInsecureControlPlane is process-wide because the control-plane URL +// reaches the node from several places (flag, store, mobile FFI) and every +// request to it must be held to the same transport policy. +var allowInsecureControlPlane atomic.Bool + +// SetAllowInsecureControlPlane records the operator's --insecure-control-plane +// choice: plaintext http:// to a non-loopback control plane is then accepted. +func SetAllowInsecureControlPlane(allow bool) { + allowInsecureControlPlane.Store(allow) +} + +// controlPlaneTransport applies api.ValidateControlPlaneTransport to every +// request, including redirects, so a plaintext hop is refused wherever the +// URL came from. +type controlPlaneTransport struct { + base http.RoundTripper +} + +func (t controlPlaneTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { + if err := api.ValidateControlPlaneTransport(req.URL.String(), allowInsecureControlPlane.Load()); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return t.base.RoundTrip(req) +} + +// controlPlaneHTTPClient is the client for every request the node makes to +// its control plane. +func controlPlaneHTTPClient(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client { + return &http.Client{ + Timeout: timeout, + Transport: controlPlaneTransport{base: http.DefaultTransport}, + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/controlplane_test.go b/internal/node/controlplane_test.go index 38469539..d40c13ed 100644 --- a/internal/node/controlplane_test.go +++ b/internal/node/controlplane_test.go @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import ( "context" "crypto/ed25519" "encoding/base64" + "errors" "io" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" @@ -139,9 +140,13 @@ func TestSyncMeshConfig(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal info: %v", err) } - cpPub, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) - gracePub, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) - keysBody, err := proto.Marshal(&api.KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{cpPub, gracePub}}) + cpPub, cpPriv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) + gracePub, gracePriv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) + keysResp := &api.KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{cpPub, gracePub}} + if err := api.SignKeysResponse(keysResp, []ed25519.PrivateKey{cpPriv, gracePriv}, time.Now()); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + keysBody, err := proto.Marshal(keysResp) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal keys: %v", err) } @@ -175,7 +180,9 @@ func TestSyncMeshConfig(t *testing.T) { t.Errorf("Expected empty result for empty store, got pubKey=%v, addrs=%v", pubKey, addrs) } - // Save initial config with explicit control plane URL + // Save initial config with explicit control plane URL. The node trusts + // only cpPub, as after enrollment; the grace key must be learned through + // cpPub's signature on the set. testPubKey := []byte("test-pub-key") if err := store.SaveMeshConfig(testPubKey, []string{"/ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/1234"}); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to save mesh config: %v", err) @@ -183,6 +190,9 @@ func TestSyncMeshConfig(t *testing.T) { if err := store.SaveControlPlaneURL(server.URL); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Failed to save control plane URL: %v", err) } + if err := store.SaveTrustedKeys([]TrustedKey{{Key: cpPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}}); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("SaveTrustedKeys: %v", err) + } // Call SyncMeshConfig, it should fetch new addrs from server pubKey, addrs, _, err = SyncMeshConfig(context.Background(), store) @@ -223,6 +233,103 @@ func TestSyncMeshConfig(t *testing.T) { } } +// Whoever answers /keys must already be the control plane: a set that is not +// signed by a key the node trusts leaves the trust set untouched. +func TestSyncMeshConfigRefusesUntrustedKeySet(t *testing.T) { + cpPub, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) + attackerPub, attackerPriv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) + + infoBody, err := proto.Marshal(&api.ControlPlaneInfoResponse{RouterAddresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/4001"}}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + for name, keysResp := range map[string]*api.KeysResponse{ + "unsigned set": {PublicKeys: [][]byte{cpPub, attackerPub}}, + "set signed only by the attacker": func() *api.KeysResponse { + r := &api.KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{cpPub, attackerPub}} + if err := api.SignKeysResponse(r, []ed25519.PrivateKey{attackerPriv, attackerPriv}, time.Now()); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return r + }(), + } { + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + keysBody, err := proto.Marshal(keysResp) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if r.URL.Path == "/keys" { + _, _ = w.Write(keysBody) + return + } + _, _ = w.Write(infoBody) + })) + defer server.Close() + + store, err := NewStore(t.TempDir()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer store.Close() //nolint:errcheck + if err := store.SaveMeshConfig(cpPub, nil); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := store.SaveControlPlaneURL(server.URL); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := store.SaveTrustedKeys([]TrustedKey{{Key: cpPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}}); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + if _, _, _, err := SyncMeshConfig(context.Background(), store); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("SyncMeshConfig: %v", err) + } + + trusted, err := store.LoadTrustedKeys() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if len(trusted) != 1 || !trusted[0].Key.Equal(cpPub) { + t.Fatalf("trust set was replaced by an unverified /keys answer: %d keys", len(trusted)) + } + }) + } +} + +// The control plane is the trust root, so a plaintext hop to it is refused +// unless the operator opted in; loopback is the standalone case and is fine. +func TestControlPlaneClientRefusesPlaintextToNonLoopback(t *testing.T) { + server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + body, _ := proto.Marshal(&api.ControlPlaneInfoResponse{}) + _, _ = w.Write(body) + })) + defer server.Close() + // httptest binds 127.0.0.1; spell it as a non-loopback name that the + // transport must refuse before any connection is attempted. + nonLoopbackURL := strings.Replace(server.URL, "127.0.0.1", "sam-control-plane.invalid", 1) + + t.Cleanup(func() { SetAllowInsecureControlPlane(false) }) + + if _, err := FetchControlPlaneInfo(context.Background(), server.URL); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("loopback plaintext must be accepted: %v", err) + } + + _, err := FetchControlPlaneInfo(context.Background(), nonLoopbackURL) + if !errors.Is(err, api.ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL) { + t.Fatalf("plaintext to a non-loopback host: err = %v, want %v", err, api.ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL) + } + + // With the opt-in the request is attempted; the name does not resolve, + // which is a dial error, not the policy error. + SetAllowInsecureControlPlane(true) + _, err = FetchControlPlaneInfo(context.Background(), nonLoopbackURL) + if err == nil || errors.Is(err, api.ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL) { + t.Fatalf("with --insecure-control-plane the policy must not be what fails: %v", err) + } +} + func TestReportNodeCatalog(t *testing.T) { services := []*api.ServiceInfo{ {Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP, Name: "stvv-compliance-docs", Description: "doc lookup"}, diff --git a/internal/node/enroll.go b/internal/node/enroll.go index 5d212a92..bbed85eb 100644 --- a/internal/node/enroll.go +++ b/internal/node/enroll.go @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) enrollHTTP(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL, jwt string, p } httpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-protobuf") - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second} + client := controlPlaneHTTPClient(30 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Do(httpReq) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP request failed: %v", err) @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) EnrollBootstrap(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string, b enrollURL := controlPlaneURL + "/enroll" logger.Infof("Enrolling via Bootstrap token at %s", enrollURL) - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second} + client := controlPlaneHTTPClient(30 * time.Second) httpReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", enrollURL, bytes.NewReader(data)) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to create HTTP request: %w", err) diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go index 6ac1cb65..6c6bad98 100644 --- a/internal/node/node.go +++ b/internal/node/node.go @@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { b64Biscuit := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(currentBiscuit) httpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+b64Biscuit) - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second} + client := controlPlaneHTTPClient(30 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Do(httpReq) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("http request failed: %w", err) @@ -1135,11 +1135,14 @@ func (n *SamNode) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden { - logger.Errorf("Refresh rejected: Node is banned (403 Forbidden). Initiating hard-kill.") - if n.Host != nil { - _ = n.Host.Close() + // Not fatal on its own: a 403 is a claim by whoever answered, and + // only a verified MeshEvent_BANNED is the control plane's word. The + // node keeps serving on its current biscuit until that expires. + body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxControlPlaneBodyBytes)) + return &RefreshError{ + StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, + Message: fmt.Sprintf("refresh refused (403 Forbidden): %s", string(body)), } - os.Exit(1) } if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { @@ -1164,6 +1167,13 @@ func (n *SamNode) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { return fmt.Errorf("refresh error: %s", refreshResp.ErrorMessage) } + // Same checks as enrollment: the token must be signed by a key this node + // already trusts and carry the role it runs as, or a response from the + // wrong party would replace a good identity with a useless one. + if err := n.verifyOwnBiscuit(refreshResp.BiscuitToken); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("refreshed biscuit rejected: %w", err) + } + // Save new biscuit and its expiration if err := n.Store.SaveIdentity(refreshResp.BiscuitToken); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to save refreshed identity: %w", err) @@ -1176,6 +1186,44 @@ func (n *SamNode) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { return nil } +// verifyOwnBiscuit checks a token the control plane handed this node: signed +// by a trusted key, bound to this peer, and carrying the configured role. +func (n *SamNode) verifyOwnBiscuit(token []byte) error { + if len(token) == 0 { + return errors.New("empty biscuit token") + } + n.keysMu.RLock() + trusted := publicKeysOf(n.trustedKeys) + n.keysMu.RUnlock() + if len(trusted) == 0 { + return errors.New("no trusted control plane keys loaded") + } + var peerID peer.ID + if n.Host != nil { + peerID = n.Host.ID() + } else { + privBytes, err := n.Store.LoadKey() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load node key: %w", err) + } + priv, err := crypto.UnmarshalPrivateKey(privBytes) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("corrupted node key: %w", err) + } + if peerID, err = peer.IDFromPrivateKey(priv); err != nil { + return err + } + } + _, key, err := identity.VerifyBiscuitAndGetKey(token, peerID, trusted, n.BiscuitTimeout) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if n.config.RequiredRole == "" { + return nil + } + return identity.VerifyBiscuitRole(token, key, n.config.RequiredRole, n.BiscuitTimeout) +} + func (n *SamNode) renewWithRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, clientSecret string) (string, error) { if n.Store == nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("store is not initialized") diff --git a/internal/node/refresh_test.go b/internal/node/refresh_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85dc31bb --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/refresh_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2" + "github.com/google/sam/api" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" +) + +// refreshHarness is a node with a stored identity and a mock control plane +// whose /refresh answer the test chooses. +type refreshHarness struct { + node *SamNode + cpPub ed25519.PublicKey + cpPriv ed25519.PrivateKey + peerID peer.ID + identity []byte +} + +func mintRoleBiscuit(t *testing.T, priv ed25519.PrivateKey, peerID peer.ID, role string) []byte { + t.Helper() + builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv) + for _, f := range []biscuit.Fact{ + {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactNode, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(peerID.String())}}}, + {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(role)}}}, + {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactExpiration, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Date(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour))}}}, + } { + if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(f); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + } + tok, err := builder.Build() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + b, err := tok.Serialize() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return b +} + +func newRefreshHarness(t *testing.T, refresh http.HandlerFunc) *refreshHarness { + t.Helper() + cpPub, cpPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + store, err := NewStore(t.TempDir()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { _ = store.Close() }) + + privKey := GetOrGenerateKey(store) + peerID, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(privKey.GetPublic()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + current := mintRoleBiscuit(t, cpPriv, peerID, api.RoleNode) + if err := store.SaveIdentity(current); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + mux := http.NewServeMux() + mux.HandleFunc("/refresh", refresh) + srv := httptest.NewServer(mux) + t.Cleanup(srv.Close) + if err := store.SaveControlPlaneURL(srv.URL); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + node := &SamNode{ + Store: store, + trustedKeys: []TrustedKey{{Key: cpPub, ReceivedAt: time.Now()}}, + BiscuitTimeout: 500 * time.Millisecond, + config: Options{RequiredRole: api.RoleNode}, + } + node.SetIdentityCache(current) + return &refreshHarness{node: node, cpPub: cpPub, cpPriv: cpPriv, peerID: peerID, identity: current} +} + +func writeRefreshResponse(t *testing.T, w http.ResponseWriter, token []byte) { + t.Helper() + data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: token, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour).Unix()}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-protobuf") + _, _ = w.Write(data) +} + +func (h *refreshHarness) storedIdentityUnchanged(t *testing.T) { + t.Helper() + stored, err := h.node.Store.LoadIdentity() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(stored, h.identity) { + t.Error("stored identity was replaced by a response that must not have been accepted") + } + if !bytes.Equal(h.node.GetIdentity(), h.identity) { + t.Error("cached identity was replaced by a response that must not have been accepted") + } +} + +// A 403 from whoever answers /refresh is not the control plane's word that +// this node is banned; that is a verified MeshEvent_BANNED. The node reports +// the refusal and keeps its current identity instead of exiting. +func TestRefreshEnrollmentForbiddenDoesNotExit(t *testing.T) { + h := newRefreshHarness(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + http.Error(w, "node banned", http.StatusForbidden) + }) + + err := h.node.RefreshEnrollment(context.Background()) + var rerr *RefreshError + if !errors.As(err, &rerr) || rerr.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("RefreshEnrollment = %v, want *RefreshError with 403", err) + } + h.storedIdentityUnchanged(t) +} + +// The refreshed token is held to the same bar as the enrolled one: signed by +// a key this node already trusts, bound to this peer, carrying its role. +func TestRefreshEnrollmentRejectsUntrustworthyToken(t *testing.T) { + _, strangerPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + otherPeer := randomPeerID(t) + + tests := []struct { + name string + mint func(h *refreshHarness) []byte + }{ + {"signed by an untrusted key", func(h *refreshHarness) []byte { + return mintRoleBiscuit(t, strangerPriv, h.peerID, api.RoleNode) + }}, + {"bound to another peer", func(h *refreshHarness) []byte { + return mintRoleBiscuit(t, h.cpPriv, otherPeer, api.RoleNode) + }}, + {"wrong role", func(h *refreshHarness) []byte { + return mintRoleBiscuit(t, h.cpPriv, h.peerID, api.RoleRouter) + }}, + } + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + var h *refreshHarness + h = newRefreshHarness(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + writeRefreshResponse(t, w, tt.mint(h)) + }) + if err := h.node.RefreshEnrollment(context.Background()); err == nil { + t.Fatal("RefreshEnrollment accepted a token it must have rejected") + } + h.storedIdentityUnchanged(t) + }) + } + + t.Run("a good token is adopted", func(t *testing.T) { + var h *refreshHarness + h = newRefreshHarness(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + writeRefreshResponse(t, w, mintRoleBiscuit(t, h.cpPriv, h.peerID, api.RoleNode)) + }) + if err := h.node.RefreshEnrollment(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("RefreshEnrollment: %v", err) + } + if bytes.Equal(h.node.GetIdentity(), h.identity) { + t.Error("a valid refreshed token must replace the current identity") + } + }) +} diff --git a/internal/router/config.go b/internal/router/config.go index 73ef9327..7debe25f 100644 --- a/internal/router/config.go +++ b/internal/router/config.go @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ type Options struct { // cap (default: 8) when > 0. Raise it when the listener sits behind a // TLS-terminating proxy or NAT, where many peers share a few source IPs. ConnsPerSourceIP int + // AllowInsecureControlPlane accepts a plaintext http:// ControlPlaneURL + // to a non-loopback host. Off by default: whoever answers that URL is + // the trust root. + AllowInsecureControlPlane bool } // Default sets default values for options. @@ -91,5 +95,5 @@ func (o *Options) Validate() error { if o.ControlPlaneURL == "" { return fmt.Errorf("ControlPlaneURL must be specified") } - return nil + return api.ValidateControlPlaneTransport(o.ControlPlaneURL, o.AllowInsecureControlPlane) } diff --git a/internal/router/router.go b/internal/router/router.go index 85c80a43..02899279 100644 --- a/internal/router/router.go +++ b/internal/router/router.go @@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ func (r *Router) enroll(peerID peer.ID) error { return err } - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second} + client := r.controlPlaneClient(30 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Post(r.config.ControlPlaneURL+"/register", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(data)) if err != nil { return err @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ func (r *Router) enrollBootstrap(peerID peer.ID) error { return err } - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second} + client := r.controlPlaneClient(30 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Post(r.config.ControlPlaneURL+"/enroll", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(data)) if err != nil { return err @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ func (r *Router) recoverAfterLease401() error { } func (r *Router) syncKeys() error { - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second} + client := r.controlPlaneClient(10 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Get(r.config.ControlPlaneURL + "/keys") if err != nil { return err @@ -689,13 +689,14 @@ func (r *Router) syncKeys() error { return err } - r.keysMu.Lock() - var newKeys []ed25519.PublicKey - for _, kb := range keysResp.PublicKeys { - if len(kb) == ed25519.PublicKeySize { - newKeys = append(newKeys, ed25519.PublicKey(kb)) - } + // Only a set signed by a key this router already trusts may replace + // the trust set; anything else is whoever answered the URL. + newKeys, err := api.VerifyKeysResponse(&keysResp, r.getTrustedPublicKeys(), time.Now()) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("/keys response rejected: %w", err) } + + r.keysMu.Lock() r.trustedPublicKeys = newKeys r.keysMu.Unlock() @@ -703,6 +704,24 @@ func (r *Router) syncKeys() error { return nil } +// controlPlaneClient is the client for every request to the control plane; +// its transport re-checks the plaintext policy on each hop, redirects included. +func (r *Router) controlPlaneClient(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client { + return &http.Client{ + Timeout: timeout, + Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { + if err := api.ValidateControlPlaneTransport(req.URL.String(), r.config.AllowInsecureControlPlane); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return http.DefaultTransport.RoundTrip(req) + }), + } +} + +type roundTripperFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) + +func (f roundTripperFunc) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { return f(req) } + func (r *Router) getTrustedPublicKeys() []ed25519.PublicKey { r.keysMu.RLock() defer r.keysMu.RUnlock() @@ -890,7 +909,7 @@ func (r *Router) renewLease() { } data, _ := proto.Marshal(req) - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second} + client := r.controlPlaneClient(10 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Post(r.config.ControlPlaneURL+"/routers/lease", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(data)) if err != nil { logger.Errorf("Failed to renew lease with control plane: %v", err) @@ -1009,7 +1028,7 @@ func (r *Router) runFederationLoop() { } func (r *Router) connectBootstrapRouters() { - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second} + client := r.controlPlaneClient(10 * time.Second) // Taken before the request: anything banned after this point cannot be // reflected in the answer, so reconciliation must not read its absence as // an unban (see reconcileBannedPeers). @@ -1333,7 +1352,7 @@ func (r *Router) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { b64Biscuit := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(currentBiscuit) httpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+b64Biscuit) - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second} + client := r.controlPlaneClient(10 * time.Second) resp, err := client.Do(httpReq) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("http request failed: %w", err) @@ -1347,11 +1366,11 @@ func (r *Router) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { } if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden { - logger.Errorf("Refresh rejected: Router is banned (403 Forbidden). Hard-killing router.") - if r.Host != nil { - _ = r.Host.Close() - } - os.Exit(1) + // A 403 is a claim by whoever answered; only a verified + // MeshEvent_BANNED is the control plane's word. Keep serving on the + // current biscuit until it expires. + body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) + return fmt.Errorf("refresh refused (403 Forbidden): %s", string(body)) } if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { @@ -1373,6 +1392,12 @@ func (r *Router) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { return fmt.Errorf("refresh error: %s", refreshResp.ErrorMessage) } + // Same checks as enrollment: signed by a trusted key, bound to this + // router, carrying the router role. + if err := r.verifyOwnBiscuit(refreshResp.BiscuitToken, peerID); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("refreshed biscuit rejected: %w", err) + } + // Update local biscuit token and expiration under lock r.keysMu.Lock() r.biscuitToken = refreshResp.BiscuitToken @@ -1383,6 +1408,18 @@ func (r *Router) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error { return nil } +func (r *Router) verifyOwnBiscuit(token []byte, peerID peer.ID) error { + trusted := r.getTrustedPublicKeys() + if len(trusted) == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("no trusted control plane keys loaded") + } + _, key, err := identity.VerifyBiscuitAndGetKey(token, peerID, trusted, r.config.BiscuitTimeout) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return identity.VerifyBiscuitRole(token, key, r.config.RequiredRole, r.config.BiscuitTimeout) +} + func (r *Router) runBiscuitRenewalLoop() { defer r.wg.Done() ticker := time.NewTicker(api.TokenRefreshCheckInterval) diff --git a/internal/router/trust_test.go b/internal/router/trust_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2ef260b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/router/trust_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package router + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2" + "github.com/google/sam/api" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" +) + +// A router pointed at a plaintext control plane on another host has no way +// to know who it is talking to, so Options refuse it unless the operator +// says the network is trusted. Loopback is the standalone case. +func TestOptionsValidateControlPlaneTransport(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + url string + insecure bool + wantErr bool + }{ + {"http://127.0.0.1:8080", false, false}, + {"https://cp.example.com", false, false}, + {"http://sam-mesh-control-plane:8080", false, true}, + {"http://sam-mesh-control-plane:8080", true, false}, + } + for _, tt := range tests { + o := Options{ControlPlaneURL: tt.url, AllowInsecureControlPlane: tt.insecure} + o.Default() + err := o.Validate() + if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr { + t.Errorf("Validate(%q, insecure=%v) = %v, wantErr %v", tt.url, tt.insecure, err, tt.wantErr) + } + if tt.wantErr && !errors.Is(err, api.ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL) { + t.Errorf("Validate(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.url, err, api.ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL) + } + } +} + +// The transport re-checks the policy on every hop, so a stored or redirected +// plaintext URL is refused just like a flag-supplied one. +func TestControlPlaneClientRefusesPlaintextHop(t *testing.T) { + r := &Router{config: Options{}} + req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://sam-mesh-control-plane:8080/keys", nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, err = r.controlPlaneClient(time.Second).Do(req) + if !errors.Is(err, api.ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL) { + t.Fatalf("Do = %v, want %v", err, api.ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL) + } +} + +// /keys may only replace the trust set when signed by a key already in it. +func TestSyncKeysRequiresTrustedSignature(t *testing.T) { + oldPub, oldPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + newPub, newPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + attackerPub, attackerPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + var body []byte + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + _, _ = w.Write(body) + })) + defer srv.Close() + + newRouter := func() *Router { + return &Router{config: Options{ControlPlaneURL: srv.URL}, trustedPublicKeys: []ed25519.PublicKey{oldPub}} + } + marshal := func(resp *api.KeysResponse) []byte { + data, err := proto.Marshal(resp) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return data + } + + t.Run("rotation signed by the retiring key is adopted", func(t *testing.T) { + resp := &api.KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{oldPub, newPub}} + if err := api.SignKeysResponse(resp, []ed25519.PrivateKey{oldPriv, newPriv}, time.Now()); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + body = marshal(resp) + r := newRouter() + if err := r.syncKeys(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("syncKeys: %v", err) + } + if keys := r.getTrustedPublicKeys(); len(keys) != 2 || !keys[1].Equal(newPub) { + t.Errorf("trusted keys = %d, want old and new", len(keys)) + } + }) + + t.Run("unsigned set is refused", func(t *testing.T) { + body = marshal(&api.KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{oldPub, attackerPub}}) + r := newRouter() + if err := r.syncKeys(); err == nil { + t.Fatal("an unsigned /keys answer must not be adopted") + } + if keys := r.getTrustedPublicKeys(); len(keys) != 1 || !keys[0].Equal(oldPub) { + t.Errorf("trust set changed on a refused answer: %d keys", len(keys)) + } + }) + + t.Run("set signed only by a stranger is refused", func(t *testing.T) { + resp := &api.KeysResponse{PublicKeys: [][]byte{oldPub, attackerPub}} + if err := api.SignKeysResponse(resp, []ed25519.PrivateKey{attackerPriv, attackerPriv}, time.Now()); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + body = marshal(resp) + r := newRouter() + if err := r.syncKeys(); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a /keys answer signed by an untrusted key must not be adopted") + } + if keys := r.getTrustedPublicKeys(); len(keys) != 1 || !keys[0].Equal(oldPub) { + t.Errorf("trust set changed on a refused answer: %d keys", len(keys)) + } + }) +} + +func mintRouterBiscuit(t *testing.T, priv ed25519.PrivateKey, peerID peer.ID, role string) []byte { + t.Helper() + builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv) + for _, f := range []biscuit.Fact{ + {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactNode, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(peerID.String())}}}, + {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(role)}}}, + {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactExpiration, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Date(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour))}}}, + } { + if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(f); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + } + tok, err := builder.Build() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + b, err := tok.Serialize() + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return b +} + +// A 403 from /refresh is reported, not obeyed with an exit; and a refreshed +// token is held to the enrollment bar (trusted signer, this peer, router role). +func TestRouterRefreshEnrollmentHardening(t *testing.T) { + cpPub, cpPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, strangerPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + priv, _, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + peerID, err := peer.IDFromPrivateKey(priv) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + current := mintRouterBiscuit(t, cpPriv, peerID, api.RoleRouter) + + var respond func(w http.ResponseWriter) + srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if r.URL.Path != "/refresh" { + t.Errorf("unexpected request to %s", r.URL.Path) + http.Error(w, "unexpected", http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } + respond(w) + })) + defer srv.Close() + + newRouter := func() *Router { + return &Router{ + privKey: priv, + biscuitToken: current, + trustedPublicKeys: []ed25519.PublicKey{cpPub}, + config: Options{ControlPlaneURL: srv.URL, RequiredRole: api.RoleRouter, BiscuitTimeout: time.Second}, + } + } + tokenResponse := func(token []byte) func(http.ResponseWriter) { + return func(w http.ResponseWriter) { + data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: token, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix()}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, _ = w.Write(data) + } + } + + t.Run("403 is an error, not an exit", func(t *testing.T) { + respond = func(w http.ResponseWriter) { http.Error(w, "router banned", http.StatusForbidden) } + r := newRouter() + err := r.RefreshEnrollment(context.Background()) + if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "403") { + t.Fatalf("RefreshEnrollment = %v, want a 403 error", err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(r.biscuitToken, current) { + t.Error("the current biscuit must be kept on a refused refresh") + } + }) + + for name, token := range map[string][]byte{ + "token signed by an untrusted key": mintRouterBiscuit(t, strangerPriv, peerID, api.RoleRouter), + "token bound to another peer": mintRouterBiscuit(t, cpPriv, newTestPeerID(t), api.RoleRouter), + "token without the router role": mintRouterBiscuit(t, cpPriv, peerID, api.RoleNode), + } { + t.Run(name+" is refused", func(t *testing.T) { + respond = tokenResponse(token) + r := newRouter() + if err := r.RefreshEnrollment(context.Background()); err == nil { + t.Fatal("RefreshEnrollment adopted a token it must have refused") + } + if !bytes.Equal(r.biscuitToken, current) { + t.Error("the current biscuit must be kept when the refreshed one is refused") + } + }) + } + + t.Run("a good token is adopted", func(t *testing.T) { + fresh := mintRouterBiscuit(t, cpPriv, peerID, api.RoleRouter) + respond = tokenResponse(fresh) + r := newRouter() + if err := r.RefreshEnrollment(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("RefreshEnrollment: %v", err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(r.biscuitToken, fresh) { + t.Error("a valid refreshed token must replace the current one") + } + }) +} diff --git a/mobile/mobile_e2e.sh b/mobile/mobile_e2e.sh index 6b962f33..6d4f7b30 100755 --- a/mobile/mobile_e2e.sh +++ b/mobile/mobile_e2e.sh @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ docker run --name sam-router \ -d --rm \ sam-router:local \ --control-plane http://sam-control-plane:37001 \ + --insecure-control-plane \ --listen /ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/37002 \ --listen /ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/37002/quic-v1 \ --external-addr /ip4/10.0.2.2/tcp/37002 \ @@ -250,6 +251,7 @@ docker run --name host-node \ run \ --data-dir /data \ --control-plane http://sam-control-plane:37001 \ + --insecure-control-plane \ --jwt "$HOST_JWT" \ --bind-addr 0.0.0.0:8081 \ --allow-loopback \ diff --git a/site/content/docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md b/site/content/docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md index c54f7862..c9a3bcfa 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md +++ b/site/content/docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md @@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ If you are using the **Mock OIDC Provider**, the node can fetch the token using ```bash sam-node run \ --control-plane "http://$CONTROL_PLANE_IP:9090" \ + --insecure-control-plane \ --oidc-issuer "http://$MOCK_IP:18080" \ --client-id "sam-mesh-audience" \ # client secret via SAM_CLIENT_SECRET env or --client-secret-path @@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ If you are using **Google OIDC**, you must obtain a valid Google ID token for yo ```bash sam-node run \ --control-plane "http://$CONTROL_PLANE_IP:9090" \ + --insecure-control-plane \ --jwt "" ``` @@ -322,7 +324,7 @@ The SAM project supports three primary flows for acquiring a JWT token to enroll * **Example:** ```bash sam-node run \ - --control-plane "http://control-plane.example.com:9090" \ + --control-plane "https://control-plane.example.com:9090" \ --oidc-issuer "https://accounts.google.com" \ --client-id "$SAM_OIDC_ID" \ --client-secret "$SAM_OIDC_SECRET" @@ -349,7 +351,7 @@ sam-node run * **Example:** ```bash sam-node run \ - --control-plane "http://control-plane.example.com:9090" \ + --control-plane "https://control-plane.example.com:9090" \ --jwt-path "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token" ``` > [!NOTE] diff --git a/site/content/docs/manifests/sam-router.yaml b/site/content/docs/manifests/sam-router.yaml index 0d75b0ee..5567a6dd 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/manifests/sam-router.yaml +++ b/site/content/docs/manifests/sam-router.yaml @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ spec: imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent args: - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--listen=/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/4501" - "--listen=/ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/4501/quic-v1" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" diff --git a/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md b/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md index ac7510e8..7fd625ed 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md +++ b/site/content/docs/user/control-plane-configuration.md @@ -39,13 +39,14 @@ The Router is a dedicated GossipSub helper that maintains stable network address | CLI Flag | Default Value | Description | | :--- | :--- | :--- | -| `--control-plane` | `http://127.0.0.1:8080` | Control Plane web service URL. | +| `--control-plane` | `http://127.0.0.1:8080` | Control Plane web service URL. Plaintext `http://` is accepted only for a loopback host. | +| `--insecure-control-plane` | `false` | Accept a plaintext `http://` control-plane URL to a non-loopback host (e.g. an in-cluster Service). Whoever answers that URL becomes the router's trust root, so leave this off outside a network you already trust. The same flag exists on `sam-node`. | | `--listen` | `/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/5001`, `/ip6/::/tcp/5001` | Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs to listen on. | | `--external-addr` | *None* | External multiaddrs to announce to control plane. | | `--keys-path` | `router.key` | Path to save/load persistent private key (determines Peer ID). | | `--jwt-path` | *None* | Path to file containing OIDC JWT token for enrollment. | | `--oidc-token` | *None* | Direct OIDC ID token or bootstrap secret token for enrollment. | -| `--keys-sync-interval` | `5m` | Key synchronization polling interval. | +| `--keys-sync-interval` | `5m` | Key synchronization polling interval. `GET /keys` returns the valid key set signed by every key in it; the router (and nodes, at start-up) accept the set only if one of those signatures verifies under a key they already trust, so the first key always comes from enrollment and a rotation is learned from the retiring key. | | `--lease-renew-interval` | `300s` | Lease renewal registration interval. | | `--allow-loopback` | `false` | Allow loopback and link-local addresses for discovery (development only). | diff --git a/site/content/docs/user/kubernetes-deployment.md b/site/content/docs/user/kubernetes-deployment.md index 68c8fba1..e7d53e77 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/user/kubernetes-deployment.md +++ b/site/content/docs/user/kubernetes-deployment.md @@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ spec: name: p2p-udp args: - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane.sam.svc.cluster.local:8080" + # In-cluster plaintext; the cluster network is the trust boundary. + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--listen=/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/4501" - "--listen=/ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/4501/quic-v1" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" @@ -304,6 +306,7 @@ spec: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" - "--control-plane=http://sam-control-plane.sam.svc.cluster.local:8080" + - "--insecure-control-plane" - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" - "--api-token-path=/var/run/secrets/sam/api-token" volumeMounts: diff --git a/tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats b/tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats index eeea49f5..730f4436 100644 --- a/tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats +++ b/tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats @@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ teardown() { "sam-node:local" \ run \ --data-dir /data \ - --control-plane "http://sam-control-plane:8080" + --control-plane "http://sam-control-plane:8080" \ + --insecure-control-plane MESH_CONTAINERS+=("${node_name}") mesh_wait_for_log "${node_name}" "Using stored identity." 20 @@ -152,6 +153,7 @@ sys.exit(0 if b'\x05label' in raw and b'\x06region' in raw and b'\x02eu' in raw "sam-node:local" \ run \ --control-plane "http://sam-control-plane:8080" \ + --insecure-control-plane \ --jwt-path "/var/run/secrets/tokens/sa-token" MESH_CONTAINERS+=("${node_name}") @@ -216,7 +218,8 @@ sys.exit(0 if b'\x05label' in raw and b'\x06region' in raw and b'\x02eu' in raw "sam-node:local" \ run \ --data-dir /data \ - --control-plane "http://sam-control-plane:8080" + --control-plane "http://sam-control-plane:8080" \ + --insecure-control-plane MESH_CONTAINERS+=("${node_name}") mesh_wait_for_log "${node_name}" "Using stored identity." 20 diff --git a/tests/e2e/lib/container_mesh.bash b/tests/e2e/lib/container_mesh.bash index 5caba6c7..e0a21e97 100644 --- a/tests/e2e/lib/container_mesh.bash +++ b/tests/e2e/lib/container_mesh.bash @@ -497,6 +497,7 @@ if [[ -z "${MESH_HELPERS_LOADED:-}" ]]; then --log-level debug \ --discovery-interval 2s \ --control-plane "http://sam-control-plane:8080" \ + --insecure-control-plane \ --client-id "sam-mesh-audience" \ --oidc-issuer "http://mock-oidc:18080" \ --listen "/ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/5001/quic-v1" \ From 0244e42bc54d8415691257285e5ad04c2ac90e43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 08:33:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 08/14] charts, docs, skill: secrets out of the tree and out of env (audit PR 7) L37 demo.cast: the asciinema recording on the docs site carried a real daemon API token (46 of 64 hex chars) in some sixty frames. Redacted in place with a same-width placeholder so the frames stay aligned. hack/verify-secrets.sh (run by `make verify` in CI) now fails on `Bearer [0-9a-f]{32,}` and on any PEM private-key block in tracked files; both rules fire against the previous HEAD. Operator action still needed: rotate the token on the machine that recorded the cast (delete ~/.config/sam-mesh/api-token and re-run `sam-node run --daemonize`). L38 mock OIDC signing key: the RSA private key of the mock issuer was committed three times (docs manifest, e2e image, inline in policy.bats) and the docs recommended that issuer for local testing. All three now generate the key at start-up and derive the JWKS from it; the guide warns that a control plane trusting the mock admits anyone who can reach it. L19 chart secrets: the sam-node chart put `apiToken: devtoken` in the pod's env; it is now a generated Secret (-api-token, stable across upgrades, pin with --set) mounted as a file and read via --api-token-path, matching the sam-mesh chart's admin-token pattern. The router bootstrap token minted by the sam-mesh bootstrap job had max_usages 999999; it is now one use per router replica. L22 / I22 security contexts: the sam-node Deployment and the internal postgres StatefulSet had none. Both get runAsNonRoot with the numeric uid (65532 distroless, 70 postgres with fsGroup for the PVC), seccomp RuntimeDefault, allowPrivilegeEscalation false, all capabilities dropped, and automountServiceAccountToken false (the node uses the projected, audienced token; postgres needs none). I25 skill: the sam-mesh skill and the node's MCP instructions told the agent to read ~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json or ~/.claude.json to recover the node token, which puts every other MCP server's headers into the model context; L37 is what that produces. They now point at the daemon token file with a curl form that reads it without putting the value in argv, and say to ask the user otherwise. I5: delete internal/sambox/gateway.go, the dead TLS-MITM forward proxy (no non-test caller). Chart tests cover the mounted Secret, the security contexts, and the router token cap; the verify-secrets rules were checked against HEAD before the fix. --- Makefile | 1 + agents/skills/sam-mesh/SKILL.md | 19 +- charts/sam-mesh/templates/bootstrap-job.yaml | 4 +- charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml | 9 + charts/sam-mesh/tests/bootstrap-job_test.yaml | 14 + .../sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml | 21 + charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml | 14 + charts/sam-node/README.md | 3 +- charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml | 21 +- charts/sam-node/templates/secret.yaml | 19 + charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml | 43 +- charts/sam-node/values.yaml | 25 +- hack/verify-secrets.sh | 48 ++ internal/node/mcp.go | 2 +- internal/sambox/gateway.go | 528 ------------------ internal/sambox/gateway_test.go | 296 ---------- .../docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md | 6 + site/content/docs/manifests/mock-oidc.yaml | 49 +- site/static/demo.cast | 124 ++-- tests/e2e/docker/mock_oidc.py | 52 +- tests/e2e/policy.bats | 51 +- 21 files changed, 354 insertions(+), 995 deletions(-) create mode 100644 charts/sam-node/templates/secret.yaml create mode 100755 hack/verify-secrets.sh delete mode 100644 internal/sambox/gateway.go delete mode 100644 internal/sambox/gateway_test.go diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index ab330ff1..d1233036 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ helm-test: .PHONY: verify verify: ./hack/verify-generated.sh + ./hack/verify-secrets.sh update: go mod tidy diff --git a/agents/skills/sam-mesh/SKILL.md b/agents/skills/sam-mesh/SKILL.md index f6e8f348..0725a892 100644 --- a/agents/skills/sam-mesh/SKILL.md +++ b/agents/skills/sam-mesh/SKILL.md @@ -88,16 +88,23 @@ The host in the URL is a placeholder that curl ignores once it dials a socket. **2. The TCP endpoint, with the node API token.** Use this when `get_mesh_info` reports no `local_api_socket`, or when that path is not reachable from where you -run, for example a node inside a container. You already hold that token: it is -the header you were configured with to reach this MCP server in the first place. -Read it back from your own MCP client configuration — the `sam-mesh` entry in, -for example, `~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json` or `~/.claude.json` — rather than -asking the user for it or reading the node's token file. +run, for example a node inside a container. Do not read your MCP client +configuration to recover it: those files hold the headers of every other server +you are connected to, and reading them puts all of those secrets into the +transcript. A daemonized node writes its token to +`~/.config/sam-mesh/api-token`; let curl read that file itself so the value +never appears in an argument, the shell history, or your output: ```bash -curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/models -H "X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer " +curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/models -H @<(printf 'X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer %s' "$(cat ~/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)") ``` +`<(...)` needs bash or zsh; in a plain `sh`, write the header line to a file +with mode 0600 and pass `-H @that-file` instead. + +If the node was started with `--api-token-path` or `SAM_API_TOKEN`, ask the +user where the token lives rather than searching for it. + Never print the token or echo it into the transcript. `Authorization` is not the node's credential: send it only when the destination service needs its own, and it passes through to that service untouched. diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/bootstrap-job.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/bootstrap-job.yaml index a6247548..b6503c97 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/bootstrap-job.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/bootstrap-job.yaml @@ -128,10 +128,12 @@ spec: echo "Generating bootstrap token for sam-router..." + # One use per router replica: a leaked token is worth nothing once + # the routers have enrolled. TOKEN_RESP=$(curl -sf -X POST \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer ${ADMIN_TOKEN}" \ - -d '{"role": "sam:role:router", "max_usages": 999999}' \ + -d '{"role": "sam:role:router", "max_usages": {{ .Values.router.replicaCount | int }}}' \ "${CP_URL}/admin/bootstrap-tokens") ROUTER_TOKEN=$(echo "${TOKEN_RESP}" | sed -n 's/.*"token"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p') diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml index 2e635355..18c6b7a4 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml @@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ spec: labels: app: {{ include "sam-mesh.fullname" . }}-db spec: + automountServiceAccountToken: false + {{- with .Values.database.postgres.podSecurityContext }} + securityContext: + {{- toYaml . | nindent 8 }} + {{- end }} {{- with .Values.database.postgres.nodeSelector }} nodeSelector: {{- toYaml . | nindent 8 }} @@ -32,6 +37,10 @@ spec: - name: postgres image: "{{ .Values.database.postgres.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.database.postgres.image.tag }}" imagePullPolicy: {{ .Values.global.imagePullPolicy }} + {{- with .Values.database.postgres.securityContext }} + securityContext: + {{- toYaml . | nindent 10 }} + {{- end }} env: - name: POSTGRES_DB value: {{ .Values.database.postgres.database | quote }} diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/bootstrap-job_test.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/bootstrap-job_test.yaml index cbdc6e03..a7ae94a7 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/bootstrap-job_test.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/bootstrap-job_test.yaml @@ -42,6 +42,20 @@ tests: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args[0] pattern: '"name": "sam:role:node".*"allowed_labels": \[\]' + - it: router bootstrap token is spent after one use per replica + set: + router.replicaCount: 3 + documentSelector: + path: kind + value: Job + asserts: + - matchRegex: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args[0] + pattern: '"role": "sam:role:router", "max_usages": 3\}' + - notMatchRegex: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args[0] + pattern: '999999' + - it: node role grants no services by default (fail closed) documentSelector: path: kind diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml index 7d3090e7..ab3b936f 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml @@ -16,6 +16,27 @@ tests: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].livenessProbe.exec.command[0] value: pg_isready + - it: runs postgres as its own uid with no capabilities + documentSelector: + path: kind + value: StatefulSet + asserts: + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.securityContext.runAsNonRoot + value: true + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.securityContext.runAsUser + value: 70 + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.securityContext.fsGroup + value: 70 + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.automountServiceAccountToken + value: false + - contains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].securityContext.capabilities.drop + content: ALL + - it: scheduling knobs pass through to the pod spec set: database.postgres.tolerations: diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml index bd379eaf..b4e06b36 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml @@ -83,6 +83,20 @@ database: port: 5432 sslmode: disable storageSize: 1Gi + # postgres:16-alpine runs as uid 70 (postgres) and needs the data dir + # owned by it; fsGroup does that on the PVC. + podSecurityContext: + runAsNonRoot: true + runAsUser: 70 + runAsGroup: 70 + fsGroup: 70 + fsGroupChangePolicy: "OnRootMismatch" + seccompProfile: + type: RuntimeDefault + securityContext: + allowPrivilegeEscalation: false + capabilities: + drop: ["ALL"] nodeSelector: {} tolerations: [] affinity: {} diff --git a/charts/sam-node/README.md b/charts/sam-node/README.md index 3818c750..e3a61277 100644 --- a/charts/sam-node/README.md +++ b/charts/sam-node/README.md @@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ service: |-----|---------|---------| | `controlPlaneUrl` | — (required) | Control plane URL the node enrolls with | | `audience` | `sam-mesh-audience` | Projected token audience | -| `apiToken` | `devtoken` | Bearer token for the node's local REST API | +| `apiToken` | `""` (generated) | Bearer token for the node's local REST API, stored in the Secret `-api-token` and mounted as a file. Empty generates a random one on first install; set to pin | +| `podSecurityContext` / `securityContext` | nonroot 65532, seccomp RuntimeDefault, no capabilities | Pod and container security contexts | | `bindAddr` | `127.0.0.1:8080` | Node API bind address (loopback = pod-private) | | `extraArgs` | `[]` | Extra sam-node args | | `config` | empty services | Merged over the chart's defaults and rendered as `sam-node.yaml`; pods roll on config changes | diff --git a/charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml b/charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml index 76eaf769..c314ae61 100644 --- a/charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-node/templates/deployment.yaml @@ -19,13 +19,21 @@ spec: checksum/config: {{ include (print $.Template.BasePath "/configmap.yaml") . | sha256sum }} spec: serviceAccountName: {{ default (include "sam-node.fullname" .) .Values.serviceAccount.name }} + # The node reads the projected token below; the default SA token would + # be a second, unaudienced credential in the pod. + automountServiceAccountToken: false + {{- with .Values.podSecurityContext }} + securityContext: + {{- toYaml . | nindent 8 }} + {{- end }} containers: - name: sam-node image: "{{ .Values.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.image.tag }}" imagePullPolicy: {{ .Values.image.pullPolicy }} - env: - - name: SAM_API_TOKEN - value: {{ .Values.apiToken | quote }} + {{- with .Values.securityContext }} + securityContext: + {{- toYaml . | nindent 12 }} + {{- end }} args: - "run" - "--config=/etc/sam/sam-node.yaml" @@ -36,6 +44,7 @@ spec: - "--insecure-control-plane" {{- end }} - "--jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/tokens/sam-token" + - "--api-token-path=/var/run/secrets/sam/api-token" - "--bind-addr={{ .Values.bindAddr }}" {{- range .Values.extraArgs }} - {{ . | quote }} @@ -50,6 +59,9 @@ spec: - name: sam-token mountPath: /var/run/secrets/tokens readOnly: true + - name: api-token + mountPath: /var/run/secrets/sam + readOnly: true {{- if .Values.service.image }} - name: {{ .Values.service.name }} image: {{ .Values.service.image | quote }} @@ -87,6 +99,9 @@ spec: - name: config configMap: name: {{ include "sam-node.fullname" . }}-config + - name: api-token + secret: + secretName: {{ include "sam-node.fullname" . }}-api-token - name: sam-token projected: sources: diff --git a/charts/sam-node/templates/secret.yaml b/charts/sam-node/templates/secret.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49713055 --- /dev/null +++ b/charts/sam-node/templates/secret.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{{- $secretName := printf "%s-api-token" (include "sam-node.fullname" .) }} +{{- $existing := lookup "v1" "Secret" .Release.Namespace $secretName }} +{{- $apiToken := .Values.apiToken }} +{{- if not $apiToken }} + {{- if and $existing (hasKey $existing "data") (hasKey $existing.data "api-token") }} + {{- $apiToken = index $existing.data "api-token" | b64dec }} + {{- else }} + {{- $apiToken = randAlphaNum 32 }} + {{- end }} +{{- end }} +apiVersion: v1 +kind: Secret +metadata: + name: {{ $secretName }} + labels: + {{- include "sam-node.labels" . | nindent 4 }} +type: Opaque +data: + api-token: {{ $apiToken | b64enc | quote }} diff --git a/charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml b/charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml index 7a0f6c6f..62289eb7 100644 --- a/charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-node/tests/deployment_test.yaml @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ tests: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args content: "--bind-addr=127.0.0.1:8080" - equal: - path: spec.template.spec.volumes[1].projected.sources[0].serviceAccountToken.audience + path: spec.template.spec.volumes[2].projected.sources[0].serviceAccountToken.audience value: sam-mesh-audience - it: does not opt into plaintext for an https control plane @@ -45,6 +45,47 @@ tests: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args content: "--insecure-control-plane" + - it: reads the API token from a mounted Secret, never from env or argv + template: templates/deployment.yaml + set: + controlPlaneUrl: https://hub.example.com + asserts: + - contains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].args + content: "--api-token-path=/var/run/secrets/sam/api-token" + - notExists: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].env + - contains: + path: spec.template.spec.volumes + content: + name: api-token + secret: + secretName: RELEASE-NAME-sam-node-api-token + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.automountServiceAccountToken + value: false + + - it: runs as the distroless nonroot uid with no capabilities + template: templates/deployment.yaml + set: + controlPlaneUrl: https://hub.example.com + asserts: + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.securityContext.runAsNonRoot + value: true + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.securityContext.runAsUser + value: 65532 + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.securityContext.seccompProfile.type + value: RuntimeDefault + - equal: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation + value: false + - contains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].securityContext.capabilities.drop + content: ALL + - it: renders the service container when service.image is set template: templates/deployment.yaml set: diff --git a/charts/sam-node/values.yaml b/charts/sam-node/values.yaml index 8579c8ab..9f8510c8 100644 --- a/charts/sam-node/values.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-node/values.yaml @@ -15,8 +15,29 @@ controlPlaneUrl: "" # plane's allowedAudiences. audience: sam-mesh-audience -# Bearer token protecting the node's local REST API. -apiToken: devtoken +# Bearer token protecting the node's local REST API. Leave empty to generate a +# random one on first install (kept stable across upgrades) in the Secret +# -api-token; read it with +# kubectl get secret -api-token -o jsonpath='{.data.api-token}' | base64 -d +# Set explicitly (e.g. via --set) to pin a known value. The generated form +# relies on Helm's lookup, which sees no cluster under `helm template`, +# `--dry-run` or a GitOps diff: those render a fresh value each time. Pin the +# token, or pre-create the Secret, when the manifests are rendered outside +# `helm install`/`upgrade`. +apiToken: "" + +# Pod and container security contexts. The image is distroless nonroot; +# runAsNonRoot needs the numeric uid. +podSecurityContext: + runAsNonRoot: true + runAsUser: 65532 + runAsGroup: 65532 + seccompProfile: + type: RuntimeDefault +securityContext: + allowPrivilegeEscalation: false + capabilities: + drop: ["ALL"] # Address the node API binds inside the pod. Loopback keeps the API # pod-private; set 0.0.0.0:8080 to expose it on the pod IP. diff --git a/hack/verify-secrets.sh b/hack/verify-secrets.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..bde88a3e --- /dev/null +++ b/hack/verify-secrets.sh @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# Copyright 2026 Google LLC +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +# Refuses tracked files that carry a SAM-shaped credential. Generic secret +# scanners do not know these shapes: a node API token is 32 random bytes hex +# encoded behind "Bearer", and a private key block anywhere outside a test +# fixture is a key somebody will trust (a demo recording once carried a real +# daemon token; a documented mock issuer once shipped its signing key). + +set -o errexit +set -o nounset +set -o pipefail + +REPO_ROOT=$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd) +cd "${REPO_ROOT}" + +status=0 + +# A bearer of 32+ hex chars is a token, not a placeholder. +if hits=$(git grep -nE 'Bearer [0-9a-f]{32,}' -- ':!hack/verify-secrets.sh'); then + echo "Bearer tokens found in tracked files:" + echo "${hits}" + status=1 +fi + +# PEM private keys. Nothing tracked should hold one: fixtures generate theirs. +if hits=$(git grep -nE -- '-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |OPENSSH |)PRIVATE KEY-----' -- ':!hack/verify-secrets.sh'); then + echo "Private key blocks found in tracked files:" + echo "${hits}" + status=1 +fi + +if [[ "${status}" -ne 0 ]]; then + echo "Remove the credential, rotate it if it was ever real, and regenerate fixtures at start-up instead of committing them." +fi +exit "${status}" diff --git a/internal/node/mcp.go b/internal/node/mcp.go index bb0bac35..61d57d58 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp.go @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Inference services ('inference://...') are NOT called via call_remote_tool — t To authenticate such an HTTP request to this node, try these in order: 1. If get_mesh_info reports a local_api_socket, send the request over that Unix socket and skip authentication entirely: it serves this same HTTP API, and only the user who owns the socket can connect to it, so no token is involved and no secret lands in a command line. e.g. 'curl --unix-socket /chat/completions'. - 2. Otherwise use the TCP endpoint with header 'X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer '. You already have that token: it is the header you were configured with to reach this MCP server, so read it back from your own MCP client configuration (the entry for this server in e.g. ~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json or ~/.claude.json) instead of asking the user for it or hunting for the node's token file. + 2. Otherwise use the TCP endpoint with header 'X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer '. Do not read your MCP client configuration files to recover that token: they hold every other server's headers too, and reading them puts all of those secrets into the transcript. A daemonized node writes its token to ~/.config/sam-mesh/api-token; have curl read the file itself (e.g. -H @<(printf 'X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer %s' "$(cat ~/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)")) so the value never lands in an argument. If the node was started with --api-token-path or SAM_API_TOKEN, ask the user where the token lives. Never print that token or echo it into the transcript. 'Authorization: Bearer ' is a different thing: send it only when the destination service requires its own credential — it passes straight through untouched and is never used to authenticate to this node.` diff --git a/internal/sambox/gateway.go b/internal/sambox/gateway.go deleted file mode 100644 index 6688d366..00000000 --- a/internal/sambox/gateway.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,528 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2026 Google LLC -// -// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -// You may obtain a copy of the License at -// -// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -// -// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -// limitations under the License. - -package sambox - -import ( - "bufio" - "bytes" - "crypto/rand" - "crypto/rsa" - "crypto/tls" - "crypto/x509" - "crypto/x509/pkix" - "encoding/pem" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "log" - "math/big" - "net" - "net/http" - "net/http/httputil" - "os" - "path/filepath" - "strings" - "sync" - "sync/atomic" - "time" -) - -type SecretKind string - -const ( - SecretKindBearer SecretKind = "bearer" - SecretKindCustomHeader SecretKind = "customheader" - SecretKindBasicAuth SecretKind = "basicauth" -) - -type SecretConfig struct { - Kind SecretKind `yaml:"kind" json:"kind"` - HeaderName string `yaml:"header_name" json:"header_name"` - Value string `yaml:"value" json:"value"` -} - -type CA struct { - CertBytes []byte - Certificate *x509.Certificate - PrivateKey *rsa.PrivateKey -} - -func GenerateEphemeralCA() (*CA, error) { - priv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - serialNumberLimit := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128) - serialNumber, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, serialNumberLimit) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - template := &x509.Certificate{ - SerialNumber: serialNumber, - Subject: pkix.Name{ - Organization: []string{"Ephemeral SamBox CA"}, - CommonName: "SamBox Ephemeral Root CA", - }, - NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour), - NotAfter: time.Now().Add(365 * 24 * time.Hour), - KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign, - BasicConstraintsValid: true, - IsCA: true, - } - - derBytes, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template, &priv.PublicKey, priv) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - certPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{ - Type: "CERTIFICATE", - Bytes: derBytes, - }) - - cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(derBytes) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return &CA{ - CertBytes: certPEM, - Certificate: cert, - PrivateKey: priv, - }, nil -} - -type CertCache struct { - mu sync.RWMutex - certs map[string]*tls.Certificate - leafKey *rsa.PrivateKey -} - -func NewCertCache() (*CertCache, error) { - priv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate reusable leaf private key: %w", err) - } - return &CertCache{ - certs: make(map[string]*tls.Certificate), - leafKey: priv, - }, nil -} - -func (c *CertCache) GetCertificate(sni string, ca *CA) (*tls.Certificate, error) { - c.mu.RLock() - cert, exists := c.certs[sni] - c.mu.RUnlock() - if exists { - return cert, nil - } - - c.mu.Lock() - defer c.mu.Unlock() - if cert, exists = c.certs[sni]; exists { - return cert, nil - } - - newCert, err := GenerateLeafCert(sni, ca, c.leafKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - c.certs[sni] = newCert - return newCert, nil -} - -func GenerateLeafCert(sni string, ca *CA, priv *rsa.PrivateKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) { - serialNumberLimit := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128) - serialNumber, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, serialNumberLimit) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - template := &x509.Certificate{ - SerialNumber: serialNumber, - Subject: pkix.Name{ - CommonName: sni, - }, - DNSNames: []string{sni}, - NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour), - NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour), - KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment, - ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{ - x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, - }, - } - - derBytes, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, ca.Certificate, &priv.PublicKey, ca.PrivateKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - certPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{ - Type: "CERTIFICATE", - Bytes: derBytes, - }) - - privDer := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(priv) - keyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{ - Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", - Bytes: privDer, - }) - - tlsCert, err := tls.X509KeyPair(certPEM, keyPEM) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return &tlsCert, nil -} - -type Gateway struct { - CA *CA - CertCache *CertCache - SecretStore map[string]SecretConfig - Transport http.RoundTripper - InterceptorsDir string - - caBootstrapped atomic.Bool - interceptorBootstrapped atomic.Bool -} - -func NewGateway(secretStore map[string]SecretConfig, transport http.RoundTripper, interceptorsDir string) (*Gateway, error) { - ca, err := GenerateEphemeralCA() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - certCache, err := NewCertCache() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return &Gateway{ - CA: ca, - CertCache: certCache, - SecretStore: secretStore, - Transport: transport, - InterceptorsDir: interceptorsDir, - }, nil -} - -func (g *Gateway) Serve(listener net.Listener) error { - tlsListener := &channelListener{ - conns: make(chan net.Conn, 100), - closed: make(chan struct{}), - } - defer func() { _ = tlsListener.Close() }() - - director := func(req *http.Request) { - req.URL.Scheme = "https" - req.URL.Host = req.Host - host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host) - if err != nil { - host = req.Host - } - if config, ok := g.SecretStore[host]; ok { - switch SecretKind(strings.ToLower(string(config.Kind))) { - case SecretKindBearer: - req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+config.Value) - case SecretKindBasicAuth: - req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+config.Value) - case SecretKindCustomHeader: - if config.HeaderName != "" { - req.Header.Set(config.HeaderName, config.Value) - } - } - } - } - - proxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{ - Director: director, - Transport: g.Transport, - } - - server := &http.Server{ - Handler: proxy, - // Bound header-read time only: proxied backend responses can stream. - ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second, - IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second, - } - - var serverErr error - var errMu sync.Mutex - - go func() { - if err := server.Serve(tlsListener); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) { - errMu.Lock() - serverErr = err - errMu.Unlock() - _ = listener.Close() - } - }() - - for { - rawConn, err := listener.Accept() - if err != nil { - errMu.Lock() - sErr := serverErr - errMu.Unlock() - if sErr != nil { - return sErr - } - - select { - case <-tlsListener.closed: - return nil - default: - if errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) { - return nil - } - log.Printf("Accept error: %v; retrying in 50ms", err) - time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) - continue - } - } - - go g.handleConnection(rawConn, tlsListener) - } -} - -func (g *Gateway) handleConnection(rawConn net.Conn, tlsListener *channelListener) { - br := bufio.NewReader(rawConn) - peekBytes, err := br.Peek(5) - if err != nil { - _ = rawConn.Close() - return - } - - conn := &bufferedConn{ - Conn: rawConn, - r: br, - } - - if len(peekBytes) > 0 && peekBytes[0] == 0x16 { - tlsConfig := &tls.Config{ - GetCertificate: func(info *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) { - sni := info.ServerName - if sni == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing SNI") - } - return g.CertCache.GetCertificate(sni, g.CA) - }, - } - tlsConn := tls.Server(conn, tlsConfig) - if err := tlsConn.Handshake(); err != nil { - _ = tlsConn.Close() - return - } - - select { - case tlsListener.conns <- tlsConn: - case <-tlsListener.closed: - _ = tlsConn.Close() - } - } else { - g.handleHTTPConnection(conn, tlsListener) - } -} - -func (g *Gateway) handleHTTPConnection(conn *bufferedConn, tlsListener *channelListener) { - req, err := http.ReadRequest(conn.r) - if err != nil { - _ = conn.Close() - return - } - - if req.Method == "CONNECT" { - _, err := conn.Write([]byte("HTTP/1.1 200 Connection Established\r\n\r\n")) - if err != nil { - _ = conn.Close() - return - } - g.upgradeToTLS(conn, req.Host, tlsListener) - return - } - - defer func() { _ = conn.Close() }() - - if req.Method == "GET" && req.URL.Path == "/internal/bootstrap/ca.crt" { - if !g.caBootstrapped.CompareAndSwap(false, true) { - write403(conn) - return - } - - resp := &http.Response{ - StatusCode: http.StatusOK, - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, - ContentLength: int64(len(g.CA.CertBytes)), - Body: io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(g.CA.CertBytes)), - Header: make(http.Header), - } - resp.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-x509-ca-cert") - _ = resp.Write(conn) - } else if req.Method == "GET" && req.URL.Path == "/internal/bootstrap/libinterceptor.so" { - if g.InterceptorsDir == "" { - write404(conn) - return - } - - arch := req.URL.Query().Get("arch") - libc := req.URL.Query().Get("libc") - if !isValidIdentifier(arch) || !isValidIdentifier(libc) { - write404(conn) - return - } - - if !g.interceptorBootstrapped.CompareAndSwap(false, true) { - write403(conn) - return - } - - var filename string - if arch != "" && libc != "" { - filename = fmt.Sprintf("libinterceptor-%s-%s.so", arch, libc) - } else { - filename = "libinterceptor.so" - } - - // isValidIdentifier already forbids path separators; Base is defense in depth. - filePath := filepath.Join(g.InterceptorsDir, filepath.Base(filename)) - fileData, err := os.ReadFile(filePath) - if err != nil && filename != "libinterceptor.so" { - filePath = filepath.Join(g.InterceptorsDir, "libinterceptor.so") - fileData, err = os.ReadFile(filePath) - } - - if err != nil { - write404(conn) - return - } - - resp := &http.Response{ - StatusCode: http.StatusOK, - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, - ContentLength: int64(len(fileData)), - Body: io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(fileData)), - Header: make(http.Header), - } - resp.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream") - _ = resp.Write(conn) - } else { - write404(conn) - } -} - -func write404(conn net.Conn) { - resp := &http.Response{ - StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, - Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("Not Found")), - Header: make(http.Header), - } - _ = resp.Write(conn) -} - -func write403(conn net.Conn) { - resp := &http.Response{ - StatusCode: http.StatusForbidden, - ProtoMajor: 1, - ProtoMinor: 1, - Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("Forbidden")), - Header: make(http.Header), - } - _ = resp.Write(conn) -} - -func (g *Gateway) upgradeToTLS(rawConn net.Conn, sni string, tlsListener *channelListener) { - host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(sni) - if err != nil { - host = sni - } - - tlsConfig := &tls.Config{ - GetCertificate: func(info *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) { - return g.CertCache.GetCertificate(host, g.CA) - }, - } - - tlsConn := tls.Server(rawConn, tlsConfig) - if err := tlsConn.Handshake(); err != nil { - _ = tlsConn.Close() - return - } - - select { - case tlsListener.conns <- tlsConn: - case <-tlsListener.closed: - _ = tlsConn.Close() - } -} - -type bufferedConn struct { - net.Conn - r *bufio.Reader -} - -func (c *bufferedConn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { - return c.r.Read(b) -} - -type channelListener struct { - conns chan net.Conn - closed chan struct{} - once sync.Once -} - -func (l *channelListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { - select { - case conn := <-l.conns: - return conn, nil - case <-l.closed: - return nil, io.EOF - } -} - -func (l *channelListener) Close() error { - l.once.Do(func() { - close(l.closed) - for { - select { - case conn := <-l.conns: - _ = conn.Close() - default: - return - } - } - }) - return nil -} - -func (l *channelListener) Addr() net.Addr { - return &net.UnixAddr{Name: "internal-tls-multiplexer", Net: "unix"} -} - -func isValidIdentifier(s string) bool { - if s == "" { - return true - } - for _, r := range s { - if (r < 'a' || r > 'z') && (r < 'A' || r > 'Z') && (r < '0' || r > '9') && r != '_' && r != '-' { - return false - } - } - return true -} diff --git a/internal/sambox/gateway_test.go b/internal/sambox/gateway_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 0dae8de0..00000000 --- a/internal/sambox/gateway_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,296 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2026 Google LLC -// -// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -// You may obtain a copy of the License at -// -// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -// -// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -// limitations under the License. - -package sambox - -import ( - "context" - "crypto/tls" - "crypto/x509" - "io" - "net" - "net/http" - "net/http/httptest" - "os" - "path/filepath" - "testing" - "time" -) - -func TestGenerateEphemeralCA(t *testing.T) { - ca, err := GenerateEphemeralCA() - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("GenerateEphemeralCA failed: %v", err) - } - - if len(ca.CertBytes) == 0 { - t.Fatal("Empty CertBytes") - } - - if ca.Certificate == nil { - t.Fatal("Certificate is nil") - } - - if ca.PrivateKey == nil { - t.Fatal("PrivateKey is nil") - } - - // Validate self-signed - roots := x509.NewCertPool() - roots.AddCert(ca.Certificate) - opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ - Roots: roots, - } - if _, err := ca.Certificate.Verify(opts); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Certificate self-verification failed: %v", err) - } -} - -func TestCertCache(t *testing.T) { - ca, _ := GenerateEphemeralCA() - cache, err := NewCertCache() - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to create CertCache: %v", err) - } - - cert1, err := cache.GetCertificate("example.com", ca) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to get cert: %v", err) - } - - cert2, err := cache.GetCertificate("example.com", ca) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to get cert second time: %v", err) - } - - if cert1 != cert2 { - t.Errorf("CertCache did not cache the certificate") - } - - cert3, err := cache.GetCertificate("another.com", ca) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to get cert for different domain: %v", err) - } - - if cert1 == cert3 { - t.Errorf("CertCache returned same certificate for different domains") - } -} - -func TestGatewayPlaintextAndTerminatingProxy(t *testing.T) { - // 1. Upstream Mock Server - upstream := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { - auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization") - if auth != "Bearer mock-token" { - w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized) - return - } - w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) - _, _ = w.Write([]byte("mock upstream response")) - })) - defer upstream.Close() - - // Redirect proxy calls to upstream mock server - transport := &http.Transport{ - DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { - return net.Dial(network, upstream.Listener.Addr().String()) - }, - TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{ - InsecureSkipVerify: true, - }, - } - - // 2. Gateway setup - secretStore := map[string]SecretConfig{ - "example.com": { - Kind: SecretKindBearer, - Value: "mock-token", - }, - } - gateway, err := NewGateway(secretStore, transport, "") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewGateway failed: %v", err) - } - - listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to listen: %v", err) - } - defer func() { _ = listener.Close() }() - - go func() { - _ = gateway.Serve(listener) - }() - - addr := listener.Addr().String() - - // 3. Test Plaintext HTTP bootstrap download - resp, err := http.Get("http://" + addr + "/internal/bootstrap/ca.crt") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to download CA cert: %v", err) - } - defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() - - if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - t.Fatalf("Expected 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode) - } - - certBytes, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to read CA cert response body: %v", err) - } - - // Verify that a second download attempt is blocked (one-shot protection) - respSecond, err := http.Get("http://" + addr + "/internal/bootstrap/ca.crt") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Second download request failed: %v", err) - } - defer func() { _ = respSecond.Body.Close() }() - if respSecond.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden { - t.Errorf("Expected second download to be forbidden (403), got status: %d", respSecond.StatusCode) - } - - // Verify downloaded cert matches gateway cert - roots := x509.NewCertPool() - if !roots.AppendCertsFromPEM(certBytes) { - t.Fatalf("Failed to parse downloaded certificate as PEM") - } - - // 4. Test TLS Terminating Proxy - tlsConfig := &tls.Config{ - RootCAs: roots, - } - - // Create custom client that dials the gateway but expects "example.com" domain - client := &http.Client{ - Transport: &http.Transport{ - DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) { - return net.Dial(network, addr) - }, - TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig, - }, - Timeout: 5 * time.Second, - } - - resp2, err := client.Get("https://example.com/some-path") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Terminating TLS proxy request failed: %v", err) - } - defer func() { _ = resp2.Body.Close() }() - - if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - t.Fatalf("Expected 200 from upstream, got %d", resp2.StatusCode) - } - - body2, err := io.ReadAll(resp2.Body) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to read response body: %v", err) - } - - if string(body2) != "mock upstream response" { - t.Errorf("Expected 'mock upstream response', got %q", string(body2)) - } -} - -func TestGatewayOneShotAndSanitization(t *testing.T) { - // Create a temporary directory containing mock interceptor files - tempInterceptorsDir := t.TempDir() - mockLibData := []byte("mock-so-binary-content") - if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tempInterceptorsDir, "libinterceptor-amd64-glibc.so"), mockLibData, 0644); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to create mock interceptor file: %v", err) - } - - gateway, err := NewGateway(nil, nil, tempInterceptorsDir) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewGateway failed: %v", err) - } - - listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to listen: %v", err) - } - defer func() { _ = listener.Close() }() - - go func() { - _ = gateway.Serve(listener) - }() - - addr := listener.Addr().String() - client := &http.Client{Timeout: 2 * time.Second} - - // 1. First download of ca.crt should succeed - resp1, err := client.Get("http://" + addr + "/internal/bootstrap/ca.crt") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("First ca.crt request failed: %v", err) - } - _ = resp1.Body.Close() - if resp1.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - t.Errorf("Expected 200 for first ca.crt request, got %d", resp1.StatusCode) - } - - // 2. Second download of ca.crt should be forbidden (one-shot) - resp2, err := client.Get("http://" + addr + "/internal/bootstrap/ca.crt") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Second ca.crt request failed: %v", err) - } - _ = resp2.Body.Close() - if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden { - t.Errorf("Expected 403 for second ca.crt request, got %d", resp2.StatusCode) - } - - // 3. First download of valid interceptor should succeed - resp3, err := client.Get("http://" + addr + "/internal/bootstrap/libinterceptor.so?arch=amd64&libc=glibc") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("First interceptor request failed: %v", err) - } - _ = resp3.Body.Close() - if resp3.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - t.Errorf("Expected 200 for first interceptor request, got %d", resp3.StatusCode) - } - - // 4. Second download of interceptor should be forbidden (one-shot) - resp4, err := client.Get("http://" + addr + "/internal/bootstrap/libinterceptor.so?arch=amd64&libc=glibc") - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Second interceptor request failed: %v", err) - } - _ = resp4.Body.Close() - if resp4.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden { - t.Errorf("Expected 403 for second interceptor request, got %d", resp4.StatusCode) - } - - // 5. Test path traversal and input sanitization (using a fresh Gateway to bypass the one-shot check for interceptor) - gateway2, _ := NewGateway(nil, nil, tempInterceptorsDir) - listener5, _ := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") - defer func() { _ = listener5.Close() }() - go func() { _ = gateway2.Serve(listener5) }() - addr2 := listener5.Addr().String() - - traversalURLs := []string{ - "http://" + addr2 + "/internal/bootstrap/libinterceptor.so?arch=../&libc=glibc", - "http://" + addr2 + "/internal/bootstrap/libinterceptor.so?arch=amd64&libc=..\\", - "http://" + addr2 + "/internal/bootstrap/libinterceptor.so?arch=amd64.so&libc=glibc", - "http://" + addr2 + "/internal/bootstrap/libinterceptor.so?arch=amd64&libc=glibc;invalid", - } - - for _, u := range traversalURLs { - resp, err := client.Get(u) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Request to %q failed: %v", u, err) - } - _ = resp.Body.Close() - if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound { - t.Errorf("Expected 404 for invalid identifier URL %q, got %d", u, resp.StatusCode) - } - } -} diff --git a/site/content/docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md b/site/content/docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md index c9a3bcfa..ca2ba853 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md +++ b/site/content/docs/development/kubernetes-deployment.md @@ -160,6 +160,12 @@ If you'd rather deploy the pieces by hand — for example to exercise the Mock O The manifests for the mock OIDC provider are available in [mock-oidc.yaml](manifests/mock-oidc.yaml). +> **Warning:** the mock issuer signs a token for whatever identity it is asked +> for. It generates its signing key at start-up so nothing secret ships in the +> manifest, but any control plane that trusts this issuer admits anyone who can +> reach it. Use it only on a cluster nobody else can reach, and never as the +> `--issuer` of a control plane exposed beyond that cluster. + [mock-oidc.yaml](manifests/mock-oidc.yaml ':include') ### SAM Control Plane and Router Manifests diff --git a/site/content/docs/manifests/mock-oidc.yaml b/site/content/docs/manifests/mock-oidc.yaml index 3384591a..b654f027 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/manifests/mock-oidc.yaml +++ b/site/content/docs/manifests/mock-oidc.yaml @@ -23,35 +23,24 @@ data: import jwt from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer - PRIVATE_KEY = """-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- - MIIEvAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKYwggSiAgEAAoIBAQDGtPD85uaT342Y - yqGAiWQ6OV2BxvpXQRMzsb7VpdLa146xf5/1b9lIR4dFvhvGUqnyzFLV0EdIzTqo - xyKGHbQY68DIUjH3iwt6rzU0Vkw/3g/R/TBEmGwdqNDLCBItsLOnF4HfsxAWtjaU - R96S4oXaCUcXOD/3yHs0ha4tu8YgwGwMHa/CQRgcTX5FshR6uHow5G7NiOVYUcAP - c1HXmwmf0FeSY9r0QudmIjkJSeIH1I/BufpEqbcjrSyjYd4eldbhjlCvuIR93Sva - 8jZBzdCW+xxyU+8dz2tEgRjm9G7CpoCpAwhcEQQW7XRUb8DP9+bid9VfT+3C1Te6 - u8eowndXAgMBAAECggEAGF6ZjZKt5aXNolb7jp2K/r8JUkC6dBgFiFn8uwwOu4sj - M26hCgNRJRWsp+eEVYLO1/mqERHtpCaTUp61g7hB3aqQJqE6Ao95dW7megg5ar3L - t+ey0z7UR6DsFnJjdFoO9meiJHK7/uUS9YWI7P++BbsMjnL2GWfrgEoCzhYQ2vQ2 - 8t9lGmJfaEeicTcPs4/Jtz9nX+KQ1CqKb5uHP6IyVQjV/nIjWh1WZJV5wsmLM1ZF - YT7NPEhXkgH5JjwzEI3QR9ZMs4FUgbduImmS280YCMNMUNVsSBbbV/1hh7Sxlp6B - bRaK12sPPRwW0sHw3odZKjGzKIFlu9I5TieNJ5w2AQKBgQDy3cxDXxj+bcSYuWDp - p4EVNTwg+IY9eT0x1x+tWXaOjGTscD4GrdUYhspWuoUn5NxZ0ub0apiTMQfoM9a0 - Qr3CKngkL5JTi6OwdnEaTPNvQiSJdgXXzYdCXeucK5soeHCZTPAb3bV27LtpxyMI - QSx9rnKcSyoRSavLWP0hr8QNVwKBgQDRc84q3I5tZX/whoUmeTj6aNJoIa1KAACM - 0Fnr9ecjLS50kXIiTSCiNE8pcBcsSxYgo+PG5W9oQaZcdd7r2nJOqaizpjnHbF+9 - S/Ts9vj+dJlCUcjjROghzYrI5mdb8Dq2Ngd93IcBt5H+W6bm8wWUgLy0IJmJDKHE - Z7SS22imAQKBgAETHi5GI3QsxCvw1g7yoM2ZOLTkpKNs/+pSi19XAAFNebzaGkwp - RMIhBpAvrxsoFhmHp2H5fsdX9jL+17pgeTp8uZ9fXoRkH8tOGt4E7SbW4haBoTD9 - RdXzWHGOd9dMASOMhZt59a2bCpFDQlJtB2de+D7czkjZTJtPv38AqhttAoGAE8X2 - Aa/etk8tu9xHN7GcAm/g5TnArUrAwops4szNLFH4n8KXXsufOBDuJEBTv7e6+Avg - 1gcU9Ge2N+ZczDFMN0bnCUa5D62YgDtqfPB34zXIvi0QZPw9WeuYnYy610AfmtIQ - 9P3btPrKipPGdukcbr+UkQC+3eRWZT9RGcgi4gECgYApA3J0jlD+JFtYKFOuJWxS - aFEhYPe2dVW78bJoMMhxPtD9hWw/zWVUdyhdXMHoP8/igwNiUqXaYacPbxTFu5ft - w/+UummqB6KpqPFnpbqP826Udr4SEHH0iwvs4MDqSlXcOC5CXbIoMLB/zMjE+u/J - IqNKTt9jbR4zISCpyOCsQw== - -----END PRIVATE KEY-----""" + # The signing key is generated fresh on every start and the JWKS derived from + # it, so no private key ships in this manifest. Even so: this issuer signs any + # identity it is asked for. Never point a reachable control plane at it. + from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization + from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa + def _b64url_uint(n): + import base64 + raw = n.to_bytes((n.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big') + return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b'=').decode('ascii') + + _KEY = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) + PRIVATE_KEY = _KEY.private_bytes( + serialization.Encoding.PEM, + serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, + serialization.NoEncryption(), + ) + _PUB = _KEY.public_key().public_numbers() JWKS = { "keys": [ { @@ -59,8 +48,8 @@ data: "alg": "RS256", "use": "sig", "kid": "test-key-id", - "n": "xrTw_Obmk9-NmMqhgIlkOjldgcb6V0ETM7G-1aXS2teOsX-f9W_ZSEeHRb4bxlKp8sxS1dBHSM06qMcihh20GOvAyFIx94sLeq81NFZMP94P0f0wRJhsHajQywgSLbCzpxeB37MQFrY2lEfekuKF2glHFzg_98h7NIWuLbvGIMBsDB2vwkEYHE1-RbIUerh6MORuzYjlWFHAD3NR15sJn9BXkmPa9ELnZiI5CUniB9SPwbn6RKm3I60so2HeHpXW4Y5Qr7iEfd0r2vI2Qc3QlvscclPvHc9rRIEY5vRuwqaAqQMIXBEEFu10VG_Az_fm4nfVX0_twtU3urvHqMJ3Vw", - "e": "AQAB" + "n": _b64url_uint(_PUB.n), + "e": _b64url_uint(_PUB.e), } ] } diff --git a/site/static/demo.cast b/site/static/demo.cast index 9a016984..9282570d 100644 --- a/site/static/demo.cast +++ b/site/static/demo.cast @@ -3679,7 +3679,7 @@ [279.574477, "o", "vailable microservices around the globe (inference, \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mlocal_proxy_url mappings, remote MCP endpoints), read up on those remote tool schemas, and directly pipe inputs to them.\u001b[60X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like me to test-fire a prompt against the mesh model we found, or demonstrate how to query for specific peer services on the control plane?\u001b[31X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status"] [279.574488, "o", " 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenA"] [279.574497, "o", "I-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────"] -[279.574506, "o", "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1"] +[279.574506, "o", "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer "] [279.574542, "o", "b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n⣟ \u001b[38;5;111mR\u001b[38;5;109munning...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [279.574611, "o", "───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [279.606504, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⡿ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3711,7 +3711,7 @@ [281.796342, "o", "146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\n\u001b[5D\u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model "] [281.796355, "o", "routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[46X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[63X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[136X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—"] [281.796532, "o", "SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38"] -[281.796557, "o", ";5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-nod\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[169X\u001b[m\n\u001b[10D\u001b[38;5;109mWo\u001b[38;5;111mrking\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[8D\u001b[?25h"] +[281.796557, "o", ";5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-nod\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[169X\u001b[m\n\u001b[10D\u001b[38;5;109mWo\u001b[38;5;111mrking\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[8D\u001b[?25h"] [281.808636, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;251m\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[3"] [281.808695, "o", "8;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;"] [281.808703, "o", "189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;251m\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38"] @@ -3721,7 +3721,7 @@ [281.809101, "o", "r demonstrate how to query for specific peer services on the control plane?\u001b[31X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the me"] [281.809138, "o", "sh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) "] [281.809151, "o", "that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Han"] -[281.809162, "o", "dling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[168X\u001b[m\r\n⣷ \u001b[38;5;109mWor\u001b[38;5;111mking.\u001b[38;5;109m..\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────"] +[281.809162, "o", "dling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[168X\u001b[m\r\n⣷ \u001b[38;5;109mWor\u001b[38;5;111mking.\u001b[38;5;109m..\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────"] [281.809173, "o", "─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [281.809278, "o", "───────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [281.861811, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣯ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3745,7 +3745,7 @@ [282.448627, "o", " Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\n\u001b[5D\u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X"] [282.448645, "o", "\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[46X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[63X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[136X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to "] [282.448662, "o", "explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b["] -[282.448682, "o", "38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've als\u001b[144X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[8D\u001b[?25h"] +[282.448682, "o", "38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've als\u001b[144X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[8D\u001b[?25h"] [282.47496, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[8C\u001b[38;5;189mo gone ahead\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[20D\u001b[?25h"] [282.499809, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;251m\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5"] [282.499882, "o", ";189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189"] @@ -3756,7 +3756,7 @@ [282.500196, "o", "or specific peer services on the control plane?\u001b[31X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for "] [282.500251, "o", "the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities"] [282.500271, "o", " for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m"] -[282.500286, "o", " \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successf"] +[282.500286, "o", " \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successf"] [282.500343, "o", "ully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automat\u001b[148X\u001b[m\r\n⣽ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [282.50036, "o", "───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [282.524892, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[32C\u001b[38;5;189mically updat\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[44D\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3772,18 +3772,18 @@ [282.745443, "o", "s -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[85X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### "] [282.745468, "o", "How this works under the hood\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[33X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[109X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[35X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[101X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or i"] [282.745485, "o", "nventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1m"] -[282.745501, "o", "Bash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msetting\u001b[167X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[7D\u001b[?25h"] +[282.745501, "o", "Bash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msetting\u001b[167X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[7D\u001b[?25h"] [282.77808, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;189mAfter this configuration, any time you interact with me, I will be able to transparently inspect mesh routing state, discover available microservices around the globe (inference,\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mlocal_proxy_url mappings, remote MCP endpoints), read up on those remote tool schemas, and directly pipe inputs to them.\u001b[58X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[120X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like me to test-fire a prompt against the mesh model we found, or demonstrate how to query for specific peer services on the control plane?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: "] [282.778347, "o", "application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[85X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under"] [282.778384, "o", " the hood\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[33X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[109X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[35X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[101X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh co"] [282.778402, "o", "ntrol plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(c"] -[282.778428, "o", "url -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[7D\u001b[?25h"] +[282.778428, "o", "url -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[7D\u001b[?25h"] [282.81397, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A \u001b[38;5;189;3mNote: You would replace \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189;3m with the contents of your \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mapi-token\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189;3m file.\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b["] [282.814384, "o", "38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like me to test-fire a prompt against the mesh model we found, or demonstrate how to query for specific peer services on the control plane?\u001b[31X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Init"] [282.814428, "o", "ial Options\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38"] [282.814449, "o", ";5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different se"] [282.814475, "o", "rvice—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s"] -[282.814491, "o", ", 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b"] +[282.814491, "o", ", 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b"] [282.814506, "o", "[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[174X\u001b[m\r\n⣷ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m───────────────────────────────────────"] [282.814523, "o", "──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [282.858228, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\t\u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[19D\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3793,7 +3793,7 @@ [282.898894, "o", "───────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b["] [282.898917, "o", "38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mTh"] [282.898935, "o", "is means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;"] -[282.898958, "o", "5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b["] +[282.898958, "o", "5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b["] [282.898977, "o", "38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n⣯ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [282.899163, "o", "────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [282.941153, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[3A \u001b[38;5;111mW\u001b[38;5;109mo\u001b[m\n\n\n\b\b\b\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3804,13 +3804,13 @@ [282.960906, "o", "nst the mesh model we found, or demonstrate how to query for specific peer services on the control plane?\u001b[31X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m mod"] [282.960924, "o", "el running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via "] [282.960939, "o", "its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;14"] -[282.960954, "o", "6m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007htt"] +[282.960954, "o", "6m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007htt"] [282.960969, "o", "p://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n⣯ \u001b[38;5;111mW\u001b[38;5;109morking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [282.961163, "o", "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [283.001447, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come "] [283.001653, "o", "back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[85X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[33X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[109X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;1"] [283.001676, "o", "89;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[35X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[101X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/"] -[283.001688, "o", "sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m"] +[283.001688, "o", "sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m"] [283.001699, "o", "\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;255;48;5;203m\"\u001b]8;id=jka0b01707;http://127.0.0.1:8080/\u0007http\u001b[38;5;187;49m:\u001b[38;5;242m//127.0.0.1:8080/\u001b[m\u001b]8;;\u0007\n\n\n\n\u001b[44D\u001b[?25h"] [283.024776, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣟ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [283.040708, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[3A\u001b[2C\u001b[38;5;111mo\u001b[38;5;109mr\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[4D\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3818,7 +3818,7 @@ [283.075446, "o", "38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, re"] [283.07547, "o", "ady to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189"] [283.075481, "o", "m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b"] -[283.075492, "o", "[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b["] +[283.075492, "o", "[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b["] [283.075502, "o", "38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;255;48;5;203m\"\u001b]8;id=jka0b01707;http://127.0.0.1:8080/\u0007http\u001b[38;5;187;49m:\u001b[38;5;242m//127.0.0.1:8080/\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b]8;;\u0007\u001b[136X\u001b[m\r\n⣟ \u001b[38;5;111mWo\u001b[38;5;109mrking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [283.075513, "o", "───────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [283.091513, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[3A\u001b[3C\u001b[38;5;111mr\u001b[38;5;109mk\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[5D\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3826,13 +3826,13 @@ [283.191999, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\n\u001b[5D\u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;1"] [283.192529, "o", "11;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[46X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[63X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[136X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding"] [283.192703, "o", " API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n"] -[283.192792, "o", "\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189ms"] +[283.192792, "o", "\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189ms"] [283.192869, "o", "ettings:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[178X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;255;48;5;203m\"X-\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[31X\u001b[m\n\u001b[9D\u001b[38;5;111mk\u001b[38;5;109mi\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[6D\u001b[?25h"] [283.210095, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[13C\u001b[38;5;255;48;5;203mSam-Authenti\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[25D\u001b[?25h"] [283.226477, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;111;1m> yes please\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back acro"] [283.226546, "o", "ss the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogl"] [283.226558, "o", "e/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;2"] -[283.226572, "o", "2m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP prot"] +[283.226572, "o", "2m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP prot"] [283.226625, "o", "ocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;255;48;5;203m\"Beare"] [283.22664, "o", "r\u001b[38;5;251;49m \u001b[38;5;255;48;5;203m\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [283.226653, "o", "──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3843,17 +3843,17 @@ [283.360824, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m"] [283.361037, "o", "google/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[85X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[33X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[109X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[35X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[101X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execut"] [283.361158, "o", "ion without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config"] -[283.361233, "o", ".json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and "] +[283.361233, "o", ".json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and "] [283.361328, "o", "the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[57D\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[49X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[5D\u001b[?25h"] [283.375351, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\n\u001b[5D\u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer net"] [283.375565, "o", "work:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[46X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[63X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[136X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m"] [283.375746, "o", "\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & H"] -[283.375903, "o", "eader\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[178X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b["] +[283.375903, "o", "eader\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[178X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b["] [283.376029, "o", "m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[55X\u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[6D\u001b[?25h"] [283.396972, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[1;38;5;111m> yes please\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147"] [283.397222, "o", "X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or invento"] [283.397353, "o", "ry the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;14"] -[283.397415, "o", "6;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b["] +[283.397415, "o", "6;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b["] [283.397563, "o", "38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP to\u001b[166X\u001b[m\r\n⢿ \u001b[38;5;109mW\u001b[38;5;111morkin\u001b[38;5;109mg...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────"] [283.397656, "o", "───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [283.397809, "o", "──────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3861,14 +3861,14 @@ [283.446651, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 4s, 563 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the ho"] [283.446707, "o", "od\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remot"] [283.446718, "o", "e services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;"] -[283.446726, "o", "5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;18"] +[283.446726, "o", "5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;18"] [283.446733, "o", "9m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are load\u001b[154X\u001b[m\r\n⣻ \u001b[38;5;109mWo\u001b[38;5;111mrking\u001b[38;5;109m...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m───────"] [283.44674, "o", "──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [283.446748, "o", "─────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [283.496804, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Reviewing Initial Options\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mBash\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(curl -s --unix-socket ~/.config/sam-mesh/sam.sock http://localhost/v1/chat/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\": \"google/gemma-2-2b-it\", \"messages\":\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed throu"] [283.496884, "o", "gh the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution withou"] [283.497212, "o", "t hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;"] -[283.497338, "o", "146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b"] +[283.497338, "o", "146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b"] [283.497393, "o", "[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b"] [283.497447, "o", "[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n⣻ \u001b[38;5;109mWor\u001b[38;5;111mking.\u001b[38;5;109m..\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [283.497508, "o", "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3882,13 +3882,13 @@ [283.693147, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[85X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[33X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;"] [283.693218, "o", "5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[109X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[35X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[101X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[156"] [283.69418, "o", "X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam"] -[283.694345, "o", "-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http:"] +[283.694345, "o", "-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http:"] [283.694416, "o", "//127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_in\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[159X\u001b[m\r\n⣾ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [283.714292, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[12C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfo\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[16D\u001b[?25h"] [283.727619, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m[{\"...)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mManageTask\u001b[38;5;146;22m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b"] [283.727866, "o", "[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane usin"] [283.727981, "o", "g the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://1"] -[283.728206, "o", "27.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m"] +[283.728206, "o", "27.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m"] [283.728345, "o", ":\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_inf"] [283.728529, "o", "o\u001b[38;5;189;49m,\u001b[165X\u001b[m\r\n⣾ \u001b[38;5;109mWorki\u001b[38;5;111mng...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [283.728624, "o", "─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3897,7 +3897,7 @@ [283.810383, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[36C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[59D\u001b[?25h"] [283.827128, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[46X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m1. Look"] [283.8274, "o", "s at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[63X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[136X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b"] -[283.827447, "o", "[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MC"] +[283.827447, "o", "[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MC"] [283.827469, "o", "P service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[178X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;14"] [283.827486, "o", "0m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[55X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[5D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[169X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you r\u001b[49X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;109mg\u001b[38;5;111m.\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[9D\u001b[?25h"] [283.847344, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣷ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] @@ -3905,7 +3905,7 @@ [283.876394, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mManageTask\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(status 8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/task-36)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the network.\u001b[17X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though yo"] [283.876639, "o", "u are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integrati"] [283.876866, "o", "on we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Co"] -[283.876883, "o", "ntent-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m"] +[283.876883, "o", "ntent-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m"] [283.876893, "o", "{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;"] [283.8769, "o", "111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me\u001b[135X\u001b[m\r\n⣷ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking\u001b[38;5;111m...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Press ctrl+r to review pending artifacts.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────"] [283.876908, "o", "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] @@ -4008,13 +4008,13 @@ [304.375262, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;109m? for shortcuts\u001b[m\u001b[2A\u001b[13D\u001b[?25h"] [304.393736, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[85X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[33X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n "] [304.393964, "o", "\u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[46X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[101X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[142X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-toke"] -[304.394094, "o", "n)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;"] +[304.394094, "o", "n)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;"] [304.394186, "o", "5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[40X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[16D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[57X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b["] [304.394261, "o", "7D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\n\n\u001b[73D\u001b[?25h"] [304.415351, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 1s, 292 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Analyzing the Situation\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've just sent a test prompt to the \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m model running somewhere on the mesh! Let's wait a moment for the response to come back across the\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m network.\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m model routed through the peer network:\u001b[49X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b"] [304.41557, "o", "[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else fo"] [304.415612, "o", "r the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini"] -[304.415636, "o", "/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;"] +[304.415636, "o", "/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;"] [304.415657, "o", "5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me "] [304.415792, "o", "immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n⣾ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [304.415827, "o", "───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C"] @@ -4132,7 +4132,7 @@ [310.678187, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[2A⣟ \u001b[38;5;109mLoadin\u001b[38;5;111mg...\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\n\u001b[11D\u001b[?25h"] [310.710082, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[85X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[109X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different servic"] [310.710138, "o", "e—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[46X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[83X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\n\n\u001b[55D\u001b[38;5;146m2s, 16\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;146mPractices\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\n\u001b[27D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[m\u001b[10P\n\n\u001b[21D\u001b[38;5;146m268 \u001b[m\n\u001b[20D\u001b[38;5;146mCorrecting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\n\u001b[23D\u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[34C\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38"] -[310.710148, "o", ";5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[162X\u001b[m\n\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m "] +[310.710148, "o", ";5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[162X\u001b[m\n\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m "] [310.710168, "o", "\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[159X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[47D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[18D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[58D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[44X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[17X\u001b[m\n\b\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[60X\u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[3"] [310.710179, "o", "8;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\n\u001b[57D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[49D\u001b[38;5;109mg\u001b[38;5;111m.\u001b[m\n\n\u001b[9D\u001b[?25h"] [310.727668, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 221 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Analysis\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe request just came back from the mesh! Here is the response from the \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m model routed through the peer\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m network:\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m"] @@ -4140,7 +4140,7 @@ [310.727767, "o", "89m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m "] [310.727785, "o", "\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189m│ \"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections!\"\u001b[95X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard Ope"] [310.727803, "o", "nAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────"] -[310.727821, "o", "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3"] +[310.727821, "o", "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer "] [310.727839, "o", "c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;"] [310.727859, "o", "5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool"] [310.728145, "o", "\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n⣟ \u001b[38;5;109mLoading\u001b[38;5;111m...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] @@ -4178,7 +4178,7 @@ [313.263729, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A \u001b[38;5;189m│ \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m\"Hello! Welcome to the SAM mesh network, ready to support your device connections\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m!\"\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m"] [313.263876, "o", " \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2"] [313.26389, "o", ". Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38"] -[313.263897, "o", ";5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;"] +[313.263897, "o", ";5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;"] [313.263904, "o", "236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b"] [313.263912, "o", "[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the te"] [313.263918, "o", "rminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;214m○\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n⢿ \u001b[38;5;111mLo\u001b[38;5;109mading...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] @@ -4235,7 +4235,7 @@ [317.541779, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[2A\u001b[8C\u001b[38;5;109m.\u001b[38;5;111m.\u001b[m\n\n\u001b[10D\u001b[?25h"] [317.575569, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[33X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[109X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[35X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[101X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for sp"] [317.575628, "o", "ecific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config."] -[317.575643, "o", "json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"s"] +[317.575643, "o", "json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"s"] [317.575829, "o", "am-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[110X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[59X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to di"] [317.576353, "o", "scover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\n\u001b[28D\u001b[38;5;214;1mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\n\u001b[122D\u001b[38;5;109m.\u001b[38;5;111m.\u001b[m\n\n\u001b[11D\u001b[?25h"] [317.591465, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[2A \u001b[38;5;109mGen\u001b[38;5;111merati\u001b[38;5;109mng...\u001b[m\n\n\u001b[14D\u001b[?25h"] @@ -4243,7 +4243,7 @@ [317.626614, "o", ";189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189"] [317.627017, "o", "m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;39;1m### How this works under the hood\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[147X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. L"] [317.627097, "o", "ooks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m───────────────────────────────────────────────"] -[317.627162, "o", "─────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-nod"] +[317.627162, "o", "─────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-nod"] [317.627222, "o", "e\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189"] [317.62727, "o", "m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magicall"] [317.627322, "o", "y be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n⣾ \u001b[38;5;109mGen\u001b[38;5;111merati\u001b[38;5;109mng...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────"] @@ -4290,14 +4290,14 @@ [321.02417, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[2A⣯ \u001b[38;5;111mGen\u001b[m\n\n\u001b[4D\u001b[?25h"] [321.108589, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[33X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[109X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[35X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[101X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control"] [321.108636, "o", " plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -"] -[321.108824, "o", "s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38"] +[321.108824, "o", "s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38"] [321.108844, "o", ";5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[110X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[59X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh"] [321.108851, "o", "! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\n\u001b[28D\u001b[38;5;214;1mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n⣯ \u001b[38;5;111mGene\u001b[38;5;109mrating...\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\n\n\u001b[51D\u001b[?25h"] [321.144721, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;39;1m### \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;39;1mHow this works under the\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;39;1m hood\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38"] [321.14477, "o", ";5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;1"] [321.144777, "o", "89m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool e"] [321.144783, "o", "xecution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.j"] -[321.144788, "o", "son)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the"] +[321.144788, "o", "son)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the"] [321.144792, "o", " correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[3"] [321.144797, "o", "8;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;"] [321.144801, "o", "5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;214m○\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n⣟ \u001b[38;5;111mGene\u001b[38;5;109mrating...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] @@ -4306,7 +4306,7 @@ [321.181189, "o", ";189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189"] [321.181206, "o", "m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[38;5;189;49m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m:\u001b[71X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38"] [321.181221, "o", ";5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b["] -[321.181235, "o", "m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;1"] +[321.181235, "o", "m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;1"] [321.181439, "o", "11;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;"] [321.181501, "o", "5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restar"] [321.181517, "o", "t the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;214m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n⣟ \u001b[38;5;111mGener\u001b[38;5;109mating...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models"] @@ -4354,14 +4354,14 @@ [324.440273, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⡿ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [324.540158, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⢿ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [324.607355, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[109X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[35X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[101X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────"] -[324.607546, "o", "───────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n"] +[324.607546, "o", "───────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n"] [324.607569, "o", " \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5"] [324.607584, "o", ";251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[110X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[59X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────"] [324.607599, "o", "──────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\n\u001b[28D\u001b[38;5;214;1mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[2C\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;214m○\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote\u001b[m\u001b[P\n\n\n\n\u001b[37D\u001b[?25h"] [324.62432, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A \u001b[38;5;189mEven though you are just querying \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mlocalhost\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m using standard OpenAI-compatible API schemas, the local \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m:\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[3"] [324.624531, "o", "8;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m1. Looks at the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmodel\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter you requested.\u001b[134X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search f"] [324.624554, "o", "or specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5"] -[324.624569, "o", ";111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161"] +[324.624569, "o", ";111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161"] [324.624598, "o", "X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh co"] [324.624613, "o", "mmands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[3"] [324.62463, "o", "8;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;214m○\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n⣻ \u001b[38;5;109mGenerating...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] @@ -4402,7 +4402,7 @@ [327.444179, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣯ \u001b[38;5;109mGenera\u001b[38;5;111mting.\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[12D\u001b[?25h"] [327.540364, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣟ \u001b[38;5;109mGenerat\u001b[38;5;111ming..\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[13D\u001b[?25h"] [327.557251, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[136X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thou"] -[327.557314, "o", "ght for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;"] +[327.557314, "o", "ght for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;"] [327.557569, "o", "111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[178X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[55X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[5D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[169X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> c"] [327.557776, "o", "an you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\n\u001b[103D\u001b[38;5;214;1mdescribe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[44D\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely!\u001b[169X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[11D\u001b[?25h"] @@ -4413,7 +4413,7 @@ [327.599235, "o", "38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5"] [327.59925, "o", ";189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189m2. Identifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[44X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3. Passes the prompt securely t"] [327.599267, "o", "o that remote peer and streams the response back to your local socket.\u001b[79X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n"] -[327.599286, "o", "\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and aut"] +[327.599286, "o", "\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and aut"] [327.599447, "o", "omatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5"] [327.599492, "o", ";189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [327.599507, "o", "────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we con\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n⣟ \u001b[38;5;109mGenerati\u001b[38;5;111mng...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────"] @@ -4427,7 +4427,7 @@ [327.740497, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[3A\u001b[10C\u001b[38;5;109m.\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[11D\u001b[?25h"] [327.797581, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[109C\u001b[38;5;189meven restar\u001b[m\r\n⢿ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [327.824262, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[136X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m"] -[327.824325, "o", "\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48"] +[327.824325, "o", "\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48"] [327.824335, "o", ";5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[178X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[55X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[5D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this a"] [327.824343, "o", "gent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[169X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/fin"] [327.824354, "o", "d_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\n\u001b[103D\u001b[38;5;214;1mdescribe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[44D\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere\u001b[116X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[4D\u001b[?25h"] @@ -4435,7 +4435,7 @@ [327.859531, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A \u001b[38;5;189m2\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m. \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189mIdentifies a reachable provider on the mesh (via its DHT and service registry) that advertised capabilities for \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mgoogle/gemma-2-2b-it\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m.\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m3\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m. \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189mPasses the prompt securely to that remote peer and streams the response back to your l"] [327.859743, "o", "ocal\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m socket.\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;"] [327.859766, "o", "5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mThis means you get universal, drop-in inference and tool execution without hardcoding API keys or endpoints for every different service—SAM handles the routing!\u001b[20X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;1"] -[327.859782, "o", "11m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it"] +[327.859782, "o", "11m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it"] [327.859797, "o", " successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:"] [327.859809, "o", "\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m───────────"] [327.859821, "o", "─────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without ev"] @@ -4444,7 +4444,7 @@ [327.898467, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[40C\u001b[38;5;189mamically uti\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[52D\u001b[?25h"] [327.931207, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[52C\u001b[38;5;189mlize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[m\r\n⣻ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [327.942242, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[142X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correc"] -[327.942444, "o", "ting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n"] +[327.942444, "o", "ting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n"] [327.942481, "o", " \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[40X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[16D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[57X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189"] [327.9425, "o", ";49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/out"] [327.942516, "o", "put.txt)\u001b[m\n\u001b[103D\u001b[38;5;214;1mdescribe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;214;1mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\n\n\n\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] @@ -4455,27 +4455,27 @@ [327.976167, "o", "89m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m "] [327.976187, "o", "\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mdi"] [327.976206, "o", "scussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -"] -[327.976223, "o", "H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5"] +[327.976223, "o", "H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5"] [327.976237, "o", ";189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b"] [327.976252, "o", "[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system"] [327.976305, "o", "_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1.\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[174X\u001b[m\r\n\n⣻ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [327.976362, "o", "───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [327.998128, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[5A\t\u001b[38;5;39;1m View Local\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\n\u001b[17D\u001b[?25h"] [328.033997, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp "] -[328.034096, "o", "-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;"] +[328.034096, "o", "-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;"] [328.034117, "o", "id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[110X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[59X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the term"] [328.034134, "o", "inal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\n\u001b[28D\u001b[38;5;214;1mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[2C\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;214;1mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually tes"] [328.034153, "o", "t it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[87X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[17X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local ``\u001b[162X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[18D\u001b[?25h"] [328.057543, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[16C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its\u001b[m\r\n⣽ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [328.076739, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A \u001b[38;5;189mWould you like to explore anything else for the demo, such as how to search for specific remote services or inventory the mesh control plane using the MCP tool integration we\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed earlier?\u001b[162X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o t"] -[328.076811, "o", "o expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;"] +[328.076811, "o", "o expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;"] [328.07683, "o", "189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;"] [328.076845, "o", "189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo "] [328.077121, "o", "Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[144X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;11"] [328.077161, "o", "1;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current rou\u001b[129X\u001b[m\r\n⣽ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [328.077252, "o", "─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [328.108688, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[51C\u001b[38;5;189mting state:\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[62D\u001b[?25h"] -[328.142669, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;"] +[328.142669, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;"] [328.142917, "o", "189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;2"] [328.142954, "o", "51m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[40X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[16D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[57X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────"] [328.142973, "o", "───────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\n\u001b[103D\u001b[38;5;214;1mdescribe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;214;1mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamicall"] @@ -4483,26 +4483,26 @@ [328.167171, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A \u001b[38;5;189mdiscussed\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m earlier?\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38"] [328.167248, "o", ";5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;1"] [328.167264, "o", "89m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL "] -[328.167277, "o", "& Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X"] +[328.167277, "o", "& Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X"] [328.167292, "o", "\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first b"] [328.167493, "o", "oots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh"] [328.167538, "o", " info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[144X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38"] [328.167554, "o", ";5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[151X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• We are currently c\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n⣽ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [328.16757, "o", "───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [328.201119, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;111;1m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-"] -[328.201199, "o", "Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m"] +[328.201199, "o", "Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m"] [328.20122, "o", " \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5"] [328.201236, "o", ";189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_gene"] [328.201251, "o", "rated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[144X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[151X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• We are currently connected to\u001b[149X\u001b[m\r\n⣾ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\r"] [328.201266, "o", "\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [328.201283, "o", "────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] -[328.232314, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local "] +[328.232314, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local "] [328.233638, "o", "HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[3"] [328.23368, "o", "8;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[110X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[59X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to us"] [328.23369, "o", "e the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\n\u001b[28D\u001b[38;5;214;1mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[2C\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;214;1mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[87X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[36X\u001b"] [328.2337, "o", "[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[62X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[m\n\u001b[24D\u001b[38;5;189mare currently connected to \u001b[1m15\u001b[22m active peer nodes!\u001b[m\n\u001b[51D\u001b[38;5;189mThe ro\u001b[23X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[8D\u001b[?25h"] [328.258579, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[8C\u001b[38;5;189muter peer ID we're talki\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[32D\u001b[?25h"] -[328.292128, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[1;38;5;111m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP s"] +[328.292128, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[1;38;5;111m> is the mcp service also working?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP s"] [328.292188, "o", "ervice is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;"] [328.292199, "o", "189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover"] [328.292207, "o", " and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m("] @@ -4511,20 +4511,20 @@ [328.292227, "o", "───────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [328.311157, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[55C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m1pA6goegCncq\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[67D\u001b[?25h"] [328.324477, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣷ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] -[328.344011, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[65A\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:"] +[328.344011, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[65A\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:"] [328.344104, "o", "8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[40X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}"] [328.344151, "o", "\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[16D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[57X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\u001b["] [328.344172, "o", "K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\n\u001b[103D\u001b[38;5;214;1mdescribe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;214;1mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[87X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189"] [328.344214, "o", "mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[36X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• We are currently connected to \u001b[1m15\u001b[22m active peer nodes! \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• The router peer ID we're talking through is \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWG1pA6goegCncqwbZLSr8pnjUZ6JMAAe6SmnHTgUNCk88\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;228;48;5;63;1m \u001b[38;5;189;49;22m\u001b[51X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\n\n\n\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [328.374112, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[5A\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 2. Discover Remote To\u001b[m\n\n\u001b[23D\u001b[38;5;111mo\u001b[38;5;109mr\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[4D\u001b[?25h"] -[328.400244, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the l"] +[328.400244, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 3s, 513 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe File Handling\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the l"] [328.400463, "o", "ocal HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b["] [328.400495, "o", "38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mes"] [328.400513, "o", "h! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to ex"] [328.400529, "o", "pand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[144X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[151X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• We are currently connected to \u001b[1m15\u001b[22m active peer nodes!\u001b[127X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• The router peer ID we're talking through is \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWG1pA6goegCncqwbZLSr8pnjUZ6JMAAe6SmnHTgUNCk88\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[81X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 2. Discover Remote Tools in\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[149X\u001b[m\r\n\n⣷ \u001b[38;5;111mWo\u001b[38;5;109mrking...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip:"] [328.400545, "o", " Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [328.400562, "o", "─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] -[328.47618, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp"] +[328.47618, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp"] [328.47625, "o", "\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38"] [328.476531, "o", ";5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[110X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[59X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;"] [328.476699, "o", "5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\n\u001b[28D\u001b[38;5;214;1mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[2C\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;214;1mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[87X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[36X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing"] @@ -4539,13 +4539,13 @@ [328.608918, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣟ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [328.632411, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[3A\u001b[5C\u001b[38;5;111mi\u001b[38;5;109mn\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[7D\u001b[?25h"] [328.641989, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[111C\u001b[38;5;189mexposing the demo MCP \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236meverything\u001b[m\r\n\n\n\n\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] -[328.6588, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also"] +[328.6588, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also"] [328.658888, "o", " gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up"] [328.658907, "o", ", \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[110X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[59X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\n\u001b["] [328.659138, "o", "28D\u001b[38;5;214;1mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[2C\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;214;1mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[87X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[36X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[62X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[m\n\u001b[24D\u001b[38;5;189mare currently connected to"] [328.659189, "o", " \u001b[1m15\u001b[22m active peer nodes!\u001b[m\n\u001b[51D\u001b[38;5;189mThe router peer ID we're talking through is \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWG1pA6goegCncqwbZLSr8pnjUZ6JMAAe6SmnHTgUNCk88\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[99X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 2. Discover Remote Tools in the Mesh\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[40X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI sent a broadcast across the mesh to discover remote tools \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m. I found multiple peers that are exposing the demo MCP \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236meverything\u001b[38;5;189;49m server!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mFor\u001b[140X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\b\b\b\u001b[?25h"] [328.708375, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[4C\u001b[38;5;189mexample, a machine with\u001b[m\n\u001b[26D\u001b[38;5;109mW\u001b[38;5;111morkin\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[7D\u001b[?25h"] -[328.729004, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mBash\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1"] +[328.729004, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mBash\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(cat /home/aojea/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1"] [328.729072, "o", ":8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;14"] [328.729084, "o", "0m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238"] [328.729091, "o", "m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test"] @@ -4558,13 +4558,13 @@ [328.864204, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[3A\u001b[3C\u001b[38;5;109mr\u001b[38;5;111mking.\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[9D\u001b[?25h"] [328.924645, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[69C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mjjCvDbAQsnuz\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[81D\u001b[?25h"] [328.947952, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[81C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mKBJjSGL\u001b[38;5;189;49m is advertising tools like:\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[6C\u001b[38;5;109mk\u001b[38;5;111ming..\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[10D\u001b[?25h"] -[328.977247, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated y"] +[328.977247, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated y"] [328.97752, "o", "our Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[178X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[55X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[5D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the ag"] [328.977546, "o", "ent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[169X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mes"] [328.977563, "o", "h info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\n\u001b[103D\u001b[38;5;214;1mdescribe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[44D\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[51X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[51X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[33X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• We are curre"] [328.977612, "o", "ntly connected to \u001b[1m15\u001b[22m active peer nodes!\u001b[m\n\u001b[51D\u001b[38;5;189mThe router peer ID we're talking through is \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWG1pA6goegCncqwbZLSr8pnjUZ6JMAAe6SmnHTgUNCk88\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 2. Discover Remote Tools in the Mesh\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[59X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mI sent a broadcast across the mesh to discover remote tools \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m. I found multiple peers that are exposing the demo MCP \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236meverything\u001b[38;5;189;49m server!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mFor example, a machine with \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mpeer_id\u001b[38;5;189;49m \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWF1FEUKJPz3FiR6z6KqZa9xjEXjjCvDbAQsnuzKBJjSGL\u001b[38;5;189;49m is advertising tools like:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[151X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://ev\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[105X\u001b[m\r\n⣻ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [328.99682, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[10C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236merything/ech\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[22D\u001b[?25h"] -[329.012382, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated"] +[329.012382, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 163 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated"] [329.012446, "o", " your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n "] [329.012465, "o", "\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [329.012477, "o", "──\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via "] @@ -4573,7 +4573,7 @@ [329.012534, "o", "\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] [329.025162, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[3A\u001b[5C\u001b[38;5;109mi\u001b[38;5;111mng...\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[11D\u001b[?25h"] [329.043713, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[8C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236meverything/g\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[20D\u001b[?25h"] -[329.077721, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your A"] +[329.077721, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Prioritizing Safe Practices\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your A"] [329.077958, "o", "ntigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;"] [329.077994, "o", "189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m"] [329.078013, "o", "\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP"] @@ -4583,24 +4583,24 @@ [329.10717, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[15C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236ming/simulate-\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;109mn\u001b[38;5;111mg\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[8D\u001b[?25h"] [329.131145, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣽ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [329.159826, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[28C\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mresearch-que\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[40D\u001b[?25h"] -[329.177663, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[3"] +[329.177663, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[156X\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[3"] [329.177877, "o", "8;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[17D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[40X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[16D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[57X\u001b[m\n\b\b\b\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;"] [329.177915, "o", "236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[52X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d"] [329.177934, "o", "/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\n\u001b[103D\u001b[38;5;214;1mdescribe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;214;1mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[87X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[36X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• We are currently connected to \u001b[1m15\u001b[22m active peer nodes! \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• The router peer ID we're talking through is \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWG1pA6goegCncqwbZLSr8pnjUZ6JMAAe6SmnHTgUNC"] [329.177953, "o", "k88\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 2. Discover Remote Tools in the Mesh\u001b[38;5;189;22m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[99X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI sent a broadcast across the mesh to discover remote tools \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m. I found multiple peers that are exposing the demo MCP \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236meverything\u001b[38;5;189;49m server!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mFor example, a machine with \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mpeer_id\u001b[38;5;189;49m \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWF1FEUKJPz3FiR6z6KqZa9xjEXjjCvDbAQsnuzKBJjSGL\u001b[38;5;189;49m is advertising tools like:\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://everything/echo\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[128X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://everything/get-sum\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[89X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://everything/simulate-research-query\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[23X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 3. Describe and Call a Remo\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\n\n\n\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] -[329.194542, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m "] +[329.194542, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m "] [329.19476, "o", "\u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[110X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[5"] [329.194788, "o", "9X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\n\u001b[28D\u001b[38;5;214;1mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[2C\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;2"] [329.194806, "o", "14;1mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[87X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[36X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[62X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[m\n\u001b[24D\u001b[38;5;189mare currently connected to \u001b[1m15\u001b[22m active peer nodes!\u001b[m\n\u001b[51D\u001b[38;5;189mThe router peer ID we're talking through is \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWG1pA6goegCncqwbZLSr8pnjUZ6JMAAe6SmnHTgUNCk88\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[99X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 2. Discover Remote Tools in the Mesh\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[40X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI sent a broadc"] [329.194824, "o", "ast across the mesh to discover remote tools \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m. I found multiple peers that are exposing the demo MCP \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236meverything\u001b[38;5;189;49m server!\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mFor example, a machine with \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mpeer_id\u001b[38;5;189;49m \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWF1FEUKJPz3FiR6z6KqZa9xjEXjjCvDbAQsnuzKBJjSGL\u001b[38;5;189;49m is advertising tools like:\u001b[36X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[115X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://everything/echo\u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget-sum\u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msimulate-research-query\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[42X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 3. Describe and Call a Remote Tool\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[31X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBef\u001b[177X\u001b[m\n\u001b[4C\u001b[38;5;109mg\u001b[38;5;111m.\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[9D\u001b[?25h"] -[329.216205, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mRead\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/"] +[329.216205, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mRead\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 268 tokens\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/"] [329.216279, "o", "mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38"] [329.216302, "o", ";5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and "] [329.21632, "o", "the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local M"] [329.216336, "o", "esh Network State\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[144X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[151X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• We are currently connected to \u001b[1m15\u001b[22m active peer nodes!\u001b[127X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• The router peer ID we're talking through is \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWG1pA6goegCncqwbZLSr8pnjUZ6JMAAe6SmnHTgUNCk88\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[81X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 2. Discover Remote Tools in the Mesh\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[140X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI sent a broadcast across the mesh to discover remote tools \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m. I found multiple peers that are exposing the demo MCP \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236meverything\u001b[38;5;189;49m server!\u001b[29X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mFor example, a machine with \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mpeer_id\u001b[38;5;189;49m \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWF1FEUKJPz3FiR6z6KqZa9xjEXjjCvDbAQsnu"] [329.216352, "o", "zKBJjSGL\u001b[38;5;189;49m is advertising tools like:\u001b[65X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://everything/echo\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[157X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://everything/get-sum\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[154X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://everything/simulate-research-query\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 3. Describe and Call a Remote Tool\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[142X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBefore calling\u001b[166X\u001b[m\r\n⣽ \u001b[38;5;109mWorking\u001b[38;5;111m...\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109m└ Tip: Use /model to switch between available models.\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"] [329.216371, "o", "───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m>\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;238m─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;109mesc to cancel\u001b[m\u001b[158X\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;109mGemini 3.1 Pro\u001b[m\r\u001b[2A\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] -[329.261075, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b"] +[329.261075, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;146m Correcting URL & Header\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b"] [329.261357, "o", "[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP t"] [329.261428, "o", "ools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;2"] [329.261502, "o", "14;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[144X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I q"] @@ -4616,7 +4616,7 @@ [329.425174, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[3A\u001b[10C\u001b[38;5;109m.\u001b[m\n\n\n\u001b[11D\u001b[?25h"] [329.44078, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣷ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] [329.470338, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[158C\u001b[38;5;189mon the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mec\u001b[m\r\n\n\n\n\u001b[2C\u001b[?25h"] -[329.492316, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38"] +[329.492316, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mEdit\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\n\u001b[38D\u001b[38;5;214;1mBash\u001b[38;5;146;22m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[165X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[169X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\b\b\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38"] [329.492573, "o", ";5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[m\n\u001b[15D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[m\n\u001b[40D\u001b[38;5;140mheaders\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\u001b[12D\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[m\n\u001b[54D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[53X\u001b[m\r\n\t\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[6D\u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\n\u001b[4D\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when the agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[110X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[59X\u001b["] [329.492627, "o", "m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\n\u001b[28D\u001b[38;5;214;1mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\n\u001b[45D\u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[2C\u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\u001b[K\n\u001b[35D\u001b[38;5;214;1"] [329.492647, "o", "mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[K\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[138X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[87X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[36X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[62X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• We have \u001b[1m3\u001b[22m nodes in the DHT.\u001b[m\n\u001b[24D\u001b[38;5;189mare currently connected to \u001b[1m15\u001b[22m active peer nodes!\u001b[m\n\u001b[51D\u001b[38;5;189mThe router peer ID we're talking through is \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWG1pA6goegCncqwbZLSr8pnjUZ6JMAAe6SmnHTgUNCk88\u001b[38;5;189;49m.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[99X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 2. Discover Remote Tools in the Mesh\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[40X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI sent a broadcast "] @@ -4630,7 +4630,7 @@ [329.544233, "o", ";5;236mpeer_id\u001b[38;5;189;49m \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m12D3KooWF1FEUKJPz3FiR6z6KqZa9xjEXjjCvDbAQsnuzKBJjSGL\u001b[38;5;189;49m is advertising tools like:\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[151X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://everything/echo\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b[92X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m• \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmcp://everything/get-sum\u001b[m\n\u001b[7D\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msimulate-research-query\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[26X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 3. Describe and Call a Remote Tool\u001b[38;5;189;22m \u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mBefore calling a remote tool, the safety protocol requires me to pull its schema over the network to know how to use it safely. I called \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mdescribe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m on the \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mecho\u001b[38;5;189;49m tool and\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mlearned it accepts a \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mmessage\u001b[38;5;189;49m parameter.\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[178X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI th\u001b[29X\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[4D\u001b[?25h"] [329.567377, "o", "\u001b[?25l\u001b[4A\u001b[4C\u001b[38;5;189men ran \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall\u001b[m\n\n\n\n\u001b[15D\u001b[?25h"] [329.575747, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[3A⣯ \n\n\n\u001b[?25h"] -[329.61924, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mEdit\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mBash\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer 0b3963fd41e8cb6a2d3c1b2f12c127b345440d8207fc6e...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{"] +[329.61924, "o", "\u001b[?25l\r\u001b[66A\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mEdit\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json)\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[1;38;5;214mBash\u001b[m\u001b[38;5;146m(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"X-Sam-Authentication: Bearer ...)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to\u001b[m\u001b[K\r\n\u001b[?5W\u001b[J\u001b[38;5;146mexpand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mThe \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m MCP service is up and running! I just tested the local HTTP endpoint \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b[38;5;189;49m\u001b]8;;\u0007 and it successfully responded to an MCP protocol request.\u001b[15X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mI've also gone ahead and automatically updated your Antigravity MCP configuration file at \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236m~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json\u001b[38;5;189;49m with the correct token we generated and the correct URL \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189msettings:\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m{"] [329.61942, "o", "\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"mcpServers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"sam-mesh\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[161X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"serverUrl\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"\u001b]8;id=jk72e0e2d5;http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u0007http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp\u001b]8;;\u0007\"\u001b[38;5;187m,\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[131X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"headers\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m{\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[160X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;140m\"X-Sam-Authentication\"\u001b[38;5;187m:\u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;173m\"Bearer \"\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[118X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[171X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;251m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[175X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m \u001b[38;5;187m}\u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[177X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mBecause MCP tools are loaded dynamically when t"] [329.61945, "o", "he agent first boots up, \u001b[1myou will need to restart this agent session\u001b[22m to grant me immediate access to the SAM mesh commands \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m(\u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mget_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mfind_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;189;49m, \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236mcall_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;189;49m, etc.).\u001b[121X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mOnce you restart and start a new chat with me, I will magically be able to discover and call remote node services across the mesh! Would you like to restart the terminal and test \u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189mit out?\u001b[173X\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;238m────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111;1m> can you do a demo on how to use the local mcp server and the remote ones?\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;146m▸ Thought for 2s, 618 tokens\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;146m Initiating the Demo Design\u001b[m\r\n\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/get_mesh_info\u001b[38;5;"] [329.619487, "o", "146;22m(Get mesh info)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/find_remote_tools\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Find remote tools)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1mRead\u001b[38;5;146;22m(~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/8444cce5-beab-4803-ba8b-86fec8ea517d/.system_generated/steps/56/output.txt)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/describe_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Describe tool)\u001b[m\r\n\u001b[38;5;111m●\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;214;1msam-mesh/call_remote_tool\u001b[38;5;146;22m(Call remote tool)\u001b[m \u001b[38;5;146m(ctrl+o to expand)\u001b[m\r\n\n \u001b[38;5;189mAbsolutely! Since we configured the MCP server earlier, I can actually test it via lazy-loaded tools without even restarting the terminal.\u001b[42X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mHere are three steps we just took to dynamically utilize the mesh via the MCP protocol.\u001b[93X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;39;1m### 1. View Local Mesh Network State\u001b[38;5;189;22m\u001b[144X\u001b[m\r\n \u001b[38;5;189m\u001b[180X\u001b[m\n\u001b[38;5;189mUsing the local \u001b[38;5;111;48;5;236msam-node\u001b[38;5;189;49m, I queried its current routing state:\u001b"] diff --git a/tests/e2e/docker/mock_oidc.py b/tests/e2e/docker/mock_oidc.py index 7d6a36ad..5cb36ca8 100644 --- a/tests/e2e/docker/mock_oidc.py +++ b/tests/e2e/docker/mock_oidc.py @@ -4,38 +4,24 @@ import urllib.parse from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer -# The following RSA private key and JWKS were generated for testing purposes. -# They are used by the mock OIDC server to sign JWTs. -# Parameters: RSA 2048 bits, Algorithm: RS256, kid: test-key-id -PRIVATE_KEY = """-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- -MIIEvAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKYwggSiAgEAAoIBAQDGtPD85uaT342Y -yqGAiWQ6OV2BxvpXQRMzsb7VpdLa146xf5/1b9lIR4dFvhvGUqnyzFLV0EdIzTqo -xyKGHbQY68DIUjH3iwt6rzU0Vkw/3g/R/TBEmGwdqNDLCBItsLOnF4HfsxAWtjaU -R96S4oXaCUcXOD/3yHs0ha4tu8YgwGwMHa/CQRgcTX5FshR6uHow5G7NiOVYUcAP -c1HXmwmf0FeSY9r0QudmIjkJSeIH1I/BufpEqbcjrSyjYd4eldbhjlCvuIR93Sva -8jZBzdCW+xxyU+8dz2tEgRjm9G7CpoCpAwhcEQQW7XRUb8DP9+bid9VfT+3C1Te6 -u8eowndXAgMBAAECggEAGF6ZjZKt5aXNolb7jp2K/r8JUkC6dBgFiFn8uwwOu4sj -M26hCgNRJRWsp+eEVYLO1/mqERHtpCaTUp61g7hB3aqQJqE6Ao95dW7megg5ar3L -t+ey0z7UR6DsFnJjdFoO9meiJHK7/uUS9YWI7P++BbsMjnL2GWfrgEoCzhYQ2vQ2 -8t9lGmJfaEeicTcPs4/Jtz9nX+KQ1CqKb5uHP6IyVQjV/nIjWh1WZJV5wsmLM1ZF -YT7NPEhXkgH5JjwzEI3QR9ZMs4FUgbduImmS280YCMNMUNVsSBbbV/1hh7Sxlp6B -bRaK12sPPRwW0sHw3odZKjGzKIFlu9I5TieNJ5w2AQKBgQDy3cxDXxj+bcSYuWDp -p4EVNTwg+IY9eT0x1x+tWXaOjGTscD4GrdUYhspWuoUn5NxZ0ub0apiTMQfoM9a0 -Qr3CKngkL5JTi6OwdnEaTPNvQiSJdgXXzYdCXeucK5soeHCZTPAb3bV27LtpxyMI -QSx9rnKcSyoRSavLWP0hr8QNVwKBgQDRc84q3I5tZX/whoUmeTj6aNJoIa1KAACM -0Fnr9ecjLS50kXIiTSCiNE8pcBcsSxYgo+PG5W9oQaZcdd7r2nJOqaizpjnHbF+9 -S/Ts9vj+dJlCUcjjROghzYrI5mdb8Dq2Ngd93IcBt5H+W6bm8wWUgLy0IJmJDKHE -Z7SS22imAQKBgAETHi5GI3QsxCvw1g7yoM2ZOLTkpKNs/+pSi19XAAFNebzaGkwp -RMIhBpAvrxsoFhmHp2H5fsdX9jL+17pgeTp8uZ9fXoRkH8tOGt4E7SbW4haBoTD9 -RdXzWHGOd9dMASOMhZt59a2bCpFDQlJtB2de+D7czkjZTJtPv38AqhttAoGAE8X2 -Aa/etk8tu9xHN7GcAm/g5TnArUrAwops4szNLFH4n8KXXsufOBDuJEBTv7e6+Avg -1gcU9Ge2N+ZczDFMN0bnCUa5D62YgDtqfPB34zXIvi0QZPw9WeuYnYy610AfmtIQ -9P3btPrKipPGdukcbr+UkQC+3eRWZT9RGcgi4gECgYApA3J0jlD+JFtYKFOuJWxS -aFEhYPe2dVW78bJoMMhxPtD9hWw/zWVUdyhdXMHoP8/igwNiUqXaYacPbxTFu5ft -w/+UummqB6KpqPFnpbqP826Udr4SEHH0iwvs4MDqSlXcOC5CXbIoMLB/zMjE+u/J -IqNKTt9jbR4zISCpyOCsQw== ------END PRIVATE KEY-----""" +# The signing key is generated fresh on every start and the JWKS derived from +# it, so no private key lives in the repository: an issuer whose key is public +# would let anyone mint a token for any identity a control plane trusts. +from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization +from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa +def _b64url_uint(n): + import base64 + raw = n.to_bytes((n.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big') + return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b'=').decode('ascii') + +_KEY = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) +PRIVATE_KEY = _KEY.private_bytes( + serialization.Encoding.PEM, + serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, + serialization.NoEncryption(), +) +_PUB = _KEY.public_key().public_numbers() JWKS = { "keys": [ { @@ -43,8 +29,8 @@ "alg": "RS256", "use": "sig", "kid": "test-key-id", - "n": "xrTw_Obmk9-NmMqhgIlkOjldgcb6V0ETM7G-1aXS2teOsX-f9W_ZSEeHRb4bxlKp8sxS1dBHSM06qMcihh20GOvAyFIx94sLeq81NFZMP94P0f0wRJhsHajQywgSLbCzpxeB37MQFrY2lEfekuKF2glHFzg_98h7NIWuLbvGIMBsDB2vwkEYHE1-RbIUerh6MORuzYjlWFHAD3NR15sJn9BXkmPa9ELnZiI5CUniB9SPwbn6RKm3I60so2HeHpXW4Y5Qr7iEfd0r2vI2Qc3QlvscclPvHc9rRIEY5vRuwqaAqQMIXBEEFu10VG_Az_fm4nfVX0_twtU3urvHqMJ3Vw", - "e": "AQAB" + "n": _b64url_uint(_PUB.n), + "e": _b64url_uint(_PUB.e), } ] } diff --git a/tests/e2e/policy.bats b/tests/e2e/policy.bats index 7215b033..a9878964 100644 --- a/tests/e2e/policy.bats +++ b/tests/e2e/policy.bats @@ -34,35 +34,24 @@ import time import jwt from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer -PRIVATE_KEY = """-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- -MIIEvAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKYwggSiAgEAAoIBAQDGtPD85uaT342Y -yqGAiWQ6OV2BxvpXQRMzsb7VpdLa146xf5/1b9lIR4dFvhvGUqnyzFLV0EdIzTqo -xyKGHbQY68DIUjH3iwt6rzU0Vkw/3g/R/TBEmGwdqNDLCBItsLOnF4HfsxAWtjaU -R96S4oXaCUcXOD/3yHs0ha4tu8YgwGwMHa/CQRgcTX5FshR6uHow5G7NiOVYUcAP -c1HXmwmf0FeSY9r0QudmIjkJSeIH1I/BufpEqbcjrSyjYd4eldbhjlCvuIR93Sva -8jZBzdCW+xxyU+8dz2tEgRjm9G7CpoCpAwhcEQQW7XRUb8DP9+bid9VfT+3C1Te6 -u8eowndXAgMBAAECggEAGF6ZjZKt5aXNolb7jp2K/r8JUkC6dBgFiFn8uwwOu4sj -M26hCgNRJRWsp+eEVYLO1/mqERHtpCaTUp61g7hB3aqQJqE6Ao95dW7megg5ar3L -t+ey0z7UR6DsFnJjdFoO9meiJHK7/uUS9YWI7P++BbsMjnL2GWfrgEoCzhYQ2vQ2 -8t9lGmJfaEeicTcPs4/Jtz9nX+KQ1CqKb5uHP6IyVQjV/nIjWh1WZJV5wsmLM1ZF -YT7NPEhXkgH5JjwzEI3QR9ZMs4FUgbduImmS280YCMNMUNVsSBbbV/1hh7Sxlp6B -bRaK12sPPRwW0sHw3odZKjGzKIFlu9I5TieNJ5w2AQKBgQDy3cxDXxj+bcSYuWDp -p4EVNTwg+IY9eT0x1x+tWXaOjGTscD4GrdUYhspWuoUn5NxZ0ub0apiTMQfoM9a0 -Qr3CKngkL5JTi6OwdnEaTPNvQiSJdgXXzYdCXeucK5soeHCZTPAb3bV27LtpxyMI -QSx9rnKcSyoRSavLWP0hr8QNVwKBgQDRc84q3I5tZX/whoUmeTj6aNJoIa1KAACM -0Fnr9ecjLS50kXIiTSCiNE8pcBcsSxYgo+PG5W9oQaZcdd7r2nJOqaizpjnHbF+9 -S/Ts9vj+dJlCUcjjROghzYrI5mdb8Dq2Ngd93IcBt5H+W6bm8wWUgLy0IJmJDKHE -Z7SS22imAQKBgAETHi5GI3QsxCvw1g7yoM2ZOLTkpKNs/+pSi19XAAFNebzaGkwp -RMIhBpAvrxsoFhmHp2H5fsdX9jL+17pgeTp8uZ9fXoRkH8tOGt4E7SbW4haBoTD9 -RdXzWHGOd9dMASOMhZt59a2bCpFDQlJtB2de+D7czkjZTJtPv38AqhttAoGAE8X2 -Aa/etk8tu9xHN7GcAm/g5TnArUrAwops4szNLFH4n8KXXsufOBDuJEBTv7e6+Avg -1gcU9Ge2N+ZczDFMN0bnCUa5D62YgDtqfPB34zXIvi0QZPw9WeuYnYy610AfmtIQ -9P3btPrKipPGdukcbr+UkQC+3eRWZT9RGcgi4gECgYApA3J0jlD+JFtYKFOuJWxS -aFEhYPe2dVW78bJoMMhxPtD9hWw/zWVUdyhdXMHoP8/igwNiUqXaYacPbxTFu5ft -w/+UummqB6KpqPFnpbqP826Udr4SEHH0iwvs4MDqSlXcOC5CXbIoMLB/zMjE+u/J -IqNKTt9jbR4zISCpyOCsQw== ------END PRIVATE KEY-----""" - +# The signing key is generated fresh on every start and the JWKS derived from +# it, so no private key lives in the repository: an issuer whose key is public +# would let anyone mint a token for any identity a control plane trusts. +from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization +from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa + +def _b64url_uint(n): + import base64 + raw = n.to_bytes((n.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big') + return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b'=').decode('ascii') + +_KEY = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) +PRIVATE_KEY = _KEY.private_bytes( + serialization.Encoding.PEM, + serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, + serialization.NoEncryption(), +) +_PUB = _KEY.public_key().public_numbers() JWKS = { "keys": [ { @@ -70,8 +59,8 @@ JWKS = { "alg": "RS256", "use": "sig", "kid": "test-key-id", - "n": "xrTw_Obmk9-NmMqhgIlkOjldgcb6V0ETM7G-1aXS2teOsX-f9W_ZSEeHRb4bxlKp8sxS1dBHSM06qMcihh20GOvAyFIx94sLeq81NFZMP94P0f0wRJhsHajQywgSLbCzpxeB37MQFrY2lEfekuKF2glHFzg_98h7NIWuLbvGIMBsDB2vwkEYHE1-RbIUerh6MORuzYjlWFHAD3NR15sJn9BXkmPa9ELnZiI5CUniB9SPwbn6RKm3I60so2HeHpXW4Y5Qr7iEfd0r2vI2Qc3QlvscclPvHc9rRIEY5vRuwqaAqQMIXBEEFu10VG_Az_fm4nfVX0_twtU3urvHqMJ3Vw", - "e": "AQAB" + "n": _b64url_uint(_PUB.n), + "e": _b64url_uint(_PUB.e), } ] } From 3b6dc32f25918beb641ef8acb3c1590d8f4242e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 08:48:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 09/14] mobile, node: per-device API token, authenticated sensor server, coarse location (audit PR 8) H5: the mobile app's sidecar token was the fixed string "secret-token", and Android loopback is shared by every installed app, so any of them could drive the phone's mesh identity. The token is now generated on first launch (32 random bytes, base64url) and kept in the app-private data dir next to the node key and biscuit it protects; the Config tab shows it (hidden by default) with copy and regenerate. There is no default value anywhere. M10: the phone-sensors MCP backend listened on 127.0.0.1:9090 with no authentication. It now binds a random loopback port, mints a token per start and refuses any request without it (constant-time compare). The node reaches it through a general backend-credential mechanism added here. A service may name a file in target_auth_path ("TOKEN" is sent as "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN", "user:pass" as Basic); the node reads it once at start and composes the credential into the in-memory target as URL userinfo. A credential written into target_url inside sam-node.yaml is refused at load: that file is copied, committed and rendered into ConfigMaps. Userinfo is still honoured on an in-memory config, which is how the mobile app hands over its per-launch token without writing it. On every backend path (reverse proxy, MCP client transport, inference proxy and engine, A2A card probe) the node presents the credential, overrides any caller-supplied Authorization there, strips it from the URL it dials, and never echoes a URL in an error (url.Error would print the userinfo). L39: the app requested ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION and returned metre-level GPS coordinates under a switch labelled "coarse". It now requests only coarse permission, reads the network provider, rounds to two decimals (about a kilometre) and says so in the tool description, the switch and the README. ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION is dropped from the manifest. M12 (data half): android:allowBackup="false", so the node key, biscuit and API token are excluded from cloud and adb backups and a restore cannot clone the identity onto another device. The release-signing half still needs a keystore in CI secrets and is left for the operator. Tests: TestParseBackendTarget, TestReverseProxySendsBackendCredential, TestBackendCredentialComesFromAFileNotTheConfig, TestBackendCredentialRefusedInConfigFileOnly (node); Dart: random loopback port with token as userinfo, request without or with a wrong token refused (401), request with the launch token served, new token per start, constant-time comparison. flutter analyze clean. --- api/policy.go | 18 +- internal/node/a2a_service.go | 8 +- internal/node/backend_target.go | 131 ++++++++++++++ internal/node/backend_target_test.go | 163 ++++++++++++++++++ internal/node/config.go | 14 ++ internal/node/config_test.go | 50 ++++++ internal/node/inference_service.go | 19 +- internal/node/mcp_service.go | 6 +- internal/node/service.go | 16 +- mobile/sam-node-app/README.md | 11 +- .../android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml | 8 +- .../com/example/sam_agent/MainActivity.kt | 25 +-- mobile/sam-node-app/lib/main.dart | 105 ++++++++++- mobile/sam-node-app/lib/mcp_server.dart | 58 ++++++- mobile/sam-node-app/test/mcp_server_test.dart | 76 ++++++++ site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md | 3 +- 16 files changed, 658 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/node/backend_target.go create mode 100644 internal/node/backend_target_test.go diff --git a/api/policy.go b/api/policy.go index f9918d49..61799679 100644 --- a/api/policy.go +++ b/api/policy.go @@ -20,12 +20,18 @@ const ( ) type ServiceConfig struct { - Type string `yaml:"type"` // e.g., "mcp", "inference" - Name string `yaml:"name"` - Description string `yaml:"description"` - TargetURL string `yaml:"target_url,omitempty"` - Command []string `yaml:"command,omitempty"` - Env map[string]string `yaml:"env,omitempty"` + Type string `yaml:"type"` // e.g., "mcp", "inference" + Name string `yaml:"name"` + Description string `yaml:"description"` + TargetURL string `yaml:"target_url,omitempty"` + // TargetAuthPath names a file holding the credential the backend at + // TargetURL requires: "TOKEN" is sent as "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN", + // "user:pass" as HTTP Basic. A file, not a value, for the same reason + // the CLI takes --api-token-path: config files are copied, committed and + // rendered into ConfigMaps; a credential in one is a credential in all. + TargetAuthPath string `yaml:"target_auth_path,omitempty"` + Command []string `yaml:"command,omitempty"` + Env map[string]string `yaml:"env,omitempty"` } // NodeConfig defines the optional attenuation rules and static services for a specific SAM Node. diff --git a/internal/node/a2a_service.go b/internal/node/a2a_service.go index 5990098c..3498901c 100644 --- a/internal/node/a2a_service.go +++ b/internal/node/a2a_service.go @@ -66,12 +66,16 @@ func (s *A2AService) Probe(ctx context.Context) error { if !ok { return fmt.Errorf("a2a service %q has no URL backend to probe", s.info.GetName()) } - cardURL := strings.TrimSuffix(target.TargetUrl, "/") + "/.well-known/agent-card.json" + backend, err := parseBackendTarget(target.TargetUrl) + if err != nil { + return err + } + cardURL := strings.TrimSuffix(backend.url.String(), "/") + "/.well-known/agent-card.json" req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, cardURL, nil) if err != nil { return err } - resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req) + resp, err := backend.client().Do(req) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("fetch agent card of %q: %w", s.info.GetName(), err) } diff --git a/internal/node/backend_target.go b/internal/node/backend_target.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d99d8737 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/backend_target.go @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "encoding/base64" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "net/url" + "os" + "strings" +) + +// backendTarget is a service's target_url split into the address the node +// dials and the credential it presents there. A target_url may carry that +// credential as URL userinfo: "http://:token@host" sends "Bearer token", +// "http://user:pass@host" sends HTTP Basic. Nothing else in the node sees +// the userinfo: it is not advertised, logged or forwarded to callers. +type backendTarget struct { + url *url.URL // userinfo stripped + auth string // Authorization header value, or "" +} + +func parseBackendTarget(raw string) (backendTarget, error) { + u, err := url.Parse(raw) + if err != nil { + // Not %w: url.Error prints the raw URL, userinfo included. + return backendTarget{}, errors.New("invalid target URL") + } + t := backendTarget{url: u} + if u.User == nil { + return t, nil + } + pass, _ := u.User.Password() + t.auth = authorizationFor(u.User.Username(), pass) + clean := *u + clean.User = nil + t.url = &clean + return t, nil +} + +// authorizationFor turns decoded userinfo into an Authorization header value: +// a password with no user is a bearer token, user and password are Basic. +func authorizationFor(user, pass string) string { + if user == "" { + return "Bearer " + pass + } + return "Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user+":"+pass)) +} + +// rejectInlineBackendCredential refuses a credential written into a config +// file's target_url; target_auth_path is the channel for that. Userinfo is +// still honoured on the wire (parseBackendTarget) so an in-process caller, +// e.g. the mobile app, can pass a per-launch token without ever writing it. +func rejectInlineBackendCredential(raw string) error { + u, err := url.Parse(raw) + if err != nil { + return errors.New("invalid target_url") + } + if u.User != nil { + return errors.New("target_url must not carry a credential; put it in a file and set target_auth_path") + } + return nil +} + +// withBackendAuthFile composes the in-memory target URL for a service whose +// credential lives in a file: the file's content becomes the URL userinfo, +// which parseBackendTarget turns into the Authorization header and strips +// before dialling. The credential never returns to disk or to any log. +func withBackendAuthFile(targetURL, authPath string) (string, error) { + data, err := os.ReadFile(authPath) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("read target_auth_path: %w", err) + } + cred := strings.TrimSpace(string(data)) + if cred == "" { + return "", fmt.Errorf("target_auth_path %s is empty", authPath) + } + u, err := url.Parse(targetURL) + if err != nil { + return "", errors.New("invalid target_url") + } + if user, pass, ok := strings.Cut(cred, ":"); ok { + u.User = url.UserPassword(user, pass) + } else { + u.User = url.UserPassword("", cred) + } + return u.String(), nil +} + +// apply sets the backend credential on an outbound request. The operator's +// configured credential wins over anything a caller sent: the caller's +// Authorization was for the node, this one is the node's for the backend. +func (t backendTarget) apply(h http.Header) { + if t.auth != "" { + h.Set("Authorization", t.auth) + } +} + +// client returns an HTTP client that presents the backend credential on +// every request, for backends dialled through an SDK rather than a proxy. +func (t backendTarget) client() *http.Client { + if t.auth == "" { + return http.DefaultClient + } + return &http.Client{Transport: backendAuthTransport{target: t, base: http.DefaultTransport}} +} + +type backendAuthTransport struct { + target backendTarget + base http.RoundTripper +} + +func (b backendAuthTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { + req = req.Clone(req.Context()) + b.target.apply(req.Header) + return b.base.RoundTrip(req) +} diff --git a/internal/node/backend_target_test.go b/internal/node/backend_target_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3786709 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/node/backend_target_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +// Copyright 2026 Google LLC +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +package node + +import ( + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/google/sam/api" +) + +func TestParseBackendTarget(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + raw string + wantURL string + wantAuth string + }{ + {"http://127.0.0.1:9090", "http://127.0.0.1:9090", ""}, + {"http://:s3cret@127.0.0.1:9090/mcp", "http://127.0.0.1:9090/mcp", "Bearer s3cret"}, + {"http://alice:pw@backend.example/v1", "http://backend.example/v1", "Basic YWxpY2U6cHc="}, + // Percent-encoded userinfo is decoded before it becomes a header. + {"http://alice:p%40ss@backend.example", "http://backend.example", "Basic YWxpY2U6cEBzcw=="}, + } + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.raw, func(t *testing.T) { + got, err := parseBackendTarget(tt.raw) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if got.url.String() != tt.wantURL { + t.Errorf("url = %q, want %q", got.url.String(), tt.wantURL) + } + if got.auth != tt.wantAuth { + t.Errorf("auth = %q, want %q", got.auth, tt.wantAuth) + } + if strings.Contains(got.url.String(), "@") { + t.Errorf("userinfo leaked into the dialled URL %q", got.url) + } + }) + } + // A malformed URL must not be echoed: url.Error prints it, credential + // included. + _, err := parseBackendTarget("http://:leaked-secret@[::1") + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("an unparsable URL must be an error") + } + if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "leaked-secret") { + t.Errorf("parse error echoes the credential: %v", err) + } +} + +// Config files are copied, committed and rendered into ConfigMaps, so a +// credential written into target_url is refused there; target_auth_path +// reads it from a file and composes the in-memory URL instead. +func TestBackendCredentialComesFromAFileNotTheConfig(t *testing.T) { + if err := rejectInlineBackendCredential("http://:tok@127.0.0.1:9090"); err == nil { + t.Error("a credential inside target_url must be refused in a config file") + } + if err := rejectInlineBackendCredential("http://127.0.0.1:9090"); err != nil { + t.Errorf("a plain target_url must be accepted: %v", err) + } + + dir := t.TempDir() + tokenFile := filepath.Join(dir, "token") + if err := os.WriteFile(tokenFile, []byte("phone-token\n"), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + basicFile := filepath.Join(dir, "basic") + if err := os.WriteFile(basicFile, []byte("alice:p@ss"), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + for _, tt := range []struct { + name, path, wantAuth string + }{ + {"bearer", tokenFile, "Bearer phone-token"}, + {"basic", basicFile, "Basic YWxpY2U6cEBzcw=="}, + } { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + req, err := buildRegisterRequest(api.ServiceConfig{ + Type: "mcp", Name: "sensors", TargetURL: "http://127.0.0.1:9090/mcp", TargetAuthPath: tt.path, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + target, err := parseBackendTarget(req.GetTargetUrl()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if target.auth != tt.wantAuth { + t.Errorf("auth = %q, want %q", target.auth, tt.wantAuth) + } + if target.url.String() != "http://127.0.0.1:9090/mcp" { + t.Errorf("dialled URL = %q", target.url) + } + }) + } + + if _, err := buildRegisterRequest(api.ServiceConfig{Type: "mcp", Name: "s", TargetURL: "http://127.0.0.1:1", TargetAuthPath: filepath.Join(dir, "missing")}); err == nil { + t.Error("a missing credential file must fail the service, not silently run unauthenticated") + } + empty := filepath.Join(dir, "empty") + if err := os.WriteFile(empty, []byte(" \n"), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, err := buildRegisterRequest(api.ServiceConfig{Type: "mcp", Name: "s", TargetURL: "http://127.0.0.1:1", TargetAuthPath: empty}); err == nil { + t.Error("an empty credential file must be an error") + } +} + +// The credential in target_url is the node's for the backend: it is sent on +// every proxied request and overrides whatever Authorization the caller +// sent, which was for the node. +func TestReverseProxySendsBackendCredential(t *testing.T) { + var gotAuth string + backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization") + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) + })) + defer backend.Close() + + h, err := newReverseProxyHandler(strings.Replace(backend.URL, "http://", "http://:phone-token@", 1)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/mcp", nil) + req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer caller-token") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + h.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent { + t.Fatalf("status = %d", rec.Code) + } + if gotAuth != "Bearer phone-token" { + t.Errorf("backend saw Authorization %q, want the configured backend credential", gotAuth) + } + + // Without a configured credential the caller's header passes through. + plain, err := newReverseProxyHandler(backend.URL) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + plain.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req) + if gotAuth != "Bearer caller-token" { + t.Errorf("without a backend credential the caller's Authorization must pass through, got %q", gotAuth) + } +} diff --git a/internal/node/config.go b/internal/node/config.go index ee60b0e5..85f79d7c 100644 --- a/internal/node/config.go +++ b/internal/node/config.go @@ -62,6 +62,17 @@ func LoadNodeConfig(path string) (*NodeConfigComplete, error) { path, config.Version, api.NodeConfigVersionV1Alpha1) } + // A credential written into a file on disk is refused here, not in + // CompleteNodeConfig: the mobile FFI builds its config in memory with a + // per-launch token that is never written anywhere. + for _, svc := range config.Services { + if svc.TargetURL != "" { + if err := rejectInlineBackendCredential(svc.TargetURL); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("node config %s, service %q: %w", path, svc.Name, err) + } + } + } + return CompleteNodeConfig(config) } @@ -97,6 +108,9 @@ func CompleteNodeConfig(config api.NodeConfig) (*NodeConfigComplete, error) { if err := api.ValidateServiceFormat(svc.Type + "://" + svc.Name); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid service config at index %d: %w", i, err) } + if svc.TargetAuthPath != "" && svc.TargetURL == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("service %q: target_auth_path needs a target_url", svc.Name) + } } for _, pStr := range config.Attenuation.Policies { diff --git a/internal/node/config_test.go b/internal/node/config_test.go index 3b9190fb..7ecb1db7 100644 --- a/internal/node/config_test.go +++ b/internal/node/config_test.go @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ package node import ( "os" "path/filepath" + "strings" "testing" "github.com/google/sam/api" @@ -337,6 +338,55 @@ func TestCompleteNodeConfig(t *testing.T) { } } +// A backend credential may not be written into sam-node.yaml: the file is +// copied, committed and rendered into ConfigMaps. It comes from +// target_auth_path instead. An in-memory config (the mobile FFI, which +// passes a per-launch token that is never written) is not held to this. +func TestBackendCredentialRefusedInConfigFileOnly(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "sam-node.yaml") + inline := `version: v1alpha1 +services: + - type: mcp + name: sensors + target_url: "http://:s3cret@127.0.0.1:9090" +` + if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(inline), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, err := LoadNodeConfig(path) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("a credential inside target_url in a config file must be refused") + } + if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "s3cret") { + t.Errorf("the refusal must not echo the credential: %v", err) + } + + viaFile := `version: v1alpha1 +services: + - type: mcp + name: sensors + target_url: "http://127.0.0.1:9090" + target_auth_path: ` + filepath.Join(dir, "token") + ` +` + if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(viaFile), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + cfg, err := LoadNodeConfig(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("target_auth_path form must load: %v", err) + } + if cfg.Services[0].TargetAuthPath == "" { + t.Error("target_auth_path was not carried through") + } + + if _, err := CompleteNodeConfig(api.NodeConfig{ + Services: []api.ServiceConfig{{Type: "mcp", Name: "sensors", TargetURL: "http://:launch-token@127.0.0.1:41225"}}, + }); err != nil { + t.Errorf("an in-memory config with a per-launch credential must be accepted: %v", err) + } +} + func TestLoadNodeConfigEgressFloor(t *testing.T) { write := func(t *testing.T, body string) string { t.Helper() diff --git a/internal/node/inference_service.go b/internal/node/inference_service.go index 6c94682b..08659f36 100644 --- a/internal/node/inference_service.go +++ b/internal/node/inference_service.go @@ -42,9 +42,10 @@ const backendProbeTTL = 30 * time.Second // and token usage tracking for OpenAI-compatible endpoints. type InferenceService struct { baseService - backendURL *url.URL - engine InferenceEngine - active atomic.Int64 + backendURL *url.URL + backendAuth backendTarget + engine InferenceEngine + active atomic.Int64 modelsMu sync.Mutex cachedModels []string @@ -54,12 +55,13 @@ type InferenceService struct { func (s *InferenceService) Init(ctx context.Context) error { switch x := s.backend.(type) { case *api.RegisterServiceRequest_TargetUrl: - u, err := url.Parse(x.TargetUrl) + target, err := parseBackendTarget(x.TargetUrl) if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("invalid inference backend URL %q: %w", x.TargetUrl, err) + return fmt.Errorf("invalid inference backend URL: %w", err) } - s.backendURL = u - s.engine = newOpenAIEngine(u, nil) + s.backendURL = target.url + s.backendAuth = target + s.engine = newOpenAIEngine(target.url, target.client()) s.handler = s.trackActive(s.newInferenceProxy()) case *api.RegisterServiceRequest_Command: return fmt.Errorf("command-based backends are not supported for InferenceService") @@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ func (s *InferenceService) newInferenceProxy() http.Handler { }, Transport: &inferenceTransport{ backend: s.backendURL, + auth: s.backendAuth, base: http.DefaultTransport, }, } @@ -122,6 +125,7 @@ func (s *InferenceService) newInferenceProxy() http.Handler { type inferenceTransport struct { backend *url.URL + auth backendTarget base http.RoundTripper } @@ -133,6 +137,7 @@ func (t *inferenceTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error attemptReq.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-For") attemptReq.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Host") attemptReq.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-Proto") + t.auth.apply(attemptReq.Header) attemptReq.URL.Scheme = t.backend.Scheme attemptReq.URL.Host = t.backend.Host diff --git a/internal/node/mcp_service.go b/internal/node/mcp_service.go index 0fb80068..a7873c10 100644 --- a/internal/node/mcp_service.go +++ b/internal/node/mcp_service.go @@ -140,7 +140,11 @@ func (m *MCPService) Teardown() error { func (m *MCPService) backendTransport() (mcp.Transport, error) { switch x := m.backend.(type) { case *api.RegisterServiceRequest_TargetUrl: - return &mcp.StreamableClientTransport{Endpoint: x.TargetUrl}, nil + target, err := parseBackendTarget(x.TargetUrl) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &mcp.StreamableClientTransport{Endpoint: target.url.String(), HTTPClient: target.client()}, nil case *api.RegisterServiceRequest_Command: if x.Command == nil || len(x.Command.Command) == 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing command for command-backed MCP service %q", m.info.GetName()) diff --git a/internal/node/service.go b/internal/node/service.go index 28487857..5969d510 100644 --- a/internal/node/service.go +++ b/internal/node/service.go @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import ( "fmt" "net/http" "net/http/httputil" - "net/url" "os/exec" "strings" @@ -51,10 +50,11 @@ type baseService struct { // newReverseProxyHandler builds a single-host reverse-proxy handler for a // URL backend. Same code path as today's URL branch in RegisterService. func newReverseProxyHandler(targetURL string) (http.Handler, error) { - u, err := url.Parse(targetURL) + target, err := parseBackendTarget(targetURL) if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid target URL: %w", err) + return nil, err } + u := target.url return &httputil.ReverseProxy{ Rewrite: func(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) { noTrailingSlash := pr.In.Header.Get(api.HeaderSamNoTrailingSlash) == "true" @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ func newReverseProxyHandler(targetURL string) (http.Handler, error) { // is addressed by its configured URL. pr.Out.Host = u.Host pr.Out.Header.Del(api.HeaderSamNoTrailingSlash) + target.apply(pr.Out.Header) if noTrailingSlash && !strings.HasSuffix(u.Path, "/") && strings.HasSuffix(pr.Out.URL.Path, "/") { pr.Out.URL.Path = strings.TrimSuffix(pr.Out.URL.Path, "/") } @@ -143,7 +144,14 @@ func buildRegisterRequest(sCfg api.ServiceConfig) (*api.RegisterServiceRequest, } switch { case sCfg.TargetURL != "": - req.Backend = &api.RegisterServiceRequest_TargetUrl{TargetUrl: sCfg.TargetURL} + target := sCfg.TargetURL + if sCfg.TargetAuthPath != "" { + var err error + if target, err = withBackendAuthFile(target, sCfg.TargetAuthPath); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("service %s: %w", sCfg.Name, err) + } + } + req.Backend = &api.RegisterServiceRequest_TargetUrl{TargetUrl: target} case len(sCfg.Command) > 0: req.Backend = &api.RegisterServiceRequest_Command{ Command: &api.CommandBackend{ diff --git a/mobile/sam-node-app/README.md b/mobile/sam-node-app/README.md index b3298444..c27656fb 100644 --- a/mobile/sam-node-app/README.md +++ b/mobile/sam-node-app/README.md @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Once launched, the app displays a control interface: 1. **Control plane URL**: The address of the SAM control plane (e.g., `https://bananas.sam-mesh.dev`). 2. **Enrollment JWT**: A valid JWT token retrieved from your OIDC provider to authenticate the node registration. -3. **Local API Token**: The secret bearer token used to secure the local sidecar REST APIs (defaults to `secret-token`). +3. **Local API Token**: The bearer token that secures the local sidecar REST API. It is generated on first launch and kept in the app's private storage; view, copy or regenerate it on the **Config** tab. There is no default: Android loopback is shared by every installed app, so a fixed value would let any of them act as this node. 4. **Enroll Node**: Click this button first to generate the local Peer Identity and register the node with the control plane. 5. **Start Node**: Launches the Go node runtime in the background. It will bind its local MCP sidecar to `127.0.0.1:5005`. 6. **Stop Node**: Gracefully shuts down the background Go mesh client. @@ -111,23 +111,24 @@ You can query the phone's telemetry from a remote machine (or another node) usin 1. **Discover tools on the remote phone service**: ```bash # Query the local SAM node proxy for tools hosted by the phone-sensors peer + # (-token is your own node's API token, not the phone's) go run cmd/mcp-client/main.go \ -url "http://localhost:8080/sam//mcp/phone-sensors" \ - -token "secret-token" \ + -token "$(cat ~/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)" \ -list ``` *Output:* * `get_battery_status`: Returns the current battery level and charging status of the device. - * `get_location`: Returns the current coarse location of the device. + * `get_location`: Returns the approximate location of the device, rounded to about a kilometre. 2. **Query the location**: ```bash go run cmd/mcp-client/main.go \ -url "http://localhost:8080/sam//mcp/phone-sensors" \ - -token "secret-token" \ + -token "$(cat ~/.config/sam-mesh/api-token)" \ -tool "get_location" ``` - *Output:* `{"latitude": 42.2805588, "longitude": -8.6124088}` + *Output:* `{"latitude": 42.28, "longitude": -8.61, "precision_km": 1}` --- diff --git a/mobile/sam-node-app/android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml b/mobile/sam-node-app/android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml index b38c0f47..1488396d 100644 --- a/mobile/sam-node-app/android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml +++ b/mobile/sam-node-app/android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ - @@ -13,7 +12,12 @@ + android:icon="@mipmap/ic_launcher" + android:allowBackup="false"> + ("enabled") ?: false Log.d("SAM_NODE", "setExposeLocation: $enabled") if (enabled) { + // Coarse only: the tool promises an approximate position, so + // the app must not hold a permission that could give more. if (androidx.core.content.ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission(this, android.Manifest.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION) != android.content.pm.PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) { - androidx.core.app.ActivityCompat.requestPermissions(this, arrayOf(android.Manifest.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, android.Manifest.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION), 1001) + androidx.core.app.ActivityCompat.requestPermissions(this, arrayOf(android.Manifest.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION), 1001) } } result.success(true) @@ -72,18 +74,18 @@ class MainActivity : FlutterActivity() { result.success("{\"error\": \"Location permission not granted\"}") return@setMethodCallHandler } - - val hasFineLocation = androidx.core.content.ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission(this, android.Manifest.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION) == android.content.pm.PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED + + // Network provider only, and rounded to two decimals (about + // a kilometre): a mesh peer gets the neighbourhood, not the + // building, whatever the platform would hand this app. val locationManager = getSystemService(Context.LOCATION_SERVICE) as android.location.LocationManager - val location: android.location.Location? = if (hasFineLocation) { - locationManager.getLastKnownLocation(android.location.LocationManager.GPS_PROVIDER) - ?: locationManager.getLastKnownLocation(android.location.LocationManager.NETWORK_PROVIDER) - } else { + val location: android.location.Location? = locationManager.getLastKnownLocation(android.location.LocationManager.NETWORK_PROVIDER) - } - + if (location != null) { - result.success("{\"latitude\": ${location.latitude}, \"longitude\": ${location.longitude}}") + val lat = coarsen(location.latitude) + val lon = coarsen(location.longitude) + result.success("{\"latitude\": $lat, \"longitude\": $lon, \"precision_km\": 1}") } else { result.success("{\"error\": \"No location available\"}") } @@ -97,4 +99,7 @@ class MainActivity : FlutterActivity() { } } } + + // Two decimal places of a degree is roughly 1.1 km at the equator. + private fun coarsen(degrees: Double): Double = Math.round(degrees * 100.0) / 100.0 } diff --git a/mobile/sam-node-app/lib/main.dart b/mobile/sam-node-app/lib/main.dart index 46049fe9..19204d54 100644 --- a/mobile/sam-node-app/lib/main.dart +++ b/mobile/sam-node-app/lib/main.dart @@ -83,7 +83,13 @@ class _NodeControlPageState extends State { final _jwtController = TextEditingController(); // Saved by the FFI at enrollment so Re-enroll can skip the browser. String _refreshToken = ''; - final _tokenController = TextEditingController(text: 'secret-token'); + // Bearer token for the sidecar API on 127.0.0.1:5005. Android loopback is + // shared by every installed app, so a fixed value would let any of them + // act as this node. Generated once and kept in the app-private data dir + // next to the identity it protects; shown on the Config tab. + static const _apiTokenFile = 'api-token'; + String _apiToken = ''; + bool _apiTokenVisible = false; // Labels are attested at enrollment; changing them requires re-enrolling. // The field is saved here after a successful enrollment and read back at // launch, like attenuation.json. @@ -141,7 +147,6 @@ class _NodeControlPageState extends State { _pollingTimer?.cancel(); _controlPlaneController.dispose(); _jwtController.dispose(); - _tokenController.dispose(); _labelsController.dispose(); _externalMcpUrlController.dispose(); _externalMcpNameController.dispose(); @@ -157,6 +162,7 @@ class _NodeControlPageState extends State { final dataDir = '${appDir.path}/sam_data'; final enrolled = _samLib.isEnrolled(dataDir); await _loadAttenuation(dataDir); + await _loadOrCreateApiToken(dataDir); final labelsFile = File('$dataDir/$_labelsFile'); if (await labelsFile.exists()) { _labelsController.text = await labelsFile.readAsString(); @@ -193,6 +199,31 @@ class _NodeControlPageState extends State { } } + Future _loadOrCreateApiToken(String dataDir) async { + final file = File('$dataDir/$_apiTokenFile'); + if (await file.exists()) { + final saved = (await file.readAsString()).trim(); + if (saved.isNotEmpty) { + _apiToken = saved; + return; + } + } + await _writeApiToken(file, SamDartMcpServer.newToken()); + } + + Future _writeApiToken(File file, String token) async { + await file.parent.create(recursive: true); + await file.writeAsString(token, flush: true); + _apiToken = token; + } + + Future _regenerateApiToken() async { + final appDir = await getApplicationDocumentsDirectory(); + await _writeApiToken( + File('${appDir.path}/sam_data/$_apiTokenFile'), SamDartMcpServer.newToken()); + if (mounted) setState(() {}); + } + // The field keeps the CLI's old --labels wire format. Only the split lives // here; the FFI validates keys and values with the CLI's rules. Map _parseLabels(String text) { @@ -792,7 +823,7 @@ class _NodeControlPageState extends State { // services are declared in the start configuration and probed at startup, // there is no runtime registration. try { - await _embeddedMcpServer.start(port: 9090); + await _embeddedMcpServer.start(); } catch (e) { setState(() { _status = 'Start failed: embedded MCP server: $e'; @@ -806,7 +837,7 @@ class _NodeControlPageState extends State { 'name': 'phone-sensors', 'description': 'Exposes phone sensors like battery and location to the SAM mesh', - 'targetUrl': 'http://127.0.0.1:9090', + 'targetUrl': _embeddedMcpServer.targetUrl, }, if (_externalMcpUrlController.text.isNotEmpty && _externalMcpNameController.text.isNotEmpty) @@ -830,7 +861,7 @@ class _NodeControlPageState extends State { 'controlPlaneURL': _controlPlaneController.text, 'meshID': 'public-mesh', 'bindAddr': '127.0.0.1:5005', // sidecar port inside phone - 'apiToken': _tokenController.text, + 'apiToken': _apiToken, 'allowLoopback': true, 'enableRelay': false, 'labels': labels, @@ -1015,7 +1046,7 @@ class _NodeControlPageState extends State { ), SwitchListTile( title: const Text('Location'), - subtitle: const Text('Share coarse location with mesh peers'), + subtitle: const Text('Share approximate location (about 1 km) with mesh peers'), value: _exposeLocation, onChanged: (bool value) async { setState(() { @@ -1103,6 +1134,68 @@ class _NodeControlPageState extends State { child: Column( crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.stretch, children: [ + Card( + child: Padding( + padding: const EdgeInsets.all(16.0), + child: Column( + crossAxisAlignment: CrossAxisAlignment.start, + children: [ + const Text('Local API Token', + style: + TextStyle(fontWeight: FontWeight.bold, fontSize: 16)), + const SizedBox(height: 6), + const Text( + 'Bearer token for the sidecar API on 127.0.0.1:5005. Any ' + 'app on this phone that holds it can act as this node, ' + 'so it is generated here and never a fixed value. ' + 'Regenerating takes effect on the next Start.', + style: TextStyle(fontSize: 12, color: Colors.grey), + ), + const SizedBox(height: 10), + Row( + children: [ + Expanded( + child: SelectableText( + _apiTokenVisible + ? _apiToken + : '\u2022' * 24, + style: const TextStyle( + fontFamily: 'monospace', fontSize: 13), + ), + ), + IconButton( + tooltip: _apiTokenVisible ? 'Hide' : 'Show', + icon: Icon(_apiTokenVisible + ? Icons.visibility_off + : Icons.visibility), + onPressed: () => setState( + () => _apiTokenVisible = !_apiTokenVisible), + ), + IconButton( + tooltip: 'Copy', + icon: const Icon(Icons.copy), + onPressed: () async { + await Clipboard.setData( + ClipboardData(text: _apiToken)); + if (mounted) { + ScaffoldMessenger.of(context).showSnackBar( + const SnackBar( + content: Text('Token copied'))); + } + }, + ), + IconButton( + tooltip: 'Regenerate', + icon: const Icon(Icons.refresh), + onPressed: isRunning ? null : _regenerateApiToken, + ), + ], + ), + ], + ), + ), + ), + const SizedBox(height: 20), Card( child: Padding( padding: const EdgeInsets.all(16.0), diff --git a/mobile/sam-node-app/lib/mcp_server.dart b/mobile/sam-node-app/lib/mcp_server.dart index a111e8d0..afe6f98c 100644 --- a/mobile/sam-node-app/lib/mcp_server.dart +++ b/mobile/sam-node-app/lib/mcp_server.dart @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ import 'dart:io'; import 'dart:convert'; +import 'dart:math'; import 'package:flutter/services.dart'; import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart'; @@ -7,6 +8,9 @@ class SamDartMcpServer { static const MethodChannel _channel = MethodChannel('com.example.sam_agent/mesh_expose'); HttpServer? _server; final List _sseClients = []; + // Android loopback is shared by every installed app, so the port alone is + // no boundary: each start mints a token only the node is told about. + String? _token; // Callbacks to check current feature status from UI final bool Function() isBatteryEnabled; @@ -17,19 +21,37 @@ class SamDartMcpServer { required this.isLocationEnabled, }); - /// Starts the Dart HTTP Server acting as an MCP backend. The service it - /// backs is declared in the node's start configuration; there is no - /// runtime registration, so this server must be listening before the node - /// starts and probes it. + /// The URL the node dials, with this launch's credential as userinfo; the + /// node turns that into an Authorization header and never advertises it. + String get targetUrl { + final s = _server; + if (s == null || _token == null) throw StateError('not started'); + return 'http://:$_token@127.0.0.1:${s.port}'; + } + + static String newToken() { + final rng = Random.secure(); + return base64Url.encode(List.generate(32, (_) => rng.nextInt(256))).replaceAll('=', ''); + } + + /// Starts the Dart HTTP Server acting as an MCP backend on a random + /// loopback port. The service it backs is declared in the node's start + /// configuration; there is no runtime registration, so this server must be + /// listening before the node starts and probes it. /// - /// Throws if the port cannot be bound. - Future start({int port = 9090}) async { + /// Throws if no port can be bound. + Future start({int port = 0}) async { if (_server != null) throw StateError('already started'); + _token = newToken(); _server = await HttpServer.bind(InternetAddress.loopbackIPv4, port); - debugPrint('SAM Dart MCP Server listening on port $port'); + debugPrint('SAM Dart MCP Server listening on port ${_server!.port}'); _server!.listen((HttpRequest request) async { - // Handle CORS if needed, but since it's loopback and called by Go, maybe not strict + if (!_authorized(request)) { + request.response.statusCode = HttpStatus.unauthorized; + await request.response.close(); + return; + } if (request.method == 'GET') { _handleSse(request); } else if (request.method == 'POST') { @@ -41,10 +63,28 @@ class SamDartMcpServer { }); } + bool _authorized(HttpRequest request) { + final token = _token; + if (token == null) return false; + return constantTimeEquals(request.headers.value(HttpHeaders.authorizationHeader), 'Bearer $token'); + } + + /// Compares a presented credential without leaking where it diverges. + @visibleForTesting + static bool constantTimeEquals(String? a, String b) { + if (a == null || a.length != b.length) return false; + var diff = 0; + for (var i = 0; i < a.length; i++) { + diff |= a.codeUnitAt(i) ^ b.codeUnitAt(i); + } + return diff == 0; + } + /// Stops the server Future stop() async { await _server?.close(force: true); _server = null; + _token = null; _sseClients.clear(); debugPrint('SAM Dart MCP Server stopped'); } @@ -127,7 +167,7 @@ class SamDartMcpServer { if (isLocationEnabled()) { tools.add({ 'name': 'get_location', - 'description': 'Returns the current coarse location of the device.', + 'description': 'Returns the approximate location of the device, rounded to about a kilometre.', 'inputSchema': {'type': 'object', 'properties': {}} }); } diff --git a/mobile/sam-node-app/test/mcp_server_test.dart b/mobile/sam-node-app/test/mcp_server_test.dart index 74b94719..0b9e953e 100644 --- a/mobile/sam-node-app/test/mcp_server_test.dart +++ b/mobile/sam-node-app/test/mcp_server_test.dart @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +import 'dart:convert'; +import 'dart:io'; + import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart'; import 'package:sam_agent/mcp_server.dart'; @@ -104,4 +107,77 @@ void main() { expect(response['error']['code'], -32601); // Method not implemented }); }); + + // Android loopback is shared by every installed app, so the sensor server + // must refuse anyone who does not hold this launch's token; only the node, + // told the token through target_url userinfo, may reach the sensors. + group('SamDartMcpServer loopback authentication', () { + late SamDartMcpServer server; + + setUp(() async { + server = SamDartMcpServer( + isBatteryEnabled: () => true, + isLocationEnabled: () => false, + ); + await server.start(); + }); + + tearDown(() => server.stop()); + + Future post(String? authorization) async { + final target = Uri.parse(server.targetUrl); + final client = HttpClient(); + try { + final req = await client.postUrl(Uri(scheme: 'http', host: target.host, port: target.port, path: '/')); + if (authorization != null) { + req.headers.set(HttpHeaders.authorizationHeader, authorization); + } + req.headers.contentType = ContentType.json; + req.write(jsonEncode({'jsonrpc': '2.0', 'id': 1, 'method': 'tools/list', 'params': {}})); + return await req.close(); + } finally { + client.close(); + } + } + + test('binds a random loopback port and carries the token as userinfo', () { + final target = Uri.parse(server.targetUrl); + expect(target.host, '127.0.0.1'); + expect(target.port, isNot(0)); + expect(target.userInfo, startsWith(':')); + expect(target.userInfo.length, greaterThan(32)); + }); + + test('refuses a request without the token', () async { + final resp = await post(null); + expect(resp.statusCode, HttpStatus.unauthorized); + }); + + test('refuses a request with a wrong token', () async { + final resp = await post('Bearer not-the-token'); + expect(resp.statusCode, HttpStatus.unauthorized); + }); + + test('serves a request with this launch token', () async { + final token = Uri.parse(server.targetUrl).userInfo.substring(1); + final resp = await post('Bearer $token'); + expect(resp.statusCode, HttpStatus.ok); + final body = jsonDecode(await utf8.decoder.bind(resp).join()); + expect((body['result']['tools'] as List).single['name'], 'get_battery_status'); + }); + + test('each start mints a new token', () async { + final first = server.targetUrl; + await server.stop(); + await server.start(); + expect(server.targetUrl, isNot(first)); + }); + + test('constant-time comparison rejects length and content mismatches', () { + expect(SamDartMcpServer.constantTimeEquals('Bearer abc', 'Bearer abc'), isTrue); + expect(SamDartMcpServer.constantTimeEquals('Bearer abd', 'Bearer abc'), isFalse); + expect(SamDartMcpServer.constantTimeEquals('Bearer ab', 'Bearer abc'), isFalse); + expect(SamDartMcpServer.constantTimeEquals(null, 'Bearer abc'), isFalse); + }); + }); } diff --git a/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md b/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md index 07af2184..c38d2bd0 100644 --- a/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md +++ b/site/content/docs/user/node-configuration.md @@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ The `services` array allows you to register endpoints that remote peers in the S | `description` | A human-readable description published to the mesh discovery catalogue. | | `command` | *(For MCP)* The executable command array to spawn as a local subprocess, speaking MCP over stdio (e.g. `["node", "index.js"]`). Mutually exclusive with `target_url`. | | `env` | *(For MCP)* Key-value environment variables passed to the subprocess. | -| `target_url` | *(For MCP/Inference/A2A)* The upstream URL to proxy traffic to. For `type: mcp`, this points to an already-running Streamable HTTP MCP server; SAM does not spawn or manage its lifecycle, but only proxies to it. Mutually exclusive with `command`. | +| `target_url` | *(For MCP/Inference/A2A)* The upstream URL to proxy traffic to. For `type: mcp`, this points to an already-running Streamable HTTP MCP server; SAM does not spawn or manage its lifecycle, but only proxies to it. Mutually exclusive with `command`. Must not carry a credential (`http://user:pass@...` is refused); use `target_auth_path`. | +| `target_auth_path` | *(Optional, with `target_url`)* Path to a file holding the credential the backend requires: a bare `TOKEN` is sent as `Authorization: Bearer TOKEN`, `user:pass` as HTTP Basic. The node reads the file once at start, presents the credential on every request to the backend (overriding any `Authorization` a caller sent) and never advertises or logs it. A file, not a value, because `sam-node.yaml` is copied, committed and rendered into ConfigMaps; mount a Secret and point here, as with `--api-token-path`. | ### Inference Service Path Standards & Proxy Routing From 843a4b813495e51fca4a882c745ab7a020638b10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 11:32:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 10/14] charts: non-root postgres needs a data directory it owns MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The sam-mesh internal postgres was moved to runAsUser 70 with the PVC mounted at /var/lib/postgresql/data. initdb chmods its data directory and the PVC root belongs to root, so it failed with "could not change permissions of directory", the db crash-looped, the control plane never answered /info and the bootstrap post-install hook hit its deadline — the kind-mesh and bats e2e jobs both failed on `helm install`. PGDATA now points at the pgdata/ subdirectory, which postgres creates and owns (fsGroup 70 gives it group access to the PVC root). Same shape as the .github/k8s control-plane template. Reproduced with docker and on a kind cluster: without PGDATA the pod crash-loops, with it the database is ready in ~10s as uid 70 with pgdata/ at 0700. Upgrade note in values.yaml: a release whose postgres ran as root with data at the PVC root must move it into pgdata/ first. --- charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml | 5 +++++ charts/sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml | 6 ++++++ charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml | 8 ++++++-- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml index 18c6b7a4..ae18ea11 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/db-statefulset.yaml @@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ spec: {{- toYaml . | nindent 10 }} {{- end }} env: + # initdb chmods its data directory; running as uid 70 it cannot do + # that to the PVC root (owned by root, group-shared via fsGroup), so + # the cluster lives in a subdirectory postgres creates and owns. + - name: PGDATA + value: /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata - name: POSTGRES_DB value: {{ .Values.database.postgres.database | quote }} - name: POSTGRES_USER diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml index ab3b936f..bc632cbd 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/tests/db-statefulset_test.yaml @@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ tests: - contains: path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].securityContext.capabilities.drop content: ALL + # Non-root initdb needs a data directory it owns, below the PVC root. + - contains: + path: spec.template.spec.containers[0].env + content: + name: PGDATA + value: /var/lib/postgresql/data/pgdata - it: scheduling knobs pass through to the pod spec set: diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml index b4e06b36..c67b9d53 100644 --- a/charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml +++ b/charts/sam-mesh/values.yaml @@ -83,8 +83,12 @@ database: port: 5432 sslmode: disable storageSize: 1Gi - # postgres:16-alpine runs as uid 70 (postgres) and needs the data dir - # owned by it; fsGroup does that on the PVC. + # postgres:16-alpine runs as uid 70 (postgres); the data directory is + # the pgdata/ subdirectory of the PVC (initdb must own what it chmods, + # and the PVC root belongs to root). fsGroup gives uid 70 group access + # to create it. Upgrading a release whose postgres ran as root with + # data at the PVC root: move that data into pgdata/ first, or the new + # pod initialises an empty cluster beside it. podSecurityContext: runAsNonRoot: true runAsUser: 70 From b191901eefd18d85923916cce24bca43201b598e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 11:32:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 11/14] node: serialize StdioBridge stdin writes on their own lock MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Review finding on #415. The bridge held its state lock across the write to the backend's stdin. A subprocess reads stdin and writes stdout on one thread: while it is blocked writing a large reply it is not reading, so a caller's write blocks once the pipe is full — holding the lock that deliver() needs to drain stdout. Neither side could proceed. Writes now serialize on writeMu; mu is never held across I/O. The closed check moves out from under the write; if the backend exits in between, the reader's shutdown has already closed the caller's reply channel and the request answers 503 as before. TestStdioBridge_BlockedStdinWriteDoesNotStallDelivery: caller B blocked in a stdin write nobody reads, caller A's reply must still be delivered. Fails in 2s on the previous code (and without the signalling writer it would hang, which is the bug). Test fixture's stdin buffer is now mutex-guarded since writes no longer happen under b.mu. --- internal/node/stdio_bridge.go | 16 +++- internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go b/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go index 3928cfb9..5fd7fb8c 100644 --- a/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go +++ b/internal/node/stdio_bridge.go @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ type StdioBridge struct { cmd *exec.Cmd stdin io.WriteCloser stdout io.ReadCloser + // mu guards nextID, calls and closed. It is never held across I/O. mu sync.Mutex nextID uint64 // calls maps a bridge-assigned id to the request waiting on it. @@ -49,6 +50,10 @@ type StdioBridge struct { // closed is set once the stdout reader has stopped; the backend can no // longer answer, so requests are refused instead of hanging. closed bool + // writeMu serializes stdin writes. Separate from mu: a write blocks when + // the backend is not reading, and the backend may not be reading because + // it is blocked writing stdout, which only deliver (needing mu) drains. + writeMu sync.Mutex } type pendingCall struct { @@ -178,13 +183,18 @@ func (b *StdioBridge) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } b.mu.Lock() - if b.closed { - b.mu.Unlock() + isClosed := b.closed + b.mu.Unlock() + if isClosed { http.Error(w, "Backend process is no longer running", http.StatusServiceUnavailable) return } + // If the backend closes between the check and the write, the write + // fails or lands in a dead pipe; either way the reader's shutdown has + // closed call.reply and the select below answers 503. + b.writeMu.Lock() _, err = b.stdin.Write(append(toBackend, '\n')) - b.mu.Unlock() + b.writeMu.Unlock() if err != nil { http.Error(w, "Failed to write to process stdin", http.StatusInternalServerError) return diff --git a/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go b/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go index 6a53dd12..479833d2 100644 --- a/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go +++ b/internal/node/stdio_bridge_test.go @@ -21,26 +21,48 @@ import ( "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "strings" + "sync" "testing" "time" ) // newPipeBridge returns a StdioBridge wired to two in-memory pipes so tests // can drive stdin/stdout without a real subprocess. -func newPipeBridge() (*StdioBridge, *io.PipeWriter, *bytes.Buffer) { +func newPipeBridge() (*StdioBridge, *io.PipeWriter, *syncBuffer) { stdoutReader, stdoutWriter := io.Pipe() - stdinBuf := &bytes.Buffer{} + stdinBuf := &syncBuffer{} b := &StdioBridge{ - stdin: nopWriteCloser{stdinBuf}, + stdin: stdinBuf, stdout: stdoutReader, } b.Start() return b, stdoutWriter, stdinBuf } -type nopWriteCloser struct{ io.Writer } +// syncBuffer is the fake backend's stdin: written by request goroutines, +// read by the test. +type syncBuffer struct { + mu sync.Mutex + buf bytes.Buffer +} + +func (s *syncBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.buf.Write(p) +} + +func (s *syncBuffer) Close() error { return nil } -func (nopWriteCloser) Close() error { return nil } +func (s *syncBuffer) lines() []string { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + text := strings.TrimSpace(s.buf.String()) + if text == "" { + return nil + } + return strings.Split(text, "\n") +} // waitFor polls cond until it holds; fails the test after 2s. func waitFor(t *testing.T, what string, cond func() bool) { @@ -69,11 +91,13 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_GETIsRefused(t *testing.T) { // bridgeIDOf returns the id the bridge assigned to the most recent request it // wrote to the backend's stdin, so a test can answer as the backend would. -func bridgeIDOf(t *testing.T, stdinBuf *bytes.Buffer) string { +// bridgeIDOf returns the bridge-assigned id of the line-th request (1-based) +// the backend received, waiting for it to arrive. +func bridgeIDOf(t *testing.T, stdinBuf *syncBuffer, line int) string { t.Helper() - lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(stdinBuf.String()), "\n") + waitFor(t, "request to reach the backend", func() bool { return len(stdinBuf.lines()) >= line }) var msg map[string]json.RawMessage - if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(lines[len(lines)-1]), &msg); err != nil { + if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(stdinBuf.lines()[line-1]), &msg); err != nil { t.Fatalf("stdin line is not JSON: %v", err) } return string(msg["id"]) @@ -91,8 +115,8 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_POSTNotificationReturnsAccepted(t *testing.T) { if rec.Code != http.StatusAccepted { t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusAccepted) } - if got := stdinBuf.String(); got != body+"\n" { - t.Fatalf("stdin got %q, want %q", got, body+"\n") + if got := stdinBuf.lines(); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != body { + t.Fatalf("stdin got %q, want [%q]", got, body) } } @@ -116,7 +140,7 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_POSTCallWaitsForMatchingReply(t *testing.T) { return len(b.calls) > 0 }) // The backend never sees the caller's id, only the bridge's. - bridgeID := bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf) + bridgeID := bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf, 1) if bridgeID == `"caller-7"` { t.Fatal("caller id reached the backend unrewritten") } @@ -140,6 +164,77 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_POSTCallWaitsForMatchingReply(t *testing.T) { } } +// A subprocess reads stdin and writes stdout on one thread. When it is +// blocked writing a large reply, it is not reading, so a caller's write to +// stdin blocks once the pipe is full. If that writer held the state lock, +// deliver could not drain stdout, the backend could never finish writing, +// and the two would wait on each other forever: a blocked stdin write must +// not stop other callers' replies from being delivered. +func TestStdioBridge_BlockedStdinWriteDoesNotStallDelivery(t *testing.T) { + stdoutReader, stdoutWriter := io.Pipe() + // A backend that is not reading stdin: the write blocks until someone + // reads the other end, which nobody does until the end of the test. + stdinReader, stdinWriter := io.Pipe() + // entered fires as a write to stdin begins; the test must not touch b.mu + // to learn that, or it would itself hang on the bug it is looking for. + entered := make(chan struct{}, 8) + b := &StdioBridge{stdin: signalingWriter{w: stdinWriter, entered: entered}, stdout: stdoutReader} + b.Start() + defer func() { _ = stdoutWriter.Close(); _ = stdinReader.Close() }() + + // Caller A: its request is written and it waits for a reply. Its stdin + // write completes because we read exactly that line. + recA := httptest.NewRecorder() + doneA := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + b.ServeHTTP(recA, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"a","method":"ping"}`))) + close(doneA) + }() + <-entered + lineA := make([]byte, 256) + nA, err := stdinReader.Read(lineA) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + var msgA map[string]json.RawMessage + if err := json.Unmarshal(lineA[:nA], &msgA); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("stdin line is not JSON: %v", err) + } + bridgeIDA := string(msgA["id"]) + + // Caller B: registered, then blocked in the stdin write because the + // backend has stopped reading. + recB := httptest.NewRecorder() + go b.ServeHTTP(recB, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"b","method":"ping"}`))) + <-entered + + // The backend now answers A. With the state lock held by B's blocked + // write, this delivery would never happen. + if _, err := stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":` + bridgeIDA + `,"result":{}}` + "\n")); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + select { + case <-doneA: + case <-time.After(2 * time.Second): + t.Fatal("caller A's reply was not delivered while another caller was blocked writing to stdin") + } + if recA.Code != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("caller A status = %d, want 200", recA.Code) + } +} + +type signalingWriter struct { + w io.WriteCloser + entered chan struct{} +} + +func (s signalingWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + s.entered <- struct{}{} + return s.w.Write(p) +} + +func (s signalingWriter) Close() error { return s.w.Close() } + // M18: with one backend process behind every authorized caller, two callers // using the same JSON-RPC id used to collide in the bridge's routing table, // and one caller's reply was handed to the other. Each reply goes to the @@ -167,14 +262,14 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_SameIDFromTwoCallersDoesNotCrossWires(t *testing. defer b.mu.Unlock() return len(b.calls) == 1 }) - idA := bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf) + idA := bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf, 1) bb := start("secret-for-b") waitFor(t, "second call registered", func() bool { b.mu.Lock() defer b.mu.Unlock() return len(b.calls) == 2 }) - idB := bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf) + idB := bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf, 2) if idA == idB { t.Fatalf("both callers got bridge id %s", idA) } @@ -223,7 +318,7 @@ func TestStdioBridge_ServeHTTP_LargeReplyIsDelivered(t *testing.T) { }) payload := strings.Repeat("x", 100<<10) - _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":` + bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf) + `,"result":"` + payload + `"}` + "\n")) + _, _ = stdoutWriter.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":` + bridgeIDOf(t, stdinBuf, 1) + `,"result":"` + payload + `"}` + "\n")) select { case <-done: From 1613c95434b746f6afeec303abb2f313a5e5af84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 11:49:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 12/14] development: kind dev node opts into plaintext to the LoadBalancer IP run-local-node.sh derives the control-plane URL at runtime from the Gateway's LoadBalancer address, so the sweep that added --insecure-control-plane to every hardcoded in-cluster http:// launch site missed it, and the kind-mesh e2e job failed at "plaintext http:// control plane URL to a non-loopback host". This is the flag's intended case: the docker bridge on the developer's machine is the trust boundary, and the script already fetched the admin token over the same hop. TLS was considered and left for its own change: the chart's Gateway listener is HTTP-only, the control plane has no TLS serving mode, and sam-node has no CA-pinning flag for a self-signed dev certificate. --- development/kind/run-local-node.sh | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/development/kind/run-local-node.sh b/development/kind/run-local-node.sh index 1e6606e4..b94189f7 100755 --- a/development/kind/run-local-node.sh +++ b/development/kind/run-local-node.sh @@ -49,8 +49,11 @@ cleanup() { [[ -n "${NODE_PID:-}" ]] && kill "${NODE_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true; trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM export SAM_API_TOKEN=devtoken +# Plaintext to the kind LoadBalancer IP: the docker bridge on this machine is +# the trust boundary here, and the admin token above travelled the same hop. ./bin/sam-node run \ --control-plane "${CONTROL_PLANE_URL}" \ + --insecure-control-plane \ --bootstrap-token "${BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN}" \ --listen /ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/0 \ --bind-addr 127.0.0.1:9099 \ From d6619e19229954bab223381b123150ece85008e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 12:34:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 13/14] node: label gate reaches relayed and unresolved peers Verifying the callee's biscuit on every egress call (H3-a) made the label gate the first thing that dials a peer, ahead of the egress proxy that used to do the address resolution and relay reservation for it. The gate dialled with a plain context, so libp2p demanded a direct connection and peers behind a relay or not yet in the peerstore failed with "no addresses" -> egress 403. The relay and sam-one flows carry no labels or floor, so the gate had never been exercised on them before. Run preparePeerAddrs first and open the auth stream with WithAllowLimitedConn, mirroring what the guarded call does. Unit test pins the limited-connection opt-in. --- internal/node/labels_gate.go | 14 +++++++++++++- internal/node/labels_gate_test.go | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/internal/node/labels_gate.go b/internal/node/labels_gate.go index 80015913..8fb449a9 100644 --- a/internal/node/labels_gate.go +++ b/internal/node/labels_gate.go @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import ( "github.com/google/sam/api" "github.com/google/sam/internal/identity" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" "github.com/libp2p/go-msgio" "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" @@ -240,6 +241,13 @@ type peerBiscuitObservation struct { ConnectionPeer peer.ID } +// labelGateDialContext allows the auth stream to open over a relayed +// (limited) connection. Without it libp2p insists on a direct dial, which +// peers behind a relay have no addresses for. +func labelGateDialContext(ctx context.Context) context.Context { + return network.WithAllowLimitedConn(ctx, "label-gate") +} + // fetchPeerBiscuitEvidence is the uncached form used by the local evidence API. // It preserves the PeerID authenticated by the libp2p stream separately from // the requested target so callers can fail closed on any binding mismatch. @@ -249,7 +257,11 @@ func (n *SamNode) fetchPeerBiscuitEvidence(ctx context.Context, peerID peer.ID) return peerBiscuitObservation{}, fmt.Errorf("missing node identity") } - dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, labelGateDialTimeout) + // Reach the peer the way the call this gate guards would: the egress + // proxy resolves addresses lazily and rides relayed connections, so the + // check runs before either has happened and must do both itself. + n.preparePeerAddrs(ctx, peerID) + dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(labelGateDialContext(ctx), labelGateDialTimeout) defer cancel() s, err := n.Host.NewStream(dialCtx, peerID, api.AuthProtocolID) if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/node/labels_gate_test.go b/internal/node/labels_gate_test.go index ebf20f83..e462b34b 100644 --- a/internal/node/labels_gate_test.go +++ b/internal/node/labels_gate_test.go @@ -23,9 +23,22 @@ import ( "github.com/google/sam/api" "github.com/google/sam/internal/identity" lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network" "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" ) +// The gate guards calls that ride relayed connections (egress proxy, MCP +// sessions). If its own auth stream could not, every relay-only peer would be +// refused as "no addresses" before the call it was checking ever ran. +func TestLabelGateDialsOverLimitedConnections(t *testing.T) { + if allowed, _ := network.GetAllowLimitedConn(context.Background()); allowed { + t.Fatal("a plain context must not allow limited connections; the test would prove nothing") + } + if allowed, _ := network.GetAllowLimitedConn(labelGateDialContext(context.Background())); !allowed { + t.Fatal("the label gate's dial context must allow a relayed (limited) connection") + } +} + func TestCheckPeerLabels(t *testing.T) { cpPub, cpPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) if err != nil { From 77379f3da28974cf3ab0bcc6f9cbf0aeba518a3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio Ojea Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 12:34:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 14/14] e2e: follow the hardened join and stdio contracts auth_flows: the two `sam-node join` invocations take the control plane URL positionally and were missed when the other http:// call sites opted into --insecure-control-plane; join now refuses plaintext to a non-loopback host by default. datapath: the stdio assertions encoded the old broadcast behaviour (POST reply delivered on a shared SSE stream to whoever was listening). The bridge now correlates replies to the requesting POST, so the test issues two concurrent POSTs with the same id and checks each caller gets its own reply, and asserts GET returns 405 as the MCP Streamable HTTP transport permits for servers that do not offer a server-push stream. --- tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats | 4 +- tests/e2e/datapath.bats | 87 ++++++++++++++++----------------------- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats b/tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats index 730f4436..145c37dd 100644 --- a/tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats +++ b/tests/e2e/auth_flows.bats @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ teardown() { -v "${data_vol}:/data" \ -v "${labels_config}:/etc/sam/node-config.yaml:ro" \ "sam-node:local" \ - join --config /etc/sam/node-config.yaml --data-dir /data "http://sam-control-plane:8080" + join --config /etc/sam/node-config.yaml --data-dir /data --insecure-control-plane "http://sam-control-plane:8080" MESH_CONTAINERS+=("${node_name}-join") run mesh_wait_for_log "${node_name}-join" "OAuth Device Authorization Flow" 20 @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ sys.exit(0 if b'\x05label' in raw and b'\x06region' in raw and b'\x02eu' in raw $(mesh_get_add_hosts) \ -v "${data_vol}:/data" \ "sam-node:local" \ - join --data-dir /data --bootstrap-token "${node_token}" "http://sam-control-plane:8080" + join --data-dir /data --bootstrap-token "${node_token}" --insecure-control-plane "http://sam-control-plane:8080" # 3. Start the node container with stored identity docker run -d \ diff --git a/tests/e2e/datapath.bats b/tests/e2e/datapath.bats index c692d140..37312e9f 100644 --- a/tests/e2e/datapath.bats +++ b/tests/e2e/datapath.bats @@ -128,66 +128,49 @@ with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as response: # 4. Test Stdio Datapath: Node 1 calls Node 2's Stdio service echo "[$(date +%T)] Testing Stdio Datapath from Node 1 to Node 2" - - # Start SSE client in background on Node 1 targeting Node 2's service - docker run -d \ - --name sse-client \ - --network "${MESH_NETWORK}" \ - python:3.12 python3 -c " -import urllib.request + + # One backend process serves every caller, so the bridge owns the JSON-RPC + # id space: a reply comes back on the POST that asked for it, carrying the + # caller's own id, and never on a shared stream. There is no GET/SSE side — + # the old broadcast handed every caller's tool output to every other + # reader — so a GET is refused, which MCP Streamable HTTP permits (405). + run docker run --rm --network "${MESH_NETWORK}" python:3.12 python3 -c " +import urllib.request, urllib.error req = urllib.request.Request( \"http://${node1_name}:8080/sam/${node2_peer_id}/mcp/stdio-tool/\", headers={\"X-Sam-Authentication\": \"Bearer secret-token\"} ) try: with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as response: - print(\"SSE Client Connected\", flush=True) - for line in response: - print(line.decode(\"utf-8\").strip(), flush=True) -except Exception as e: - print(f\"Error: {e}\", flush=True) + print(f\"unexpected {response.status}\") +except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: + print(f\"GET status {e.code}\") " - MESH_CONTAINERS+=("sse-client") - - # Wait a bit for SSE stream container to start up - local i - for ((i=0; i<15; i++)); do - if docker logs sse-client 2>&1 | grep -q "SSE Client Connected"; then - break - fi - sleep 1 - done - - # Send message via POST from Node 1 to Node 2's service - test_message="{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"ping\",\"id\":1}" - run docker run --rm --network "${MESH_NETWORK}" -e MSG="${test_message}" python:3.12 python3 -c " -import urllib.request -import os -req = urllib.request.Request( - \"http://${node1_name}:8080/sam/${node2_peer_id}/mcp/stdio-tool/\", - data=os.environ['MSG'].encode('utf-8'), - headers={ + echo "GET output: $output" + [[ "$output" == *"GET status 405"* ]] + + # The backend is `cat`: it echoes the request line, so the reply is the + # request with the caller's id restored. A second caller using the same id + # in flight at the same time must get its own line back, not the first's. + local reply_a reply_b + run docker run --rm --network "${MESH_NETWORK}" python:3.12 python3 -c " +import json, urllib.request, concurrent.futures +url = \"http://${node1_name}:8080/sam/${node2_peer_id}/mcp/stdio-tool/\" +def call(method): + body = json.dumps({\"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\", \"method\": method, \"id\": 1}).encode() + req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, headers={ \"X-Sam-Authentication\": \"Bearer secret-token\", - \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\" - } -) -with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as response: - print(response.status) + \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"}) + with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as r: + return r.status, json.loads(r.read()) +with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(2) as ex: + a, b = ex.submit(call, \"ping-a\"), ex.submit(call, \"ping-b\") + (sa, ra), (sb, rb) = a.result(), b.result() +print(f\"A {sa} {json.dumps(ra, sort_keys=True)}\") +print(f\"B {sb} {json.dumps(rb, sort_keys=True)}\") " - echo "POST status: $output" + echo "POST output: $output" [[ "$status" -eq 0 ]] - [[ "$output" == *"200"* ]] - - # Check SSE client logs for the echoed message - local success=0 - for ((i=0; i<15; i++)); do - run docker logs sse-client - if [[ "$output" == *"data: ${test_message}"* ]]; then - success=1 - break - fi - sleep 1 - done - echo "SSE client logs: $output" - [[ "$success" -eq 1 ]] + [[ "$output" == *'A 200 {"id": 1, "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "ping-a"}'* ]] + [[ "$output" == *'B 200 {"id": 1, "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "ping-b"}'* ]] }