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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: lectures/cagan_ree.md
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plt.show()
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```
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It is instructive to compare the preceding graphs with graphs of log price levels and inflation rates for data from four big inflations described in
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{doc}`this lecture <inflation_history>`.
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In particular, in the above graphs, notice how a gradual fall in inflation precedes the "sudden stop" when it has been anticipated long beforehand, but how
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inflation instead falls abruptly when the permanent drop in money supply growth is unanticipated.
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It seems to the author team at quantecon that the drops in inflation near the ends of the four hyperinflations described in {doc}`this lecture <inflation_history>`
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more closely resemble outcomes from the experiment 2 "unforeseen stabilization".
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(It is fair to say that the preceding informal pattern recognition exercise should be supplemented with a more formal structural statistical analysis.)
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: lectures/inflation_history.md
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Things were different in the 20th century, as we shall see in this lecture.
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This lecture will set the stage for some subsequent lecture about a particular theory that economists use to
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This lecture will set the stage for some subsequent lectures about a particular theory that economists use to
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think about determinants of the price level.
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By staring at the graph carefully, you might be able to guess when these temporary lapses occurred, because they were also times during which price levels rose markedly from what had been average values during more typical years.
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* 1791-1797 in France (the French revolution)
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* 1791-1797 in France (the French Revolution)
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* 1776-1793 in the US (the US War for Independence from Great Britain)
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* 1861-1865 in the US (the US Civil War)
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* While using valuable gold and silver as coins was a time-tested way to anchor the price level by limiting the supply of money, it cost real resources.
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* that is, society paid a high "opportunity cost" for using gold and silver as coins; gold and silver could instead be used as valuable jewelry and also as an industrial input
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* that is, society paid a high "opportunity cost" for using gold and silver as coins; gold and silver could instead be used as valuable jewelry and also as an industrial input.
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Keynes and Fisher proposed what they suggested would be a socially more efficient way to achieve a price level that would be at least as firmly anchored, and would also exhibit less year-to-year short-term fluctuations.
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But notice that in doing so, it also eliminates an automatic supply mechanism constraining the price level.
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A low-inflation paper fiat money system replaces that automatic mechanism with an enlightened government that commits itself to limit the quantity of a pure token, no-cost currency.
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A low-inflation paper fiat money system replaces that automatic mechanism with an enlightened government that commits itself to limiting the quantity of a pure token, no-cost currency.
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Now let's see what happened to the price level in our four countries when after 1914 one after another of them
Staring at the above graphs conveys the following impressions to the authors of this lecture at quantecon.
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* an episode of "hyperinflation" with rapidly rising log price level and very high monthly inflation rates
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* a sudden stop of the hyperinflation as indicated by the abrupt flattening of the log price level and a marked permanent drop in the three-month average of inflation
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* a US dollar exchange rate that shadows the price level.
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We'll see similar patterns in the next three episodes that we'll study now.
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### Hungary
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The source of our data for Hungary is:
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A striking thing about our four graphs is how **quickly** the (log) price levels in Austria, Hungary, Poland,
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and Germany leveled off after having been rising so quickly.
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These "sudden stops" are also revealed by the permanent drops in three-month moving averages of inflation for the four countries.
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In addition, the US dollar exchange rates for each of the four countries shadowed their price levels.
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* This pattern is an instance of a force modeled in the **purchasing power parity** theory of exchange rates.
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Each of these big inflations seemed to have "stopped on a dime".
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Chapter 3 of {cite}`sargent2002big` attempts to offer an explanation for this remarkable pattern.
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After World War I, the United States was on the gold standard. The US government stood ready to convert a dollar into a specified amount of gold on demand. To understate things, immediately after the war, Hungary, Austria, Poland, and Germany were not on the gold standard.
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In practice, their currencies were largely “fiat,” or unbacked. The governments of these countries resorted to the printing of new unbacked money to finance government deficits. (The notes were "backed" mainly by treasury bills that, in those times, could not be expected to be paid off by levying taxes, but only by printing more notes or treasury bills.) This was done on such a scale that it led to a depreciation of the currencies of spectacular proportions. In the end, the German mark stabilized at 1 trillion ($10^{12}$) paper marks to the prewar gold mark, the Polish mark at 1.8 million paper marks to the gold zloty, the Austrian crown at 14,400 paper crowns to the prewar Austro-Hungarian crown, and the Hungarian krone at 14,500 paper crowns to the prewar Austro-Hungarian crown.
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In practice, their currencies were largely “fiat” or "unbacked", meaning that they were not backed by credible government promises to convert them into gold or silver coins on demand. The governments of these countries resorted to the printing of new unbacked money to finance government deficits. (The notes were "backed" mainly by treasury bills that, in those times, could not be expected to be paid off by levying taxes, but only by printing more notes or treasury bills.) This was done on such a scale that it led to a depreciation of the currencies of spectacular proportions. In the end, the German mark stabilized at 1 trillion ($10^{12}$) paper marks to the prewar gold mark, the Polish mark at 1.8 million paper marks to the gold zloty, the Austrian crown at 14,400 paper crowns to the prewar Austro-Hungarian crown, and the Hungarian krone at 14,500 paper crowns to the prewar Austro-Hungarian crown.
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Chapter 3 of {cite}`sargent2002big` focuses on the deliberate changes in policy that Hungary, Austria, Poland, and Germany made to end their hyperinflations.
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The hyperinflations were each ended by restoring or virtually restoring convertibility to the dollar or equivalently to gold.
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The story told in {cite}`sargent2002big` is grounded in a "fiscal theory of the price level" described in {doc}`this lecture <cagan_ree>` and further discussed in
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{doc}`this lecture <cagan_adaptive>`.
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Those lectures discuss theories about what holders of those rapidly depreciating currencies were thinking about them and how that shaped responses of inflation to government policies.
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