@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ Before handing off to Design:
 - [ ] If peering detected and VPC ID needed → `network.existing_vpc_id` is populated
 - [ ] If Fir apps detected → `global.fir_intent` is populated (not null)
 - [ ] `operational.containerization_status` is populated
+- [ ] `operational.log_retention_days`, when present (fresh or reused preferences alike), is an integer 1–3653; Generate maps it to the Elastic Beanstalk `RetentionInDays` domain (smallest accepted value >= the preference — `clarify-interview.md` Q13), so a value outside 1–3653 is rejected here, not rounded
 - [ ] `design_constraints.compute_target.default` is one of: `"elastic_beanstalk"`, `"ecs-fargate"`, `"eks-managed"`, `"eks-or-ecs"`
 - [ ] `design_constraints.compute_target.chosen_by` is one of: `"user"`, `"system_recommended"`, `"default"`
 - [ ] `design_constraints.compute_target.overrides[]` entries, when present, have `formation`, `value`, `reason`, and `chosen_by`
 
@@ -801,6 +801,12 @@ Validate: must be valid ISO 8601 date, must be in the future.
 
 **Default:** 3 → `log_retention_days: 30`
 
+Any value 1–3653 is stored as given. Elastic Beanstalk's `aws:elasticbeanstalk:cloudwatch:logs`
+`RetentionInDays` accepts only 1, 3, 5, 7, 14, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 365, 400, 545, 731,
+1827, 3653, so for a custom value Generate writes the smallest accepted value that is >= the
+preference (2 → 3, 45 → 60); choices 1–5 are accepted as-is. Tell the user when their custom
+value will be rounded up this way.
+
 ---
 
 #### Q14 — Alerting Preference
 
@@ -1056,6 +1056,25 @@ resource "aws_iam_role" "ecs_task" {
     Name = "${var.project_name}-${var.environment}-ecs-task"
   }
 }
+
+# ECS Exec (the `heroku run bash` equivalent) opens an SSM channel from the task.
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "ecs_task_exec" {
+  name = "${var.project_name}-${var.environment}-ecs-exec"
+  role = aws_iam_role.ecs_task.id
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Effect = "Allow"
+      Action = [
+        "ssmmessages:CreateControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:CreateDataChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenDataChannel"
+      ]
+      Resource = "*"
+    }]
+  })
+}
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -1157,6 +1176,10 @@ resource "aws_ecs_service" "<app_sanitized>_<process_type>" {
   name            = "${var.project_name}-${var.environment}-<process_type>"
   cluster         = aws_ecs_cluster.main.id
   task_definition = aws_ecs_task_definition.<app_sanitized>_<process_type>.arn
+  # ECS Exec is the `heroku run bash` equivalent (MIGRATION_GUIDE.md § Day-to-day commands).
+  # It needs the ssmmessages permissions that aws_iam_role_policy.ecs_task_exec grants
+  # the task role in security.tf (Step 5).
+  enable_execute_command = true
   # 0 while var.writers_quiesced is true, so a later apply (DNS rollback, a repair)
   # cannot restart tasks that Phase 6 scaled to zero. Set the variable back to false
   # only at the next intentional handoff.
@@ -1422,6 +1445,27 @@ resource "aws_elastic_beanstalk_environment" "<app_name>_<process_type>" {
     value     = var.eb_deployment_policy
   }
 
+  # Stream instance logs to CloudWatch Logs so `aws logs tail` works (the
+  # `heroku logs --tail` equivalent in MIGRATION_GUIDE.md § Day-to-day commands).
+  # The Docker application log lands in
+  # /aws/elasticbeanstalk/<environment>/var/log/eb-docker/containers/eb-current-app/stdouterr.log
+  setting {
+    namespace = "aws:elasticbeanstalk:cloudwatch:logs"
+    name      = "StreamLogs"
+    value     = "true"
+  }
+
+  # RetentionInDays accepts only 1, 3, 5, 7, 14, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 365, 400,
+  # 545, 731, 1827, 3653. Clarify Q13 allows any integer 1–3653 (including a reused
+  # preferences.json), so the generator emits the smallest accepted value that is
+  # >= operational.log_retention_days (2 → 3, 45 → 60, 30 → 30; default 30). Never copy
+  # the raw preference: an unlisted value fails environment creation/update.
+  setting {
+    namespace = "aws:elasticbeanstalk:cloudwatch:logs"
+    name      = "RetentionInDays"
+    value     = "<smallest EB-accepted RetentionInDays >= preferences.json.operational.log_retention_days || 30>"
+  }
+
   # {{IF process_type == "web"}}
   setting {
     namespace = "aws:elasticbeanstalk:application:environment"
@@ -1467,6 +1511,34 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "eb_web_tier_<app_name>" {
   policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AWSElasticBeanstalkWebTier"
 }
 
+# Session Manager access for `aws ssm start-session` (the `heroku run bash` equivalent in
+# MIGRATION_GUIDE.md § Day-to-day commands). The environment has no EC2 key pair and no
+# :22 ingress, so `eb ssh` cannot reach an instance; AWSElasticBeanstalkWebTier grants no
+# ssm:*/ssmmessages:* either. The SSM agent is preinstalled on the AL2023 Docker platform.
+# Do NOT attach the AmazonSSMManagedInstanceCore managed policy here: it also allows
+# ssm:GetParameter(s) on Resource "*", which would widen the parameter-read boundary that
+# eb_read_secrets_<app_name> keeps under parameter/<project>/*. This inline policy carries
+# only the actions the agent needs to register and open a session channel.
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "eb_ssm_<app_name>" {
+  name = "${var.project_name}-eb-session-manager"
+  role = aws_iam_role.eb_instance_<app_name>.id
+
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Effect = "Allow"
+      Action = [
+        "ssm:UpdateInstanceInformation",
+        "ssmmessages:CreateControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:CreateDataChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenDataChannel"
+      ]
+      Resource = "*"
+    }]
+  })
+}
+
 resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "eb_read_secrets_<app_name>" {
   name = "${var.project_name}-eb-read-secrets"
   role = aws_iam_role.eb_instance_<app_name>.id
 
@@ -223,9 +223,12 @@ for the caller, so a false positive would block a real migration).
 `aws_iam_user_policy`):
 
 - **`no_wildcard_iam`** — an `Allow` statement must not use `Action`/`Resource` `"*"`.
-  The one narrow exception is an isolated
-  `elasticbeanstalk:CreateStorageLocation` statement with `Resource = "*"` because
-  AWS does not support resource-level permissions for that action.
+  Two narrow exceptions, for actions AWS defines no resource-level permissions for:
+  an isolated `elasticbeanstalk:CreateStorageLocation` statement, and an ECS Exec
+  statement listing only the four `ssmmessages` channel actions
+  (`CreateControlChannel`, `CreateDataChannel`, `OpenControlChannel`, `OpenDataChannel`)
+  as string literals. Any other action, or any non-literal member (`local.x`, `var.y`),
+  in the same statement disqualifies it.
   `aws_iam_policy_document` data sources and assume-role trust policies fail open.
 
 > The checker is a zero-dependency static HCL reader (no `terraform init`, no provider
 
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# Compliant fixture — the ECS Exec task-role grant heroku-to-aws emits in security.tf
+# (the `heroku run bash` equivalent). MUST pass (POLICY_OK): AWS defines no resource-level
+# permissions for the four ssmmessages channel actions, so Resource "*" is the only
+# possible shape and no_wildcard_iam exempts a statement that lists ONLY those actions.
+resource "aws_iam_role" "ecs_task" {
+  name = "${var.project_name}-${var.environment}-ecs-task"
+
+  assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Action = "sts:AssumeRole"
+      Effect = "Allow"
+      Principal = {
+        Service = "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com"
+      }
+    }]
+  })
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "ecs_task_exec" {
+  name = "${var.project_name}-${var.environment}-ecs-exec"
+  role = aws_iam_role.ecs_task.id
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Effect = "Allow"
+      Action = [
+        "ssmmessages:CreateControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:CreateDataChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenDataChannel"
+      ]
+      Resource = "*"
+    }]
+  })
+}
+
+# A scoped statement next to it must not be disturbed by the exemption.
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "ecs_task_queue" {
+  name = "${var.project_name}-${var.environment}-ecs-queue"
+  role = aws_iam_role.ecs_task.id
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Effect   = "Allow"
+      Action   = ["sqs:SendMessage", "sqs:ReceiveMessage"]
+      Resource = "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:123456789012:${var.project_name}-jobs"
+    }]
+  })
+}
@@ -188,10 +188,18 @@ either string form (`"*"`) or single-element list form (`["*"]`). Scope to speci
 and resource ARNs. A list that also contains scoped entries (e.g. `["s3:GetObject", ...]`) is
 not a blanket wildcard and is allowed.
 
-The narrow exception is an isolated `elasticbeanstalk:CreateStorageLocation`
-statement with `Resource = "*"`. AWS does not define resource-level permissions
-for that action; combining it with any other action does not qualify for the
-exception.
+Two narrow exceptions exist, both for actions that AWS defines no resource-level
+permissions for, so `Resource = "*"` is the only way to write them:
+
+- an isolated `elasticbeanstalk:CreateStorageLocation` statement;
+- an ECS Exec statement whose `Action` list contains only the four `ssmmessages` channel
+  actions (`CreateControlChannel`, `CreateDataChannel`, `OpenControlChannel`,
+  `OpenDataChannel`) — the task-role grant behind `aws ecs execute-command`.
+
+The exception is statement-shaped and literal-only: combining either with any other action
+(for example `ssmmessages:*`, `ssm:*`, or `s3:*` in the same list) does not qualify, and
+neither does a list with a non-literal member (`local.extra_action`, `var.x`, a function
+call) — the checker cannot see what it resolves to, so that statement is flagged.
 
 **Gate mapping:** `no_wildcard_iam`. The gate scans literal policy JSON (heredoc or
 `jsonencode({...})`) in the resources above. `aws_iam_policy_document` **data sources** fail
 
@@ -138,6 +138,129 @@ def test_required_wildcard_action_cannot_hide_other_actions() -> None:
     assert "no_wildcard_iam" in out
 
 
+def _heroku_ecs_exec_policy_block() -> str:
+    """The ECS Exec task-role statement exactly as generate-terraform.md emits it."""
+    fragment = (
+        PLUGIN_SKILL_ROOT.parent
+        / "heroku-to-aws"
+        / "references"
+        / "phases"
+        / "generate"
+        / "generate-terraform.md"
+    ).read_text()
+    start = fragment.index('resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "ecs_task_exec"')
+    end = fragment.index("\n}\n", start) + 3
+    return fragment[start:end]
+
+
+def test_heroku_ecs_exec_emitted_statement_passes() -> None:
+    # AWS defines no resource-level permissions for ssmmessages:*; the emitted
+    # statement lists only the four channel actions, so it is a required grant.
+    block = _heroku_ecs_exec_policy_block()
+    for action in (
+        "ssmmessages:CreateControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:CreateDataChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenDataChannel",
+    ):
+        assert action in block
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+        terraform_dir = Path(tmp)
+        (terraform_dir / "ecs-exec.tf").write_text(block)
+        code, out = run_policy_validator(terraform_dir)
+    assert code == 0, out
+    assert "POLICY_OK" in out
+
+
+def test_ssmmessages_exception_cannot_hide_other_actions() -> None:
+    # The exception is statement-shaped: adding any non-channel action (here the
+    # service wildcard and an unrelated service) to the list must still fail.
+    for extra in ('"ssmmessages:*"', '"ssm:StartSession"', '"s3:*"'):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            terraform_dir = Path(tmp)
+            (terraform_dir / "policy.tf").write_text(
+                f'''
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "mixed" {{
+  role = "example-role"
+  policy = jsonencode({{
+    Statement = [{{
+      Effect   = "Allow"
+      Action   = [
+        "ssmmessages:CreateControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:CreateDataChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenControlChannel",
+        "ssmmessages:OpenDataChannel",
+        {extra}
+      ]
+      Resource = "*"
+    }}]
+  }})
+}}
+'''
+            )
+            code, out = run_policy_validator(terraform_dir)
+        assert code == 1, (extra, out)
+        assert "no_wildcard_iam" in out, (extra, out)
+
+
+def test_ssmmessages_exception_requires_every_member_to_be_a_literal() -> None:
+    # A non-literal list member (local/var/function) may resolve to anything —
+    # here `local.extra_action = "s3:*"` — so the statement must keep failing
+    # no_wildcard_iam even though every quoted literal in the list is allowlisted.
+    for extra in ("local.extra_action", "var.extra_action", 'format("%s", "s3:*")'):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            terraform_dir = Path(tmp)
+            (terraform_dir / "policy.tf").write_text(
+                f'''
+locals {{ extra_action = "s3:*" }}
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "mixed_expression" {{
+  role = "example-role"
+  policy = jsonencode({{
+    Statement = [{{
+      Effect   = "Allow"
+      Action   = ["ssmmessages:CreateControlChannel", {extra}]
+      Resource = "*"
+    }}]
+  }})
+}}
+'''
+            )
+            code, out = run_policy_validator(terraform_dir)
+        assert code == 1, (extra, out)
+        assert "no_wildcard_iam" in out, (extra, out)
+
+
+def test_unrelated_wildcard_list_still_fails_alongside_ecs_exec() -> None:
+    # A second, over-broad statement in the same policy is still flagged even
+    # when the approved ECS Exec statement sits next to it.
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+        terraform_dir = Path(tmp)
+        (terraform_dir / "policy.tf").write_text(
+            '''
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "two_statements" {
+  role = "example-role"
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        Effect   = "Allow"
+        Action   = ["ssmmessages:CreateControlChannel", "ssmmessages:OpenControlChannel"]
+        Resource = "*"
+      },
+      {
+        Effect   = "Allow"
+        Action   = ["sqs:SendMessage"]
+        Resource = "*"
+      }
+    ]
+  })
+}
+'''
+        )
+        code, out = run_policy_validator(terraform_dir)
+    assert code == 1, out
+    assert "no_wildcard_iam" in out
+
+
 def test_heroku_policy_check_runs_after_eks_fragment() -> None:
     phase_dir = (
         PLUGIN_SKILL_ROOT.parent
@@ -833,7 +956,7 @@ def test_every_fixture_matches_its_good_bad_prefix() -> None:
     # Exact, not `>=`: a floor cannot detect fixtures being deleted down to it,
     # which is the removal this assertion exists to catch. Update deliberately
     # when adding or removing a fixture.
-    assert len(fixture_dirs) == 31, f"fixture count changed: {[d.name for d in fixture_dirs]}"
+    assert len(fixture_dirs) == 32, f"fixture count changed: {[d.name for d in fixture_dirs]}"
     for fixture in fixture_dirs:
         code, out = run_policy_validator(fixture)
         if fixture.name.startswith("bad-"):