This line contains only whitespace and should be removed. The conditional logic can be simplified by directly assigning result.group to userData.group without the empty line.

The indentation of this line is inconsistent with the surrounding code structure. It should be indented at the same level as the if/else block it belongs to, not nested deeper.

By removing the logic that downgraded result.group == "superadmin" to "admin", any users.group value of "superadmin" is now loaded directly into userData.group and passed to CreateExtendedPlayer, which ultimately leads to add_principal identifier.<license> group.superadmin. If an attacker can influence the users.group column (e.g., via a vulnerable admin panel, misconfigured tooling, or partial DB compromise), they can grant themselves full FiveM/ACE group.superadmin rights instead of being limited to group.admin as before. To maintain a safety boundary between regular ESX admins and server superadmins, keep superadmin values rejected or downgraded here and manage group.superadmin membership only via trusted out-of-band ACL configuration.

Removing the guard that remapped args.group == "superadmin" to "admin" means /setgroup can now assign the superadmin group, and args.playerId.setGroup(args.group) will call add_principal identifier.<license> group.superadmin under the hood. On typical FiveM/ACE setups, group.superadmin has far broader privileges than group.admin, so any ESX admin who can run /setgroup (or an attacker who compromises such an account) can escalate to full server-level superadmin. To avoid this privilege escalation, keep superadmin assignments restricted (e.g., block superadmin here or enforce that only the console or an out-of-band ACL can grant group.superadmin).