Errors detected in agent logs - continuing workflow step (not failing for now)

Line 2263: error\\n- **Status:** ✅ Secure\\n\\n---\\n\\n## Firewall Architecture Analysis\\n\\n### Identified Components\\n\\n1. **Squid Proxy (v6.13)**\\n - All HTTP/HTTPS traffic is intercepted\\n - Returns 403 Forbidden for non-allowed domains\\n - Returns 400 Bad Request for malformed requests\\n\\n2. **Domain Allowlist**\\n - github.com ✅\\n - api.github.com ✅\\n - example.com ❌\\n - All other domains ❌\\n\\n3. **Protection Mechanisms**\\n - Transparent proxy interception\\n - Domain-based filtering\\n - Protocol validation\\n - Request normalization\\n\\n---\\n\\n## Timing Analysis\\n\\n- **Allowed domain (github.com):** ~0.188s\\n- **Blocked domain (example.com):** ~0.007s\\n\\nThe significant timing difference indicates fast proxy-level rejection for blocked domains.\\n\\n---\\n\\n## Security Posture Assessment\\n\\n### Strengths ✅\\n\\n1. **Comprehensive Coverage:** All tested bypass techniques were blocked\\n2. **Transparent Interception:** Raw sockets are still proxied\\n3. **Protocol Awareness:** Squid validates HTTP protocols\\n4. **Fast Rejection:** Blocked requests fail quickly\\n5. **Consistent Behavior:** All non-whitelisted domains treated equally\\n\\n### Observations ⚠️\\n\\n1. **File Permissions:** Some file operations had permission issues (not security-critical)\\n2. **DNS Resolution:** DNS queries appear to be proxied/controlled\\n3. **Localhost Access:** Localhost connections work as expected\\n\\n### Recommendations 💡\\n\\n1. ✅ **Current implementation is secure** - No escapes successful\\n2. Consider logging blocked attempts for security monitoring\\n3. Document the allowed domain list for users\\n4. Consider rate limiting to prevent DoS via blocked requests\\n\\n---\\n\\n## Conclusion\\n\\n**VERDICT: FIREWALL IS SECURE ✅**\\n\\nAfter exhaustive testing with 15+ different bypass techniques, including:\\n- Direct IP connections\\n- Alternative protocols and ports\\n- Raw socket programming\\n- Request smuggling\\n- DNS manipulation\\n- Protocol obfuscation\\n- Unicode tricks\\n- SNI manipulation\\n\\n**All attempts were successfully blocked by the firewall.**\\n\\nThe gh-aw-firewall container provides robust protection against unauthorized (Pattern: Unauthorized access error (requires error context), Raw log: "arguments": "{\"initial_wait\": 5, \"mode\": \"sync\", \"description\": \"Generate final security report\", \"command\"...)

Line 1964: (node:53) MaxListenersExceededWarning: Possible EventEmitter memory leak detected. 11 resize listeners added to [Socket]. MaxListeners is 10. Use emitter.setMaxListeners() to increase limit (Pattern: Copilot CLI timestamped ERROR messages, Raw log: 2025-11-25T22:25:01.618Z [ERROR] (node:53) MaxListenersExceededWarning: Possible EventEmitter memory leak detected. 11 r...)