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Automatically handle Whonix's "Anon Connection Wizard" #1096
Automatically handle Whonix's "Anon Connection Wizard" #1096
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The issue was due to a double yaml intruction, which when rendered and interpreted lead to the first `set` to be ignored. Fixes: #1096
The issue was due to a double yaml intruction, which when rendered and interpreted lead to the first `set` to be ignored. Fixes: #1096
The issue was due to a double yaml intruction, which when rendered and interpreted lead to the first `set` to be ignored. Fixes: #1096
I looked into this. The correct thing to do is adjust the (empty, whonix-provided) file A few notes:
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Ooh!
Agreed on getting more info from users first, assuming it matches our intuition I think we could default to no bridges, with some way to flag (maybe
Heh :) Or maybe a systemd unit to create the file, to make it easy to connect w/ qubesdb/qubes services. |
So the file is already created by whonix, which is why I was looking at dpkg-divert since we'd be replacing a file that we didn't put in place. But I actually think (even though it's what I didn't want to do before) the simplest thing may be to append to the file, maybe in sd whonix config postinst. And I like your idea about making it configurable. |
Description
When you provision SDW or start it for the first time, you need to manually step through Whonix's Anon Connection Wizard, it would be nice if we could do that automatically for users, with some override for users who need to use a bridge.
How will this impact SecureDrop/SecureDrop Workstation users?
Users no longer need to manually walk through the Whonix connection interface, which reduces the chances of user confusion or even mistakes.
How would this affect the SecureDrop Workstation threat model?
As long as we allow people a way to set bridges, etc., I don't think it should.
User Stories
Notes
/usr/local/etc/torrc.d/40_tor_control_panel.conf
?) it'll work. We can read the code as necessary to figure this out...The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: