From dc37457586bb0b7ae33560a2101577ad1bf5f19d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Grasser Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 19:49:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] update to openssl 1.0.2r Changes between 1.0.2q and 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019] *) 0-byte record padding oracle If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data. In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway). This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018. (CVE-2019-1559) [Matt Caswell] *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(). [Richard Levitte] --- build_3rdparty.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/build_3rdparty.py b/build_3rdparty.py index 5d24d19..da0e096 100755 --- a/build_3rdparty.py +++ b/build_3rdparty.py @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ DEPENDENT_LIBS = { 'openssl': { 'order' : 1, - 'url' : 'https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.0.2q.tar.gz', - 'sha1' : '692f5f2f1b114f8adaadaa3e7be8cce1907f38c5', + 'url' : 'https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.0.2r.tar.gz', + 'sha1' : 'b9aec1fa5cedcfa433aed37c8fe06b0ab0ce748d', 'target': { 'mingw-w64': { 'result': ['include/openssl/ssl.h', 'lib/libssl.a', 'lib/libcrypto.a'],