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Prior to the standardization of ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, stateful-hash-based signature algorithms were developed, and then described in NIST Special Publication 800-208. The algorithms are:
LMS and its multi-level variant HSS/LMS. These are described in RFC 8554
XMSS and its multi-level variant XMSSMT. These are described in RFC 8391
These schemes are not vulnerable to quantum computing, and are based on the well-established security of cryptographic hash algorithms. They also have relatively small public keys and signatures (for PQC signature schemes), and relatively simple implementation requirements. However, they are based on one-time-signatures (OTS), and the security critically depends on never reusing any of the set of OTS private keys. This requirement is met by having a stateful private key, that records which OTS private keys have been used.
The implication of a stateful private key, is that deploying systems which use them have substantial system challenges related to throughput, resilience and redundancy. The security and footprint attributes of these schemes (compared to other PQC signatures) make them attractive for some specific use cases at this point in time. For example, authentication of initial stages of constrained system firmware, where the authenticating component and authentication public key are immutable.
The use case of firmware verification can be supported without needing an implementation to deal with the challenge of handling a stateful private key: the Crypto API could define suitable public-key types and signature algorithms, that can only be used with signature verification functions.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
The IETF LAMPS draft standards relating to these algorithms' use in X.509 and CMS, only define algorithm identifiers for HSS/LMS, XMSS, and XMSS^MT. There is no definitions for stand-alone LMS, but single-level HSS/LMS is a trivial wrapping of LMS.
Prior to the standardization of ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, stateful-hash-based signature algorithms were developed, and then described in NIST Special Publication 800-208. The algorithms are:
These schemes are not vulnerable to quantum computing, and are based on the well-established security of cryptographic hash algorithms. They also have relatively small public keys and signatures (for PQC signature schemes), and relatively simple implementation requirements. However, they are based on one-time-signatures (OTS), and the security critically depends on never reusing any of the set of OTS private keys. This requirement is met by having a stateful private key, that records which OTS private keys have been used.
The implication of a stateful private key, is that deploying systems which use them have substantial system challenges related to throughput, resilience and redundancy. The security and footprint attributes of these schemes (compared to other PQC signatures) make them attractive for some specific use cases at this point in time. For example, authentication of initial stages of constrained system firmware, where the authenticating component and authentication public key are immutable.
The use case of firmware verification can be supported without needing an implementation to deal with the challenge of handling a stateful private key: the Crypto API could define suitable public-key types and signature algorithms, that can only be used with signature verification functions.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: