🚨 Static Analysis Report - January 4, 2026: Critical Infrastructure Failure (Day 11) #8889

2026-01-04T14:39:20Z

github-actions[bot]
bot Jan 4, 2026

🚨 Static Analysis Report - January 4, 2026

Executive Summary

Critical Status: The MCP compilation infrastructure has been non-functional for 11 consecutive days, preventing comprehensive security scanning. Based on historical data from December 24, 2025, we estimate 900-920 security findings across 146 workflows, with the dominant issue being 660-670 instances of credential persistence (artipacked rule).

Immediate Action Required: Infrastructure team intervention to resolve MCP error -32603.

🔥 Critical Infrastructure Issue

MCP Compilation Failure - Day 11

Metric	Status
Error Code	MCP -32603 (generic internal error)
Days Failed	11 (since last complete scan Dec 24)
Retry Attempts	2 retries today (10s delay)
Root Cause	Tools not available in runner environment
Impact	Zero scanning capability
Security Risk	Growing blind spot in security posture

Tools Status

zizmor (security scanner): ❌ Not installed in runner
poutine (supply chain): ❌ Not installed in runner
actionlint (linting): ❌ Requires MCP compilation

Infrastructure Reliability Trend

Date	Status	Issue
Dec 24	✅ Success	858 findings across 134 workflows
Dec 31	⚠️ Partial	MCP timeout, Docker images not ready
Jan 3	❌ Failed	MCP -32603 error
Jan 4	❌ Failed	MCP -32603 persists after retry

Trend: Infrastructure reliability has critically degraded.

📊 Projected Security Findings (Based on Dec 24 Baseline)

Overall Statistics

Metric	Dec 24 Actual	Jan 4 Projected	Change
Total Workflows	134	146	+12 (+8.9%)
Total Findings	858	900-920	+42-62
Medium Severity	602	655-665	+53-63
Warnings	65	68-72	+3-7
Info	191	195-205	+4-14

Findings by Tool

Tool	Purpose	Dec 24	Jan 4 Projected	Status
zizmor	Security scanner	610+	660-670	❌ Unavailable
poutine	Supply chain security	125	132-135	❌ Unavailable
actionlint	Workflow linting	123	130-135	❌ Unavailable
TOTAL		858	900-920

Findings by Severity

Severity	Count	Primary Issue
🔴 Critical	0	None
🟠 High	0	None
🟡 Medium	655-665	artipacked (660-670), excessive-permissions (2)
🔵 Warning	68-72	shellcheck SC2155 (~63), default_permissions (5)
⚪ Info	195-205	unverified_script_exec (~132), shellcheck SC2012 (~63)

🎯 Top Priority Issues

P0: Infrastructure Failure ⚠️ CRITICAL

Issue: MCP compilation completely broken for 11+ days
Impact: No security scanning capability - growing security blind spot
Owner: MCP/Infrastructure team
Action: Immediate escalation and investigation required

Recommendations:

Debug MCP -32603 error with infrastructure team
Consider installing zizmor/poutine directly in runner as backup
Implement health checks before compilation attempts
Add monitoring and alerting for scan failures

P1: artipacked - Credential Persistence 🔒 HIGH PRIORITY

Rule: [artipacked]((redacted) (zizmor)
Severity: Medium
Count: 660-670 projected (was 600+ on Dec 24)
Workflows Affected: ~125 workflows (~86% of repository)
Days Unresolved: 11+ days

Problem: Checkout actions may persist Git credentials in workspace, risking exposure through artifacts or compromised workflows.

Current Pattern (appears in nearly every job):

steps:
  - name: Checkout actions folder
    uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd
    with:
      sparse-checkout: .github/actions
      sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
      # Missing: persist-credentials: false

Recommended Fix:

steps:
  - name: Checkout actions folder
    uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd
    with:
      sparse-checkout: .github/actions
      sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
      persist-credentials: false  # ← Add this line

Fix Strategy: Bulk template update

Update workflow generation templates to include persist-credentials: false by default
Recompile all 146 workflows
Review exceptions (jobs that need git operations)

Fix Template: /tmp/gh-aw/cache-memory/fix-templates/artipacked-credential-persistence.md

Detailed Fix Prompt for Copilot Agent

You are fixing a security finding identified by zizmor's artipacked rule.

**Issue**: Credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
**Severity**: Medium
**Rule**: artipacked
**Reference**: (redacted)

**Current Problem**:
The workflow uses `actions/checkout` without explicitly disabling credential persistence. 
This means Git credentials are persisted in the workspace and could potentially be exposed 
through artifacts.

**Required Fix**:
Add `persist-credentials: false` to all `actions/checkout` steps that don't need to perform 
Git operations (commits, pushes).

**Steps**:
1. Identify all jobs in the workflow
2. For each job, determine if it performs Git operations:
   - If NO: Add `persist-credentials: false` to the checkout step
   - If YES: Add a comment explaining why credentials are needed

**Jobs that typically don't need credentials**:
- activation (checks conditions only)
- agent (reads files, runs analysis)
- safe-outputs (parses outputs, creates issues)

**Jobs that might need credentials**:
- Jobs that run `git commit`
- Jobs that run `git push`
- Jobs that create PRs with file changes

Please review the workflow and apply this fix to all appropriate checkout steps.

P2: excessive-permissions 🔓 HIGH PRIORITY

Rule: excessive-permissions (zizmor)
Severity: Medium
Count: 2 workflows
Workflows: ai-moderator, layout-spec-maintainer
Days Unresolved: 14+ days (confirmed Dec 31)

Problem: Jobs have overly broad permissions beyond what's needed.

Fix Template: /tmp/gh-aw/cache-memory/fix-templates/zizmor-excessive-permissions.md

P2: default_permissions_on_risky_events ⚠️ HIGH PRIORITY

Rule: default_permissions_on_risky_events (poutine)
Severity: Warning
Count: 5 workflows
Workflows: ai-moderator, archie, brave, cloclo, grumpy-reviewer
Days Unresolved: 14+ days (confirmed Dec 31)

Problem: Workflows triggered by untrusted input (issue_comment, pull_request) use default permissions instead of explicit minimal permissions.

Fix Template: /tmp/gh-aw/cache-memory/fix-templates/poutine-default_permissions_on_risky_events.md

P3: Shellcheck Warnings (SC2155, SC2012)

Tool: actionlint
Severity: Warning (SC2155), Info (SC2012)
Count: ~130 projected instances
Workflows Affected: ~65 workflows

Issues:

SC2155: Declare and assign separately to avoid masking return values (~63 instances)
SC2012: Use find instead of ls (~63 instances)

Impact: Code quality - potential to mask errors in generated scripts

📈 Historical Trend Analysis

Findings Progression

Date	Workflows	Findings	Status	Major Changes
Dec 15	37	89	Partial	Initial baseline
Dec 20	123	0	Success	Limited scope
Dec 21	123	258	Success	Full scan
Dec 24	134	858	Success	+600 artipacked rule added
Dec 31	145	~850 (est)	Partial	MCP timeout, +11 workflows
Jan 3	146	~880 (est)	Failed	MCP -32603 error
Jan 4	146	900-920 (est)	Failed	MCP -32603 persists

Key Observations:

📈 +600 findings on Dec 24 due to new artipacked rule
📈 +12 workflows since last complete scan (8.9% growth)
📉 Infrastructure reliability declining - 2 consecutive failures
⚠️ No remediation applied to artipacked for 11+ days
🚨 Security blind spot growing with each passing day

🔄 Actionable Recommendations

IMMEDIATE (P0) - This Week

🚨 Escalate MCP Infrastructure Issue
- Engage infrastructure team to debug -32603 error
- Document failure pattern and error logs
- Explore alternative tool installation methods
- Priority: CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

HIGH PRIORITY (P1) - Next 2 Weeks

🔒 Begin artipacked Mitigation (660+ instances)
- Update workflow generation templates with persist-credentials: false
- Recompile all 146 workflows
- Review and document exceptions (jobs needing git operations)
- Verify with zizmor after fixes applied
- Fix template: artipacked-credential-persistence.md
🔓 Fix excessive-permissions (2 workflows)
- Apply least privilege to ai-moderator
- Apply least privilege to layout-spec-maintainer
- Fix template: zizmor-excessive-permissions.md
⚠️ Add explicit permissions (5 workflows)
- Define minimal permissions for risky event triggers
- Workflows: ai-moderator, archie, brave, cloclo, grumpy-reviewer
- Fix template: poutine-default_permissions_on_risky_events.md

MEDIUM PRIORITY (P3) - Next Month

📝 Address shellcheck warnings (~130 instances)
- SC2155: Separate declaration and assignment
- SC2012: Replace ls with find
- Fix templates available in /tmp/gh-aw/cache-memory/fix-templates/

LONG-TERM

🔍 Establish monitoring
- Add health checks before compilation
- Implement automated alerting for scan failures
- Create backup scanning methods
- Document infrastructure dependencies

📁 Available Fix Templates

All fix templates are located in /tmp/gh-aw/cache-memory/fix-templates/:

High Priority:

✅ artipacked-credential-persistence.md (660+ instances)
✅ zizmor-excessive-permissions.md (2 workflows)
✅ poutine-default_permissions_on_risky_events.md (5 workflows)

Medium Priority:

✅ actionlint-SC2155.md - Shellcheck SC2155 warnings
✅ actionlint-sc2086-fix.md - Shellcheck SC2086 quoting
✅ poutine-unverified_script_exec.md - Unverified script execution (info level)

📝 Data Freshness and Confidence

Data Source	Date	Age	Confidence
Complete scan	Dec 24, 2025	11 days	High
Partial confirmation	Dec 31, 2025	4 days	Medium
Repository state	Jan 4, 2026	Current	High
Projections	Jan 4, 2026	Current	Medium

Methodology: Projections based on Dec 24 baseline + linear scaling for 12 new workflows + confirmation from Dec 31 partial scan.

Limitations:

No actual scan performed today due to infrastructure failure
Projections assume new workflows follow same patterns as existing ones
Cannot detect new security issues introduced in past 11 days
Cannot confirm resolution of any issues

🎯 Success Metrics

Track progress with these metrics:

Metric	Current	Target
MCP reliability	0% (failed)	95%+
Days since scan	11 days	< 2 days
artipacked findings	660+ (est)	< 50
Medium severity	655-665 (est)	< 100
Total findings	900-920 (est)	< 400

🔗 Additional Resources

zizmor documentation: (redacted)
poutine documentation: https://github.com/boostsecurityio/poutine
actionlint documentation: https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint
GitHub Actions security: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions

Report Date: January 4, 2026
Scan Status: ❌ Failed (MCP -32603 error)
Last Complete Scan: December 24, 2025 (11 days ago)
Report Confidence: Medium (based on 11-day-old baseline + projections)
Generated By: Static Analysis Report Agent (Claude)
Workflow Run: §20694356890

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🚨 Static Analysis Report - January 4, 2026: Critical Infrastructure Failure (Day 11) #8889

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github-actions[bot] bot Jan 4, 2026

🚨 Static Analysis Report - January 4, 2026

Executive Summary

🔥 Critical Infrastructure Issue

MCP Compilation Failure - Day 11

Tools Status

Infrastructure Reliability Trend

📊 Projected Security Findings (Based on Dec 24 Baseline)

Overall Statistics

Findings by Tool

Findings by Severity

🎯 Top Priority Issues

P0: Infrastructure Failure ⚠️ CRITICAL

P1: artipacked - Credential Persistence 🔒 HIGH PRIORITY

P2: excessive-permissions 🔓 HIGH PRIORITY

P2: default_permissions_on_risky_events ⚠️ HIGH PRIORITY

P3: Shellcheck Warnings (SC2155, SC2012)

📈 Historical Trend Analysis

Findings Progression

🔄 Actionable Recommendations

IMMEDIATE (P0) - This Week

HIGH PRIORITY (P1) - Next 2 Weeks

MEDIUM PRIORITY (P3) - Next Month

LONG-TERM

📁 Available Fix Templates

📝 Data Freshness and Confidence

🎯 Success Metrics

🔗 Additional Resources

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github-actions[bot]
bot Jan 4, 2026